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5Abstract
This study addresses the role of the possible or virtual in Shakespearean drama. 
It argues that the possible component constitutes an integral part of 
Shakespearean drama, and that they are as important as the actual events or 
component. To underscore its paramount importance, the study stresses two 
aspects of the possible in Shakespearean drama: its potentiality and its 
cognitive function.  Potentiality highlights the power of the virtual in opening up 
different meanings and interpretations, suggesting alternative possibilities and 
creating new storylines out of the original ones. The cognitive function of the 
virtual or possible underlines its role in rendering the actual events and 
happenings more intelligible, probable and comprehensible. The study builds on
the theoretical framework of possible worlds theory as well as Classical and
Renaissance rhetoric; it argues that Shakespeare’s familiarity with and 
employment of these notions can be attributed to his rhetorical training, which 
formed an essential part of Elizabethan education. 
The study deals with the drama both as a fictional story and as theatre. On 
the level of theatre, it demonstrates that, despite its materiality, theatre must 
stimulate an imaginary virtual reality if the physical events and happenings 
onstage are to be fully meaningful. On the level of the fictional story, it shows 
that virtual or possible events form the beliefs and intentions of characters. They 
help to set the conflict on track and help the audience to access the characters’ 
inwardness. Although the possible is thought of as an ontological category, the 
study highlights its cognitive dimension, and argues that features of the possible 
even shape our image of the actual past. It addresses this question in relation to 
the representation of history in Shakespeare’s history plays. Finally, it deals with 
counterfactual statements in Shakespeare and uses a multidisciplinary 
approach to study their significance. 
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OPHELIA. Lord, we know what we are, but know not what we may be. 
(Hamlet; 4.5.42-3)
FORTINBRAS.                                    Let four captains
Bear Hamlet like a soldier to the stage,
For he was likely, had he been put on, 
To have proved most royally;
(Hamlet; 5.2.339-42)
These two speeches by Ophelia and Fortinbras point to one issue: possibility. 
Both are referring to a potentiality that sets apart what people are from what 
they may be or might have been. However, the two speeches portray two 
different images of the possible. Ophelia, on the one hand, is uncomfortably 
captivated by the idea of the possible. She is discomforted about her lack of 
access to her potential self. To be sure, Ophelia is not drawing a contrast 
between a known, present actuality and an unknown, future potentiality. Rather, 
the possible is already there alongside the actual. (The modal ‘may’ is 
inherently ambiguous, and can refer both to the present and the future.) The 
possible is an integral part of our identities that we need to know if we are to 
fully understand ourselves. Fortinbras, on the other hand, is contemplating the 
possible history of a Hamlet who was given the opportunity to rule. If Hamlet 
had been given that opportunity, he would have proved a royal king. In the final 
lines of the play, Fortinbras is adding a piece of characterization of Hamlet, 
based as it is, not on what he was, but on what he might have been. What 
matters in Fortinbras’s account is not the actual history of Hamlet but his 
potential history, a history that never was, but has been latent there all along. A 
sense of potentiality, then, would open up our understanding of characters into 
new dimensions. It defines the possibility of change in the fictional world, directs 
the movement of these characters to realize their potentialities, and initiates 
conflicts among their colliding aspirations. So, from the perspectives of both 
Ophelia and Fortinbras, the possible is of the very essence of the actual. But 
9while for Ophelia the possible is shrouded with lack of knowledge, Fortinbras 
manages to find a way to access the possible, if only as a ‘likely’ probability. 
That deep sense of possibility, which Ophelia and Fortinbras have tersely 
expressed, is what literature is all about. Other artistic forms, like sculpture and 
painting, can depict what things are, but are severely restricted in depicting how 
things may be. Literature, armed with human language, can depict all these 
possible states, thus enabling us to ponder their intersection and their relation to
the actual one. As the above extracts show, Shakespeare has a fairly subtle 
sense of the possible in life, which has enabled him to express it in his art with 
such variety and grandeur. Yet, this aspect of Shakespearean drama has rarely 
received due attention or systematic critical appraisal. Shakespeare criticism 
has not directly engaged with pronouncements of the possible or virtual in the 
plays; even when they are discussed, they are not studied as part of a wider 
phenomenon that deserves attention as such. Consequently, this neglect of the 
possible in Shakespearean drama has deprived us of the profound insights into 
the plays’ plots, characterization and even their author’s worldview, which 
awareness of the possible would otherwise yield.  
Therefore, this study aims to address this important dimension in 
Shakespearean drama. It sets out to demonstrate that the possible occupies a 
central position in Shakespeare’s plays. This ‘central position’ is as crucial as 
the one occupied by the actual events or component of these plays. Two 
aspects of the possible chiefly underline its substantial role in Shakespearean 
drama: the first is the sense of potentiality that it implies. The potential is what is
always there with the actual, lurking beneath it and directing it. It is a force, for it 
refers to what people can do and could have done. Three centuries after 
Shakespeare, T. S. Eliot writes in the first part of Four Quartets: “What might 
have been and what has been / Point to one end, which is always present” (9-
10). Moreover, the potentiality of the possible renders it into a liberating force 
from the shackles of the actual. If we are left with the actual only, the world will 
disintegrate into an all-encompassing determinism which makes any hope of 
change unthinkable. Again, T. S. Eliot’s words are particularly revealing: “If all 
time is eternally present / All time is unredeemable” (4-5).The second aspect of 
the possible is the cognitive function of the possible, which mainly consists in
the idea of probability which defines the possible and is defined by it. The 
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possible is what gives sense to the actual world: things can be defined as much 
by what they might be as by what they are. The possible helps the reader or 
spectator to fill in the gaps of the text or performance and supplements the 
missing or withheld information that is necessary to make sense of that text or 
performance. Consequently, it serves to make intelligible strings of objects or 
events that would otherwise seem disparate and incoherent. Thus, although the 
possible is conceived as an ontological category, the study foregrounds its 
cognitive dimension. It aims to show that, in Shakespearean drama, the 
distinction between the actual and the possible is subject to representational 
strategies and cognitive processes.  
The possible has attracted the attention of philosophers from the time of 
the ancient Greeks. However, it acquired a new momentum at the hands of the 
German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). Leibniz’s notion of 
‘possible worlds’ has been exceedingly popular in the twentieth century. Some 
literary theorists have been especially keen to apply the idea of possible worlds
to the study of literature. This study looks into the possible worlds in 
Shakespeare’s drama. It will be dealing with both aspects of drama: as a 
theatrical performance and as a fictional story. We shall look into the ways 
Shakespeare invested in the rich and fertile realm of the possible in his plays, 
as well as the ways they might help us better appreciate his artistic production. 
In this Introduction, we shall survey the development of ‘possible worlds’ theory 
in the fields of philosophy and literature. After that I shall show the relevance of 
the possible to early modern culture in general and to Shakespeare in particular, 
and shall end up with a general outline of the aims and structure of the present 
study.  
Possible Worlds in Philosophy
Leibniz is considered the first philosopher who introduced and systematically 
employed the concept of ‘possible worlds.’ Leibniz considers the world we 
inhabit as only one among an infinitude of other possible worlds. These worlds 
are contingent in nature, and so they need the divine agent to interfere and 
render them actual. In order for God to select one world as the actual one, He 
must have access to all these worlds which exist in the divine Intelligence or 
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what Leibniz terms the ‘Region of Verities’. In his Theodicy (written 1709), 
Leibniz writes: “the cause of the world must needs have had regard or reference 
to all these possible worlds in order to fix upon one of them” (1966, 35). Leibniz 
has evoked the notion of possible worlds in order to account for the existence of 
evil. The one actual world chosen by God is the one which has less evil than the 
other possible worlds. Leibniz observes that although this world contains evil, it 
is the best among all other possible worlds in this respect.  In other words, the 
actual world contains less evil than any other possible world would have 
contained if it had been the case. Thus, the world chosen by God is the best of 
these possible worlds: “there is an infinitude of possible worlds among which 
God must needs have chosen the best, since he does nothing without acting in 
accordance with supreme reason” (ibid.). 
To Leibniz, worlds are holistic entities, in the sense that they are to be 
taken in their entirety. Even one different detail in two worlds will render them 
different, for each such detail is connected with other details. Reality is 
attributed to only one world which is so comprehensive as to exclude the 
existence of other possible worlds. So he uses the concept ‘world’ 
synonymously with ‘Universe’ (ibid.). These possible worlds exist only in the 
divine intelligence. Possible worlds, moreover, are different in terms not only of 
their existents, but also of the laws governing them. In his ‘Letter to Arnauld’ 
(written 1686), Leibniz states: “For, since there is an infinity of possible worlds, 
there is also an infinity of possible laws, some proper to one world, others 
proper to another” (1989, 71). Yet, though Leibniz leaves the door wide open to 
think  in terms of possibilities, his thinking is deterministic in nature for he 
observes that, as this world is the best, there is no way whatsoever that it can 
be bettered. 
The Leibnizian concept of possible worlds does not seem to have had 
considerable influence on philosophy for the two centuries after his death. 
However, the ‘possible worlds’ concept was given a new momentum in the 
second half of the twentieth century when philosophers working in the fields of 
modal logic and the philosophy of language started to realize the viability of this 
concept of explaining such modal notions as possibility, necessity, and 
probability. One of the earliest treatments of possible worlds in modal logic is 
Saul A. Kripke’s essay “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic” (1963). In 
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this essay Kripke suggests a ‘model structure’ composed of the triple (G, K, R), 
where K stands for a set of objects, G is one member of that set, and R is a 
relation that holds between members of K. Defined in terms of possible worlds, 
K would stand for the set of all possible worlds, G for the actual world, while R
stands for the accessibility (possibility) relation between G and any other 
member of K ([1963] 1974, 804). Kripke then assigns to each world a domain of 
individuals as members. The domains differ from one world to another. So, not 
all individuals existing in the real world would also exist in other possible worlds. 
Conversely, creatures like Pegasus which might exist in another possible world 
are not among the existents of this real world (ibid., 805). One breakthrough of 
Kripke’s approach is the study of quantification in terms of possible worlds: 
according to Kripke’s formulation, the existential quantifier ‘some’ can be 
interpreted as ‘being true at least in one possible world,’ while the universal 
quantifier ‘all’ can be interpreted as ‘true in all possible worlds.’ 
In his later classic book, Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke briefly 
surveys his views of ‘possible worlds’. He does not agree with viewing them as 
remote planets, the way David Lewis does. Kripke blames the vagueness of the 
notion of ‘possible worlds’ on the confused terminology used to describe them. 
So, instead of the ‘world’ metaphor, he suggests understanding possible worlds 
as possible states, possible histories of the world, or counterfactual situations 
(1980, 15). He rejects the view of the concreteness of possible worlds or 
Lewis’s extreme realism and thinks that the ontological cost it implies is too high 
to bear.1 He defines them rather as “total ‘ways the world might have been’ or 
states or histories of the entire world” (ibid., 18; emphasis in original). 
However, the most stringent adherent of the idea of possible worlds in the 
last century is David Lewis. Lewis puts his doctrine flatly: “It is uncontroversially 
true that things might be otherwise than they are. I believe, and so do you, that 
things could have been different in countless ways . . . I therefore believe in the 
existence of entities that might be called ‘ways the world could have been’. I 
prefer to call them ‘possible worlds’” (1973, 84). Lewis adopts what he calls 
‘modal realism’, the belief that the other possible worlds are no less real than 
the one we inhabit, although they are isolated, in the sense that no 
spatiotemporal relation holds between any one world and another. Lewis
believes that other possible worlds are concrete, not abstract or even linguistic 
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entities (1973, 85; 1986, 81). Like Leibniz, he also believes in the infinity of 
possible worlds, a principle which he calls ‘plenitude’ (1986, 86).  
The belief in modal realism has led David Lewis to adopt a view regarding 
the actuality of worlds which he calls ‘indexical’ theory. According to this theory, 
the actuality of worlds is not an absolute trait, but is rather world-relative. ‘Actual’ 
is analogous to the indexical terms ‘here’ and ‘now’.2 The inhabitants of every 
possible world can call the world they inhabit ‘actual’ in so far as they can talk 
about it as being here and now, just the way we do about our world (ibid., 92-3). 
Lewis is conscious of the ontological price to be paid for believing in modal 
realism, but he considers the benefits of that belief to outweigh its cost. He 
considers the belief in possibilia as a paradise to the philosopher and he 
sketches many applications for this concept, such as modality, closeness or 
similarity between worlds (which he uses to account for counterfactual 
conditionals), as well as the content of belief and epistemic worlds.  Lewis’s 
theory has helped popularize the general idea of possible worlds in philosophy 
and broaden its applicability. Besides, his indexical theory has some bearing on 
our view of fictional worlds, as we shall show below. 
Possible Worlds in Literature
The idea of a multiplicity of possible worlds has attracted the attention of 
scholars who have been quick to recognize its relevance to the fictional nature 
of literature. Interestingly, the philosophers who adopted the possible worlds 
approach also recognized its relevance to the study of literary fictionality and 
the relation between the idea of possible worlds and the fictional worlds. In fact, 
it was Leibniz who first recognized this relevance. In his essay ‘On Freedom’ 
(written in 1689), Leibniz regards the fictional worlds evoked by stories as 
examples of possible worlds: 
Nor can we really deny that many stories, especially those called novels, 
are thought to be possible, though they might find no place in this universal 
series God selected—unless one imagined that in such an expanse of 
space and time there are certain poetical regions, where you can see King 
Arthur of Great Britain, Amadis of Gaul, and the illustrious Dietrich von Bern 
of the German stories, all wandering through the world.(1989, 94)
Saul Kripke, in his essay mentioned above and in which he inaugurated 
the use of possible worlds in logic, has recourse to a fictional creation (Sherlock 
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Holmes) to exemplify a possible object or state of affairs. David Lewis (1978) 
makes use of the possible world concept to account for the nature of fictionality 
and the question of truth in fiction. He bases that account on his views of the 
idea of the similarity of worlds which he developed in his 1973 study on 
counterfactuals. We shall examine Lewis’s account in more detail in our 
analysis of counterfactuals in Chapter Four. 
After the promising prevalence of the concept of possible worlds in 
philosophy and modal logic, literary theorists have realized the benefits that 
result from the application of possible worlds to literature. These benefits can be 
classed under two main domains: fictionality and narrativity. The fictionality of 
literary works has been studied in terms of the characteristics that are peculiar 
to fiction, be they ontological, semantic or pragmatic. With the flourishing of the 
possible worlds concept in philosophy and logic, theorists of literature have 
begun to explain fictionality in terms of possible worlds, and then moved to the 
analysis of the narrative structure of literary works in terms of modality3 and 
possible worlds. The earliest discussions of possible worlds in literature are 
inclined almost exclusively towards fictionality, and an awareness of its 
relevance to narrativity came fairly late in the works of Eco, Dolezel, and Ryan. 
These theorists, we shall later observe, have used the very notions used for the 
study of fictionality for the analysis of the narrative structure of literary works. 
The first attempt to integrate of Leibniz’s possible worlds philosophy into 
literary theory was made as early as the 1740s by the Swiss friends and co-
authors Johann Bodmer and Johann Breitinger. These two theorists were quick 
to notice the potential application of possible worlds to the study of art. Among 
their contributions two stand out as relatively significant. First, they reinterpreted 
the Aristotelian notion of mimesis in accordance with the new notion of possible 
worlds. This helped to broaden the range of mimesis and give more freedom to 
the poet, for mimesis turned out to be not restricted to imitating the real world, 
but to cover the depiction of any of the infinitely varied possible worlds. 
According to Breitinger, the poet is free to depict marvellous images “whose 
originals are not to be looked for in the actual world of real things but in some 
other possible world-structure. Every well-invented poem is therefore to be seen 
as a history from another possible world” (quoted in Dolezel 1990, 42). And as 
Bodmer puts it, “Since the number of worlds that can be imitated in literature is 
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infinite, the poet becomes equipotent to nature” (quoted inibid., 41). Thus the 
poet is a maker or demigod, who selects things from the realm of the possible 
and renders them existent through his works. Second, they capitalized on 
Leibniz’s idea of the compossible, the idea that the elements of any possible 
world should be in accord with one another and show no contradictions among 
themselves. This led to a new concept of the poem as a heterocosm, a whole 
enclosed entity with its own laws. The probability of the poem is not to be 
sought in terms of its relation to the real world, but rather to its own internal 
coherence. In Breitinger’s words, poetic probability “consists in this, that the 
details accord with the intention, that they are grounded in one another, and that 
they show no contradiction among themselves” (quoted in Abrams 1953, 278). 
These ideas inspired and were inspired by relatively similar conceptions of the 
nature of art in England and Germany and were part of the paradigm shift from 
neo-Classicism to Romantic poetics (Abrams 1953; Dolezel 1990). In England, 
Joseph Addison and Richard Hurd had been making similar points, although 
they lacked the philosophical basis that Bodmer and Breintinger successfully
built on. 
No later attempts were made to ground a theory of art in possible worlds
philosophy until two centuries later, starting after the middle of the twentieth 
century. These new adventures were not inspired by Leibniz directly but by the 
new development of this concept in logic and philosophy. One enthusiastic 
adherent to analysing the fictional nature of literature in terms of possible worlds 
is Thomas Pavel. Pavel adheres to an internal approach to fiction and finds out 
that the best way to treat fiction on its own terms is to base the theory of fiction 
on the concept of ‘possible worlds’. He borrows his frame from Kripke’s model 
structure mentioned above. In Pavel’s reformulation, K can stand for a fictional 
world evoked by a work of fiction which is accessible to G (i.e., possible from 
the point view of G) though not identical with it. One advantage of Kripke’s 
model is that it allows a variation of individuals from one world to another, and 
can thus admit the introduction of new individuals such as Sherlock Holmes to 
our ontological inventory; so this model of possible worlds is rooted in the 
“common aesthetic intuition that takes for granted that things found in novels 
are in some way compatible with real life” (1986, 46). To Pavel, this 
understanding of literary fiction is in line with Aristotle’s conviction that the poet 
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should show what happens according to the rules of possibility and necessity. 
‘Possibility’ means that it happens in one possible world accessible from the 
actual world, and ‘necessity’ means that it actually happens in all alternative 
possible worlds (ibid.).4
Other serious attempts to study fictionality in terms of possible worlds have 
been carried out by Lubomir Dolezel and Marie-Laure Ryan. Dolezel takes 
fictionality to be mainly an ontological issue and so he regards fictional worlds 
as a subset of possible worlds. He identifies three areas where the fictional 
worlds of literature are similar to possible worlds: first, they are both ensembles 
of nonactualized states of affairs. Second, both fictional worlds and possible 
worlds are unlimited and maximally varied in the sense that there are no 
restrictions on the number of possible or fictional worlds to be generated. And 
third, they are both accessed through semiotic channels, such as language, still 
or moving pictures, and so on. A more elaborate account of using possible 
worlds to explain fictionality is given by Marie-Laure Ryan (1991). Ryan’s 
approach to fictionality is both ontological and pragmatic. It is ontological, in the 
sense that fiction forces a recentering around a new system of reality other than 
the actual world, and pragmatic in that it introduces a new substitute speaker. In 
order to pinpoint the true nature of fictionality and fictional worlds, she contrasts 
the views of David Lewis and Nicholas Rescher on possible worlds. Lewis holds 
that possible worlds are real, just like the actual world, and that they have an 
existence of their own. From the point of view of their inhabitants, they can be 
referred to as ‘here’ and ‘now.’ Rescher, on the other hand, believes that 
possible worlds are mere mental constructs and that they are ontologically 
inferior to the actual world. If we assimilate this debate about fictional worlds, it 
yields informative insights into the nature of fiction. Pro Lewis and contra 
Rescher, we tend to treat fictional worlds as really existing, which explains the 
complex ways we interact with them. Pro Rescher and contra Lewis, we are still 
aware of the ontological difference between fictional worlds and the actual world 
(see Ryan 1991, 21). Ryan holds that these two views explain our emotional 
engagement with fiction and our full realization that it is fiction and not reality. 
However, these scholars are quick to warn against a full identification of 
possible worlds of logic with fictional worlds of literature. For Pavel, one 
difference between the two sets of worlds is that fictional worlds might contain 
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contradictions, which is unacceptable in logical possible worlds. Moreover, 
fictional worlds are far more rich, complex and varied than logical worlds, and 
so we cannot reduce “the theory of fiction to a Kripkean theory of modality” 
(1986, 49). Dolezel spots three areas where fictional worlds differ from possible 
worlds of logic: first, fictional worlds are incomplete, while logical possible 
worlds are complete, maximal sets. Second, fictional worlds might be 
heterogeneous, containing natural and supernatural creatures. Third, fictional 
worlds owe their existence to literary texts, prior to which they have no 
existence (1998, 21-4). However, despite their insistence on these differences, 
Ruth Ronen (1994) criticizes the adherents of possible worlds in literature for 
not going far enough in differentiating their use of fictional worlds from the 
original use and meaning of the concept of possible worlds in logic and 
philosophy. In addition to the differences mentioned so far, Ronen takes the 
main difference between possible worlds and fictional worlds to be their relative 
status with regard to the actual world. To her, fictional worlds are more 
independent than possible worlds relative to the actual world. While possible 
worlds are stipulations of certain unactualized possible states of affairs 
ramifying from the actual state of affairs, fictional worlds represent whole 
autonomous realms parallel to the actual world, each with its own complex 
modal structure: “fictional worlds, unlike possible worlds, manifest a world-
model based on the notion of parallelism rather than ramification" (1994, 8). 
Ronen also points out that for philosophers fictionality is a property of 
propositions, while for literary theorists it is a property of texts (ibid., 85). 
The second area of the application of possible worlds concepts to
literature is that of narrativity. Possible worlds theorists have addressed the 
question of narrative structure, and based their plot models on the same notions 
of possibility and necessity which they have used to tackle the problem of 
fictionality.  Traditionally, the problems of fictionality and narrativity have been 
addressed by different approaches, each using different assumptions and 
methods. The possible worlds approach to literature, on the other hand, is
unique in that it could tackle the problems of fictionality and narrativity using the 
same analytical notions and methods. In possible worlds approaches, “The 
narrativity of worlds is tackled through modal concepts of actuality and 
possibility, concepts which were primarily adopted by literary theory to account 
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for the fictionality of worlds” (Ronen 1994, 171n). Fictionality and narrativity are 
also related in terms of the effect of one feature on the other. This has mainly to 
do with the question of whether the narrative structure of a text results in its 
fictionality. This question has a great bearing on historical discourse, namely 
whether the narrative quality of historical discourse makes it a fictional 
discourse. These questions have been debated among proponents of 
postmodernism and possible worlds theory, and we shall touch on them and 
their implications for Shakespeare’s representation of history in Chapter Three. 
Possible worlds theorists base their narratological views and the plot 
models resulting from them on notions of modality and worlds. Umberto Eco 
(1979; 1990), for example, uses possible worlds to work out a narrative analysis 
of the fabula. He divides the worlds created into the main world of the fabula, 
the subworlds of the characters’ attitudes (their wishes, beliefs, values), and the 
worlds constructed by the Model Reader.5 The point of interest to Eco is the 
divergence of these three classes of worlds, as when characters create 
mistaken beliefs about the world of the fabula, or when the reader is led to false 
conclusions about what will take place. However, except for the idea of 
divergence and the interesting results that ensue, Eco’s approach is too 
formalistic to be immediately applicable to complex literary works. His insights, 
though, have been essential to the development of the later models by Dolezel 
and  Ryan.
Dolezel (1998) bases his model on four narrative modalities: alethic, 
deontic, axiological and epistemic modalities 6 , each with its parameters of 
possibility, necessity and impossibility. These modalities comprise almost 
everything in the fictional world, including the kind of existents, the laws 
governing that world, the characters’ knowledge and beliefs, as well as their 
desires and motivation. Conflict ensues from a clash between two or more 
parameters in one character or among different characters. Marie-Laure Ryan 
(1991) uses the metaphor of ‘world’ to designate the contents of the characters’ 
domains, thus talking about Knowledge World, Wish Worlds, Obligation Worlds, 
in addition to the Textual Actual World. In her model, conflict is also a result of 
the dissatisfaction of one of these private worlds, and it takes place among 
worlds belonging to the same character, among worlds belonging to different 
characters, or between the private world of a character and the textual actual 
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world. These approaches will be surveyed in more detail in Chapter Two, but 
here suffice it to observe that these models presuppose the autonomy of the 
fictional world; the fictional world is treated not as a merely possible world 
relative to the actual world, but rather as a whole world with its own modal 
structure: within these worlds there is a state of affairs which is actual and a 
galaxy of other states that are possible relative not to the actual world of the 
reader, but to that fictional world’s actual state of affairs.  Compared to the 
traditional formalist and structuralist plot models, these possible worlds plot 
models possess some advantages. Traditional models are static and backward 
looking: they take the end of the story as a given and then move backward to 
see how that end came about. Possible world narratological models, on the 
other hand, are dynamic and forward-looking, in the sense that they view the 
movement in the plot as a choice the fictional agents make at each step from 
the many possibilities available to them. Through actualizing one of these 
possibilities, the situation again unfolds with other choices to be made, and so 
forth. We will foreground some of these points in Chapter Four while discussing 
the viability of this model for the analysis of counterfactuals in Shakespeare’s 
plays.   
Possible worlds theory negotiates the founding assumptions of theoretical 
trends that dominated the critical paradigms over the last decades, namely 
poststructuralism and postmodernism. Poststructuralism and postmodernism 
developed partly as a reaction against the positivist views that denied the 
validity of any discourse about nonexistent objects. The reaction, however, went 
to the other extreme by denying the objective truth of even scientific discourse. 
Between these two extremes came the possible world framework to lend validity 
to both factual and fictional discourses: "In the same way that the logical 
positivists' declarations of the death of poetry appear confining, so do also the 
post-structuralists' claim of the death of reality. A possible-worlds semantics will 
preserve both"(Martin 2004, 62). Thomas Martin emphasizes two differences in 
the assumptions of poststructuralism and possible worlds theory: first, they are 
rooted in different views about language. Following Jaakko Hintikka, he 
characterizes poststructuralism as endorsing a view of language as a universal 
medium: the view that language encompasses all human behaviour and 
thinking and that there is nothing outside language. Possible worlds theory, on 
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the other hand, endorses a view of language as calculus: the view of language 
as an abstract symbolism which can be reinterpreted and reapplied to ever new 
domains of discourse. According to the view of language as calculus, language 
is not confined to talking about this world only, and conversely our ability to 
imagine and talk about new worlds is not hindered by the language we speak. 
The second difference is the capacity to present a modal structure. In so far as 
poststructuralism is rooted in sweeping textualism, within which the search for 
the actual reality is endlessly frustrated, it lacks the proper modal structure that 
comprises a multiplicity of possible worlds in the centre of which stands one 
actual world:  "In post-structuralist theory the distinction between possible and 
actual is not a modal one at all, but rather a mere semiological one, 
representing just one more linguistic, epistemological binary” (ibid., 9). It is to be 
noted that positivism, by denying the existence of the possible and sticking to 
the actual, also lacks that modal structure which possible worlds theory is keen 
on preserving. 
By assuming the existence of the one actual world, possible worlds theory
has exasperated postmodernists, who see in it a kind of narrow-minded 
homogeneity that, by privileging the one actual world at the centre, denies 
validity of diverging opinions and the right of diversity, and imposes a 
hierarchical understanding of life and society. Trying to counter this negative 
attitude, Ryan (2001) refers to David Lewis’s indexical theory mentioned above. 
According to that view, if actuality is based on the use of the indexical 
expressions ‘here’ and ‘now,’ then the actuality of the actual world is less an 
ontological privilege than a point of view. The inhabitants of other worlds also 
have the right to consider their own world as actual. Thus, the discourses of 
marginalized and under-represented groups also gain credence as long as,
from their owners’ point of view, they enjoy that kind of actuality. “With an 
indexical definition, the concept of actual world can easily tolerate historical, 
cultural, and even personal variations. Without sacrificing the idea of an 
absolutely existing, mind-independent reality, we can relativize the ontological 
system by placing at its center individual images of reality, rather than reality 
itself” (2001, 101). 
These controversies between postmodernism and possible worlds theory 
become significant in the discussion of historiography. Postmodernism posed 
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real challenges to the quest for truth in historical writing. Some postmodernist 
accounts treat history as no more than discourse; and some have gone even 
further to claim that there are no real differences between fictional discourse 
and the discourse of history. These positions have called history’s claim to 
objectivity and verifiable truth into question. The introduction of possible worlds 
would counterbalance the encompassing textualism of postmodernism: “The 
one clear advantage of the ‘possible-worlds’ approach as applied to issues in 
historiography is that it manages to avoid the poststructuralist or the wholesale 
‘textualist’ conflation of historical with fictive modes of narrative discourse” 
(Norris 2007, 120-1). Dolezel (2010) has been especially keen to address the 
postmodern challenge to history represented by the writings of Roland Barthes 
and Hayden White, using the framework of possible worlds. According to 
Dolezel, history has more to it than mere discourse; consequently, even if 
fictional discourse and historical discourse are similar, history and fiction still 
differ on the level of worlds. The possible worlds of history and of fiction are 
markedly different. We will address these controversies over the nature of the 
actual world and historical truth in more detail in Chapter Three when dealing 
with the truth status of the representation of history in Shakespeare’s history 
plays.  
The application of possible worlds theory has not been even across 
different literary genres. Possible worlds theory has been mainly and primarily 
applied to narrative fiction, and only secondarily to drama and poetry. The 
theorists mentioned above (e.g. Dolezel, Pavel, Ryan) take works of narrative 
fiction as their default field of investigation. This tendency to neglect drama and 
poetry is due to the “belief that among literary genres, narrative fiction most 
clearly constructs those systematic sets and states of affairs to which the 
concept of world pertains” (Ronen 1994, 13; emphasis in original). Elina Semino 
(1997) complains that the theory was not applied to poetry due to the belief that 
it does not create possible/fictional worlds the way novels do. She challenges 
this belief by conducting a possible worlds analysis of Andrew Marvel’s “To His 
Coy Mistress.”  With drama the case is even more complicated. As we have 
shown above, the theory has been used to investigate two main aspects of 
literary works, fictionality and narrativity. Literary theory has generally been 
sceptical about drama having either of these two features. As far as fictionality 
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is concerned, the main obstacle has been the material aspect of the theatre. For 
if drama is staged in live theatrical performances and displays ‘real’ personages 
and actions in the ‘here’ and ‘now,’ how can it be said to conjure up and refer to 
fictional or possible worlds that exist elsewhere? This is why most theories of 
fictionality, many of which we will survey in Chapter One, take narrative fiction 
as their point of departure and deal with theatre only marginally. As for 
narrativity, many narratologists (e.g. Genette 1980) have denied that drama is a 
narrative genre following the dichotomy between diegesis and mimesis 
established by Aristotle. To them drama is a mimetic, not a diegetic genre, and 
so is not qualified for the narrative analysis which narratological theories, 
including possible worlds theory, may offer. 
Yet some critics and theorists particularly interested in the poetics of 
drama have attempted to apply the theory of possible worlds to the dramatic 
genre. In his Semiotics of Theatre and Drama ([1980] 2002), Keir Elam devotes
a chapter to ‘Dramatic Logic’, in which he mainly discusses the possible worlds 
of drama. According to Elam, the need to investigate the possible worlds of 
drama stems from the ability of the spectator to project an imaginary reality to 
which the performance is taken to refer, and the need for that spectator to fill in 
the gaps of the performance and to make hypotheses of what comes next, all of 
which necessitate the use of the imagination to fill in the gaps of the incomplete 
story given by the performance. This approach also gains support from ability to 
account for the creation of conflicts and resolution of plots in drama. Dan 
McIntyre, in his Point of View in Plays (2006), makes use of possible worlds 
theory, namely of Ryan’s classification of private worlds (Knowledge, Intention, 
Wish and Obligation Worlds, Fantasy Universes) to account for the points of 
view of characters in drama. Every character domain thus turns out to be 
expressive of the viewpoints of that character. He combines these concepts 
from possible worlds with corresponding ideas from deictic fields theory. So the 
process of recentering, and then the movement from one possible world to 
another, are indicated by a deictic shift, and this in turn would inform us of the 
different perspectives at work during the course of the play.  In this study we will 
attempt to address all these genre-specific issues, and try to stretch the 
applicability of the theory to account for both the theatrical performance and the 
dramatic plot. 
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Possible Worlds in Shakespeare’s Plays and Early Modern England
So far we have traced the development of possible worlds theory in the 
philosophical tradition; then we surveyed the questions and issues it raised at 
the hands of literary theorists, especially in the domains of fictionality and 
narrativity. We have also shown the debates it has occasioned with dominant 
paradigms such as postmodernism and poststructuralism. Lastly, we 
demonstrated the relevance of this theory to the analysis of drama and theatre 
as well as to narrative fiction. This study is devoted to the application of possible 
worlds theory to Shakespearean drama. It investigates the fictional and 
narrative aspects of the possible as it features in Shakespeare’s plays. However, 
Shakespeare did not write in a vacuum and undoubtedly he was influenced by 
the cultural and intellectual milieu in which he lived, learned and produced his 
art. I would like to demonstrate that the notions of the plurality of worlds and 
multiple existences were already prominently present in early modern culture. 
Although Shakespeare did not read Leibniz (Leibniz was born in 1646, thirty 
years after Shakespeare’s death), the awareness in that period of the relativity 
of existence and the multiplicity of worlds was heightened by many factors, such 
as philosophy and theology, geography, science, and rhetoric. All these 
disciplines fostered that awareness and contributed to its reflection in the 
literature of the period. Before I turn to possible worlds in Shakespeare’s drama, 
I shall briefly point to some of the important factors that enhanced possibilistic 
thinking in the early modern period. 
The early modern period is fairly amenable to the notions of possibility and 
the plurality of worlds. Scholars observe that this period witnessed an 
unprecedented surge in modal thinking characterized by the widening of 
possibilities in many fields such as religion, cosmology, science, geography, 
and rhetoric. One manifestation of this belief in infinite possibilities is the 
Principle of Plenitude – the belief that all genuine possibilities will be actualized 
in time. In his exhaustive survey of the Principle of Plenitude from the late 
Middle Ages through the Renaissance, Arthur O. Lovejoy observes that “By the 
early sixteenth century the theories of the plurality of solar systems and of 
inhabited planets, of the infinity of the number of the stars and the infinite extent 
of the universe in space, were already common topics of discussion” (1936, 
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115). Lovejoy attributes this belief less to the scientific discoveries at that time 
and more to the philosophical and theological doctrines. On the one hand, the 
belief in a finite creation was thought to suggest a less than omnipotent Creator. 
According to the most enthusiastic adherent of this principle, Giordano Bruno, in 
his De lmmens (1586), "We insult the infinite cause when we say that it may be 
the cause of a finite effect; to a finite effect it can have neither the name nor the 
relation of an efficient cause" (quoted in ibid., 117). On the other hand, the 
infinity and unlimited vastness of the Universe were given a moral significance, 
by being seen as fostering the Christian virtue of humility. Man was to think how 
small he is in this world, and that he is in no sense the centre of the universe 
nor that the whole Universe was created for his use only.
Although this adherence to the concept of plenitude was not as pervasive 
as Lovejoy’s account might seem to imply, there is no gainsaying that the 
Renaissance entertained such possibilities. Jaakko Hintikka qualifies some 
aspects of Lovejoy’s account but he admits that “This widening of realm of 
possibilities is one of the most interesting overall features of the history of 
Western thought which is made clearer to us by a study of the Principle of 
Plenitude” (1981, 7). Although that line of thought might be attributed to Aristotle, 
and was revived in the medieval period, it is a characteristic feature of the 
Renaissance. The writings of Hobbes and Vico, as Nancy S. Strauverargues, 
are just examples of this tendency: “Their ambitions are modal to the core: an 
accomplishment of Hobbes and Vico is to renegotiate modalities . . . they proffer 
more civil possibilities” (2009, 10; emphasis in original). This ongoing tendency 
towards the proliferation of possibilities culminates with Leibniz. Leibniz makes 
the clearest unequivocal declaration of this mode of thinking with his notion of 
‘possible worlds’. However, we have to be careful in characterizing Leibniz’s 
position, for, unlike the previous subscribers of this doctrine, Leibniz adds to it a 
hierarchical dimension, thus talking of the ‘best’ of possible worlds. So although 
he starts off by widening the realm of possibilities, he ends up with a 
deterministic view which holds that no improvement is possible on the actual 
world, because it is the best we can imagine. Like Bruno’s, Leibniz’s motivation 
for his notion of ‘possible worlds’ is theological in essence. 
This proliferation of the notion of the possible in the early modern period 
was also fostered by and manifested in the rhetorical thought of that period
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(Lanham 2004; Mack 2004). Rhetoric is a fertile realm for the virtual, the 
contingent and the probable, and is unsurprisingly amenable to modal thinking.  
We have already met with the idea of modal operators of possibility and 
necessity as quantifiers over possible worlds. Rhetorical argumentation is also 
rooted in the notion of quantification: as rhetoric is the art of the probable, the 
orator is concerned to show a given act as being more or less probable than 
another. He can do that by piling up evidence on one side to render it more and 
more probable to his audiences. In modal terminology, he is showing ‘more’ 
possible worlds in which the act could have taken place than the ones in which 
it did not. Rhetorical training fostered this agility of thought and calculation of 
probabilities on every side. Thus, rhetoric is a liberating strategy, replacing the 
qualitative system of philosophy – that of the absolute ‘true’ or ‘false’ – with a 
wider, more flexible domain of the ‘more’ and ‘less’ plausible, probable, or 
convincing. 
Another important factor in opening the early modern mind to plurality was 
the new geographical discoveries of the New World and beyond. Since it was 
first discovered by the Spanish and then the following of the French and English 
in that project, the New World posed a challenge to the Renaissance mind 
through the introduction of many places, cultures, peoples, languages, wonders 
– all of them different, fascinating and challenging at once. It opened up the 
horizon of the actual to the many previously unthought-of possibilities of 
existence. The fascination of the Renaissance with these alternative modes of 
existence was unmistakable and “might suggest a mind grown alert to horizon 
of possibilities through the terse, fragmentary reports of sailors, missionaries, 
and explorers” (Wilson 1995, 146). 
The effects of all these tendencies of possibilistic thinking are not far from 
literature.  Not only did Renaissance literature show a fascination with depicting 
alien peoples and cultures, but it also was concerned with the effect that would 
have on the nature of the literary work itself and on the fictional world it conjures 
up. The idea of the fictional work as a heterocosm, as propagated by Sir Philip 
Sidney’s dictum that the poet creates a golden world distinct from the brazen 
world of nature, was especially familiar at that time. Sidney writes about nature
that “her world is brazen, the poets only deliver a golden” ([1595] 2004, 9). More 
relevant in this context is the effect this mode of thinking has had on the internal 
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structure of the literary work and the fictional world. In other words, the 
ontological plurality of the actual was reflected in the construction of fictional 
worlds. According to Rawdon Wilson, “one way in which literature reflects the 
perception of a dichotomous world is through the creation of texts that 
emphasize the plurality of worlds, the shifting frontiers that indicate possibilities 
lying hidden within actuality, the staggering alternativity of things” (1995, 145). 
This should not imply that before this period literature did not register that
plurality of worlds, but rather that only now it was done more consciously. It is 
as if people’s understanding of the actual world threw light on the nature of 
fictional worlds and vice versa.    
Thus we see how the philosophical, theological, geographical and 
rhetorical thinking of the period all enhanced an awareness of the possible and 
the implications this would have for literature. It is interesting to notice that 
studies of possible worlds in the literature of the period have concentrated 
almost exclusively on Shakespeare. This might be due to both the quantity and 
the quality of his artistic production. The range of genres of Shakespeare’s 
drama makes it an especially fertile ground for the explication of possible worlds 
and realities. Besides, Shakespeare seems to have been acutely conscious of 
the importance of the possible to which he allocates a large part of his interest, 
as this study is keen on showing in the next chapters. Below I shall consider
three recent studies that have applied possible worlds to the study of 
Shakespeare: Cindy Chopoidalo (2009), Georgi Niagolov (2013) and Simon 
Palfrey (2014). 
In Shakespeare’s Wordplay and Possible Worlds (2013), Niagolov 
conducts an analysis of the effect of Shakespeare’s wordplay according to a 
possible worlds framework. Niagolov’s approach is cognitive in essence and it 
takes the possible worlds theory, as developed by Eco, Pavel, Dolezel and 
Ryan, as a starting point which he complements with insights from cognitive 
poetics, such as mental spaces, conceptual blending, and text worlds. His 
analysis builds on the significant corpus of work done on ambiguity and 
wordplay by such writers as William Empson, M. M. Mahood, and others. He 
assumes that a pun or wordplay depends in its effect on creating two domains 
or interpretations.  The sets of these dual meanings or interpretations, which 
can both be legitimately attached to the pun, are best seen as cognitive worlds. 
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They are further characterized as coherent sets, since the two meanings are not 
contradictory; in order to have the desired effect they must exist in parallel to 
each other so that they can be recalled simultaneously. Moreover, they are 
accessible to each other and ‘traffic’ is taking place among them, so that the 
determination of one alternative meaning in one world or set would also 
influence the choice the reader/viewer would make regarding the alternative 
interpretations of the other sets. This is based on the critical opinion that these 
puns are not ‘isolated or local phenomena,’ but rather contribute to the meaning 
of the whole fictional world they appear in. Although Niagolov puts aside the 
ontological and narratological aspects of possible worlds theory, which will 
feature frequently in this thesis, his emphasis on the cognitive function of 
possible worlds shares an important aim with my study. I am also interested in 
the cognitive function of the notion of ‘possibility,’ but on a larger argumentative 
level rather than on the lexical levels which Niagolov meticulously examines. 
This is why I shall be leaning on rhetoric, rather than on theories of mental 
spaces and conceptual blending, to explore the cognitive function of the 
possible.
Chopoidalo (2009) has applied the theory of possible/fictional worlds to the 
study of Shakespeare’s adaptations. She takes as her point of departure 
Dolezel’s (1998) framework of postmodern re-writes (postmodern works that 
adapt classical literary works). Following Dolezel, Chopoidalo argues that the 
best approach to study adaptation is that of possible/fictional worlds since it can 
account for the global changes that take place in the fictional world as a result 
of adaptation. Her study, though, is quite justifiably restricted to adaptations of 
Hamlet, and it aims to “examine worlds created through the adaptation of the 
text of Hamlet, both Shakespeare’s creation of his fictional world from those of 
his sources, and other writers’ use of his text to create new and diverse fictional 
worlds of their own which nonetheless share common origins and elements” 
(2009, 6-7). She examines and expands upon taxonomies of adaptation
developed by Dolezel and Douglas Lanier. Among these adaptational strategies 
are transposition (changing the settings and norms, time and place of the 
original world into a new reality), expansion (adding new events or new 
characters, or expanding on the roles of minor characters in the original text) 
and displacement (which includes many processes of transposition and 
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expansion, as well as some radical changes to the protoworld to ‘challenge its 
worldview’).  All these changes, be it noted, take place on a global level of the 
fictional world, by deleting some elements, adding others and changing other 
elements. The study is revealing about the changes that fictional worlds 
undergo in the process of adaptation. Although adaptation works on the 
possible or virtual events, we are not dealing with it directly in this study. 
However, we shall touch on a phenomenon relevant to adaptation, namely 
counterfictionality, in our analysis of the literary dimension of counterfactuals in 
Chapter Four. 
In Shakespeare’s Possible Worlds (2014), Simon Palfrey looks into the 
different manifestations of possibility in Shakespeare. Palfrey is not interested in 
the main possible worlds approaches of the twentieth century, be they in 
philosophy (with the exception of David Lewis) or literary theory, both of which 
he finds too restrictive to account for an active imagination like Shakespeare’s. 
He turns instead to Renaissance philosophy for inspiration, with Leibniz leading 
the way through to Shakespeare’s practice. Palfrey borrows Leibniz’s idea of 
the monad and identifies in Shakespeare monadic playworlds in every part of 
which – scenes, acts, actors, characters, cues – he can recognize a life of 
possibilities. These parts are not determined by the whole and do have a life of 
their own. He concentrates on these aspects and, guided by close readings, 
attempts to find out the possibilities latent in each configuration. He calls these 
instruments ‘formactions’ because they are formative of possibilities and 
because formation in literature cannot be separated from action. Another idea 
which Palfrey identifies as essential to Shakespeare is that of the ‘potential’ 
which Shakespeare could have learned from Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In 
Shakespeare, as in Aristotle, potentiality is linked to actuality: the possible is 
that which will be actualized in the future. If it is not actualized, then it was not 
possible in the first place. Palfrey, like Niagolov, is interested in Shakespeare’s 
words and their ability to evoke multiple worlds at one moment, although he 
sees Shakespeare’s freedom with words as anti-rhetorical, for it goes against 
the recipes of traditional rhetorical treatises. Palfrey’s study is by far the first 
book-length study of possible worlds in Shakespeare, and it represents a real 
starting point for the subject in its breadth and erudition, which is both inspiring 
and thought-provoking. This study shares Palfrey’s interest in the potentiality of 
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the possible, though not in the full philosophical sense which Palfrey 
painstakingly explores. The potentiality we are concerned with here is more of a 
narratological nature than a philosophical one. Moreover, both studies share an 
interest in the possible in theatrical performance as well as the literary text. 
This Study
In this study, we shall be dealing with the notion of possible worlds in 
Shakespearean drama. The study will employ an interdisciplinary approach, but 
will be rooted in the strand developed in literary theory in general and 
narratology in particular. As such, it will not be primarily concerned with the 
other discourses in which the notion of possible worlds featured prominently, 
such as the possible worlds of logic and philosophy, or the new worlds of 
geographical and scientific discoveries. The study will cover both areas of 
fictionality and narrativity. As far as fictionality is concerned, the study explores 
the role of the possible or virtual in the fictional nature of theatre despite the 
material presence of objects and persons onstage. Dramatic worlds are 
supposed to conjure up that absent reality or possible world. As for narrativity, 
the possible (or virtual) events are necessary to the plot-structure of
Shakespeare’s plays. The virtual events are evoked in order to determine what 
actually happened. In this study, we shall explore the ways in which they 
interact with the actual events, how they are withdrawn from the reader, or used 
to trigger counterfactual scenarios to contemplate the significance of the actual 
course of events. Thus, this study will be dealing with Shakespeare’s plays as 
both text and theatre. While Chapter One will be devoted to the role of the 
virtual in theatrical performance, the next three Chapters will be chiefly 
concerned with the plays as text and the analysis of the narrative aspects of the 
possible or virtual events in Shakespeare’s plays. 
So far I have been employing the two terms, ‘possible’ and ‘virtual,’ almost 
interchangeably. While the former term is mostly used in possible worlds 
philosophy, the latter is preferred by literary theorists working also in the field of 
electronic literature and virtual reality. Following Marie-Laure Ryan (1991; 2001), 
I will be using the term ‘virtual’ throughout this thesis alongside the term 
‘possible’. I am employing the term ‘virtual’ the way Pierre Levy (1998) does. 
Levy uses the term ‘virtual’ mainly in the sense of the ‘potential.’ He draws two 
distinctions, one between the possible and the real and the other between the 
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virtual and the actual. According to Levy, “The virtual is by no means the 
opposite of the real. On the contrary, it is a fecund and powerful mode of being 
that expands the process of creation, opens up the future, injects a core of 
meaning beneath the platitude of immediate physical presence”(1998,16). While 
the possible/real distinction is static, the virtual/actual distinction is dynamic. 
The movement from virtuality to actuality is unpredictable, in the sense that the 
virtual’s potential is open to many different forms at once, and its actualization is 
not deterministic and pre-ordained. Moreover, the virtual is not exhausted with 
actualization, and so the potential is a never-depleted resource for change. 
Although I do recognize that the two terms are not synonymous in all contexts, I 
will use the terms ‘possible’ and ‘virtual’ interchangeably throughout this 
study.7For my purposes they both denote the senses of potentiality and 
cognitive functioning with which we are chiefly concerned in this study. 
The study aims to show that the possible or virtual events in 
Shakespeare’s plays are no less important than the actual events. Access to 
and awareness of these events are necessary if the plays are to make sense for 
the reader/spectator. The critical importance of the possible or virtual in 
Shakespeare stems from its sense of potentiality and its cognitive function.  
Potentiality is inherent in the meaning of virtuality. The word ‘virtual’ is derived 
from the Latin virtus which means ‘strength, manliness, courage’ and also from 
the Latin virtualis which means ‘power, force’. This has implications for the 
virtual in literature as a source of energy that ceaselessly fuels the literary text. 
As Marie-Laure Ryan puts it, “the virtual is not that which is deprived of 
existence but that which possesses the potential, or force, of developing into 
actual existence” (2001, 27). The virtual in Shakespeare is not the passive, non-
existent, the thing that is not there; it is rather the sense of possibility latent 
under the surface and which gives new meanings to the actual. It is there to 
remind us of the contingency of the actual and of the infinite ways in which 
things could have been. The potential both enriches the text, by foregrounding 
its infinite capabilities and openness to new meanings, and is liberating for us, 
for it opens new horizons of thinking and permits us to rid ourselves of the 
apparent determinism of the actual. From reading the plays we can notice that 
this sense of potentiality is essential to Shakespeare’s dramatic art. Joel B. 
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Altman identifies what he calls the ‘language of theatrical potentiality’ in 
Shakespeare:
It is potential insofar as it is incomplete in itself and must coalesce with 
labile thought- and feeling-structures in an auditor’s mind to produce the 
powerful, temporary satisfactions we call meaning. In the theatrical 
experience of Shakespeare’s audience, this tendentious, interactive process 
often gave shape to a dramatic action that might, if scanned analytically, 
actually resist intelligibility. (2010, 207; emphasis in original)
This exploitation of the potential stems from the awareness of the limitations of 
the actual and material reality. On the level of theatre, it is an awareness of the 
inherent limitations of the material aspects of the theatrical performance and 
that theatre has much more to it than just that material aspect. On the level of 
story, it is the awareness that the actual must have started essentially as a 
possibility, and that it can only emerge after a choice is made which excludes all 
the other possibilities that could simply have been actualized instead. The 
unactualized possibilities define the text’s potential to be otherwise, to lead in a 
different direction out of which a new story will definitely emerge. 
Altman’s ‘action that resists intelligibility’ leads us to the second aspect of 
the virtual or possible: its cognitive function.  The possible functions mainly as a 
sense-making strategy that contributes to the intelligibility and probability of the 
action. Regrettably, possible worlds theory barely investigates this area of the 
relation between the possible and the probable. M.-L.Ryan touches on this in 
passing while discussing the Knowledge Worlds of characters and the degree to 
which they correspond to the real status of the textual actual world. In one case, 
indeterminacy, a character is uncertain about the truth of a certain fact in the 
actual world, and so his/her knowledge is based on probability, which ranges 
from low to high probability (1991, 115). Yet the relation between the concepts 
of possibility and probability is deeper and wider than that. Probability is closely
related to virtual or possible events. In the domain of fictionality, the possible or 
virtual is needed to help the spectator make sense of the material objects and 
happenings that take place onstage and which would otherwise seem 
incoherent and unintelligible. On the level of narrative structure, in order for 
characters to determine what might have happened in the past, they need to 
conduct probabilistic reasoning whereby they can measure the probability of 
each of the different paths which the action is to have taken. Only then can they 
determine how likely it is that an event might have taken place. Even in judging 
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the credibility of the virtual plans of other characters, a character will use 
probabilistic thinking to determine how honest the planner is.
It is to be noted that the idea of probability is absolutely central to talking
about possibility in philosophical discourse. In fact, the very definition of 
possible worlds in philosophy as “ways the world might have been” is based on 
a basic sense of probability. ‘Probability’ is inherent in the meaning of the modal 
auxiliary ‘might.’ To determine the ways things ‘might have been’ and exclude 
the other ways things ‘might not have been’ is rooted in an informal induction of 
how likely things might be in given circumstances. Saul A. Kripke considers the 
very idea of probability to be based on the concept of possible worlds: “Indeed 
the general notion of 'sample space' that forms the basis of modern probability 
theory is just that of such a space of possible worlds” (1980, 19). Using the 
classical example of the probabilities resulting from throwing dice, Allwood, 
Anderson and Dahl also refer to the affinity between the theory of probability 
and modal logic, and consequently to the possible worlds framework: “Each 
such possible combination or outcome of the game is comparable to a possible 
world. Probabilities are usually graded from 1 (what is completely certain) to 0 
(what cannot occur). In the terminology of modal logic, 1 is equal to ‘true in all 
possible worlds’ and 0 to ‘true in no possible world’” (1977, 109n). Others (e.g. 
Bigelow 1976) have used David Lewis’s (1973) theory of counterfactuals, which 
is based on the notion of similarity of possible worlds, to give a possible worlds 
account of probability defined in terms of similarity among possible worlds.  All 
these formulations in philosophy prove that probability has been of the very 
essence of possible worlds accounts in philosophy and semantics. As Ruth 
Ronen puts it, the distinction between the possible and the necessary in 
philosophy is not an ontological distinction “between modes of existence, but 
only between probabilities of occurrence" (1994, 53). 
However, this native affinity between possibility and probability in 
philosophy has been neglected by those theorists who introduced possible 
worlds theory to literary studies. Ruth Ronen complains that “literary 
theorists . . . detach the notion of possibility from any abstract idea of relative 
probability of occurrence as originally formulated in possible worlds' semantics” 
(ibid., 50). Their emphasis, that is, has been mainly ontological and not 
cognitive.8 Thus, one aim of this study is to retain the interest in and 
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significance of the cognitive notion of probability to the accounts of possible 
worlds in literature. It aspires to show the various ways in which the two notions 
of possibility and probability are embedded in and presuppose each other in 
Shakespeare’s drama. Although literary theories of possible worlds have 
contributed to our understanding of the virtual component of the drama, they 
have had little to say about probability. 
To fill in this lacuna about probability in possible worlds theories, I shall
turn to the art of judicial rhetoric, in its classical and Renaissance formulations, 
as it has been truly the art of the virtual and the probable. In its emergence in 
ancient Greece, rhetoric was the art of making plausible and convincing 
arguments in law courts (Olmsted 2006, 138). The success of the orator 
depended, not merely on the facts he claims, but more importantly on how 
probable he can make these ‘facts’ seem to his audiences, most importantly the 
judge and the jury. Since that time rhetoric has been known as the art of the 
possible or the probable, a discourse to which indeterminacy and ambiguity are 
indispensable, and it has been regarded as mainly concerned with the 
contingent, possible and probable (Gaonkar 2006, 5). Since the incidents being 
arbitrated are now over and no eyewitnesses are available, the orator has 
retrospectively to reconstruct the past event. So he engages with the virtual 
events that are most likely to have happened. In order to prove that his version 
of events is more likely than the opponent’s version, the orator has to carry out 
probabilistic methods of reasoning in which the more convincing account will 
have the upper hand. 
Thus, throughout this study I shall develop a reciprocal relationship 
between the possible and the probable. I shall argue that, on the one hand, the 
possible or virtual in Shakespeare’s plays is cognitively functional in the sense 
that it is one of the sense-making strategies that forcefully and broadly affects 
the probability and intelligibility of the whole structure. On the other hand, it is 
through the work of probabilistic reasoning that characters in the plays can 
establish what might possibly have happened and even what must certainly 
have happened – the possible and the actual, respectively, in the fictional world. 
So it will be concerned with a two-way traffic between the ontologically possible 
and the cognitively probable. ‘Probability’ here will be used in its literary, 
common-sense meaning rather than its mathematical meaning. Although this 
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study preserves the ontological distinction between the actual and the possible, 
it foregrounds the cognitive dimension of the possible. In other words, our 
judgement of what is possible or actual will be subject to representational tools 
and cognitive processes. Likewise, even our knowledge and judgement of the 
actual world is subject to representation and cognition. In Chapter Three, we 
shall argue for a sense of ‘potentialist’ reality, adopted in Shakespeare’s 
representation of the past, which shows how our image of even the actual world 
hovers over the senses of potentiality and cognitive functions which we have 
associated with the possible or virtual. 
This study consists of an Introduction, four chapters and a Conclusion. In 
Chapter One, we will be dealing with the plays as theatre, investigating the 
virtual as a potential to be actualized in the spectator’s imagination, and the role 
played by the virtual or possible dimension in the general intelligibility of 
theatrical performance. It is mostly centred on the fictionality axis of possible 
worlds theory. I shall argue that, despite its materiality, theatre cannot dispense 
with the virtual domain which is created by the spectator’s imagination through 
two main sources: theatrical signs and acts of narration in drama. We put 
forward a view of the fictionality of theatre that stresses its rhetorical and 
communicative dimension. In early modern England theorists and theatre 
practitioners also differed regarding the priority of either the actual or virtual 
components of theatre, although they all emphasized the rhetorical role through 
the concept of verisimilitude. In the practical part of Chapter One, I apply these 
observations to three examples from Shakespeare. The first concerns the 
Chorus in Henry V, whose invocations to the spectators to use their imagination 
show the inherent limitations of the theatrical medium and the indispensability of 
the virtual component in making sense of the theatrical performance. The 
second deals with Pyramus and Thisbe, the play-within-a-play in A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream.It examines the effect, mostly humorous, generated when the 
actors play down the imaginative capacities of their audiences, which shows 
how essential such virtual imagining is to the understanding of the drama. In the 
last extended example, we will be dealing with the acts of narration in Antony 
and Cleopatrato see how the virtual reality which is invoked by narrative helps 
to supplement the actual material performance conditions of the stage. Through 
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the dramatization of the action in disparate locations, the play stresses the need 
for imagining the offstage events. Without the ability to imagine that other reality 
which the play summons up, we can hardly make full sense of the otherwise 
scattered and incoherent onstage happenings. These examples show the 
extent to which the virtual component of theatre is cognitively functional and 
thus forms a crucial element of any theatrical experience.
Chapter Two examines the role of the virtual events in Shakespearean 
drama. The virtual events comprise the scenarios which characters mentally 
construct to anticipate future events or conclude past ones. They interact with 
the actual events that have taken place or will definitely take place in the course 
of the action. It observes that the virtual events are no less important to the 
understanding of the plays than the actual events. It also argues that 
Shakespeare’s familiarity with these concepts is due to his rhetorical training 
which dominated early modern education. The Chapter sketches the 
development of the concept of the virtual in narratology. To supplement the lack 
of theorizing of probability in possible worlds narratology, we shall look closely 
into the art of rhetoric to explore the role of the concepts of the virtual and the 
probable in Classical and Renaissance rhetoric. These observations will be 
applied to two plays from the Shakespeare canon: Cymbeline and Richard II. In 
the wager scene from Cymbeline, we see how rhetorical techniques are used to 
determine the probability, and consequently the possibility, of certain events 
having taken place in the past. The play, moreover, gives access to a rich, 
motley platform of virtual courses of events mentally and verbally constructed 
by characters, which the reader has the opportunity to compare to the actual 
one. Richard II, in contrast, allows the readers decidedly limited access to the 
virtual domain or the mental constructions of the main characters – namely, 
Bolingbroke and Richard – leaving them with only the actual events which they 
should use to retrospectively construct the virtual domain. This, in turn, affects
the intelligibility and the interpretation of the play, for readers are exposed to a 
wider range of gaps which they should fill in to make sense of the whole fictional 
world. Both instances show how crucial an appreciation of the virtual events is 
to the understanding of the plays.
In Chapter Three, I set out to demonstrate that even our knowledge and 
representation of the actual world sustain the two features we associate with 
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virtuality: potentiality and probability. I explore these questions in the context of 
the debate between possible worlds theorists and postmodern scholars 
regarding the nature of the actual world and historical truth. In these debates I 
employ the notion of ‘potentialist’ realism proposed by J. Fisher Solomon which 
preserves the factuality of historical discourse while admitting the shaping effect 
of representation on historical truth. These debates are used to reflect on a 
similar controversy in Shakespeare’s histories regarding the nature of historical 
truth, with the two positions of what I call ‘naked’ and ‘apparelled’ truths. Taking 
the three parts of Shakespeare’s Henry VI as a case study, I argue that 
characters in Shakespeare’s history plays always treat historical truth as 
‘apparelled’ rather than ‘naked’ and that they are acutely aware of the effect of 
representation on historical facts. Accordingly, the potentialist and cognitive 
nature of historical representation is foregrounded in the characters’ telling and 
retelling of historical events. These aspects are highlighted in three main areas: 
the use of emplotment, tropes and figures, and theatricality. I argue that 
characters seem to be so endlessly trapped in the process of representation 
that even when they strive to present their claims as naked truths, they can only 
do so within the representational frameworks of which they are part. 
Chapter Four takes up the study of counterfactual statements in 
Shakespearean drama. The study of counterfactuals has grown into an 
interdisciplinary enterprise that ranges through the disciplines of philosophy, 
politics, sociology, psychology, literary theory and many others. The chapter 
argues that, through the use of counterfactuals, Shakespearean drama opens 
up the inherent potentiality of the virtual events by exploring what might have 
been alongside what has been. Through the use of counterfactuals, the plays 
employ purely possible scenarios in order to create a coherent and cognitively 
intelligible structure by the use of the sense-making strategy of causation. The 
Chapter shows how characters in these plays assess the significance of what 
really happened by contemplating what could have possibly happened. The 
final result of exploring these negative ontologies is for characters to make 
sense of their lives by attributing success and failure to contingent actions that 
could simply have turned out otherwise. The chapter examines four dimensions 
of the use of counterfactuals in Shakespeare’s plays. The first is the 
psychological, which investigates the kind of responses, positive or negative, 
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characters make when contemplating counterfactual scenarios. The second 
dimension is the historical (political), which shows that counterfactuals are 
mainly used to ascribe blame to certain political figures for mishaps they could 
have avoided but did not. The third is the philosophical, which examines the 
anti-deterministic position implied by the use of counterfactuals, and gives more 
room for human agency. The last dimension is the literary, which surveys the 
implications of the use of counterfactuals for the theory of plot models as 
developed in the possible worlds tradition. I argue that the existence of 
counterfactuals proves the advantages of possible worlds models over the 
established traditional plot models. 
This study can be seen as a contribution to the already massive body of 
contemporary Shakespeare criticism. Although some of its findings, especially 
in Chapter Three regarding history and with regard to political and historical 
determinism in Chapter Four, might have historical and political implications, the 
study does not directly engage in historicist readings of the plays. Rather, it can 
be seen in the light of some new critical trends that aim to supersede purely 
historicist approaches and bring back some formal and aesthetic concerns that 
have been long absent from critical debates in Shakespeare studies. I am here 
thinking mainly of Stephen Cohen’s Shakespeare and Historical Formalism
(2007) as a plea for joining the forces of formal and historicist tools in the 
analysis of the Shakespearean text. I also invoke the work on ‘new aestheticism’ 
as mainly exemplified by John J. Joughin’s and Simon Malpas’s (2003) 
collection, The New Aestheticism. The editors are abundantly clear about the 
openness of aesthetics to possibility: “Tied to actuality, in ways that cannot be 
reduced to the empirical, aesthetic experience allows for the creation of 
‘possible worlds’ as well as for critical experimentation” (2003, 2). Particularly 
relevant in this collection is Thomas Docherty’s essay in which he calls for 
education to “be more hospitable to the possibilities for culture and to culture as 
potentiality” (ibid., 33). 
This study also makes a contribution to the discipline of rhetoric by 
incorporating the possible worlds concept of the possible or virtual into the study 
of rhetoric. By combining rhetorical analysis with notions derived from modality, 
virtuality and possible worlds, it provides a new view of how rhetorical 
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argumentation works in the early modern period. It also helps find new horizons 
for the study of rhetoric in early modern drama. The nature of my endeavour 
here has been essentially interdisciplinary, stemming from the conviction that no 
single discourse can account solely for such a complex phenomenon as that of 
possibility; hence the deployment of disciplines including philosophy, rhetoric, 
narratology, and literary theory. In Chapter Four, we will see how an 
investigation of the significance of counterfactuality in psychology, philosophy, 
political sciences, and other fields helps us understand the significance of 
counterfactual statements in Shakespeare. This study also contributes to the 
growing interest in the narrative elements of Shakespeare’s plays and in theatre 
in general. In recent decades, many studies have been conducted in this area, 
such as Wilson (1995), Hardy (1997), Meek (2009) and Gruber (2010). In this 
study we shall consider some other aspects of narration in Shakespeare, such 
as its role in creating an imaginary reality, the relation between the onstage and 
offstage, its role in the representation of history and so on. Finally, we will refer 
in the Conclusion to some other areas where the possible worlds framework 
can be of use, such as genre theory, literary adaptation, and teaching literature.  
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Chapter One
The Possible Worlds of Performance: The Virtual in 
Shakespeare’s Theatre
HIPPOLYTA. This is the silliest stuff that ever I heard.
THESEUS. The best in this kind are but shadows, and the worse are no 
worse if imagination amend them.
HIPPOLYTA. It must be your imagination, then, and not theirs.
THESEUS. If we imagine no worse of them than they of themselves, they may 
pass for excellent men.    
(A Midsummer Night’s Dream; 5.1.207-12)
In this extract, Hippolyta and Theseus are exchanging views about the very 
nature of the theatrical performance. Hippolyta complains about the awkward 
production of Pyramus and Thisbe by the Athenian mechanicals. In a 
characteristically metatheatrical remark, Theseus replies that any theatrical 
performance ‘in this kind’ is inherently limited; and since what appears onstage 
is essentially not the thing itself, onstage happenings are but ‘shadows.’ For 
these onstage happenings and objects to have any meaning, they have to be 
supplemented by their spectators’ imagination to ‘amend’ them and unleash 
their potential. Theseus shows that it is the spectators’ imagination, not the 
players’, which undertakes that amending. It is the ‘imaginative forces,’ as the 
Chorus in Henry V is going to call it, of the spectators that will turn the 
performers of this ‘silliest stuff’ into ‘excellent men.’ But how does imagination 
amend the theatrical performance? Obviously, it does that by helping the 
spectators project the absent, virtual or possible reality of which the 
performance is a representation, and supporting it by filling in the gaps and 
inferring the real things of which stage figures and events are mere signifiers. 
Employing terms that Theseus did not, we can say that in spite of its material 
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dimension, or perhaps because of it, theatrical performance is in need of the 
virtual or possible dimension if it is to seem meaningful to its spectators. 
These questions will occupy us for the rest of this chapter. The chapter 
explores the role of the possible or virtual in Shakespeare’s theatre. It examines 
how the special nature of the theatrical medium, with its basic dimension of 
actuality, where the setting and characters are materially present to the 
spectators, might seem to preclude any sense of virtuality. In this chapter I 
argue for two things: the first is that, notwithstanding its materiality, the space 
for the possible in the theatre is secured through its reference to a possible 
world or virtual space outside the material confines in the theatre. So in theatre 
we can discern two components through which spectators can make sense of 
the performance: the first is the actual component, which consists of everything 
that is shown onstage and can be accessed through spectators’ seeing or 
hearing. It includes the actors and their actions, other staged happenings, sets 
and props, and the theatrical space. The second component is the virtual 
domain, which consists of everything that the spectator cannot access through 
the senses, but has to imagine and mentally elicit if the theatrical performance 
is to make some sense for him/her. It can be accessed through understanding 
the signification of theatrical signs by recognizing the referential status of the 
narrative passages scattered throughout the play, and imagining what virtually 
happens offstage. The virtual can also be understood as a possible world 
invoked by the theatrical performance. Or it can be seen as the theatre’s 
category of the ‘unperformed’ and/or ‘unperformable,’ in parallel to Gerald 
Prince’s similar categories in the domain of narrative fiction.1 Or as Katharine 
Eisaman Maus would have it, the virtual stands for the ‘undisplayed’ or 
‘undisplayable’ in the theatre (1995, 32).The binary of the actual and virtual is 
also variably expressed as a binary between ‘real/possible,’ ‘onstage/offstage,’ 
‘theatrical space time/dramatic space time,’ and so on.
The second thing I argue for is that the virtual or possible domain in 
Shakespeare’s theatre is by no means less important than the actual one, and it 
can even be said to play a far greater role than the actual one in understanding 
the theatrical performance as a whole. The virtual in Shakespeare’s plays works 
as a potential content latent within the actual component that enriches it and 
supplements its inherent limitations. It is that which helps create content and 
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meaning out of the disparate physical movement and signs which constitute the 
theatrical performance. As such the virtual is cognitively functional in the sense 
that it is a sense-making strategy that forcefully and broadly affects the 
probability and intelligibility of the whole structure. So we will be concerned with 
the movement from the ontologically possible to the cognitively probable. It is 
through the interaction between the actual component and the virtual potential 
that spectators can make sense of the theatrical event. However, as the actual 
component is taken for granted, it is the virtual component that will occupy our 
attention in this chapter. Below I shall first delineate the theoretical basis of the 
virtual in theatre from the perspective of the theories of fictionality in theatre. 
Then I shall attempt to contextualize this view of the virtual in early modern 
theatrical theory and practice, and finally I will look into how Shakespeare 
employed the virtual or possible component in his theatrical practice, using 
three plays as case studies: Henry V, A Midsummer Night’s Dream and Antony 
and Cleopatra. 
Theories of fictionality and the virtual in Theatre
In this section I shall put forward a theoretical view of the virtual that stresses its 
rhetorical and communicative potential. However, any enquiry into the possible 
or virtual component of theatre is inextricably linked to, and studied in terms of,
the question of the fictionality of theatre; so the best place to look into the 
function of the virtual in theatre is in theories of fictionality in theatre, since 
fictionality is usually, though not always, understood in spatial terms as a distant 
foreign possible and virtual reality. A work is regarded as fictional insofar as it 
posits a foreign reality, a possible world situated ‘out there,’ somewhere else 
than the present situation of the receiver of the text:“’Fictional worlds’ are easily 
thought of as corners of the universe” (Walton 1990, 41). This spatial concept is 
always understood in terms of the referential function of the texts: they refer to a 
reality ‘outside’ of themselves. And reference, in a sense, implies an element of 
‘distancing’ or even ‘absence.’ Robert Weimann contends that “representation . 
. . is vitally connected with the imaginary product and effect of rendering absent 
meanings, ideas and images of artificial persons’ thoughts and actions” (2000, 
11). Literary scholars find it tempting sometimes to speak about this referential, 
absent reality in terms of ‘worlds’. They speak, for example, about the ‘world’ of 
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Hamlet, the ‘world’ of the pastoral, the ‘world’ of Charles Dickens, and so forth. 
So, we will be mainly approaching the question of the possible and virtual in 
theatre through theories of the fictionality of theatre.2
Nevertheless, the study of theatre’s fictionality is underdeveloped. This is 
because theories of fictionality are mainly and primarily designed to deal with 
the problem of fictionality in narrative fiction, and only secondarily and 
marginally, if ever, do they deal with the question of fictionality in theatre. Many 
reasons lurk behind this prejudice. One reason is that most of these theories 
are suggested by linguists or philosophers of language, which is why they 
account mainly for verbal narrative, and when they address non-verbal media, 
they rely on their initial account of verbal narrative. The second reason is the 
association of fiction with narrative genres. This has resulted from a certain 
historical development that settled on ‘fiction’ as a designation for these 
narrative genres in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Cohn 1990, 11). 
The third reason lies in the fact that, except perhaps for narratives(and films), all 
other media use some material objects to convey their message, as is the case 
with sculpture, painting, and theatre. According to Daphna Ben Chaim, in the
case of narrative and film, “‘fictionality’ (nonreality) is inherent in the medium 
itself . . .  Both the novel and the film have a built-in fictionality (neither use 
realities to represent nonrealities)” (quoted in Power 2008, 24). The case of 
theatre is even more complicated; thanks to the real presence of the stage sets 
and props as well as actors, the fictional aspect of theatre (its virtual reality) 
might be irrecoverably overridden by its material aspect. As Christian Metz 
points out, “The actor’s bodily presence contradicts the temptation . . . to 
perceive him as a protagonist in a fictional universe . . . Because the theater is 
too real, theatrical fictions yield only a weak impression of reality” (1974, 9-10).
This ‘weak impression of reality’ resulting from the theatrical fiction makes it 
harder for the spectator to extract the imaginary and virtual reality from that 
material existence. As Rosencrantz shows regarding theatre actors, “their real 
presence gives them an objective reality and to transpose them into beings in 
an imaginary world the will of the spectator has to intervene actively, that is to 
say, to will to transform their physical reality into an abstraction” (quoted in
Bazin 1967, 99).  
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This difficulty of transposing material presences in the theatre into ‘beings 
in an imaginary world’ might seem to delimit the space occupied by possible 
worlds in the theatre. However, I shall argue that, on the contrary, the possible 
and the virtual do still occupy a pivotal role in the theatre in general and in 
Shakespeare in particular. Throughout this chapter, I shall show the extent to 
which Shakespearean theatre depends on the virtual and possible component 
in its effort to make sense to its spectators. Consequently, my view of fictionality 
is primarily rhetorical and it stresses the cognitive aspect of the virtual in 
Shakespeare’s theatre. This view of fictionality is mainly inspired by Richard 
Walsh’s (2007) approach to the rhetoric of fictionality. I contend that fictionality 
in general and the virtual in Shakespeare have a sense-making function, in that 
they facilitate the inferences that the spectator should make in order to lend 
meaning and coherence to the happenings onstage. However, this aspect of the 
virtual is not exhaustive and other approaches have highlighted other aspects 
that will prove highly relevant to the analysis of the possible or virtual in 
Shakespeare. Below I shall survey some of the prevalent theories of fictionality 
which attempt to address the question of the fictionality of theatre. First I shall
look at theories for which theatre has not been the primary subject, such as the 
possible worlds approach (Ryan 1991; 2001) and make-believe approaches 
(Walton 1990). Then I shall turn to contrasting approaches taken by theatre 
theorists, such as theatre semiotics (Ubersfeld 1974; Elam 2002) and theatre 
phenomenology (States 1985) as well as approaches that tried to combine both 
views (Alter 1990). Lastly I shall conclude with some approaches that took 
fictionality as a cognitive category (Saltz 2006; Walsh 2007), which I think can 
better account for the role of the possible in theatre. 3 Throughout these 
discussions I shall focus on the two concepts of the virtual and the actual, and 
observe how different theories have attempted (or failed) to integrate them both 
in accounting for our experience of the theatrical performance.
Let’s start our survey with possible worlds theories of fictionality, which 
allocate privileged place to the possible and virtual. Marie-Laure Ryan (1991), 
for example, sees the virtual, and fictionality, as resulting from two 
prerequisites: recentering and embedded communicative acts. ‘Recentering’ 
consists in a movement from the actual to the virtual, and is the activity whereby 
the realm of actuality and possibility is shifted from the actual world to an 
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alternative possible world. Thus, the movement from one system of reality to 
another, say from the actual world to the world of the fictional text, necessitates 
an act of recentering: “For the duration of our immersion in a work of fiction, the 
realm of possibilities is thus recentered around the sphere which the narrator 
presents as the actual world. This recentering pushes the reader into a new 
system of actuality and possibility” (1991, 22). Accordingly, Ryan is drawing a 
distinction between three modal systems. The first is the Actual World, the world 
which we inhabit. The second is the sum of textual universes at the centre of 
which is the Textual Actual World. The Textual Actual World is supposed to be 
an exact image of another system of reality outside itself, which she calls the 
Textual Reference World. The fictional actions and happenings are assumed to 
take place in the Textual Reference World which, except in the case of the 
unreliable narrator, we assume to be identical with what the text establishes as 
the true thing, or the Textual Actual World. The possible reality invoked by the 
text or the performance is tantamount to the Textual Reference World. Ryan’s 
second prerequisite for virtuality and fiction-making is the embedded speech 
act, which serves to separate the virtual speaker in the text from the actual 
author of that text. The introduction of this new voice marks the division 
between the actual elements and their virtual counterparts: between author and 
narrator, respectively (in narrative fiction) and between actor and character, 
respectively (in dramatic performance). In her later work, M.-L.Ryan (2001) 
investigates in detail the nature of virtuality and stresses the potential aspect of
the virtual on the level of text or performance: “The virtuality of texts and 
musical scores stems from the complexity of the mediation between what is 
there, physically, and what is made out of it.”  This process of the transformation 
from the physically actual to the mentally virtual involves filling in the gaps as 
well as “simulating in imagination the depicted scenes, characters, and events, 
and spatializing the text by following the threads of various thematic webs” 
(2001, 45). 
When we apply Ryan’s account to Shakespeare, it can prove particularly
fruitful in that it raises awareness of the spatial dimension we are asked to 
stimulate by the likes of the Chorus in Henry V and Gower in Pericles. It is the 
creation of this possible ‘elsewhere’ reality, warranted by the act of recentering, 
which helps spectators mentally move to that realm. However, Ryan’s
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conviction that the textual actual world is an exact image of the reference world 
is problematic in the case of the theatrical performance, for the physical 
performance is too limited to give an exact picture of the virtual reality to which it 
is referring. Yet, this inherent serious limitation of the first model can be 
counterbalanced if we stress the potentiality element of the virtual, which Ryan 
(2001) has strongly emphasized. The potential force of the virtual is greater 
than the material nature of the performance. In our analyses below we shall 
encounter this urge to move beyond the crippling reality of the performance and 
to unleash the potential forces of the imagination to supplement that reality. 
Another fruitful approach to the interaction between the actual and virtual 
is advanced by Kendall Walton’s theory of make-believe. Walton addresses the 
place of the virtual nature of fiction by assimilating it to children’s games of 
make-believe. According to him, representational arts are advanced forms of 
such games. The most crucial element in these games is the prop. Props are 
objects that are used, according to the set agreement among the participants, to 
prescribe something to be imagined. Thus, the relation between the actual and 
the virtual is embedded in the relation between the prop and the imagined 
object it prescribes. For example, in a given game children may agree to regard 
any stump as a bear. So, when any of them sees a stump, they have to imagine 
that they have seen a bear, and act accordingly: seem horrified, escape, or call 
for help. The stump here is used as a prop that prescribes imaginings: “Props 
are generators of fictional truths, things which, by virtue of their nature or 
existence, make propositions fictional” (1990, 37). Representational works of art 
also generate fictional truths within their worlds. Thus, the difference between 
truth and fiction is that the former is to be believed while the latter is to be 
imagined (or make-believed). Elements in a theatrical performance are 
supposed to function as props in games of make-believe in the sense that they 
will prescribe imaginings and consequently generate fictional truths. However, 
performance props are distinctive in that, while verbal narrative depends on 
‘description,’ theatre depends on ‘depiction.’ In other words, they use iconic 
signs that offer the likeness of the things imagined and so make more vivid 
imaginings. Thus the virtual reality imagined through theatrical signs is more 
detailed and vivid than that invoked by narrative fiction. 
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Walton’s theory affords revealing insights about the role of the virtual in 
Shakespeare’s theatre. It places a due balance between the virtual or the 
possible (the imaginings prescribed) and the actual (the real objects used as 
props). As it views fiction as a cooperative enterprise, or a game of two 
participating sides, it sets the role of audiences on more solid ground. The role it 
delegates to spectators is crucial for a theatre like the Elizabethan theatre. As 
we shall see below, Shakespeare’s hints about the theatrical conventions, 
especially those voiced in the Chorus of Henry V, are more geared to 
performer-spectator cooperation than anything else. However, the excessive 
role he ascribes to iconicity by regarding theatre signs as mainly iconic is 
problematic, as we shall see later.
The primacy of the virtual or the actual components of theatre has been a 
matter of dissent between theatre semioticians and phenomenologists,. Theatre 
semioticians address the question of the place of the virtual or possible in 
theatre through their discussions of theatre as a sign system. In most of these 
accounts they privilege the virtual, or what they consider to be the referential 
reality established by the signs, at the expense of the actual which is reduced to 
a mere vehicle to communicate the virtual. Keir Elam, for example, approaches 
fictionality in the theatre in terms of ‘possible worlds’. To him, narrative worlds 
remain merely fictional, while dramatic worlds have the opportunity of being 
realized in a physical context during the performance. Whereas the imaginative 
reality invoked by narrative fictions is ‘remote’ and purely fictional,
dramatic worlds, on the other hand, are presented to the spectator as 
‘hypothetically actual’ constructs, since they are ‘seen’ in progress ‘here and now’ 
without narratorial mediation. Dramatic performance metaphorically translates 
conceptual access to possible worlds into ‘physical’ access, since the constructed 
world is apparently shown to the audience—that is, ostended— rather than being 
stipulated or described. (Elam 2002, 98)
Elam speaks about this ‘actualization’ as just a ‘hypothetical’ one. He sets the 
relation between the real and the fictional on clearer ground, as he regards the 
physical objects and real actors as mere signs which enable the spectator “to 
translate what he sees and hears into something quite different: a fictional 
dramatic world characterized by a set of dramatic properties, a set of agents 
and a course of time-bound events” (ibid., 87). This fictional world, to be sure, is 
also located in a “spatiotemporal elsewhere” (ibid., 88). Semioticians thus 
believe that, although the actual, material components of the theatre exist, “they 
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are at the same time denied, marked with a minus sign” (Ubersfeld 1974, 24). 
This view is far from balanced, since it never seeks to integrate the virtual and 
the actual, and it does not show, if it is reduced to a mere sign system, how 
theatre is different from other sign systems. If we considered theatre objects as 
mere signifiers, we would render their existence rudimentary, for “might it not be 
preferable to read the plays with a view to imagining their realization in 
performance?” (Power 2008, 20).
Against the semiotic view stands the phenomenological view, which 
stresses the actual, material aspect of theatre, even at the expense of the 
possible or virtual aspect. Phenomenologists capitalize on the material and 
corporeal dimension of theatre and its influence on shaping the perceptual 
experience of the spectators. They complain about the undue neglect of this 
aspect of theatre due to the prevalence of mimetic theories of art which begin 
with Aristotle and are manifested in the semiotic theories of the twentieth 
century. According to Bert O. States, “The longstanding problem of mimetic 
theory is that it is obliged to define art in terms of what it is not, to seek a source 
of artistic representation in the subject matter of art”(1985, 5). However, this is 
not to denounce the semiotic project; rather, as States happily points out, 
semiotics and phenomenology are complementary and they provide us with a 
binocular vision, whereby we can view the world both phenomenally and 
significatively (ibid., 8). As we have shown above, some scholars such as
Christian Metz also view theatre as too materially real to allow for fictional 
construction. According to this account, “in order to engage imaginatively with a 
fictional world, it is necessary for the spectator to exclude all consideration of 
reality. To the extent that ‘reality’ is perceived, a fictional unreality loses its 
force” (Power 2008, 22).
A theory that attempts to bring the threads of the previous discussions 
together by striking a balance between the roles of the actual and virtual in 
theatre is put forward by Jean Alter (1990). In A Socio-semiotic Theory of 
Theatre, Alter stresses the fictional as well as the material aspects of the stage. 
According to her, any theatrical performance serves two functions: the
referential and the performant. The referential function is semiotic and it 
consists in a communicative act whereby the theatrical performance conveys 
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information about a fictional story: “To the extent that it always tells an 
imaginary story, theatre thus always offers fiction” (ibid., 10).
The second function of a theatrical performance is the performant function
which has nothing to do with telling a story. Rather, it is related to theatre as a 
spectacle or public event that refers solely to itself and whose pleasure stems 
from the performance of its agents. This dispensability of signs, or 
desemiotization (ibid., 92), does away with the doubleness essential to the 
referential function: here actors do not act out or refer to characters but to 
themselves. Instead of referring the spectator to the imaginary story-space, the 
performant function focuses his/her attention on the material stage space. 
Actors’ actions become important in themselves as mere gestures. Of these two 
functions, Alter considers the referential function to be the basic one (ibid., 32).
However, in some theatrical shows, especially comic ones, emphasis is laid on,
and attention directed to, the performer’s skills and abilities, which will 
overshadow any external story that might be told through that performance. In 
that case, the performant function will override the referential function (ibid., 43). 
Theatre shares the performant function with sports, circus, dancing and the 
other performing arts, and shares its referential function with narrative and most 
forms of verbal literature.
David Saltz (2006) puts forward another view of the fictionality of theatre 
that has affinities with the ‘seeing as’ notion or Walton’s ‘make-believe’ 
approach. Saltz adheres to a cognitive view of fictionality in theatre: "Fiction 
functions as a cognitive template that informs an audience’s perception of 
reality on stage, structuring and giving meaning to the actual events that 
transpire on stage" (ibid., 203). In performance spectators can interpret the 
material happening as referring to something else without losing touch with its
materiality. This cognitive function of fictionality he calls ‘infiction’ which he 
differentiates from ‘outfiction,’ or the virtual referential reality which the theatrical 
event represents: “Let’s call the fictional schema that structures the 
performance event the infiction, which we can distinguish from the narrative 
content that we extract from the performance event, which I shall call the 
outfiction”(ibid., 214). Thus, the spectator has the main input which the 
theatrical performance, to which he applies these fictional strategies or 
‘infiction.’ Out of the performance and the infiction, the spectator is able to 
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extract the absent, referential reality which the material performance is 
supposed to stand for, or the ‘outfiction.’ And this way we end up with a “triadic 
relationship between the spectator, the performance and the fictional world” 
(ibid., 215).
In the light of the above discussions, I shall put forward a view of the possible 
and the virtual or of fictionality in general that stresses their rhetorical role in the 
theatre. By the virtual or possible I mean the imaginary reality established by 
the theatrical performance and which the spectator is invited to project as the 
referential, absent reality which the performance is supposed to represent. It is 
chiefly achieved via the use of theatrical signs and theatre narrative acts. They 
both help the spectator make inferences about what is happening offstage and 
so enable him/her to create a coherent whole out of the disparate onstage 
happenings. I shall briefly sketch the nature of theatre signs and dramatic 
narration and then show the role of the virtual in the theatrical performance. 
Theatrical signs have been the chief concern of theatre semiotics. 
Semioticians since C. S. Pierce classify signs into icons, indices and symbols. 
Theatre signs are largely indexical, that is, they are “causally connected with 
their objects, often physically or through contiguity” (Elam 2002, 19). Cause-
and-effect relationships form a remarkably wide category, and so does physical 
contiguity: stage sets and props are mostly indexical, such as crowns that 
indicate kingship, or swords that signify knighthood, soldiers and drums that 
indicate a war, or costumes that refer to social status and historical periods. 
One subcategory of metonymy is synecdoche, which is the substitution of part 
for whole. Thus, one or two soldiers can stand for an army, one or two 
attendants can stand for the king’s train, or a tent can stand for the large 
battlefield or a cross for a Church, and so on. Symbols are signs that are not 
connected to their referent by virtue of similarity of physical contiguity, but 
according to certain conventions and laws. One central example of symbols is 
the linguistic sign, which is only arbitrarily connected to its referent. Even if we 
set aside the large role of dialogue in drama, it should be remembered “that 
theatrical performance as a whole is symbolic, since it is only through 
convention that the spectator takes stage events as standing for something 
other than themselves” (ibid., 24).
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Iconic signs are those which are related to their referents in terms of 
similarity. The iconic sign might be misconceived and would thus lead the 
viewer to confuse theatre with reality. This confusion has resulted from the 
combination of two main factors: the materiality of the stage sign and its alleged 
similarity to its referent. The icon is sometimes mistaken for the thing it stands 
for. As Russell West observes, “The more insistently iconic the sign’s 
functioning, the more powerfully it tends to replace the thing itself, generating a 
‘reality effect,’ such that we tend to forget the existence of the ‘real 
world’”(2002, 41). We will later see how the insistence on iconicity causes 
problems for theatrical performances, especially in our analysis of 
Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream.
The second wellspring of the virtual in theatre is dramatic narration. 
Dramatic narrative requires the spectator to use his/her imagination to ‘see’ with 
the ‘mind’s eye’ pictures and actions as preconfigured through language. 
Theatre narrative, moreover, evokes a distant, absent reality outside of the 
‘here’ and ‘now’ of the theatrical performance; it is an elsewhere ‘there’ and 
‘then’, the only access to it being granted via the narrative language (see Wilson 
1995, 28-9, 32-3). The power of language to create mental pictures that are so 
detailed as to compensate for the absence of the thing being described has 
long been recognized and appreciated with the use of such tropes as ekphrasis
and enargeia. The latter term, enargeia, indicates the realization of the 
potentiality of the virtual. The term was originally used by Aristotle to stand for 
the ‘actual’ in his distinction between the virtual and the actual. To describe a 
descriptive passage with enargeia means that it is so powerful that it can render 
the subject of description (which is absent and not yet actualized) as if it present 
before the eye.4 This power of language to make present to the mind’s eye what 
is physically absent is supported by cognitive sciences. According to 
psychologist Daniel Gilbret, “the region of the brain that is normally activated 
when you see objects with your eyes – a sensory area called the visual cortex –
is also activated when you inspect mental images with your mind’s eye” (quoted 
in Gruber 2010, 29). Playwrights have long traded on this imaginative faculty to 
generate images of actions happening offstage which they do not want to 
present onstage for one reason or another. So these are the main two sources 
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of the virtual or possible in theatre, and now we turn to a discussion of its 
functions. 
Thus we have shown that the virtual in theatre is mainly evoked through 
theatre signs and acts of narration. Now it is time to put forward a view of the 
role of the virtual or possible in theatre which capitalizes on the virtual as a 
cognitive, sense-making category in the sense that it helps render the 
performance more intelligible to the spectators. This position is rooted in the 
view of the fictional world as an entity that enjoys both totality and coherence. 
The fictional world is, writes Doreen Maître, “seen as a totality, a coherent 
whole. It satisfies certain coherence criteria, as does the actual world, and in 
our attempt to understand it we employ certain plausibility criteria” (1983, 29; 
emphasis in original). In a theatrical performance, the spectator draws
inferences from the actual happenings onstage to create a virtual reality. The 
spectator can also flexibly modify his/her inferences and imaginings so as to 
arrive at the most plausible and coherent image of that virtual or fictional world. 
The virtual, then, is essential to our understanding and appreciation of the 
theatrical performance. Without the spectator’s ability to create the imaginative, 
virtual world out of the actual presences onstage, the performance will fall short 
of making any probable, coherent sense to that spectator. Not only does the 
virtual serve as a referential world to which the theatrical signs are supposed to 
point, but it also helps to bring into a coherent whole the sum total of stage 
persons, things and happenings that would otherwise seem scattered, 
incoherent and irrelevant. This way the ontological category of the possible 
fosters the cognitive category of the probable. As the possible is inextricably 
related to the probable, it can best be approached through the field of rhetoric,
which employs the probable for communicative and persuasive ends. 
I shall base my account of the communicative or rhetorical function of 
fictionality on some aspects of relevance theory, advanced by Sperber and 
Wilson (1986) as well as Richard Walsh’s (2007) theory of the rhetoric of 
fictionality. Rejecting the traditional, coded model of communication, Sperber 
and Wilson put forward an ‘ostension-inference’ model, which presupposes a 
mutual cognitive environment for a successful communication process. 
According to that model, the audience depends on inference rather than coded 
information in making sense of the message, and thus even truth assumptions 
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are subordinated to relevance assumptions. The audience's interest is to 
'maximize’ the relevance of the information given to him/her. This view has deep 
implications for a theory of fictionality in general and the fictionality of theatre in 
particular. Richard Walsh builds on this theory to advance a rhetorical theory of 
fictionality, according to which "the problem of fictionality is not, after all, a 
problem of truthfulness, but a problem of relevance"(2007, 30). Thus fictionality 
ceases to be an ontological question and becomes a pragmatic, contextual 
assumption which obliges the recipient of fiction to treat all its references as 
such. Following Sperber and Wilson, Walsh talks of a ‘poetic effect’ of fiction, 
one in which the recipient accumulates and gathers scattered references and 
information to arrive at incrementally optimal relevance (ibid., 29). If fictionality 
is mainly communicative, quantitatively oriented cognitive category, then it is 
primarily a rhetorical category: "The important categorical distinction, then, is 
rhetorical rather than generic. It is the quality of fictionality rather than the genre 
of fiction that provides for the distinction's theoretical integrity"(ibid., 40).
We can approach theatre’s fictionality through the relevance theory of 
communication and the rhetorical theory of fictionality. The theatrical event is, 
above all, a communicative event. The ostensive quality of theatrical information 
is evident since, more than any other literary form, theatre chiefly depends on 
showing or ostension. However, in so far as the spectator is concerned, his/her 
role depends mainly on inference due both to the metaphorical nature of the 
theatrical signs and also to the incapacity of theatre to present everything 
onstage. The spectator has to bring together all available, relevant information 
and accumulates all the relevant references in order to arrive at the 
pragmatically working inferences that can hold the whole presentation in a 
coherent and probable manner. In order to make sense of the actual things and 
events onstage, spectators have to use all these inferences (or the virtual reality 
being evoked out of them) and weave them into an intelligible whole. And it is 
this disparity between the input used to make these inferences and the resultant 
possible world forged by the imagination that marks the potential capacity of the 
virtual. 
A communicative model presupposes the mutual agreement of and 
collaboration between the two sides of the communication. We can better 
appreciate the communicative and rhetorical aspects of fictionality if we align 
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them with its aspect as a game, which we have come across in our discussion 
of Kendall Walton’s theory of fiction as a game of make-believe. In both cases 
it should be conceived as a cooperative enterprise. As players in the game 
cannot carry on if there is no mutual agreement on set rules, so the game of 
theatre’s fictionality cannot be established if the spectator is not part of that 
theatrical event. And in order for them to take part, spectators have to rely not 
only on the actual presences onstage, but also, and even more importantly, 
have to put to use their imaginative resources in order to supply the paucity of 
factual information and enhance its relevance and hence probability. We will 
see that clearly in our discussion of Henry V and A Midsummer Night’s Dream. 
The cooperative nature of the game means that it is voluntary, in the 
sense that the spectator can take many places: he/she can be completely in the 
game (belief of the reality of the game), completely out of the game (disbelief of 
the reality of the game), or can keep switching places along the duration of the 
theatrical event. In the first and second positions the game is over for the 
spectator. Make-believe is related to the irreducibly dual nature of fiction; 
according to Walton (1990, 191), our pre-theoretical attitude about fiction is 
recognizably schizophrenic, and it consists in the polarity of our being physically 
separate from but psychologically connected to the fictional worlds. Marie-Laure 
Ryan (1991, 21), we have shown, approaches this duality in terms of possible 
worlds, using theories of David Lewis and Nicholas Rescher on possible worlds. 
These two accounts help us, on the one hand, to privilege the autonomy of the 
fictional world and also, on the other hand, still remain aware of the ontological 
differences between the actual and the fictional. 
Only in the third position, when they keep coming in and out of the game, 
can spectators be active participants of the game. This implies that the 
spectator is aware of the actual and the virtual worlds simultaneously: “this 
attempt to determine the coherence and the plausibility of the fictional world 
takes place by means of the superimposition both of the actual world on the 
fictional world and of the fictional world on the actual world” (Maître 1983, 73; 
emphasis in original). Robert Newsom (1989, 160-1) observes that such a 
spectator is neither a believer nor disbeliever in the game, but is rather a 
doubter. The doubter is one who never believes everything nor who withdraws 
from make believe for in both cases the game is over; rather, the doubter
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believes in the game but not slavishly: he reserves the right to step back and 
contemplate, after all it is his own game; this way he is rewriting the text. And it 
is in this context that the concept of probability starts to emerge. The doubting 
spectator, who keeps switching positions between the actual and the fictional, 
will be able to assess the probability of the fictional work by constantly 
comparing it to the actual world. Thus probability is setting the two worlds in 
dialogue and creating communication. "It is probability that makes the 
communication possible (even if it remains logically impossible) and that 
mediates between the real and fictional worlds, without simply eradicating the 
distinction between them and therefore without entirely ignoring the 
impermissibility of that communication"(ibid., 159). 
Up to now we have surveyed the prevalent theories of the fictionality of 
theatre and examined the place they give to the virtual dimension of the 
theatrical performance. We have seen how some theories lean toward one end 
of the virtual or the actual in the theatre, while others try to strike a difficult 
balance between the two poles. I have concluded that the importance of the 
virtual in theatre consists in the role it plays in the overall intelligibility and 
probability of the whole theatrical event. It is through stipulating the virtual or 
possible dimension that spectators can make sense of the theatrical event. The 
spectator is less concerned about the truthfulness of that fictional world than 
about its relevance, comprehensibility and ability to make sense. In order to 
construct that sense, the spectators use all the inferences they can elicit from 
the actual happenings and form a virtual reality out of it. This is central to the 
view of fictionality as a game or communicative category that enables the 
spectators to make sense out of the material happenings in the theatrical 
performance. However, the view I have advanced here does not exhaust of the 
function of fictionality and the virtual in theatre; rather I shall draw on all the 
views mentioned above by Ryan, Walton, Alter, theatre semioticians, and others 
in the analysis of the plays below. As the discussion in this section has been 
mainly theoretical, in the next section we need to contextualize our account of 
the virtual in theatre within the early modern theatrical theories and practices.  
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The Virtual in Renaissance Dramatic Theory
In the last section we sketched the main approaches to the problem of
fictionality in theatre and concluded with a view that stresses the rhetorical or 
communicative role of the virtual in theatrical performance. But the main aim of 
this chapter is to enquire into the role of the virtual in Shakespearean theatre 
and how he manages to treat these two opposing poles and define his art 
accordingly. Crucial to this enquiry, and perhaps missing from the above 
theories, is the recognition that fictionality in the theatre is a historically specific 
category. It is shaped both by the literary (and theatrical) consciousness of any 
period or any writer and the material conditions at work in that period. Thus, in 
order to account satisfactorily for fictionality in Shakespeare’s theatre we need 
to look closely into the theoretical views and theatrical conventions prevalent in 
the Renaissance. In this section I shall contend that Renaissance literary theory 
and practice are not uniform, but divided between highlighting the actual and 
highlighting the virtual components of theatre. However, all these positions are 
motivated by the requirements of probability or verisimilitude of the theatrical 
performance. Below I shall show this polarization in Italian and English 
Renaissance theory, and then will demonstrate how this is manifested in some 
dichotomies that dominated the English Renaissance theatre and finally relate 
that to the rhetorical concept of verisimilitude in the Renaissance.
Theatre critics and playwrights during the Renaissance were also aware of 
the inherent duality of the actual and virtual components of theatre and they 
explore the possible manipulations of the relation between the actual and virtual 
components of theatre. The focus on either the virtual imaginary and fictional or 
the actual, physical and material elements of the drama has led scholars to 
discern two modes of playing in the Renaissance stage: the presentational and 
representational modes. Robert Weimann proposes
a distinction between ‘presentation’ and ‘representation.’ Each of these 
theatrical practices draws upon a different register of imaginary appeal and 
‘puissance’ and each serves a different purpose of playing. While the former 
derives its primary strength from the immediacy of the physical act of 
histrionic delivery, the latter is vitally connected with the imaginary product 
and effect of rendering absent meanings, ideas, and images of artificial 
persons’ thoughts and actions. (2000, 11; see also Fass 1995, 54-63)5
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To employ Alter’s terms, in the presentational mode the performant function of 
playing is foregrounded, while in the representational mode, it is the referential 
function which is foregrounded. Theories of drama in the Renaissance polarized 
around the performant and referential positions – or the presentational and 
representational modes, respectively. These different positions were triggered 
mainly within the context of the controversy over the unities of place and time. 
A good place to start is with Italian Renaissance literary criticism, where 
critics engaged in heated debates about questions raised by reading Aristotle’s 
Poetics.  One of these questions was about the extent to which the playwright 
can depend on the audience’s imagination to understand the theatrical 
performance. The work of two critics, Ludovico Castelvetro and Francesco
Buonamici, is particularly relevant in this regard.6
Ludovico Castelvetro highlights the role of the actual component of theatre. 
All other aspects of drama should be modelled according to how well they 
influence the audience. Castelvetro’s expectations of the audience are very low. 
He assumes that, as drama is always performed in public, the audience must 
consist of ignorant crowds. These are characterized, according to Castelvetro, 
by an exclusive belief in their senses, and thus are notoriously lacking in 
imagination. In other words, they can understand only the actual component of 
theatre and have no access to its virtual component. They cannot differentiate 
the thing represented from its representation, and likewise cannot separate the 
actual time from the performance time. Castelvetro writes: “Nor is it possible to 
make them believe that several days and nights have passed when they know 
through their senses that only a few hours have passed, since no deception can 
take place in them which the senses recognize as such” (quoted in Weinberg
1961, 504; emphasis in original). While epic can narrate in a few hours what 
happened over many years, drama is incapable of doing this since it “spends as 
many hours in representing things as was taken by the actions 
themselves“ (1964, 310). That is, drama has to stick to the unities of place and 
time since it lacks the narrative component that epic enjoys, and also because 
its material component imposes restrictions on what can be imagined. Thus, in
this view of drama, the only reality that the audience can apprehend is the 
actual, material reality of the dramatic performance, and so it would be pointless 
to speak of a referential world or virtual domain outside this reality which the 
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audience has to conjure up. Castelvetro’s poetics is thus essentially 
presentational in the sense mentioned above.
Francesco Buonamici, on the other hand, gives a larger space to the 
virtual aspect of the theatre. He disagrees with Castelvetro about the 
imaginative abilities of the audiences. According to Buonamici, spectators can 
differentiate between the representation and the thing represented: 
By not distinguishing them Castelvetro generates confusion and he also 
confuses the nature of the thing represented with the nature of the thing 
representing . . . And he gives little credit to the intelligence of the auditor of 
the representation, if the latter cannot discern the time of the representation 
from that represented. Finally, he does not distinguish those people who are 
part of the action from the spectator.   (quoted in Weinberg 1961, 695) 
If Castelvetro’s audiences cannot distinguish imitation from reality, for
Buonamici, “The spectator is constantly aware that he is seeing a spectacle, not 
a real action. He knows that what he sees on the stage are ‘signs’ of an action, 
and that an operation of his own mind is necessary at every step to pass from 
the sign to the thing signified” (ibid.). Although Buonamici has higher 
expectations of the audience than Castelvetro does, he still thinks that the 
audience’s imagination should not be stretched too far by being presented with 
places and times too far away. The closer the places, the easier the imagining 
process and the higher the pleasure: “It is true that the more the time of the 
representation conformed to the time of the action represented, the easier it 
would be to imagine it (quoted in ibid., 697). Buonamici’s poetics, then, is 
mainly representational and he allows for the existence of a virtual, referential 
reality outside of, and removed from the actual, material reality of the dramatic 
performance. 
In English Renaissance theory, we single out Sir Philip Sidney as voicing 
presentational poetics, by advocating the effect of the actual component of the 
theatre upon its virtual component. In his Defence of Poetry(published 1595), 
Sidney betrays similar concerns about violating the unities of place and time. 
Although he may not adopt Castelvetro’s views about the audience, Sidney is 
uneasy about the practice of English dramatists who depicted more than one 
place or time in their plays. This is the main fault he spots in Gorboduc which, 
for all its grand style and moral lessons,
is faulty both in place and time, the two necessary companions of both 
corporal actions. For where the stage should always represent but one 
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place, and the uttermost time presupposed in it should be, both by 
Aristotle’s percept and common reason, but one day, there is both many 
days and many places inartificially imagined. ([1595] 2004, 45)
Sidney’s attack is on the imposition of things ‘inartificially imagined’, i.e., on the 
burdening of the spectator’s mind with imagining more than one place and more 
than one time. He goes on to complain about some examples where the stage 
is divided into two spatially distant places, such as Asia and Africa, or when the 
same stage place is to be imagined successively as a garden, then a rock and 
lastly as a cave. Sidney goes on to attack a fundamental theatrical convention, 
namely synecdoche: “While in the meantime two armies fly in, represented with 
four swords and bucklers, and then what hard heart will not receive it for a 
pitched field?” (ibid.).
So Sidney’s position is hostile to representational techniques of the sort 
that bears on the spectator’s imagination; and he suggests sticking to the 
material aspect of the theatre and minimizing as much as possible the need to 
stretch the spectator’s mind with the referential, imaginary side of the drama. 
However, Phyllis Rackin (1972) identifies a contradiction in Sidney’s position for, 
on the one hand, he insists that the poet should depict a golden world and not 
be restrained by the cripplingly limiting real world and, on the other hand, he 
would have the poet adhere to the unities, which stem from a desire to adhere 
to the rules of the real, in Sidney’s term ‘brazen,’ world. This survey of the three 
theorists shows how divided Renaissance theorists were about this issue, 
although more theorists were in favour of presentational than representational 
techniques.
Thus Renaissance literary and theatrical theory was not unified regarding 
the relation between the actual and the virtual in theatre. Real theatrical practice 
in the Renaissance was as varied as its literary theories regarding the place of 
the virtual relative to the actual in the theatre. Renaissance drama did not treat 
presentational and representational techniques as mutually exclusive, but rather 
employed both modes in varying degrees in different plays. In the Renaissance
theatre, this tension between the actual and the possible has taken many forms 
and occasioned certain controversies. Although Renaissance drama strove to 
sustain a representational aesthetics, presentational elements were still to 
persist, due to many factors related to the material conditions of production 
in the theatre of the period. One of these factors is the nature of theatrical space. 
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Another factor is the popular and traditional modes of acting which the 
Renaissance theatre inherited from the medieval stage, and from which it was 
increasingly trying to dissociate itself. A third decisive factor is the unresolved
relationship between text and performance and the authority which was 
negotiable between them. Consequently, these two dimensions of the fictional 
and the physical were inextricably from each other. They can be mainly 
investigated through their manifestation in three binaries: locus/platea, 
player/actor and text/performance. 
The first dichotomy is that of locus and platea. In terms of theatrical space, 
the actual and the virtual are translated into what Robert Weimann calls the 
platea and the locus, respectively. The locus is an abstract and symbolic space 
that stands for “the localized site of self-contained representations (the purely 
imaginary images of the story)”, while the platea is the concrete and immediate 
place that is “the space of the open stage, that is not isolated from the audience” 
(Weimann 2000, 12; see also Weimann 1978, 74). These two uses of space 
originated in the medieval theatre and continued well through the Renaissance. 
While the locus is localized, symbolic and detached from the audience, the 
platea is not localized, literal and attached to the audience space (see Dillon 
2006, 4-5). 
The senses of virtuality and actuality were also translated into the second 
dichotomy: between actor and player. As we have seen, the actor is someone 
who pretends to be somebody else, who acts out a character. In this sense he 
has a semiotic function whereby he refers to a fictional being other than himself 
(Aston and Savona 1991, 41). The player, on the other hand, acts as himself 
and does not impersonate any other person than himself. Acting can be said to 
satisfy Ryan’s second prerequisite for fictionality: the embedded communicative 
transaction for the actor is speaking on behalf of an embedded fictional persona. 
Acting is related to the referential function or representational mode of theatre,
while playing is related to its performant or presentational mode. 7 But in
Renaissance England, things were not so simply demarcated and there were no 
clear borderlines, especially in the early stages of English theatre. The two 
impulses were simultaneously present on the early modern stage. On the one 
hand, Elizabethan actors were striving to sustain a representational, illusionistic 
mode of acting. "Early modern actors certainly aspired to being lifelike" 
61
(Astington 2010, 19). Joseph R. Roach (1993) observes that Elizabethan actors 
were keen to convey the passion of the character they were acting out. Their 
pursuit of persuasion led them to use the manuals of rhetoric which taught 
orators how to deliver their orations convincingly. B. L. Joseph (1964) goes to 
great lengths to prove that there was no substantial difference in the training of 
the Elizabethan actors and orators. All forms of acting were motivated by the 
requirement of probability and credibility. Such books as John Bulwer’s 
Chirologia: Or the Natural Language of the Hand (1644) show how rhetorical 
instructions of delivery were being used even in theatrical acting. Even the 
doubling of roles, where one actor may be asked to play different characters, 
points in that direction. The ability of the audience to adapt to seeing the same 
actor playing different parts means that they can transcend his material 
presence and constantly assume the virtual referential character that he is 
assumed to be playing (see Bradley 1992, 18). 
On the other hand, mere performing was not uncommon on the 
Renaissance stage. Even professional actors were sometimes performing on 
the stage, rather than acting.8 One reason for this was the spectacular origin of 
the English stage. Elizabethan actors descended from, and continued to have 
affinities with, popular performers such as singers, dancers, jugglers, and 
minstrels (Hattaway 1982, 19). One feature of these performances is that they 
were direct experiences, not based on a given script, but often improvised, and 
they never aspired to represent or refer to any outside reality (Weimann 2000, 
60-1). An especially interesting case in point is the stage clowns, who shared 
features of both players and actors. Although the clowns were actors in scripted 
plays, their appeal depended partly on their performing skills. Some of these 
clowns and fools, such as William Kemp, Richard Tarlton and others, might step 
out of role and become directly engaged with the spectators by responding to 
their applause. Shakespeare makes a reference to this tradition in Hamlet’s 
advice to the players: “And let those that play your clowns speak no more than 
is set for them, for there be of them that will themselves laugh to set on some 
quantity of barren spectators to laugh too” (3.2.34-7). This was more of a 
presentational than a representational performance, one in which the 
performant function overrides the referential one. This mode is also detriment of
the fictional status of the theatre for the players here, as Kendall Walton might 
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have it, have violated the rules of the fictional game. The effect of this kind of 
playing was to distract the spectator’s attention away from the imaginary, 
remote fictional reality and to fix it on the immediate reality of the player’s 
corporeal skills. Likewise, such playing abolishes the double chronology that is 
essential for fiction-making. For by sharing the same reality as the spectators, 
story time and performance time will be the same. Soboth modes of acting and 
playing feature in Renaissance stage. 
The third, more encompassing dichotomy is that between text and 
performance. It is another site for the competing components of the virtual or 
imaginary (what the text stands for) and the actual material reality (what the 
performance stands for). This dichotomy between text and parallels the tension 
between the imaginary story and how that story is presented. For a long time, 
text and performance contested the status of authority in theatre. In Chapter 6 
of the Poetics, Aristotle considers plot as the most important of the six elements 
of tragedy, and spectacle as the least important. The tension between the 
authority of the text and the authority of the performance has continued 
throughout the history of theatre. In the Shakespearean theatre, many factors 
might intervene to decide the authority of either the text or performance; chief 
among these are the material conditions of performance in the Renaissance
public theatres as well as the symbolic value accorded to the Shakespearean
text throughout the centuries. The authority with which the text has been
endowed is motivated by an artistic impulse and is reflects a literary bias. The 
text is a representational medium and has a permanence that elevates it to the 
status of art in contrast to the ephemeral nature of theatrical performance. 
However, this textual tendency was not as dominant in the Renaissance
theatre as we might think. We have seen how the performant function was as 
strong and counterbalanced the textual or referential function in the Elizabethan 
theatre. Moreover, managers and other participants in the theatrical 
performance may have made suggestions and alterations to the text or 
promptbook. This dichotomy also has a bearing on the preferences of the 
political authority. Textually-based representation is generally preferred by 
authorities, for it regulates what is presented in contrast to sheer performance 
which is not controllable: “Written texts, like characters, are fixed, and therefore 
more susceptible to control than live improvisational performers" (Soule 2000, 
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116). This dichotomy between text and performance will feature in our analysis 
of the plays in this chapter and we will revisit it also in Chapter Four in relation 
to the question of determinism in text and performance. 
Thus it appears that, just like Renaissance literary theory, theatrical practice in 
the period was in no sense unified. Both the actual and virtual components were 
in ebb and flow, and both presentational and representational modes of theatre 
coexisted on the stage at that time. But however diverse the scope and 
orientation of these theories, and the practices which they inspired, they were 
driven by the same impulse: the quest to lend credibility or probability to the 
theatrical event. The notion of probability, which originated with Aristotle, was 
turned into the Renaissance ideal of verisimilitude; verisimilitude then meant, if 
not the scientific sense of probability, the mere appearance of truth. All of the 
theorists mentioned so far were motivated by aspiring to create verisimilar 
performance, but they differed in terms of their expectation of the spectators’ 
imaginative ability to make intelligible the otherwise scattered auditory and 
visual signs.  While Sidney and Castelvetro had a very low opinion of the 
audiences and thus thought that verisimilitude consists in what can be 
accessible to the senses, Buonamici was more ambitious and argued that even 
signs which have no similarity to their referents can be expressive of dramatic 
verisimilitude. According to Baxter Hathaway, "Buonamici objected to 
Castelvetro's argument on the ground that stage verisimilitude rested on the 
expressive cohesion of the signs or devices used in the convention of the 
representation" (1968, 84). With this relatively more relaxed conception of 
theatrical representation and verisimilitude, we are getting closer to the 
rhetorical view of fictionality or the communicative function of the virtual in 
theatre that we adumbrated in the last section. The credibility of the theatrical 
representation does not depend on the literal truth of theatrical signs. Rather it 
is the function of the whole representational process and the sum total of all the 
components of theatre, actual or virtual, auditory and visual. One advance of 
the theory of Buonamici is the insistence on the fact that in literature "probability 
is a quality of the representation (as opposed to probability statement that may 
be represented within the representation)"(Newsom 1989, 67). 
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This desire for verisimilitude also informed the varied practices that we 
sketched in the above dichotomies. As we have seen, actors’ training is likely to 
have been no different from other oratorical modes of training; and as 
probability was an end in rhetoric and oratory, so it was in theatre acting. 
However, the requirement of probability is more strongly present in 
representational than in presentational modes of acting. According to Lesley 
Wade Soule, "The popular theatre has always been a theatre of variety, 
disregardful of the consistency and probability demanded in aesthetic-textualist 
theatre"(2000, 10). This might be due to the fact that scripted textual 
performance is more controllable and predictable than improvisational 
performance, and consequently it is one in which consistency can be pre-
planned and observed. The probabilistic impulse was also strongly present in 
Shakespeare’s practice and in the next section we will see how Shakespeare 
manipulated the virtual aspect of theatre to create these realistic effects by 
stretching the limits of imaginative forces beyond what seemed possible at that 
time.
The Virtual in Shakespeare’s Theatre
Shakespeare’s practice is so wide and varied that we should be cautious before 
ascribing to him any one idea amongst the controversies raised above. Cases 
can be made for instances where he advances either a presentational or a 
representational view of theatre.9 However, some general guidelines about the 
role of the virtual component of theatre can be deduced from a variety of plays 
written in different periods of his theatrical career. In this section I shall
demonstrate that the virtual occupies a central place in Shakespeare’s 
dramaturgy and that Shakespeare viewed its function in theatre mainly as a 
potential that lurks within and supplements the actual component, and also in 
rhetorical terms as contributing to the intelligibility and probability of the whole 
theatrical performance. 
We have observed that the virtual is articulated in theatre mainly through 
theatre signs and narrative acts of the dramatic text. This is even more so in 
Shakespeare’s theatre. Given the paucity of theatre scenery, sets and props on 
the early modern stage, the onus on the spectator to use his/her imagination in 
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order to project the virtual or absent reality becomes even greater. Iconic signs 
are difficult to find in such theatre, and Shakespeare seems to make the point 
against sheer iconicity in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, which is to be discussed 
below. Indexical and metonymic signs, especially synecdoche, prove crucial in 
such performances. The ability of theatre to represent an army using just four or 
five players and to depict the action occurring in disparate locations is made 
possible essentially by its reliance on the audience’s imagination to work out the 
referents which these signs stand for. In this regard, Shakespeare’s practice is 
at odds with the prevalent ideas of drama that adhere to the unities of place and 
time, especially as advocated by Sir Philip Sidney. Shakespeare’s view seems 
closer to Buonamici than the others. Nevertheless, in such plays as Henry V
and Antony and Cleopatra, Shakespeare tends to stretch the imagination of his 
spectators too far, to an extent which Buonamici would think it is detrimental to 
intelligibility. 
The other source of the virtual in the plays is narration. Narrative also 
prompts the spectators to imagine the referential reality constructed by the 
narrative acts. As Richard Meek succinctly puts it, 
Dramatic works are always to some extent reliant upon the imagination of 
their audiences, and this is something that narrative passages in 
Shakespeare’s plays – which explicitly ask their audiences and readers to 
visualize absent places, events and works of art – invite us to consider. To 
put it another way, all modes of aesthetic experience, including hearing, 
seeing and reading plays, require a certain amount of imaginary work on the 
part of the reader or viewer.   (2009, 25)
Shakespeare makes extensive use of narration and he often crams his plays 
with narrative passages. Large portions of Shakespeare’s plays are constituted 
by narrative passages of different forms, such as reports, descriptions, 
messengers’ speeches, prologues and epilogues (Brennan 1989). Nevertheless, 
the narrative element in the plays has been underappreciated in favour of the 
assumption that Shakespeare is primarily a working playwright and a man of the 
theatre. This downplaying of the narrative component results from the belief that 
the dramatic and the narrative are mutually exclusive categories. Consequently, 
it has been claimed that the presence of narration within the dramatic mode is 
anomalous. According to Dr Johnson, narrative “in dramatic poetry is naturally 
tedious, as it is unanimated and inactive, and obstructs the progress of the 
action” (quoted in Wilson 1995, 20). However, this is hardly the opinion of the 
critical mainstream now. In the last two decades, there has been a growing 
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interest in the role of narrative in drama in general and Shakespeare in 
particular, and a good deal of admirable work has been done in this area.10
Shakespeare’s extensive use of narration in his plays is rooted in the 
traditional rhetorical scheme of enargeia mentioned above. Enargeia occupied a 
prominent place in the accounts of narrative in classical and Renaissance 
rhetoric, and has been variously called ‘evidentia,’ ‘vivid description’, ‘illustration’, 
‘hypotyposis,’ ‘ekphrasis,’ etc. Generally, enargeia refers to a description so 
vivid that it not only touches the ear but makes the absent thing being described 
seem present before the mind’s eye. The Rhetorica ad Herennium, generally 
ascribed to Cicero during the Middle Ages and Renaissance, talks about ‘occult 
demonstration’, as “when an event is so described in words that the business 
seems to be enacted and the subject to pass vividly before our eyes"(4.55.68). 
In De Oratore, Cicero makes this ability to present to the mind’s eye to be a 
distinct feature of narrative (2.66.264). In his Institutio Oratoria, Marcus Fabius 
Quintilian touches on it in many places, and he also foregrounds the glaringly 
visual aspect of this rhetorical scheme; according to Quintilian, enargeia seems
“not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual scene, while our emotions will 
be no less actively stirred than if we were present at the actual 
occurrence"(6.2.32). Quintilian also refers to the term ‘phantasia’ used by the 
Greeks for the same sense as enargeia (6.2.29).11 In the Renaissance, George 
Puttenham uses the word enargeia to mean the verbal ornaments which are
used to “satisfy and delight the ear only by a goodly outward show set upon the 
matter with words, and speeches smoothly and tuneably running” and the word 
energeia to signify “certain intendments or sense of such words & speeches
inwardly working a stir to the mind” (2004, 135). 
The effects of the use of these vivid narrative descriptions are lastingly 
important. One such effect is creating a sense of presence, as when the 
description makes the audience feel as if they were an eyewitness present in 
the past when it makes the event present to the spectator’s mind. This is 
especially relevant to the narration of off-stage events in theatrical performance. 
Thanks to these acts of narration, the off-stage events will be felt to be as 
powerfully present as the on-stage ones, thereby creating an exquisite 
continuity between what happens on- and off-stage (see Hutson 2007, 126). 
This effect will be specially foregrounded in our discussion of Antony and 
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Cleopatra. The fictionalizing aspect of these narratives is also clear, since they 
work on the ‘as if’ principle which we have identified as necessary for creating 
fictional worlds. Ruth Webb (2009, 103) remarks that in Quintilian enargeia is a 
matter of ‘illusion’ and it always characterizes the tension between absence and 
presence. This sense of presence also features in Roland Barthes’s(1989) 
discussion of these schemes (he mainly mentions ‘hypotyposis’) which create 
what he terms ‘the reality effect’. According to Barthes, this effect is achieved by 
the vivid description of details, and although it does not contribute to the plot of 
the stories, it helps create the sense of reality and verisimilitude which rhetoric 
was very keen to preserve. For Barthes, then, hypotyposis or enargeia
contributes to the intelligibility of the whole story. 
As shown above, enhancing credibility and intelligibility has always been 
the aim behind using these additional devices such as enargeia or hypotyposis. 
According to Lorna Huston, “Enargeia or evidentia understood thus . . . defines 
the intelligibility of narrative, and is particularly related to making what is fictive 
seem plainly true" (2007, 126). In Shakespeare this virtual imaginative reality, 
conjured up through theatrical signs and acts of narration, serves a rhetorical 
function. It also serves to enhance the probability and intelligibility of the whole 
theatrical performance by giving the spectator the actual action onstage and 
then supplementing it with narrative passages and other means of reporting 
events offstage. Shakespeare relies on the spectator’s imaginative ability to 
weave together all these disparate data into an intelligible, probable whole Joel 
Altman makes this point clearly:
Shakespeare is often a dramatist of shreds and patches, providing for his 
audience disparate strands of verbal and visual material that they must then 
weave into an intelligible fabric. This process is not only internal to his 
dramaturgy but is often the object of his dramatic representation. It 
actualizes an epistemology and an ontology that can only be described as 
theatrical: what you see and what you hear are nothing but images and 
words. Their meaning is to be found in the soul of the auditor: there lies the 
substance. He seems to have known, objectively and intuitively, that 
fragmentary, promissory, and even contradictory utterances are the raw 
materials of collaborating minds, which shape them into intelligible and 
coherent accounts of observed actions that are not always in agreement 
with one another.        (2010, 211-2) 
In terms of the relevance and rhetorical model sketched above, the process of 
sense-making is based on the inferences made by the spectator. Altman’s 
‘collaborating minds’ element is necessary if the spectator is to make treat the 
performance meaningfully To view it as collaboration or a game is to conceive 
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it in terms of the collaborative nature of fictionality. This game-like aspect has a
decisive role in creating the unique effect of these plays. 
Below I carry out an analysis of the role played by the virtual component of 
theatre in Shakespeare’s plays. I single out three plays for analysis: Henry V, A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream and Antony and Cleopatra. In Henry V, I shall mainly 
focus on the role of the Chorus, capitalizing on the extended pleas it makes of 
the audience to evoke the virtual reality (or Ryan’s textual reference world) of 
what is supposed be happening offstage. I shall demonstrate that this rather 
unusual example in Shakespeare (to be repeated only in Pericles) stems from a 
recognition of the limitations of the material component of theatre and its 
incapacity to present the actual reality onstage. I shall focus on the play-within-
a-play in A Midsummer Night’s Dream and show the comic effect which ensues
when the actors underestimate the imaginative capacities of their audiences 
and present an ‘art’ completely based on the actual, and devoid of any virtual 
element. In my extended analysis of Antony and Cleopatra, my main emphasis 
will be on the role of narration in creating the virtual sphere of the play and the 
way this sphere interacts, and sometimes even conflicts with, the actual 
component. The play is peculiar in the large role it assigns to narratives to 
bridge the distances covered by the action of the play. 
The Chorus in Henry V
Nowhere does Shakespeare more explicitly expose the inadequacy of the 
actual component of theatre and the essential role of the virtual component in 
making the action intelligible than he does in Henry V. My contention is that in 
this play Shakespeare addresses the inherent inadequacy of the theatrical 
medium to present onstage all the components of the story it aims to represent. 
The play makes extensive use of enargeia or phantasia in order to vividly 
describe the off-stage events of the past. More significantly, the play also 
metatheatrically draws the attention of the spectators to these facts in order, 
paradoxically, both to establish the presence of that absent reality and at the 
same time to direct the attention to its irrecoverable absence. This limitation of 
the theatrical medium, in turn, places more demands on the spectators to use 
their ‘imaginary forces’ to supplement that lack. 
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The prologues spoken by the Chorus establish this unique tendency 
unequivocally. The physical ingredients of the performance are so severely
limited that they fall short of presenting events in their entirety: 
But pardon, gentles all,
The flat unraised spirits that hath dared
On this unworthy scaffold to bring forth
So great an object. Can this cock-pit hold
The vasty fields of France? Or may we cram
Within this wooden O the very casques
That did affright the air at Agincourt?   (1, Prologue, 8-14)
The tone is blatantly apologetic; apologetic, perhaps, for almost everything 
theatrical. The actors playing this historically decisive event are ‘flat unraised 
spirits;’ the stage is an ‘unworthy scaffold’ or a mere ‘cockpit.’ Even in terms of
numbers, the actors presenting the action are ‘crooked figures,’ a zero or 
nothing, a ‘cipher,’ compared to the actual number of soldiers present in the real 
historical event. Graphically analogous to the numeral zero, the stage is 
portrayed as that ‘wooden O,’ the small enclosed area within whose ‘girdle’ that 
huge gigantic presence should now be represented. This down-to-earth humility 
staves off any attempt at iconic representation, for the disparity between the 
thing represented and the thing representing is too huge to be abridged by the 
use of these material presences. This awareness is sustained through the
speeches the Chorus makes during the play. In Act II, the Chorus asks the 
audience to be patient for it will “digest / Th’abuse of distance . . . “(Prologue 31-
2).The Chorus here admits that this gap abuses the actual past reality being 
represented here. Later in Act IV, it alludes to the non-seriousness of the 
representation, so much so that the actual material objects onstage, far from 
being emblems of the absent represented referential nature, are just mockeries 
of that nature: “yet sit and see, / Minding true things by what their mock’ries be”
(Prologue 52-3). Theatrical representation, thus, turns out to be a kind of 
original sin for which the best thing a playwright can do is to confess its 
existence and inevitability.  With this enormous disparity between the 
representation and the represented reality, we can point to a limitation of 
applying to theatre Ryan’s notion of the identity between the Textual Actual 
World and the Textual Reference World. Accordingly, the former is far from 
being an exact image of the latter. However, to think of the theatrical 
performance in terms of virtual potentiality would better help us to bridge the
gap between the representation and the reality being represented. 
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Another stunningly explicit admission of this abuse is given in the prologue 
to Act V:
I humbly pray them to admit th’excuse
Of time, of numbers, and due course of things,
Which cannot in their huge and proper life
Be here presented.                                                        (3-6)
The real thing being represented, or ‘the due course of things,’ is irretrievably 
lost because it ‘cannot . . . be here presented’ using the material, actual 
theatrical apparatus. Like the first speech at the beginning of the play, this one 
is also apologetic, seeking the audience’s ‘excuse’. This is an inherent paradox 
of theatre: that the material reality presented onstage cannot retrieve the 
original material reality. Reliance on that theatrical actual component only or the 
‘mockeries’ would justify the antitheatrical rhetoric which views theatre mainly 
as a distortion of reality.
It is here also, with the awareness of that discrepancy, that the virtual as 
potential is foregrounded. For the greater the discrepancy between the thing 
represented and the representation, the greater the potential capacity of the 
virtual to bridge that gap. Hence, the centrality of the virtual world. Unless 
supplemented by the virtual absent reality, the actual corporeal presence 
onstage would cease to make sense. The main point the play is making through 
the speeches of the Chorus is that the absent, virtual or possible component of 
theatre is indispensable for the credibility and comprehensibility of the theatrical 
performance, so much so that we come to think that “our minds and the 
performance are becoming one" (Leggatt 1988, 125). 
The virtual, referential reality is to be generated by the spectators’ 
imagination based on what it sees onstage. According to Peter Mudford (2000, 
6-7), performance means completion and filling in the gaps and completion is 
impossible without the audience. Performance, then, is inconceivable without 
the existence of the virtual meaning that waits to be actualized through the 
performance. It is a process of double actualization: on the one hand, moving 
the work from a script to a performance implies actualizing the meaning latent in 
the text. On the other hand, to understand the performance, the spectator 
needs to actualize its latent meaning as well. However, this process of 
completion is never finished or fixed: every actualization will result in a new 
reality and the potentialities of the virtual never run dry. In the Prologue to Act I, 
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the Chorus entreats the spectators to use their imaginary forces, to suppose, to 
think, and to ‘piece out’ the imperfections of the theatrical performance (17-27).
Thus, in order to supply the lack of the actual, material part of the theatrical 
representation, the Chorus is unavoidably having recourse to the imaginary, the 
virtual or the possible. And the reliance on the ‘imaginary forces’ of the 
spectators continues through the choric speeches. In Act III, it asks the 
audience to ‘think’ that they are standing on the ‘rivage’ and see a city (13-4). 
We are also entreated to “Grapple your mind” (18) and to “Work, work, your 
thoughts and therein see a siege” (25). Lastly, it asks us to “Still be kind, / And 
eke out our performance with your mind” (34-5). In Act V, the Chorus entreats 
us to “Heave him away upon your winged thoughts / Athwart the sea. Behold, 
the English beach / Pales in the flood with men, maids, wives and boys” (8-
10).With the proliferation of this visual imagery, we can observe the use of 
enargeia to make present to the ‘mind’s eye’ the irremediably absent past reality. 
The rhetorical figure of phantasia seems particularly relevant here as well. 
According to Quintilian, "There are certain experiences which . . . the Romans 
[call] visions, whereby things absent are presented to our imagination with such 
extreme vividness that they seem actually to be before our very eyes” (6.2.29).
So the spectator is granted a central role in the process of meaning-
making which renders the theatrical performance intelligible. This cooperative 
process results in what Weimann calls bifold authority: "Authority in this theatre, 
as we shall see, needed to be validated by the audience and was unlikely to 
result without the cooperative effort of the audience's "imaginary forces" (1988, 
412). This bifold authority, which is responsible for the generation of meaning 
and the establishment of credibility for the representation, can be approached in 
terms of Kendall Walton’s games of make-believe. It is with the entrance of the 
spectator as a player in the theatrical game that the true nature of the theatrical 
representation as pretence and a game of make-believe is foregrounded. In 
other words, in order for the performance to succeed and the spectator to enjoy 
the representation, the spectator needs to agree on the rules: s/he needs to 
pretend that ‘within this girdle’ two monarchies are now confronting each other, 
and that the one actor stands for thousands of real soldiers. Not only are 
theatrical existents turned into signs, but even mere narration should be taken
as such: it would have that descriptive ‘enargeia’, to the extent that when the 
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spectators hear the word ‘horses’ they have to imagine that they are really 
seeing horses in the battlefield. The ‘imperfections’ of the actual component are 
to be pieced out by imagination, or pretence.  
The play attempts to present a complementary perspective on the actual 
and virtual, in order to establish the credibility of the theatrical representation. It 
has to strike an uneasy balance between the representing (actual, material 
present reality onstage) and the represented (possible, virtual absent reality 
offstage). Uneasy, that is, because it stems from the irreducibly dual nature of 
theatrical representation in particular and fiction in general. So in theatre Marie-
Laure Ryan’s notion of ‘recentering’ into a separate possible world or new 
virtual reality does not completely hold, due to the material presence onstage of 
actors and stage sets. The Chorus is careful to stress the spatial and temporal 
presence of the actual component of theatre: spatially speaking, it makes 
extensive use of the demonstrative ‘this,’ as in ‘this cockpit,’ ‘this wooden O,’ 
‘these walls,’ etc. Temporally, it stresses the presentness of the moment as in 
‘now you see,’ ‘Now we bear,’ etc.  Even the wide use of imperatives implies the 
temporal continuity between actors and audiences (Walsh 2009, 182). In fact, 
the rhetorical schemes of enargeia and hypotyposis, which have been in use 
throughout the Chorus’s speeches, imply that single chronology, for they try to 
bridge the past with the present. As Quintilian puts it, "But this transference of 
time . . . was more modestly used in vivid description by the old orators. For 
they would preface it by words such as ‘Imagine that you see’” 
(9.2.41).However, even this corporeal presence of the actual cannot prevail and 
bring about the presence of the virtual once and for all; on the one hand, 
presence in theatre was illustrated in temporal terms and can be brought about 
by, employing Edmund Jones’ words, reconciling the ‘Now’ of the drama with 
the ‘Now’ of the theatre. Theatre, according to Thornton Wilder, brings about the 
experience of the ‘now there’ (quoted in Power 2008, 43). On the other hand, 
given the historical nature of the represented story, even the temporal presence 
which the Chorus is trying to bring forth is now disrupted. Brian Walsh observes 
that "At first glance, the Prologue traces a movement from a fantasy of 
presence to the realization of absence, a turn that occurs at the caesura of line 
8, as ‘But pardon all’"(2009, 182). However, I think that it is less of a movement 
than a co-presence of both perspectives of presence and absence at one and 
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the same time that gives the theatrical experience its special appeal. According 
to Frederick Burwick, “The real pleasure derived from knowing the scene 
represented was unreal and merely an imitation” (quoted in Power 2008, 26). 
The play is making a general case about theatrical representation, 
because what the Chorus is entreating the audience to do is a conventional rule 
which the playgoer knows by default. Therefore, it was hardly necessary to 
mention it at all for the play’s effect to be understood. The play was preceded by 
nine histories in none of which does Shakespeare make these detailed 
comments. Accordingly, contra Walsh (2009), I think that the play is making a
case about theatrical representation in general and not merely about the 
representation of history. History, nevertheless, has one more complication, 
which is the irretrievability of the past reality. We shall touch on the relation 
between historical and theatrical representations in Chapters Three and Four. 
Anne Righter (1962, 174) takes the chorus’s speeches to express 
Shakespeare’s disgust for the status of his art. However, despite the apologetic 
nature of the Prologues, I do not understand it as disgust, but rather as an 
observation about the complexity of the theatrical phenomenon and what is 
required to make sense of the performance. 
In conclusion, we have demonstrated how the play establishes the 
inherent limitations of the theatrical performance and thus stakes the need to 
supplement it with the virtual reality. It heavily uses visual imagery as well as 
the rhetorical devices of enargeia and phantasia in order to present that absent 
reality to the mind’s eye. Although it does not establish the ultimate authority for 
the virtual either, it has situated it in a pivotal position within the process of the 
reception of the theatrical performance. And with it the play also establishes the 
centrality of the spectators in the sense-making activity, whether that is 
interpreted as a game of make-believe or otherwise. Finally it shows the real 
extent of the cooperative nature of the fictional enterprise in the theatre. 
The play-within-a-play inA Midsummer Night’s Dream
In A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Shakespeare demonstrates how integral the 
virtual component is to the intelligibility of the theatrical performance by showing 
how awkward the performance would be when it does not take that component 
into account. In the play-within-a-play Pyramus and Thisbe, the mechanicals 
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start up with a highly presentational view which stresses the actual component 
of their performance. Then, afraid of the illusionistic power their performance 
might unleash, they switch to a ridiculously representational strategy. In both 
cases, however, they underestimate the imaginative powers of their audiences 
and their ability to generate the virtual referential reality which the performance 
is supposed to summon up. I shall deal with the representational strategies of 
the players and then show that their theatrical doctrine is at odds with 
Shakespeare’s practice in the larger play of A Midsummer Night’s Dream.
At the beginning of their preparation the mechanicals think that the 
audiences will take their performance at face value, taking the action onstage to 
present the real thing, which would result in a supremely illusionistic form of 
acting. For example, told that he is going to play Pyramus, the lover who kills 
himself for love, Bottom exclaims: “That will ask some tears in the true 
performing of it. If I do it, let the audience look to their eyes: I will move storms” 
(1.2.19-20). When Bottom suggests that he play the role of lion to make 
excellent roaring, Quince warns against the response this will evoke in their 
female spectators:
QUINCE: An you should do it too terribly you would fright the Duchess and 
the ladies that they would shriek, and that were enough to hang us all.
ALL THE REST. That would hang us, every mother’s son.   (61-4) 
Even though they may not be able to present the real thing itself, their aspiration 
for extreme life-likeness pushes them to use the most iconic signs at their 
disposal.  When told that he should play Thisbe, a woman, Flute protests: “Nay, 
faith, let not me play a woman. I have a beard coming” (39-40). So, they are
aiming for a degree of verisimilitude whereby the actor bears such a close 
resemblance to the character he is acting that they would be hardly 
distinguishable. “Good acting would destroy acting, by turning a resemblance 
into the thing which it resembles" (Blits 2003, 47). 
So far, the mechanicals’ view of their spectators is Castelvetro-like, in the 
sense that they believe that their audience are incapable of differentiating the 
thing represented from the representation. According to Ekbert Fass, “Even 
Bottom, perhaps mindful of Quince’s warning, exchanges a Castelvetro-type 
approach to one reminiscent of Buonamici” (1986, 67). However, their approach 
is hardly that of the Buonamici-like representationalism. While Buonamici thinks 
that the audience is capable of relating stage signs to their fictional referents, 
75
the mechanicals take up the job themselves; they declare to the spectators the 
referents of the theatrical signs they are employing, and explain that they are 
just signs and not the real things themselves. For example, when the players 
are worried about another prop they are to use, that Pyramus will use a sword 
to kill himself, Bottom tries to avoid these unwelcome consequences by 
suggesting:
Not a whit. I have a device to make it all well. Write me a prologue, and let 
the prologue seem to say we will do no harm with our swords, and that 
Pyramus is not killed indeed; and for the more better assurance, tell them 
that I, Pyramus, am not Pyramus, but Bottom the weaver. This will put them 
out of fear. (3.1.15-20)
In the same token, the actors have to write a prologue to explain the reality of 
the roaring lion and so forth. The illusion depends on the actor behaving as if 
the audiences do not exist.  So, the complete illusion they first sought is now 
shattered as they intend to speak directly to the audience. “Afraid of creating too 
much dramatic illusion, the artisans destroy what little they might have had" 
(Blits 2003, 176). This fear extends even to the use of the iconic signs which 
they first preferred. Perhaps aware of the dangers of iconicity, and the 
possibility that the icon may be mistaken for the thing itself (Elam 2002, 19; 
West 2002, 40-1), they even refrain from using the available iconic signs that 
may create theatrical illusion. When Quince expresses concern about the 
presentation of moonshine to the chambers where the lovers meet, Snout 
suggests using natural moonshine in their performance. Although they are 
informed that the moon, according to the calendar, will shine that night, they
nevertheless revert to the other option of having an actor to play moonshine: 
BOTTOM. Why, then may you leave a casement of the great chamber 
window where we play open, and the moon may shine in at the casement.
QUINCE. Ay, or else one must come in with a bush of thorns and a lantern 
and say he comes to disfigure, or to present, the person of Moonshine.  
(3.1.48-53)
And they use the same strategy by presenting an actor to play the role of 
Wall. However, though it may have been impossible for them to present a real 
Wall, they were able to do that with the Moonshine. Their aversion to using real 
moonlight indicates their reluctance to create even the least illusion in their 
performance. Switching from one extreme to the other, from bland realism to 
sheer symbolism, is exposed to derision by Shakespeare. In their actual 
performance, they stick closely to their disillusionist aesthetics. Playing Wall, 
76
Snout says: “In this same interlude it doth befall / That I, one Snout by name, 
present a wall” (5.1.154-5). When Snug comes forward as the Lion, he says 
addressing the ladies: “Then know that I as Snug the joiner am / A lion fell, nor 
else no lion’s dam” (218-9). And Starveling presents Moonshine: “This lantern 
doth the horned moon present. / Myself the man i‘ th’ moon do seem to be” 
(235-6). The artisans violate the second prerequisite which Marie-Laure Ryan 
sets for fictionality, namely the embedded communicative transaction; for with 
these declarations, the transaction from actor to character is no longer 
embedded any more. Even recentering seems impossible with the actors’
declarations about who they really are and what they are representing. With 
these two prerequisites abrogated, it is not surprising to see how little illusion 
the artisans’ performance has produced. 
This mode of disillusionist acting is subjected to harsh derision and ridicule 
by the audience for whose amusement it was originally acted. This is indicated 
by the audience’s incessant interruptions to the players, not to mention their 
direct negative comments such as Hippolyta’s “This is the silliest stuff that ever I 
heard” (5.1.207). The exasperation on the part of the audience with this mode of 
acting may stem from their feeling that their intelligence has been 
underestimated by having explained things that they should conventionally be 
familiar with. Nevertheless, Shakespeare is indicating, via Theseus, that a one-
sided participation, no matter how meticulous and detailed it might be, is hardly 
enough to create the typical theatrical experience. To Hippolyta’s above 
complaint Theseus replies:
THESEUS. The best in this kind are but shadows, and the worse are no 
worse if imagination amend them.
HIPPOLYTA. It must be your imagination, then, and not theirs.
THESEUS. If we imagine no worse of them than they of themselves, they 
may pass for excellent men.   (208-12) 
So, the theatrical experience is still lacking unless the actors’ efforts are coupled 
with the spectators’ participation, through the imaginative involvement that the 
Chorus of Henry V has begged for. The cooperation of the spectators is thus 
conceived by Hippolyta as requiring ‘your imagination, then, and not theirs’. The 
mistake of the players is that they have left very little room, if any, for the 
imaginative participation of their spectators, the result being the ridicule of the 
very spectators they have striven to please. In terms of the communicative 
model suggested in this chapter, the artisans are breaching the communicative 
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protocols that are necessary for the fictionality of theatre to be operative. They 
underestimate the inferential abilities of the audience, which leads them to give 
too much information. According to Michael Quinn, the problem lies in the 
absence of a well-defined theatrical convention, which is itself based on 
precedents: the mistake they make is that "they communicate so much more 
earnestly than the situation requires. Conventions are not usually arranged 
situations of understanding; they are assumed understandings, and the amateur 
players assume too little in the context"(2006, 304). Seen from the perspective 
of fictionality as a game of make-believe, if one side does not take part in the 
game, then the game of make-believe is over, as Kendall Walton would have it. 
Their onstage spectators no longer consider themselves to be taking part in the 
fictional game of make-believe. 
A piquant irony becomes clear when we compare the playlet with the main 
play in A Midsummer Night’s Dream. The main play is one in which all sorts of 
unrealistic actions have been presented onstage, such as the kingdom of fairies, 
the magic juice, and the improbabilities of the lovers’ behaviour. The main plot 
is so unbelievable that even Theseus, himself part of that world of wonders, has 
rejected these stories as “More Strange than true. I never may believe / These 
antique fables, nor these fairy toys” (5.1.2-3). Yet even in such a world, 
Shakespeare never feels the need to apologize or diegetically explain what is 
going on in his play, nor would the audience feel the need to have these things 
explained to them. Pyramus and Thisbe, undoubtedly, does not go so far in 
stretching the audience’s imagination as does the main play. As J. L. Styan 
wryly observes, “If only Quince had been able to slip into Shakespeare’s 
audience and see the opening scenes!” (1988, 17). So, the mechanicals should 
not have shied away from what the whole play, of which they are part, has been 
doing. It is this difference of views about theatrical conventionality that triggers
these different styles of performing. The richness of the virtual reality in the 
main play and the lack thereof in the playlet might have been an incongruity that 
Shakespeare skilfully crafted. Kiernan Ryan observes that “The buffoonery of 
Bottom and his stage-struck fellow craftsmen is first and foremost an 
affectionate study in theatrical naivety and ineptitude, which serves as a foil for 
the astonishing sophistication of A Midsummer Night’s Dream itself” (2009, 98). 
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This stark difference is also highlighted by Theseus’s paradoxical views 
about imagination. While Theseus is openly dismissive of imagination in the 
larger play, he seems supportive of imagination in the play-within-a-play. In his 
speech at the start of act 5, scene 1, Theseus presents a very derogatory view 
of the imagination, with which he associate three classes of people: the poet, 
the lover and the madman. Interestingly, what worries Theseus about 
imagination is the potential power of the virtual. Theseus insists that the 
madman can see “more devils than vast hell can hold” (5.1.9), perhaps echoing 
Christopher Marlowe’s ‘infinite riches in a little room’. This is, moreover, a 
problem with the transformative power of the imagination, the power that 
enables the lover to see “Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt” (11) and gives form 
and shape to ‘things unknown’ and gives a local habitation to ‘airy nothing’. It is 
the potential quality of the virtual that lurks within and gives the possibility of 
forever creating new things and new creatures out of nothing. Theseus is not at 
ease with this power of ‘seeing as’, which Walton and Saltz consider to be the 
essence of acts of fictionalizing. He detests this game-like aspect of imagination. 
When he slams at this aspect with which “How easyis a bush supposed a bear!” 
(22), Theseus is unwittingly anticipating Kendall Walton’s example of children’s 
games of make-believe. Surprisingly, Theseus, who is intolerant about the 
wondrous stories of the lovers in the main play, is strongly supportive of 
imagination in the playlet. The ‘amending’ to the awkwardness of the artisans’ 
playing consists in the same processes which he has just uncompromisingly 
rejected. In his latter suggestion Theseus seems to be more theatrically minded 
and expresses what the offstage audiences of A Midsummer Night’s Dream
have been doing all along. 
Thus, the play shows the unfortunate results when the players downplay 
the imaginative forces of the spectator and underestimate their capacity to 
project the possible worlds or virtual reality represented by the play. Had they 
done as their creator did in the main play, by relying on theatrical conventions 
and the spectators’ cooperation, they would not have been so derided. If Henry 
V lays bare a convention that is otherwise silently accepted by theatregoers, A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream shows what happens when that convention is 
transgressed. In the next section, we will turn to an analysis of the role of the 
virtual in Antony and Cleopatra. But whereas in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 
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we have been dealing with the use and abuse of theatrical signs, in Antony and 
Cleopatra we will be chiefly concerned with the role of narration in the 
construction of the absent virtual reality. 
Narration in Antony and Cleopatra
The place of the possible or virtual in Shakespeare’s theatre is further 
highlighted through the use of narrative in his plays. As we have shown, the use 
of narration invites the audience to conjure up the virtual reality which the 
narrative constructs. Theatrical practice shares this quality with narrative fiction 
which is the default case for fictionality. So the tension between the actual and 
the virtual which we have been tracing in Shakespeare’s theatre can be 
translated into the tension between the two modes of showing and telling in 
theatrical representation. The effect of narrative acts in theatre can be so 
pervasive that the actual action in the play is overwhelmed by, and framed 
within, the narrated actions which are supposed to take place offstage. 
This narrative effect is glaringly apparent in Antony and Cleopatra, in 
which Shakespeare draws a subtle picture of the interaction between showing 
and telling. Through its division of its two main locations, Egypt and Rome, the 
play utilizes the necessity, and even the desirability, of narration for the 
transmission of information. Critics have frequently observed that narration is 
the main representational technique in the play and that spectators see less 
action onstage and more narrative acts about actions that take place offstage.12
These acts of narration that pervade every part of the play would also demand, 
though not as directly as in Henry V, that the audience use their ‘imaginary 
forces’ to bring to life that absent reality which the narration is supposed to 
invoke. David Bevington observes that Antony and Cleopatra "relies to an 
unusual degree on the audience’s imagination, even more so than at Agincourt 
in Henry V" (2004, 96). Moreover, as narration is always reliant on a point of 
view from which the events are narrated, Shakespeare’s craftsmanship is such 
that the setting, time and action are inextricably related to and manifested by 
the characters’ perception of these elements. 
In this section, I shall argue that the virtual occupies a large space in this 
play, and as a consequence its interaction with the actual component of theatre 
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is further complicated. The narrated events that are not actualized onstage will 
be actualized in the spectators’ imagination, which generates their potential for 
a variety (perhaps infinity) of ways in which the spectator will actualize them. 
This opens the door for more and more possibilities to be realized in so far as 
they can make sense if coupled with the actual action onstage. The play uses 
narrative as a central technique to help the audience connect the onstage 
happenings which would otherwise seem only loosely connected and barely 
comprehensible. It also self-consciously and metatheatrically addresses such
issues as the relation between telling and showing, and the tension between 
text and performance, as well as the tension between actor and character. 
Moreover, between showing and telling also features as a technique of 
characterization in the play. Finally, I shall show how Shakespeare builds on 
these themes to contrast the chief two locations in the play, Rome and Egypt.
Narratives in the play fall into three main categories. Narrated events have 
either happened before the beginning of the play’s action or during it; in the 
latter case, the narration is either prior to or simultaneous with the action. In the 
first case, although the events being narrated have happened before the launch 
of the play’s action, they are crucial for readers or spectators to know as the 
background against which the present action is set. One example is the 
narration of Fulvia’s and Caesar’s actions in Rome. While frolicking in Egypt, 
Antony receives a messenger telling him about his wife Fulvia’s fight with 
Antony’s brother and then against Caesar. Another messenger then comes in to 
report that Fulvia is now dead (1.2.108). These events, all taking place prior to 
the play’s action, are necessary as the foundation upon which certain 
characters are going to build certain positions throughout the play. They cannot 
be enacted onstage, for this is counter to the principle of dramatic economy. 
More importantly, Shakespeare chooses to have these events narrated in front 
of Antony in order to show us his reaction to them. In this play events are not so 
significant as how these characters perceive them. In no other way could 
Shakespeare have portrayed Antony’s character so splendidly than by showing 
how torn he is between his duties in Rome and his wish to stay in Egypt: “These
strong Egyptian fetters I must break, / Or lose myself in dotage” (1.2.105-6). His 
reaction after hearing of Fulvia’s death also serves to show his feelings towards 
her: “There’s a great spirit gone! Thus did I desire it”(111). As this example 
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shows, the dramatic significance of narrative may be superior to that of direct 
action: these responses would be lost if we were only shown Fulvia dying 
onstage.  
This significance of reporting also applies to the events happening during 
the time-span of the play. Here also the characters’ responses are as important 
as the events themselves. The largest portion of these events consists of 
battles that could not be enacted onstage. Instead of seeing the battles enacted 
onstage, Shakespeare gives us a picture of how characters anticipate the result 
of these battles and how they respond when the battles are over. Shakespeare 
is only interested in registering “the reactions to the ebb and flow of battle in the 
eyes of those onstage to events that are entirely offstage” (Brennan 1989, 133). 
In the first battle, after Antony’s soldiers realize that they are defeated due to 
the escape of their general, Camidius enters with this succinct comment:
Our fortune on the sea is out of breath,
And sinks most lamentably. Had our general
Been what he knew himself, it had gone well.
Oh, he has given example for our flight
Most grossly by his own.     (3.10.24-8)
In these wars we do not see Antony vanquished, but rather hear how his 
generals perceive his deterioration (Ornstein 1966, 40). Having realized the 
unfortunate result of the battle, Camidius contemplates the reason behind this, 
namely the character of Antony and his actions – his escape after the 
withdrawal of Cleopatra. It is intriguing that Camidius goes even further, 
ruminating on how this result could have been avoided, by using a 
counterfactual statement to construct a virtual situation: “Had our general / Been 
what he knew himself, it had gone well.” As we shall see in Chapter Four, 
counterfactuals are a crucial technique for ascribing causality; so Camidius
attributes this failure to both Antony’s actions and, primarily and more 
importantly, to his character. This is a deeper level of causal thinking: it is 
because of his personality defects that Antony escapes, not the other way 
around. Nor does the play need to present the reaction of Caesar and his 
followers to these results showing Octavius’ skills in these battles, for “it is not 
so much that Octavius wins them as that Antony loses them” (Brennan 1989, 
134).  Similar observations can be made about other examples of the narration 
of the events that take place within the time of the play, such as the narration of 
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the second battle (4.7), the third battle (4.12), Enobarbus’ account of the 
downfall of Antony’s allies, and so on. 
Sometimes, the event being narrated is coeval with the act of narration, 
when a character onstage narrates what is going on offstage at that very 
moment. This technique, used since the ancient Greeks, is called ‘teichoscopy.’ 
One example is when Agrippa and Enobarbus are chatting about how the three 
triumviri are settling things that very moment:
AGRIPPA: What, are the brothers parted?
ENOBARBUS: They have dispatched with Pompey; he is gone.
The other three are sealing. Octavia weeps
To part from Rome. Caesar is sad, and Lepidus
Since Pompey’s feast, as Menus says, is troubled
With the green-sickness.   (3.2.1-6)
The dispatching with Pompey took place prior to the conversation (have 
dispatched), but the brothers’ sealing is going on at the very moment of the 
exchange, hence the use of the continuous present (are sealing); such is also 
the case with Octavia’s weeping and Caesar’s sadness. Another example of 
teichoscopy is in 2.7.1-15, when the servants narrate what is going on offstage 
at the feast of Pompey, especially the carousing and drunkenness of the three 
triumvirs. Here also Shakespeare is interested to convey how their common
followers perceive the behaviour and actions of these leaders and how they 
anticipate the events to come. Nowhere is this better expressed than in the 
speech of the first servant: “Here they’ll be, man. Some o’their plants are 
illrooted already; the least wind i’th’world will blow them down” (2.7.1-2). The 
servant is using this apt metaphorical language to describe, more than to 
narrate, the present state of their friendship and how they will turn against each 
other. The play actualizes what this servant has anticipated, that their friendship 
is so (illrooted) that the (least wind) will put it to an end, only to predict Caesar’s 
break with Pompey, then Lepidus and lastly with Antony. Moreover, this kind of 
narration creates the impression of being a play-within-a-play, as if the leaders 
are performing in the internal play and the underlings are performing in the 
external frame, commenting on the performance of their social superiors. Later 
in this chapter we shall embark on the metatheatrical aspect of the play in more 
detail.
The use of narration in the play, accompanied by vivid enargeia, also has 
a bearing on the relation between the onstage and the offstage action. As it 
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conjures up the imaginative presence of the offstage, it helps to create 
continuity between the two spaces. As Lorna Hutson observes about this 
tendency in Renaissance drama:
We areinclined to forget how much is not actually staged in a Renaissance 
play, because the enargeia, or vividness and presence, of various 
characters’ narrations of events that take place elsewhere gives us the 
impression, especially as readers, of a reality as immediate as that which 
we imagine to take place on-stage. (2007, 126)
As it reorients the relation between the onstage and the offstage realms, 
narration also serves to complicate the idea of theatrical presence. Whereas the 
use of narration in theatre usually serves to stimulate an absent reality in the 
minds of the spectators, the use of narrative in Antony and Cleopatra is so 
pervasive that it makes the actual and the virtual seem co-present on the stage, 
and neither of them seem more real than the other. As the action is divided 
between two main locations, Rome and Egypt, each of these locations serves 
as the backdrop or offstage for the other; the off-stage is only accessible 
through and made present by the act of narration. When we watch events 
taking place in one of these two locations, the other location is by no means 
absent. In the first two scenes, which take place in Egypt, Rome is no less 
powerfully present, through the many messengers and the letters they convey 
and the narratives they deliver about how things turned out in Rome. In 1.2 and 
in 2.2 when Antony is in Rome, Egypt is no less present through reports. 
According to Bert O. States, “When something is narrated in the fictional world 
somewhere else, qualities established in this perceptual synthesis will infect that 
offstage space” (1985, 52).
One way the onstage and offstage worlds are infected by each other is via 
the use of messengers. Ray L. Heffner points out that “the messenger is treated 
as an extension of the personality of the sender of the message” (1976, 156). 
The messenger coming to Antony from Rome is acutely aware of that: “The 
nature of bad news infects the teller” (2.1.84). However, the characters’ 
perception of the messengers’ mission is not uniform. In this regard, Cleopatra 
stands apart from the other characters as she identifies the messenger with the 
news he brings. When the messenger tells her of Antony’s marriage to Octavia, 
she says: “The most infectious pestilence upon thee!” and strikes him down 
(2.5.61). The overall effect of this excessive use of messengers is to create the 
impression of fluidity and continuity between the onstage and the offstage 
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realms and also to make the different location simultaneously present for the 
spectator. Or as Alexander Leggatt points out:
For all the vast distances its action covers, this is a play in which one land 
impinges on another quickly and easily . . . . Antony and Cleopatra is full of 
messengers, who always tell the truth. The flow of information is clear and 
constant, and annihilates distance. But the crucial factor is the mind itself, 
which can call up instantly an absent character or an absent world.  (1988, 
176-7)
Moreover, the play not only uses narration and the co-presence of the 
actual and virtual as a technique to ‘annihilate distance,’ but it also 
metatheatrically thematizes these concepts, inviting its spectator to contemplate
them more deeply.13 As far as the concept of theatrical presence is concerned, 
the play raises the issue of whether the virtual is as strongly present as the 
actual material presence onstage. Consequently, presence in the play is not 
restricted to the physical presence of characters onstage, but to the effect they 
can exert on the onstage world even when they are physically absent. Thus, 
two modes of presence can be discerned in the play: virtual presence and 
actual presence.
Virtual presence (or the presence effect) means that, even when a 
character is not physically present, his/her presence is felt onstage. Among the 
characters it is Antony whose presence is a common concern to other 
characters; as the link between the play’s major two locations, Antony is torn 
between them, and he seems at one and the same time everywhere and 
nowhere. It is his presence that most characters are concerned about.14This is 
also generally true of the leaders who want to perpetuate a sense of fluid 
presence, of being present everywhere. Ventidius tells Silius that “Caesar and 
Antony have even won / More in their officer than person” (3.1.16-7). Even in 
Antony’s absence, what his soldiers achieve is “in his name, / That magical 
word of war” (30-1). Their names, then, have the potential of power and can
exercise the same effect as if they were present. But what these underlings 
achieve is thanks to the effect of their propaganda of presence. These leaders 
seem quite aware of their presence effect; for example, chiding Octavia for 
coming unattended to Rome, Caesar supposes that her presence should be felt 
before she is actually present, that she should have “The neighs of horse to tell 
of her approach / Long ere she did appear” (3.6.45-6). Interestingly, Caesar and 
Antony both endorse and deny the effects of each other’s presence:
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ANTONY: My being in Egypt, Caesar, What was’t to you?
CAESAR: No more than my residing here at Rome
Might be to you in Egypt. Yet if you there
Did practise on my state, your being in Egypt
Might be my question.                                                         (2.2.40-4)
Actual presence is no less of an obsession in this play, which can clearly 
be seen in the characters’ perceptions of the onstage/offstage dichotomy. This 
is particularly apparent in the relationship of Cleopatra and Antony. Cleopatra is 
obsessed with her need to occupy the same physical and psychological domain 
as Antony so that they are both actually co-present, which is manifested by her 
impatience with his absence. Cleopatra’s words early in the play are: “Saw you 
my lord?” and “Was he not here?” (1.2.69). In the next scene, the first thing she 
utters is: “Where is he?” (1.3.1). Admitting that he cannot be physically with her, 
Antony assures her that they will remain psychologically together:
Let us go. 
Come. Our separation so abides and flies
That thou residing here goes yet with me,
And I, hence fleeting, here remain with thee. (1.3.103-6)
Other characters are no less aware of this mutual interdependence of Antony 
and Cleopatra. Mocking Antony’s lethargy, Pompey assures his soldiers that 
Antony cannot take part in any war against them since he is tied to Egypt: “Mark 
Antony / In Egypt sits at dinner, and will make / No wars without doors” (2.1.11-
3). Told by Maecenas that Antony is going to leave Cleopatra forever, 
Enobarbus exclaims: “Never. He will not” (2.2.239). Even in his death, Antony 
dies in order to attend Cleopatra. And, knowing that she is still alive, he asks to 
die by her side. Once Antony is dead, it is her turn to attend him. Her dream and 
preparations for death are devoted to this purpose.  When at last both are dead, 
Caesar orders that “She shall be buried by her Antony. / No grave upon the 
earth shall clip in it / A pair so famous” (5.2.348-50). 
An opposite relationship takes place between Antony and Caesar; they 
cannot be actually co-present and occupy the same domain at the same time; if 
one is onstage, the other must be offstage. Even the whole world, the largest 
stage, cannot hold them together. Early in the play, the soothsayer advises 
Antony to be away from Caesar: “O Antony, stay not by his side / . . . Make 
space enough between you” (2.3.16, 21). In fact, Antony’s residence in Egypt 
was partly motivated by his wish to stay away from Caesar. After Antony’s 
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death, Caesar holds his sword and exclaims: “We could not stall together / In 
the whole world” (5.1. 39-40).
Another central theme that the play metatheatrically addresses is the 
tension between text and performance (or between the virtual domain created 
by telling and the actual one of showing onstage) as well as the question of 
which is to claim the higher authority in theatre. Here the relation between the 
actual and the virtual is even more problematized, as the virtual is no longer the 
cognitive means by which to make sense of actual happenings. Instead, the 
play invests them with contradictory claims about the truth of what is happening 
or has happened. In other words, what the audience hear is falsified by what 
they actually see and vice versa. Such a discrepancy between telling and 
showing happens when the audience watches an event and then hears it retold 
in terms which depart from the actual action. This is the same tension between 
hearing and seeing Bert O. States refers to in Shakespeare (1985, 56). It is also 
a conflict between the semiotic and phenomenological perspectives in 
Shakespeare’s theatre.
This discrepancy between showing and telling is reflected in the 
discrepancy in chronology in both modes. For example, at the beginning of the 
play we see that Antony has received messengers from Rome and that he 
makes his mind up to go to Rome and leave the sensual delights of Egypt 
behind him. Making his excuses to Cleopatra, he tells her that “The strong 
necessity of time commands / Our services a while” (1.3.42-3). In the next 
scene, however, we see Caesar entering and reading a letter which tells him of 
the unmanly demeanour of Antony who now “fishes, drinks and wastes / The 
lamps of night in revel” in the company of Cleopatra (1.4.4-5). So what Caesar 
takes to be the case now is outdated news. “But we, the audience, know that 
this is ‘yesterday’s news’. We have ‘been’ in Alexandria as eye witnesses to the 
events Caesar’s spy has described” (Kiernan 1998, 163). The Antony portrayed 
in this letter is hardly the Antony we have just left in the last scene. The virtual 
events narrated to us are not in line with the same events which we have seen 
taking place before our eyes. Caesar seems unaware of one crucial 
characteristic of narrative reports, namely that they distort temporality since they
can only relate things in the past. When he receives Octavia, Caesar tells her: “I 
have eyes upon him, / And his affairs come to me on the wind. / Where is he 
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now?”(3.6.63-5). He treats these narratives as if they were theatrical 
performances. We have pointed out that theatre presents things ‘now there’ in 
the sense that it presents a spatially absent but temporarily present reality. 
Narrative, on the other hand, distances the reality it represents both spatially 
and temporally. So the ‘now’ that Caesar boasts about can be simply over by 
the time he utters it, for it is over by the time it has been sent to him. In another 
instance, Pompey asserts to his companions that Antony will not interrupt his 
sojourn in Egypt: “That sleep and feeding may prorogue his honour / Even till a 
Lethe’d dullness” (2.1.26-7). However, Pompey’s speech is immediately falsified 
by another messenger, Varrius, who tells them that “Mark Antony is every hour 
in Rome / Expected” (29-30).15
This tension between telling and showing is also used as a feature of 
characterization in the play. W. B. Worthen observes that “this contest between 
narrative and drama, text and performance, animates the characterization of the 
play's major roles” (1986, 297). What we hear about characters is contradicted 
by what we see of these characters’ actions onstage. One example is Antony’s 
suicide. After he hears of Cleopatra’s feigned death, Antony commits suicide by 
falling ineptly on his sword: 
To do this 
I learned from thee. 
[He stabs himself]
How? Not dead? Not dead?” (4.15.102-3).
Thus he has even failed to learn from his servant Eros who has just committed 
a properly Roman, brave suicide. Then two narratives are offered for Antony’s 
suicide, one by Antony himself, when he tells the distracted Queen: “Peace. Not 
Caesar’s valour /Hath o’erthrown Antony, but Antony’s / Hath triumphed on itself” 
(4.16.14-6). The second narrative is delivered by Dercetas to Octavius Caesar:
He is dead, Caesar,
Not by a public minister of justice,
Nor by a hired knife; but that self hand
Which writ his honour in the acts it did
Hath, with the courage which the heart did lend it,
Splitted the heart.                       (5.1.19-24)
So, both narratives insist on giving the heroic version of the event. The 
contradiction between the version we see onstage and the ones we hear 
narrated is crystal clear: as spectators we could hardly have noticed the 
courage these accounts took for granted. A more extreme example of imagining 
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Antony is provided by Cleopatra’s dream of him after his death. She tells us that 
she saw the “emperor Antony” whose “legs bestrid the ocean; his reared arm / 
Crested the whole world. His voice was propertied/ As all the tuned spheres” 
(5.2.75, 81-3). She is aware of the incredibility of such a narration, which is why 
she asks Dolabella: “Think you there was, or might be, such a man / As this I 
dreamt of?” And the answer is: “Gentle madam, no” (92-3). Thus in all these 
cases, showing is not as important as how Antony wanted his last image to be 
drawn and how his followers and enemies have received it, an image that is 
more or less different from what we have witnessed. 
A flagrant example of how narration helps create our impressions about 
the characters even more than the actions of these characters as we see them 
onstage is Enobarbus’s description of the barge of Cleopatra. Enobarbus’s 
description is the most exquisite example of the use of enargeia, phantasia or 
vivid description in the play. Enobarbus narrates how Antony and Cleopatra first 
met and how luxurious her train was on that occasion (2.2.196-236). Full of 
metaphors and hyperbole, this description is overwhelmingly subjective. To 
Enobarbus, Cleopatra’s barge was like a throne burning on water; its perfume 
made even the inanimate wind “love-sick” (200), let alone the humans smelling 
it. Even the water was “amorous” of that effect (203). Her “dimpled boys” are 
“like smiling Cupids” (208) and “Her gentlewomen” are likened to the “Nereides”
(212). So exquisite was the show that even the air, but for fear of vacancy, “Had 
gone to gaze on Cleopatra too, / And made a gap in nature” (223-4). At the
feast, Enobarbus goes on, Antony “pays his heart / For what his eyes eat only” 
(231-2). The mythical, unrealistic nature of this narration is acknowledged by 
Enobarbus himself as he admits that Cleopatra “beggared all description” (204). 
Ironically, even in this admission, he insists that she is more than anything he 
can describe. Moreover, Enobarbus seems very artistically self-conscious, in 
that to him Cleopatra outpictures “Venus where we see / The fancy outwork 
nature” (206-7). So Cleopatra is an exception to the rule, for nature here 
outpictures fancy. But what Enobarbus is doing is not providing ccess to nature, 
but rather providing another picture (or artwork) to represent that nature. It is 
like saying that the ekphrastic picture Enobarbus is now drawing of Cleopatra 
will undo all the previous versions; it is thus a comparison between different 
artworks, not between art and nature. Enobarbus’s passage epitomises the 
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whole play as much as the characters’ endeavour to exaggerate the pictures 
they draw about themselves and other characters. Indeed, some critics identify
“hyperbole . . . as the play’s basic rhetorical and structural principle” (Kahn 
1997, 110). This example also shows that the narrative language in the play is 
hardly neutral and descriptive, but is rather crammed with metaphors and value-
laden terms. In Shakespeare, the narration of the offstage events is never 
separated from the point of view of the narrator; so these narrations are 
perspectival as well as descriptive.
Thus, the Antony and Cleopatra whom we know are the sum total of all the 
different versions of these characters as conveyed by their fellow characters. It 
is not a picture of their actual state but their potential state, which we never see 
actualized in the play. What gets depicted is what these characters might be or 
might have been, and not what they really are. The actual figures onstage are 
inconsistent with the virtual reality projected about them. These represent two 
notions of character: “that while it seems to be revealed both through present 
action and through retrospective reconstruction, these two modes of 
characterization – and the ‘character(s)’ they evoke – often seem 
incommensurable" (Worthen 1986, 301). The onstage actions of characters like 
Antony and Cleopatra can hardly live up to the images, hyperbolic if fascinating, 
that are constructed about them, often before the beginning of the play’s actions. 
Their images represent their potential, which is always greater than the actuality, 
even greater than what a theatrical performance can bring to life. These images 
are cumulatively piled up over time to the extent that the characters they portray 
seem impossible to stage.16 And if we agree with Phyllis Rackin about the 
impossibility of staging Enobarbus’s description of Cleopatra’s barge (1972, 
204), then we can see how the play establishes the fact that the performance 
medium is inherently limited in conveying the virtual meanings that narrative 
sets forth.  
The limitations of the theatrical performance explain the anxiety characters 
display regarding public displays. If performance, as we have just observed, is 
inherently limited in conveying the larger historical character, in these public 
displays it is also deliberately distortive. Characters show their preference for 
the predictability and controllability of the text over their lack thereof in 
performance. Leading characters such as Antony, Cleopatra and Caesar, 
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otherwise obsessed with presence, are burdened with the idea of public 
spectacles. In (3.6), Caesar urges Romans against Antony by telling them that 
“Cleopatra and himself in chairs of gold / Were publicly enthroned. At the feet 
sat / Caesarion, whom they call my father’s son” (3.6.4-6). Likewise, Antony, 
having been defeated, prefers death to being publicly exhibited. He uses this 
scenario to convince Eros to kill him if he does not want his master to be so 
publicly humiliated (4.15.71-7). Cleopatra, who is matchlessly skilled in staging 
displays of herself, is scared of a display directed and staged by her captor, 
Octavius Caesar. Twice she imagined how Octavia “with her modest eyes” 
(4.16.28) will be “demurring upon me” (30), or how to “be chastised with the 
sober eye / Of dull Octavia” (5.2.53-4). Her fears are confirmed when Dolabella 
tells her that his master Caesar intends to lead her in triumph (108). Like Antony, 
she tells Iris of these scenarios so that Iris helps her commit suicide: “Thou, an 
Egyptian puppet shall be shown / In Rome as well as I” (204-5). Moreover, the 
very fact that the character of Cleopatra was originally played by a boy actor is 
indicative of this incompatibility between actor and character, between the 
actual performance conditions and the virtual reality they purport to represent. 
Cleopatra herself is metatheatrically aware of this fact: “I shall see / Some 
squeaking Cleopatra boy my greatness / I’th’ posture of a whore” (215-7). The 
Cleopatra who condemns the future displays that do not do justice to her 
‘greatness’ by employing boy actors to play her, is by the same token inviting 
the original spectators of Shakespeare’s play to condemn the performance they 
are watching, a performance that is doing the same injustice to the historical 
Cleopatra’s ‘greatness’ by using a boy actor to play her part on the Jacobean 
stage. 
Thus, in spite of their fondness for theatricality, these characters are afraid 
of playing roles other than the ones they are used to play. They are not so much 
afraid of being humiliated as of being humiliated in public. That is to say, they 
are worried by the presence of spectators: Cleopatra is afraid of being ‘seen’ by 
Octavia’s ‘sober’ and ‘modest’ eyes. The theatrical aspect of these shows is 
affirmed by Proculeius’s reasoning that Caesar wants this show to “Let the 
world see / His nobleness well acted” (5.2.43-4; emphasis added). According to 
Anthony Brennan, “The characters are very conscious that they are public 
figures, and it is of central importance to these world-beaters how they appear 
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in their own eyes and the eyes of their friends” (1989, 134). The question is not 
of the effect of the actor’s presence on the spectator, but the other way around: 
the actor himself is affected by the presence of the spectator. It is a reciprocal 
presence, one in which both actors and spectators are aware of and affected by 
the presence of each other (see Power 2008, Chap.3). Moreover, they treat 
these shows differently, since in their own shows they are directors as well as 
actors. But in Caesar’s show, Caesar is the director and they are mere puppets, 
as Cleopatra tells Iris she will be. “Recounted from the perspective of the 
captive forced to be an object of the common gaze in that spectacle, all the 
scenes stress the loss of physical autonomy and the shame of not being able to 
control who looks at one’s body” (Kahn 1997, 127). In this sense, victory and 
defeat are more symbolic than material, and they have to do with who can 
assume the role of the director who manipulates the shows. Consequently, 
Cleopatra’s voluntary death can be said to score a victory over Octavius in that 
she remains capable of controlling her body and determining who is to look at it. 
These different representational modes, with their varying emphases on 
the actual or virtual components of theatre, have also been shown to be 
metatheatrically relevant to the polarization established by the play between 
Egypt (represented by Cleopatra) and Rome (represented by Caesar) with 
Antony torn between these two extremes. Alan Stewart (2009) shows that the 
play creates a conflict between Roman historiography, represented by Caesar’s 
obsession with writing, and Egyptian theatricality, represented by Cleopatra’s 
‘shows’ and her pervasive playfulness, which is most apparent in her 
masterfully staged death scene. At the end, the effect of her theatricality has 
indelibly inscribed the way she will be remembered and seems to override the 
version of history of Antony and herself which Caesar intended to 
produce."Egyptian theatricality becomes an effective challenge to Roman 
historiography, and within the terms of the play, may be said to defeat 
it"(Stewart 2009, 114). Phyllis Rackin (1972) likewise identifies in Cleopatra a 
theatrical mode which is in stark contrast to Rome’s Platonic rationalism. 
Cleopatra can hardly be known as herself but she rather enjoys a staged 
identity which presents her as what she ‘seems’ or ‘is like.’ 
Shakespeare also distinguishes between Rome and Egypt  by the contrast 
between the Romans’ diligence in information-gathering and the neglect of the 
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Egyptians to do likewise. The latter would rather live their life as it is: “The 
Roman scenes are full of information and business, but in Egypt there is a more 
palpable texture, a stronger sense of felt life” or “the enjoyment of the thing itself” 
(Leggatt 1988, 177). This is nowhere clearer than in Antony’s description of the 
crocodile to Lepidus: 
LEPIDUS. What manner o’ thing is your crocodile?
ANTONY. It is shaped, sir, like itself, and it is as broad as it hath breadth. It is 
just so high as it is, and moves with it own organs. It lives by that which 
nourisheth it, and the elements once out of it, it transmigrates.
LEPIDUS. What colour is it of?
ANTONY. Of its own colour too.
LEPIDUS. ’Tis a strange serpent.
ANTONY. ’Tis so, and the tears of it are wet.    (2.7.38-46)
Antony’s definition of the crocodile in its own terms, not by likening it to anything
other than itself, is characteristic of this Egyptian tendency. That Antony is 
adopting the Egyptian position here is partly imposed by the way Lepidus and 
the others position him ‘your crocodile’, a position that he happily accepts. The 
Romans strive to understand the world significatively while the Egyptians treat it 
phenomenally. 
In conclusion, we have shown that Antony and Cleopatra is a play in which 
Shakespeare allocates a large role to the virtual component of theatre. The 
virtual plays a wide role as a measure of the limitations of the actual are 
projected, and also as a cognitive tool that helps spectators make sense of the 
events taking place onstage. As the virtual is mainly conveyed through narration, 
we have demonstrated the centrality of acts of narration to the play’s structure. 
It is through these acts that the actual and the virtual, the onstage and the 
offstage, gain a superb continuity and seem simultaneously present. It is a play 
where the virtual and the actual impinge on each other, where neither is 
complete without the backing of the other, and where the two subtly contribute 
to convey the story in ways neither is capable of conveying by itself. The virtual 
or possible not only helps make the actual more intelligible; it is also, in a 
metatheatrically crafted fashion, set in tension with the actual. The playwright 
invites us to think more deeply about the nature of both and their constant 
struggle for authority. Shakespeare’s skill is such that he turns the breaching of 
the unities of place and time into an advantage, since by exploiting the offstage 
space he is able to convey feeling and reactions that are hardly expressible 
otherwise. Moreover, the metatheatrical aspect of the play in dealing self-
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consciously with these matters is subtler and more accomplished than the 
treatment in Henry V and A Midsummer Night’s Dream. Although it has no 
choric direct addresses to the audience as in the last two plays, Antony and 
Cleopatra engages vigorously with questions about the nature of theatrical 
performance, its different components, and the struggle of authority amongst 
them.       
The play can be read as an attempt by the playwright to establish a 
position among the theories of theatre prevalent in the early modem period. 
Shakespeare’s practice goes even further than Buonamici’s views. The 
adherence to the dramatic unities, most vocally defended in England by Sir 
Philip Sidney, is notoriously inadequate to Shakespeare. We have referred to a 
contradiction which Phyllis Rackin identifies in Sidney: namely his conviction 
that the poet should depict a new reality and at the same time his insistence on 
adhering to the rules of this actual reality. She wittily observes the relevance of 
this theorizing to Antony and Cleopatra: "The contradiction in Sidney's essay, 
like the conflict in Shakespeare's play, is finally a conflict between two theories 
of poetry and two orders of reality; but while Sidney seems unaware of the 
contradiction, Shakespeare insists upon it"(1972, 206). In the Shakespearean 
canon in general, we cannot fail to notice an awareness of the duality of the 
actual and virtual inherent in the theatrical medium. Rather than dispense with 
one at the expense of the other, Shakespeare seems to reconcile them and 
tries to exploit their combined effect. According to Harry Berger, Shakespeare’s 
artistry “lies in his peculiar way of relating theatrical and dramatic space time” 
(1968, 18-9). The final result is the creation of a coherent and intelligible 
dramatic and theatrical experience which, although it does not abide by the 
prevalent views of its time, it was capable of superseding them with a higher 
form of artistic creation. 
Conclusion
The virtual component of the theatrical performance is mainly produced via the 
use of theatrical signs and dramatic narration. It chiefly fulfils a rhetorical and 
communicative function, in the sense that it renders the whole resultant fictional 
world more intelligible, coherent and plausible to the spectator. In early modern 
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England, theories of drama and theatrical practice fluctuated from concentrating 
on one or the other term of the actual/virtual dichotomy. Shakespeare’s practice, 
on the other hand, is too wide and varied to ascribe to him either of these 
modes exclusively. However, the three cases we have studied all show the role 
Shakespeare allocates to the imaginary forces of the spectator in achieving the
global comprehensibility of the fictional world. The virtual reality elicited through 
the imagination’s encounter with the actual material happenings onstage helps 
shape that general feature of the fictional worlds. While in Henry V the Chorus
entreats the audience to evoke that offstage reality, the players in Pyramus and 
Thisbe deny their spectators that right, which results in the wholesale derision of 
their performance. The interaction between the two components of theatre 
culminates in Antony and Cleopatra, so much so that no one component is 
operative without the other. Moreover, Shakespeare sometimes metatheatrically
thematizes the relation between, and relative reliability of, the actual and the 
virtual in these plays. Besides, the virtual also underlines the potential of the 
plays which opens them up to different dramatizations and performances. The 
gaps left by the performance encourage the readers and spectators to fill them 
in differently, thus coming up with as many different versions of the plays as 
there are readers/spectators. 
The approach employed in this Chapter is mainly interdisciplinary. It builds 
on modern theories of fictionality of theatre, performance theory in the 
Renaissance as well as relevant remarks from Shakespeare criticism. It aims to 
bring all these intellectual disciplines into dialogue with each other. Generally, 
due to the dominance of historicist approaches, Shakespeare scholars have 
been suspicious of the viability of theories of fictionality. The above discussion 
should have shown that we can come up with period-specific theories of 
fictionality that take into account the working factors and performance 
conditions of any given period. The analysis in this chapter shows that bringing 
these discourses together can afford illuminating insights into the nature and 
mechanisms of Shakespeare’s plays, regarding the performance conditions, the 
plays’ expectations of their spectator, and the game-like quality of the 
performance. The plays surveyed in this chapter belong to different periods and 
different genres. However, this is not to argue that they should be taken as 
representative of these periods or genres. Further studies can be conducted to 
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draw clearer guidelines about the treatment of these issues in different periods 
or among different genres of the Shakespeare canon.
In this chapter we have been dealing with the possible and virtual on the 
level of discourse, which in theatre we identified as performance. In the 
following chapter we will be dealing with it on the level of story or the plots of the 
plays. We will be concerned with the hypothetical actions that might have taken 
place in the past. There we will also see how virtual events are set in different 
relations with the actual ones and that the result of their interaction is to 
enhance the probability and intelligibility of the whole work. 
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Chapter Two
The Actual and the Virtual in the Shakespearean Text
Macbeth.                                 Will it not be received,
When we have marked with blood those sleepy two
Of his own chamber and used their very daggers,
That they have done't?
Lady Macbeth.                Who dares receive it other,
As we shall make our griefs and clamour roar
Upon his death?                                          (Macbeth: 1.7.74-9)
Macbeth and his would-be Queen are not only concerned about Duncan’s 
murder itself, but also about the investigation into the identity of the killer(s) that 
will ensue at the aftermath of the murder.  Thus, their concern is centred on the
scenario they will create and convince the other skeptical characters to adopt –
or ‘receive’. Their job, that is, is cognitive in essence. The scenario they are to 
put forward is necessarily different from the real story of what happened during 
the murder scene. In more technical terms, they aim to create a virtual course of 
events (one in which the chamber grooms have killed Duncan) which diverges 
from the actual course of events (in which Macbeth committed the murder). The 
virtual scenario they advance should be so convincing that it would seem the 
only course there is, so much so that nobody will think of any alternative 
scenario – ‘receive it other’.  To establish its credibility, they have to increase 
the probability of their virtual scenario by piling up as many pieces of possible 
evidence as they can. These pieces of evidence include: marking the hands of 
the guards with Duncan’s blood, using their own daggers in the murders, 
counterfeiting ‘grief and clamour roar upon his death’ – indeed, she will do more 
than that by fainting when she hears the news.1 Later Lady Macbeth adds 
another piece to lend support to their claim, which is wearing their nightgowns: 
“Get on your nightgown, lest occasion call us / And show us to be watchers” 
(2.2.68-9). This way Macbeth and Lady Macbeth are directing in advance the 
way in which other characters are going to draw that conclusion. These 
characters will accordingly gather these pieces and employ probabilistic thinking 
to establish what seems very likely to have happened at that scene. However, 
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later it will appear that their plan was far from waterproof; this, in turn, will force 
them to improvise, with Macbeth killing the two guards and accusing Duncan’s 
sons of hiring them. All this will breed suspicion over Macbeth’s narrative by 
Duncan’s sons, Macduff, Banquo, and others. Therefore, they are dealing less 
with the actual events than with the virtual event (or course of events) that will 
be presented as the most probable candidate among many others. 
In this Chapter, I shall address the central role played by the virtual events 
in Shakespeare’s plays. Virtual events stand in contrast to actual events, in the 
sense that they are not verified as facts by the fictional text. They include 
characters’ beliefs as well as their intentions and plans insofar as they are not 
yet realized as objective truths in the fictional world. Actual events often occupy 
the reader’s or critic’s attention, and virtual events might be dismissed as simply 
irrelevant. I shall argue, however, that virtual events are no less central to the 
development of the plot than are actual events. In Shakespearean drama, the 
virtual events constitute the background that motivates and moves the action 
forward. Conflict always arises due to divergence between the actual and virtual 
courses of events. Moreover, the virtual is a fertile domain for deception plots
where plans and counter-plans work on proliferating mistaken beliefs in the 
other characters. Further, an access to the virtual events gives insights over the 
inwardness of characters, and it influences the overall intelligibility of the action.
The role of the virtual events in the literary work has been the interest of 
‘possible worlds’ narratology. Therefore, in the following section I shall look into 
the development of the idea of the possible or virtual event in narratological 
theory, with special attention to Marie-Laure Ryan’s formulation of the virtual 
event. However, possible worlds theory is lacking with regard to the cognitive 
aspect of the virtual. As the example from Macbeth has shown, characters use 
probabilistic thinking in order to weigh among virtual events and establish the 
most likely candidate of actuality. Below I shall turn to the discipline of rhetoric 
which is mainly concerned with both the virtual and the probable. I shall
demonstrate that the prevalence of rhetoric in early modern education and 
culture has given Shakespeare and early modern dramatists an entrée into the 
use of virtuality and probabilistic thinking in their plays. So, I shall first delineate 
the narratological approaches which have contributed to the elaboration of the 
concept of the virtual. Then I shall sketch the notions of virtuality and probability 
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in Classical and Renaissance rhetoric and how it might have influenced the 
thinking and practice of Shakespeare and early modern dramatists. Lastly I 
shall analyse the role played by the virtual events in two plays of William 
Shakespeare: Richard II and Cymbeline. 
Virtuality in Narrative Theory
The virtual or possible events play a variety of roles in the literary plot and 
substantially contribute to its dynamism. The importance of these events has 
piqued the interest of narratologists and been the central concern for possible 
worlds theorists. Since virtual events have not been the focus of Shakespeare 
criticism, I need to turn to narratology for guidance about their nature and 
function. In this section I shall survey the main narratological approaches that 
emphasize the role of the possible or virtual events in plots. This survey will 
culminate in some possible worlds frameworks that have been mainly dedicated 
to the investigation of the virtual and possible events in narrative, such as the 
work of Umberto Eco, Marie-Laure Ryan, Lubomir Dolezel and Gerard Prince. 
Finally I shall point to the lack of an account of probability in these theories and 
suggest how to fill in that lacuna. 
The notion of the possible or virtual event was not comfortably 
accommodated in narratology. A stark ‘actuality’ bias is sensed in the 
narratological accounts of events and actions in narrative texts. In most 
narratological accounts, the actions and events are restricted to those events
that actually happened. Gerald Prince divides narrative events into stative and 
active (Prince 1982, 62), both of which belong to the factual domain, because 
he considers that narrativity is a “function of the extent to which their [events’] 
occurrence is given as a fact (in a certain world) rather than as possibility or 
probability. The hallmark of narrative is assurance” (ibid., 149; emphasis added). 
Mieke Bal also suggests that “we must restrict our investigation to only those 
facts that are presented to us in the actual words of the text” (1997, 116). 
Defining an event as “a change of state,” Wolf Schmid states that a necessary 
condition for the event is that “its associated change of state must be real”
(2010, 9; emphasis in original). These examples make clear how dogmatically 
biased classical narratology has been against virtual or possible events. 
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Nevertheless, in spite of that ‘actuality’ bias there has been a growing 
interest in possible and virtual events since the early days of narratology, 
although their full significance is overlooked and they remain subordinated to 
the factual events.  Indeed, modal categories appear as early as A. J. 
Greimas’s (1977) grammar, who regards modal utterances as part of the 
narrative utterances. TzvetanTodorov (1977) also considers mood as among 
the second categories of his grammar.  In his classical “Introduction to the 
Structural Analysis of Narrative” (1975), Roland Barthes first classifies narrative 
units into functions and indices, the former having the functionality of doing, and 
the latter that of being. Then he divides functions into cardinal functions and 
catalysts. Catalysts are modally significant: they open possibilities or 
alternatives of action. But a more sustained engagement with the topic is 
conducted by Claude Bremond in his “The Logic of Narrative Possibilities” 
(1966). Bremond designates the basic narrative unit as the ‘function:’ these 
functions group in sequences to form the larger narrative. An elementary 
sequence is comprised of three obligatory functions: one that opens a possibility, 
the second achieves (or fails to) that virtuality and the third is the result which 
closes the process. Thus, the movement from one state to another is based on 
the space of possibility opened by the former state. 
An awareness of the importance of virtual and possible events to the 
analysis of narrative features early in the work of Umberto Eco. Eco (1979) 
identifies the benefits of using these notions to account for those events of the 
fabula that did not take place but are nevertheless crucial to our understanding 
of the fabula and the inferences we make about it. He divides the possible 
worlds in the narrative into three categories: first is the fictional world as 
conceived by the author; second are the subworlds that are imagined, wished, 
or believed by the characters. The third is the class of subworlds that are 
imagined, believed, or wished by the Model Reader and which the actual world 
of the text will either approve or disapprove (1979, 235). The main dynamism in 
the functionality of these different worlds and subworlds is alternativity: “It is 
useful to use the notion of possible worlds when one refers to a state of affairs, 
but only if one needs to compare at least two alternative state of affairs” (1990, 
69). This idea is especially fruitful as we focus on the divergence between the 
actual and the virtual courses of events. 
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A more detailed observation of modalities in narrative theory is carried out 
by Lubomir Dolezel. According to Dolezel, modalities regulate and shape the 
structure of the fictional world. He discerns four types of modalities: the alethic, 
deontic, axiological and epistemic (1998, 114). The alethic modality shapes 
what can and cannot exist in the narrative world. It is denominated by the modal 
operators of ‘possibility,’ ‘impossibility,’ and ‘necessity.’ The deontic modality 
shapes the norms accepted in that world and is denominated by the operators 
of ‘permission,’ ‘obligation,’ and ‘prohibition.’ The axiological modality is 
denominated by the operators of ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ and ‘indifferent’. It polarizes the 
world of entities into these conflicting values. Dolezel adds a dynamic 
dimension to these modalities as he distinguishes between codexal and 
subjective levels in each, the former governing the world as a whole while the 
latter is character-specific, and does consist in the physical, instrumental and 
mental capacities of an individual character (ibid., 118). The disparity between 
the two is capable of initiating a conflict, when, for example, what is codexally 
impossible or forbidden is subjectively necessary or obligatory, and so on. 
A major contribution made so far in the field of ‘Possible Worlds’
narratology is Marie-Laure Ryan (1985, 1991). She holds that the propositions 
which express the successive states of the fictional world are of two primary 
types: the first are “those with an absolute or autonomous existence;” in other 
words, they are taken to be the real situation of the fictional world and she calls 
them the ‘factual domain’ or the ‘Textual Actual World.’ The second are “those 
whose existence is relative to somebody, i.e., which exists through a mental act 
of a character” (1985, 720). So they are relative to characters and consequently 
each is called ‘character’s domain’.  
The characters' domains or sub-worlds are divided into the Knowledge 
World, Obligation World, Wish World, Intention World, and Fantasy Universe. 
The first three correspond to Dolezel’s epistemic, deontic and axiological 
modalities, respectively. The Fantasy universe comprises dreams, day-dreams, 
hallucinations, fantasies and fictional stories told by the characters. Thus, these 
worlds, which are the content of the character’s domain, can be conceived as 
either images of the factual domain (Knowledge worlds and Intention Worlds), 
as models of what the textual actual world should be (Wish Worlds and 
Obligation Worlds), or as escapes from or true alternatives to the actual world of 
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the narrative universe (Fantasy Universes). In all cases, they are constructed by 
the human mind (mental constructs) and they all form the virtual domain of that 
narrative universe. “The virtual in the narrative universe exists in the thoughts of 
characters. Narrative concerns primarily human (or human-like) action, and 
action is determined by the mind’s involvement with external reality” (1991, 110). 
Thus, on the part of the characters, these mental activities which form the virtual 
domain, are attempts to shape, interact with and grasp the actual domain. On 
the part of the reader, an access to these mental activities helps the reader fully 
understand the actual action, how it came to be the way it is and the underlying 
mental processes whereby it came into being. 
The narrative universe is dynamic in the sense that the characters’ private
worlds are interacting with each other and with the factual domain. This 
interaction results in conflict. Conflict ensues from dissatisfaction of some 
private character domains and is eliminated by these domains coinciding as 
much as possible with the factual domain. So characters take actions to satisfy 
their private domains but this may result in the dissatisfaction of others
characters’ private domains. Consequently, Ryan claims that the modal system
– which comprises unactualizable or as yet unactualized possibilities – is the 
underlying system for the movement of narratives and for the actual actions 
taken by characters; accordingly, focus must be placed not on the factual 
actions per se, but on these virtual ones. The modal systems of Wish-Worlds 
and Obligation-Worlds set the goals for the agential actions, while the 
Knowledge Worlds and Intention Worlds serve to devise the plans whereby 
these goals are to be realized. Moreover, these virtual events are responsible 
for the diversification and the complexity of the embedded narratives generated 
by the human mind and consequently of the complexity of the plot that 
comprises them. 
For the rest of this Chapter we will be mainly concerned with the epistemic 
aspect of modality, i.e., with the Knowledge and Intention Worlds of characters 
which
hold collections of private narratives that determine their behaviour and give 
meaning to their actions. Whether they are verified by the actual event or 
remain purely virtual, these private embedded narratives weave their 
strands into the texture of the plot and turn it into a layered structure, a 
bundle of possible stories. (ibid., 147)
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The content of these two worlds has deeper implications for the characters’ set 
goals and devised plans. In setting a goal to be achieved, by forward logic the 
planner must take into account the goal state and returns backward to his/her 
current state and measures the intermediate states which specify the actions 
s/he should carry out to rule out that difference. Some steps of the plan may be 
carried out by subagents whose reactions, perceptions as well as their own 
private plans and goals should be taken into account by the main agent (ibid., 
135-42). Once agreed, the plan of the main agent must be disclosed to the 
subagent. The plan disclosed by the main agent to the subagent is called the 
‘overt’ plan. It may be the actual plan of the main agent or a faked one aimed at 
his/her deception. The latter is called a ‘virtual’ plan, “a pretended scheme, 
never meant to be fully executed” in which “the main agents hide their actual 
intent from the subagent” (ibid., 143).2 Plans and goals are present- or future-
oriented. But the virtual projection may contain also retrospective reconstruction 
of past events. This reconstruction may be correct or incorrect, faked or sincere. 
All these strategies of the proliferation of the virtual domain will enhance the 
tellability of the story. According to Ryan, “the complexity of a plot depends on 
an underlying system of purely virtual embedded narratives . . . The aesthetic 
appeal of a plot is a function of the richness and variety of the domain of the 
virtual, as it is surveyed and made accessible by these private embedded 
narratives” (ibid., 156). 
Another contribution to the concept of the virtual event is made by Gerald 
Prince’s ‘The Disnarrated’ (1988). Prince defines the ‘disnarrated’ as the
“events that do not happen but, nevertheless, are referred to (in a negative or 
hypothetical mode) by the narrative text” ([1988] 2004, 299). They include 
negative comparisons, modals, futures, counterfactuals and commands. Prince 
equates the disnarrated with Ryan’s ‘virtual embedded narratives.’3 Roughly 
speaking, the disnarrated refers to those bits of the narrative discourse that deal 
with things that did not take place, but are hypothetically mentioned by the 
narrator or one or more of the characters. Although he considers the 
disnarrated inessential to the progress of the narrative, Prince refers to many 
roles that the disnarrated might play: it is a regulator of narrative speed, when 
discoursing of the actual events is interrupted by contemplating the virtual, 
‘disnarrated’ ones. It also serves as a characterizational device. It can also 
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feature as a theme, such as the theme of reality versus illusion. It is part of the 
logic of the narrative; more generally, it stands for “the choices not made, route 
not taken, possibilities not actualized, goals not reached” (ibid., 301).
In what follows I shall use the term ‘virtual event’ in Shakespearean plot to 
stand in contrast to the ‘actual’ event. It mainly comprises the private embedded 
narratives of character domains, which form the Knowledge Worlds and 
Intention Worlds: it thus includes the image characters construct about the 
actual world, their future plans, their virtual plans, and their retrospective 
reconstruction of the past events. In the example above from Macbeth, the story 
about Duncan’s murder which Macbeth and his wife present is a virtual course 
of events since it is not the actual one. It is an image created in the 
reconstruction of the past event, which clearly diverts from the actual image and 
is meant for the deception of other characters. Besides, since the virtual events 
constitute the content of the characters’ knowledge and intentions, then it is 
mainly related to the notion of inwardness and interiority that have attracted the 
interest of early modern intellectuals. As there has been an anxiety regarding 
the accessibility to the inward thinking of persons, so one way to determine that 
inwardness in theatre is through an access to the virtual domains of characters.  
In the following discussion, two aspects of the virtual event stand out as 
being of special interest: the first is the potentiality of the virtual; as it comprises 
the roads not taken, the virtual always points us to the possibilities latent in the 
text which, if actualized, will produce new texts and new stories. It is incessantly 
evoking the inherent plurality of the text and, consequently, of reality itself, be it 
actual or fictional. The second aspect is that of probability. As we are dealing 
mainly with the epistemic worlds or modality, it is crucial to stress the relevance 
of probability in this context. It is a point which Marie-Laure Ryan only mentions 
in passing (1991, 115). Probability is closely related to the virtual or possible 
events. In order for characters to determine what might have happened in the 
past, they need to conduct probabilistic reasoning whereby they can measure 
the probability of each of the different paths which the action might have taken. 
Only then can they determine how likely an event is to have taken place. Even 
in judging the credibility of the virtual plans of other characters, a character will 
use probabilistic thinking to determine how honest the planner is. Possible 
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Worlds theory does not invest in this area, and there we have little to look for of 
the interaction between the two notions of virtuality and probability.     
It is to rhetoric that we have to turn to find out more about the interaction 
between virtuality and probability. Classical and Renaissance rhetoricians seem 
to have been quite aware of this interaction and interdependence between the 
actual and the virtual. The two notions of the virtual and the probable featured 
fairly in rhetoric. In order to better appreciate Shakespeare’s use of the virtual 
events, we need a closer look into the discipline of rhetoric that provided the 
main theoretical and practical apparatus for Renaissance playwrights to deal 
with the notions of the virtual and the probable. In the following section I shall
sketch the development of the notions of virtuality and probability in Classical 
and Renaissance rhetoric to see how it might have influenced Shakespeare’s 
thinking about and practice of these notions. 
Rhetoric: The Art of the Virtual and Probable
In the last section we have demonstrated the central role of the virtual events in 
narrative. Demonstrating the significance of the virtual has been the main 
contribution of possible worlds theories in narratology. However, we have 
pointed to the lack of any treatment of probability in these possible worlds 
accounts of the virtual or possible. A discipline that combines the interest in 
both notions of the virtual and the probable is rhetoric.  The spread of rhetoric in 
early modern learning also accounts for the pivotal place which these two 
notions occupy in the Shakespeare canon. In this section I shall argue that 
Shakespeare’s familiarity with and use of the notions of the virtual and the 
probable is attributable to the prevalence of rhetorical thinking in early modern 
England. Below I shall examine the role of virtuality and probability in Classical 
and early modern judicial rhetoric. Then I shall investigate how this rhetorical 
education has shaped relevant aspects of the drama of Shakespeare and his 
contemporaries. 
Throughout this study I am mainly concerned with one branch of rhetoric 
called judicial rhetoric. 4 Originally, rhetorical theory and practice are deeply 
rooted in the judicial system of accumulating evidence by amassing probabilities 
on one side of the case. In fact, rhetoric owes its first emergence to the need to 
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argue for lawsuits in front of the judges. As Robert P. Burns puts it, “If the trial is 
the heart of the law, then the law is rhetorical, for rhetoric rules where action 
under uncertainty is necessary” (2006, 444). This was especially the case 
during the Greek and Roman periods. After the decline of the Roman Empire, 
and through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the interest in and practice 
of rhetoric moved from the forum into the schoolroom, and rhetoric featured as 
a major discipline in Medieval and Renaissance educational systems. 
The three notions of the possible, virtual and the probable, feature 
prominently in rhetoric. The possible, in its varied manifestations as the 
contingent events of the past, has played a large role in the defining the scope 
of the art of rhetoric (Strauver 2009).5  Classical rhetoricians have defined the 
subject of their discipline as being the contingent, mainly in the sense of the 
past events whose existence is shrouded with indeterminacy and uncertainty. 
The association of the art of rhetoric with the notion of the contingent dates 
back to Aristotle. 6 In response to Plato who observed that rhetoric has no 
specified subject, Aristotle retorts by asserting that rhetoric has a subject and 
that its subject is the contingent (Gaonkar 2006). Aristotle declares that the 
subject of deliberation, as a rhetorical method, cannot be the necessary, but the 
possible: “The subjects of our deliberation are such as seem to present us with 
alternative possibilities . . . about things that could not have been, and cannot 
now or in the future be, other than they are, nobody who takes them to be of 
this nature wastes his time in deliberation” (I.ii.1375a5-7). The notion of 
contingency also features in later accounts of rhetoric. The author of Rhetorica 
ad Herennium defines the statement of fact in terms of certainty and possibility 
at the same time: “The narration or Statement of Facts sets forth the events that 
have occurred or might have occurred” (1.2.3; emphasis added). Quintilian 
gives relatively the same definition: “The statement of facts consists in the 
persuasive exposition of that which either has been done, or is supposed to 
have been done” (4.2.31; emphasis in original).
The virtual, in the sense of the private embedded narratives or the mental 
constructions, also crops up fairly frequently in rhetorical writings. Rhetoricians 
seem to be quite aware of the extent to which the orator needs to project these 
mental constructions of his audiences and the judges in order to be able to 
predict their reactions and respond proactively. Rhetorica ad Herenniumadvises 
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that the orator guide and affect the audiences’ minds and thoughts by 
masterfully exploiting his knowledge of their private knowledge and intentions, 
or to put it technically, by predicting their virtual domains. For example, it 
advises that the orator must use the exordium to prepare his audience, most 
importantly the judges and jury, to listen to the oration attentively. It astutely 
states that: “We shall have attentive hearers by promising to discuss important, 
new, and unusual matter” (1.4.7). Quintilian also recommends that the orator 
addresses his audiences’ private domains through many means. He states that 
the function of the exordium is to “prepare our audience in such a way that they 
will be disposed to lend a ready ear to the rest of our speech” so much so that 
“we gain admission to the mind of the judge in order to penetrate still further” 
(4.1.5). This can only be achieved if the orator can surmise what the audience is 
possibly thinking of at that very moment, so that he can react accordingly. By 
the same token, the orator must weigh the effect of every tactic on the judge’s 
opinion so that, by projecting the possible courses the judge’s thinking might 
take, the orator can plan to lead it in the courses most favourable to him. 
Quintilian recommends that the orator show himself weaker in acting and 
dissembling in comparison to his opponent, because “a scrupulous judge is 
always specially ready to listen to an advocate whom he does not suspect to 
have designs on his integrity” (4.1.9; also 4.1.56). The author of Rhetorica ad 
Herennium observes that an indispensable trait of the orator is to be “well aware 
of the means by which belief is ordinarily affected” (1.6.10). 
These rhetorical recipes reflect a deep awareness of the role of the virtual 
domain in directing people’s motivations and intentions. In terms that Marie-
Laure Ryan would favourably use, the relation of the orator to the judge is like 
that of the agent to the subagent, with the former guiding the latter to the 
implementation of his own plan, which necessitates that the orator projects all 
the thoughts that would go through the audience’s mind. In the same fashion, 
Quintilian holds that the orator must implant in the judge’s mind the thought that 
his fortune would be deplorable should he lose his case (4.1.29). And so it 
seems that most of the effort of the good orator should consist in dealing with 
the virtual domain of his listeners, sometimes adding to them some 
refreshments or even alleviating their fears and obsessions. This also works 
well not only with the judges, but also with the orator’s opponent, whose 
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possible actions and reactions should be weighed rightly by the orator: “Nor is 
the art of anticipating what is likely to be said against us without its use” (4.1.49).  
The notion of probability, in the sense of plausible convincing persuasion, 
also secured a pivotal place in rhetoric. For Aristotle, the main method of 
persuasion is the enthymeme, which is a form of argument like the logical 
syllogism. It differs from the syllogism of logic in that while the premises of 
logical syllogisms should be ‘certain,’ those of the enthymeme should be 
‘probable.’7To Aristotle, “the theory of rhetoric must be concerned ... with what 
seems probable8 to men of a given type” (I.ii.1356b32-5). The orator cannot 
aspire for certainty but could strive to augment the probability of his arguments. 
Quintilian also holds that the orations should be probable and use probabilistic 
reasoning: the orator’s statement of facts should be “lucid, brief and plausible” 
(4.2.31). The significance of the ‘probability’ requirement gets clearer when he 
separates it from ‘truth,’ for not every true is probable: “There are many things 
which are true, but scarcely credible, just as there are many things which are 
plausible though false” (4.2.34). In De Oratore, Cicero also mentions ‘plausibility’ 
as a requirement of the statement of facts (2.19.80; 2.80.226). And he has 
already made the same point in De Inventione (1.29.44).As far as the nature of 
the probable is concerned, the Rhetorica ad Herennium characterizes it as 
having the features of “the usual, the expected, and the natural” (1.9.16). The 
notion of ‘probability’ also gets directly under focus when the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium includes it within Conjectural Issue: “Through Probability one proves 
that the crime was profitable to the defendant, and that he never abstained from 
this foul practice. The subheads under Probability are Motive and Manner of 
Life” (2.2.3).
This emphasis on the probable in rhetoric came down to the rhetorical 
tradition of the Renaissance. In Aphthonius’s Progymnasmata, a handbook of 
rhetorical exercises which is ascribed to Aphthonius the sophist and which was 
the main rhetoric textbook in English schools during the Renaissance, narrative 
is defined as “Narratio est expositoi rei factae vel tanquam factae” (Narrative is 
the exposition of what happened or what might have happened) (1572, 17v). He 
then mentions four characteristic features of narrative, one being ‘probable’ 
(ibid.). In Foundacion of Rhetorike, Richard Rainolde follows this tradition citing 
‘probability’ as a prerequisite of narrative: “Probable, as not unlike to be true” 
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(1563, 13v). In his The Arte of Rhetorique, one of the most comprehensive 
accounts of the discipline in Elizabethan England, Thomas Wilson follows on 
the heels of previous rhetoricians in defining the conjectural issue: “The Oration 
conjectural is, when matters be examined and tryed out by suspicions gathered, 
and some likelihode of thinge appearinge”(1553, 50v; emphasis added).The 
examples he gives suggest that the orator has to collect signs that whip up the 
probability of his claim against the other claims.9 Although all these signs do not 
breed certainty, yet their job is to increase the probability of the crime being 
committed by the accused person. In possible worlds terms, the orator is trying 
to construct a virtual course of events (since the real course is irretrievably lost), 
and in doing so he is excluding the other courses the event might have taken 
instead. In order to convince the judge that this virtual course is the real one, 
the orator has to augment probabilities on that virtual side. 
Thus, the two notions of the virtual and the probable were two 
characteristic landmarks in Renaissance thought due to many factors, chief 
among which is the spread of rhetorical learning. In the Introduction we have 
demonstrated the centrality of the notions of possibility and probability in the 
philosophical, theological, geographical and rhetorical thought in the 
Renaissance. Among these sites of influence, rhetorical learning was especially 
effective in the cultivation of virtual courses and probabilistic reasoning. During 
the Renaissance, rhetoric was the main discipline in the curricula, be it in the 
grammar schools or in the universities (Mack 2004). According to Gavin 
Alexander, “Rhetoric became the master–discipline of Renaissance learning 
and the central focus of education” (2010, 38). That kind of rhetorical learning 
has also affected the way learners have to project the mental constructions of 
others in order to anticipate the virtual actions they would take and act 
accordingly. In his pioneering study, The Tudor Play of Mind, Joel B. Altman 
argues for the influence of the Tudor rhetorically-centred educational system on 
the people’s minds and the flexibility of thinking it helped to foster: “what 
happens to a mind conditioned to argue in utramque partem – on both sides of 
the question – as Renaissance students were trained to do? Surely one result 
must be a great complexity of vision, capable of making everyman not only a 
devil’s advocate, but also a kind of microcosm deity” (1978, 3). Stephen 
Greenblatt also spots this agility of thought or ‘widening of possibilities’ in the 
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early modern period, which he calls ‘improvisation,’ by which he means “the 
ability both to capitalize on the unforeseen and to transform given materials into 
one’s own scenario,” (1980, 227) or “the ability to insert the self into the sign 
systems of others” (1991, 98). Greenblatt’s notion of ‘improvisation’ is 
conceptually and practically kindred to that of the projected plans and the virtual 
in the narratological sense. To improvise thus means to be able to project the 
virtual plans of the subagents and act accordingly. This, in turn, is based on 
calculating the possible scenarios through which the subagent’s actions may 
go.10
The proliferation of rhetorical education, which highlighted the importance 
of virtuality and probability, has had its impact on the drama of the period. The 
relation between drama and rhetoric was very intimate in this period. Generally, 
drama and rhetoric share the same aim of affecting an audience. Rhetoric, just 
like drama, is often held in public and in front of an audience. Consequently, the 
skills required by both arts are characteristically similar, especially the art of 
delivery in rhetoric and the way it was taught to actors, as we have shown in 
Chapter One. As Peter Womack puts it, “If theatre was rhetorical, that was 
partly because rhetoric was already theatrical” (2006, 80). Many Renaissance 
dramatists were trained in the grammar schools whose syllabi were mainly 
based on classical rhetorical texts. Moreover, the drama bequeathed these 
rhetorical tendencies, most forcefully forensic rhetoric, from Classical drama, 
especially Latin comedy. Latin New Comedy is accredited with this strong 
forensic tendency, so much so that even rhetoricians like Cicero and Quintilian 
make reference to and give examples from Terentian comedy. The comic plots 
of Plautus and Terence bulge with intrigues and misunderstandings which 
induce characters to conduct inferential processes based on circumstantial 
evidence to arrive at the real course of events. Forensic rhetorical reasoning 
was a decisive factor that helped Renaissance dramatists shape their evidential 
plots and episodes of deception and intrigue. This can explain the forensic or 
detective-like features of English drama in the Renaissance (Hutson 2007). 
With occasional exceptions, English Renaissance dramatists were generally 
used to such forensic techniques; in their plays, they have planted and skilfully 
manipulated evidence of time and place and made intricate reference to causes 
and motives. Part of the mimetic appeal of that drama derives from its forensic 
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legacy. “Evidence, of course, entails representation, and this immediately links 
courtroom practice to theatrical mimesis” (Mukherji 2006, 3). 
Thanks to his grammar school education, Shakespeare must have been 
fairly familiar with these rhetorical techniques and exercises, which is directly 
reflected in his plays. Early in his career, Shakespeare has tried his hand and 
mastered this form of forensic rhetoric. Always in the plays characters are faced 
by certain problems which they try to solve using this forensic way of reasoning. 
Shakespeare’s fascination with the richness and complexity of the virtual and 
probable is prominent throughout his career: examples of that range from the 
use of forensic reasoning to solve the puzzles of the double twins in The
Comedy of Errors, to the intricate way in which Don John weaves the 
accusation of adultery against Hero in Much Ado about Nothing; it also features 
in Hamlet’s various techniques to prove Claudius guilty of his father’s murder. In 
these and many other examples, Shakespeare has masterfully shown how 
characters, faced with a tricky situation, try to choose among the conflicting 
interpretations by weighing evidence on each side of the case, and then take 
side according to which one is more quantitatively probable. Characters in 
Shakespeare tend to use this sort of reasoning to work out the virtual narratives, 
which only incidentally converge with the actual ones. This crafty improvisation 
has long been considered a characteristic feature of many a Shakespearean 
character, not restricted to villains, but also to good characters. The trick played 
in Much Ado about Nothing by Hero, Don Pedro, Claudio and Ursula on 
Beatrice and Benedick to help them fall in love with each other is a well-knit 
improvisation. All forms of disguise practised by Shakespeare’s heroines are 
benign examples of improvisation. In all these examples, these improvising 
characters seek to proliferate the domains of the virtual, thus alienating the 
other characters’ thinking from the actual state of affairs. However, when this is 
done on a felonious ground, this divergence between the actual and the virtual 
can be tragic, as in Othello, or comes perilously close, as in Cymbeline, unless 
generic conventions dictate the contrary, as we shall see below. 
In addition to its concern with probabilistic thinking, Renaissance drama 
also addresses the virtual domain in relation to what Katharine Eisaman Maus 
(1995) calls ‘inwardness’. Knowledge of the virtual domain or the private worlds 
of characters allows us to access the inward selves of these characters. 
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Inwardness and interiority, moreover, have been associated with the authentic 
and genuine self, in contrast to the merely outward form which mainly implies 
inauthenticity. Maus observes that in the Renaissance the value of inwardness 
is emphasized by writers, religious and otherwise, and the accessibility of the 
virtual domain of other people featured significantly in the period as the question 
of how to know what other minds are thinking of. Theatre, however, has a 
special tension with inwardness due to its investment in the material outward 
display. With the playwrights’ insistence on the limitations of their theatrical 
medium, “theatrical representation becomes subject to profound and fascinating 
crises of authenticity” (1995, 32). But the inaccessibility of the virtual is 
nevertheless recommended by some new approaches to practical politics as 
evidenced by Nicolo Machiavelli. The successful prince, Machiavelli advises, is 
one who can keep his real intents and thinking inaccessible and hidden from 
other people, while he himself should attain an understanding of how others 
think. This dangerous dissociation between the actual behaviour and the virtual 
domain is pertinent to the rhetorical insights which emphasized that the orator 
should manage the perceptions of his audiences to his own advantage. 
Machiavelli’s ideas, as Hugh Grady (2002) convincingly argues, have much to 
bear on a certain mode of representation of politics in Shakespeare. The 
question of inwardness and the accessibility of the virtual and private worlds of 
characters are pertinent to our analysis in this Chapter, and will feature 
prominently in our discussion of the character of Bolingbroke in Shakespeare’s 
Richard II. 
In this section we have demonstrated how the drama of Shakespeare and 
his contemporaries has been affected by the rhetorical education of their time. 
Among other things, this influence has been manifest in their dealing with the 
virtual and the probable in their plays. One area of this influence is the use of 
forensic methods that heavily rely on probabilistic reasoning. Another common 
theme which these notions have raised is the reality vs. illusion which has many 
manifestations in early modern drama, one of which is the practice of disguise, 
misconception and mistaken identities. Moreover, they are also relevant to the 
idea of inwardness and the irresistible urge readers and characters feel to 
access other characters’ virtual domains. These notions also illuminate the 
theme of deception that prevails in drama, be it carried out for good or evil 
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reasons. There are many other aspects of the use of the virtual events in the 
Shakespearean drama which will unfold in the following discussions. Below I 
shall further illuminate these points with reference to two plays of the 
Shakespeare canon: Richard II and Cymbeline. 
Virtuality and Probability in Shakespeare
So far we have shown the significance of the virtual events in general and in 
Shakespearean drama in particular. We have also remarked that one source of 
Shakespeare’s acquaintance with and use of these notions of the virtual and the 
probable is the spread of rhetorical education in early modern England. Here I 
shall examine two plays of Shakespeare, Cymbeline and Richard II, to address 
the role of virtual events in the working of Shakespeare’s plays. The two plays 
belong to two different periods, genres, general interests, etc. More importantly, 
the virtual component features very differently in each play. In Cymbeline, there 
is a proliferation of the virtual domain, and characters are constantly 
constructing virtual and alternative courses of events, both deliberately and by 
mistake. In Richard II, on the other hand, there is shortage and scarcity of the 
virtual domain made accessible to readers and audiences. Audiences are only 
confronted with the actual actions of characters from which they have to 
construct the virtual domain. In both cases, however, the virtual remains 
essential to the intelligibility of the play and its availability defines how the play 
will be received by its audiences. 
Cymbeline
In an epilogue to his book, The Improbability of Othello (2010), Joel B. Altman 
identifies a mode of writing in Shakespeare, which he calls ‘romantic,’ where the 
playwright seems to relax his adherence to the principle of probability. This is 
even more so in the plays generally called ‘Romances,’ Cymbeline included. In 
these plays, Altman argues, Shakespeare felt restricted by probabilistic 
representation and so looked for more ‘wondrous’ modes of presentation. 
According to Altman, Shakespeare
seems also to have recognized that probable theater reflects conventional 
thinking and that conventional thinking, if reassuring, is delimiting. He 
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wanted more for his staged persons and his audiences, and therefore 
violated the Aristotelian dictum that ‘a likely impossibility is always 
preferable to an unconvincing possibility’. (2010, 346)
While the element of ‘wonder’ is unmistakably characteristic of Cymbeline, yet I 
shall argue that probabilistic modes of thinking are also prominent in this play. 
One area of the use of probabilistic thinking in the play is the wager scene. 
Probabilistic reasoning in this scene is related to and manifested by the range of 
virtual domains that the play generates. Cymbeline is a play matchlessly rich in 
cultivating virtual courses of events and it thrives on the convergence, and often 
divergence between the virtual and the actual domains of actions. This aspect 
of the play can best be seen as manifested in three areas. The first is the use of 
forensic rhetoric; second is the foregrounding of the act of improvisation as 
theme in the play; and the third is the gap between the virtual and the actual 
courses of events. 
The use of forensic rhetoric features clearly in the wager story. This scene 
takes place in Act One, when Giacomo promises to prove to Posthumus the 
dishonour of his wife Imogen. Thus, the forensic nature of the wager is quite 
apparent: Giacomo has to prove, as a lawyer in a court would do, that Imogen is 
dishonourable. To achieve this qualitative aspect of his claim as truthful or not, 
he has inevitably to follow a quantitative approach wherein he has to increase 
the probability of his claim via collecting plausible evidence. He goes to Britain 
for this purpose and, quite shrewdly, has the opportunity to get into Imogen’s 
room while she is sleeping. In the room he has to carry out his enquiry and 
collect as much misleading evidence as he can to convince Posthumus of 
Imogen’s infidelity. 
First enamoured by the beauty of both Imogen and her bedchamber, 
Giacomo manages to turn his attention back to his main mission, namely to 
write down everything that can be used as evidence: 
Such and such pictures, there the window, such
Th’adornment of her bed, the arras, figures,
Why such and such, and the contents o’th’ story.        (2.2.25-7)
Like the story on the tapestry, Giacomo himself is after a ‘story’ which, to be 
convincing, he has to fill in relevant content and arrange it in an intelligible way. 
His aim is basically rhetorical: to persuade Posthumus of Imogen’s infidelity 
rather than really defile it. “Iachimo would rather poison Posthumus’ mind than 
possess Imogen’s body. So he does not touch her” (Nevo 2003, 101). The main 
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interest then for Giacomo, as it will be to Posthumus, is solely in stories about 
Imogen, not in the actual manipulation of her body. According to Alison Thorne,
“sexual guilt” turns out to be “a matter of rhetorical persuasion rather than direct 
proof” (1999, 184). 
Acutely aware of his main job, Giacomo turns then to weighing the 
importance of every piece of evidence according to how probable it can render 
his claim. He concludes that details of her body make his claim seem 
comparatively more probable: 
Ah, but some natural notes about her body
Above ten thousand meaner movables
Would testify t’enrich mine inventory.                      (2.2.28-30)
Although he aims to quantitatively increase the evidential data in his inventory, 
yet he is aware of the qualitative difference among different items: surely details 
of her own body (which should be an autonomous and guarded area) are more 
supportive of his claim than a mere description of the chamber, which is a more 
feasibly accessible space. 
The most precious token he can take in this regard is the bracelet from her 
arm: “’Tis mine, and this will witness outwardly, / As strongly as the conscience 
does within, / To th’madding of her lord” (2.2.35-7; emphasis added). Giacomo 
carries on in his collecting of ‘evidence’ until he notices the mole on her breast: 
“Here’s a voucher / Stronger than ever law could make. This secret / Will force 
him think I have picked the lock and ta’en / The treasure of her honour” (39-42).
Mentioning ‘law’ in this context is hardly surprising, and it shows that he 
understands his mission as a lawyer who accumulates evidence to defend or 
prosecute some person. Moreover, in order for Giacomo to be able to judge 
what seems more or less probable, or the stronger and weaker evidence, he 
has to project Posthumus’ virtual response to and interpretation of every single 
bit of evidence that Giacomo is going to present. This accords with the 
rhetoricians’ recommendation, mentioned above, that the orator should skilfully 
manipulate the virtual domain of the judge. In order to efficiently do that, 
Giacomo has to project all the virtual routes Posthumus’ thought will go in, and 
manage his available evidence accordingly. 
Back in Italy, Giacomo professes himself the winner of Imogen’s honour 
(2.4.53). Posthumus demands proof: “If you can make’t apparent / That you 
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have tasted her in bed, my hand / And ring is yours” (56-58). Quite interestingly, 
Posthumus’s request is not very ambitious: he only asks Giacomo to make the 
claim ‘apparent’. The OED shows that there were two main meanings for the 
word ‘apparent’ in the 17th century: first is the evident and clear; and the second 
is “Appearing to the senses or mind, as distinct from (though not necessarily 
opposed to) what really is” or “Likely so far as appearances go.” Thus 
Posthumus is asking for a proof that is like truth, one that is the result of 
rhetorical deliberation. This is what Giacomo has and what he is going to make. 
Giacomo, on the other hand, seizes this opportunity and makes clear the nature 
of the evidence at his disposal:
                                 Sir, my circumstances,
Being so near the truth as I will make them,
Must first induce you to believe;                                      (61-3) 
The evidence Giacomo has, then, is circumstantial, not direct evidence.  More 
captivating is his admission that his proof ‘comes near the truth’ and does not 
aspire to be the truth itself. He does not offer, nor does Posthumus ask him to, 
present eyewitnesses on the deed. The only other thing Giacomo offers is his 
‘oath’. Thus it appears that their contestation is mainly rhetorical and it aspires 
not to determine the actual event, but what looks probable according to the 
evidence presented.
To make his case Giacomo starts by describing the contents of Imogen’s 
chamber, such as the hanging tapestry and its splendour, which invites 
Posthumus’ objection: “This is true, / And this you might have heard of here, by 
me / Or by some other” (2.4.76-8; emphasis added). Posthumus, it seems, is no 
less aware of the play of possibilities than Giacomo. In possible worlds terms, 
while Giacomo claims to present the actual course of event, Posthumus is quick 
to weigh the evidence and suggest an alternative or virtual course of events. 
The evidence Giacomo presents is hardly enough, for his knowledge of her 
chamber could have come from other sources than of the fact of himself being 
there. This time Giacomo loses in the quantitative game, so he reacts by trying 
to augment the probability of his claim, now by mentioning more particular 
details: “More particulars / Must justify my knowledge” (78-9). In Roland
Barthes’s (1986) terms, these particulars and details would enhance the reality 
effect of the story. However, the particulars Giacomo mentions, the chimney 
piece and the roof of her chamber, are not convincing enough for Posthumus to 
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surrender to his claims, because these details could have been known 
otherwise than by being into Imogen’s room. This forces Giacomo to reveal the 
bracelet and claim that Imogen has given it to him. Struck first by surprise, 
Posthumus retorts shortly after that: “Maybe she plucked it off / To send it me” 
(104-5). So, the event that Giacomo presents as actual, that he made love to 
Imogen, is evidenced by the bracelet. To Posthumus, however, that evidence is 
still compatible with another virtual course of event, namely the supposition that 
it is Imogen who gave the bracelet to Giacomo. Thus, we have here two virtual 
courses of events, both compatible with presence of the bracelet with Giacomo. 
But Giacomo makes a witty move:
GIACOMO. She writes so to you, doth she?
POSTHUMUS. O no, no, no – ‘tis true. Here, take this too.
[He gives GIACOMO his ring]  (105-6) 
Giacomo is here decreasing the probability of Posthumus’s supposition for, had 
she sent it, she would have written so to him. And since she did not, then she 
was not sending it to Posthumus. Posthumus, for a moment, is quite convinced 
of that and grants Giacomo winning the wager. However, Filario, their host, gets 
involved in this playful, though deadly serious, game of possibilities, suggesting 
that “It may be probable she lost it, or / Who knows if one her women, being 
corrupted, / Hath stol’n it from her?” (2.4.115-6). Filario is suggesting another 
virtual plot in which Imogen did not give the bracelet to Giacomo nor send it to 
Posthumus, but rather it was stolen from her. This plot is no less ‘probable’ than 
the other two, which induces Posthumus to withdraw his past judgement. But 
when Giacomo swears that he had it, Posthumus starts to undermine the 
probability of Filario’s plot on behalf of that of Giacomo: “She would not lose it. 
Her attendants are / All sworn and honourable. They induced to steal it? / And 
by a stranger? No, he hath enjoyed her” (124-6). What sounds probable to 
Filario is even less so to Posthumus. This third virtual course being dismissed, 
the only remaining version, which Posthumus reluctantly accepts, is Giacomo’s. 
What is interesting about this scene is its quasi-judicial nature, for 
Giacomo here is assuming the role of orator or prosecutor, trying to convince 
Posthumus, who is assuming the role of a judge. However, Posthumus proves a 
bad judge by Renaissance standards, for he allows his ears to be affected by 
one side of the argument only, and never listens to the other side. In his essay 
‘Of Judicature’, Francis Bacon (2002) states that judges should listen to both 
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sides with patience, and they should distribute their hearing among all parties, 
especially the modest or weak side of the case. Posthumus did none of these; 
he did not even listen to Imogen’s defence of herself, let alone do that with 
patience and gravity. More interesting is the lasting influence of Giacomo’s 
rhetoric, for until the last revelation, Posthumus is persuaded by his insinuations. 
Even when Posthumus forgives Imogen before the battle and determines to die 
for her, he still believes Giacomo’s story (Kahn 1997, 168). Posthumus’ reaction 
to the evidence presented is very complicated and, at some points, far from 
logical. Giacomo presents three kinds of evidence: the room description, his 
knowledge of the mole on her breast and the bracelet. Among these, the 
strongest should be the mole on her breast. However, Posthumus focuses on 
the bracelet after he dismisses the description of the bedchamber. The irony in 
this dialogue is that the discussion begins as rational, but ends up more 
penitential than rhetorical. For although he works on weighing evidence on a 
rhetorical and probabilistic basis, Posthumus accepts Giacomo’s oath as 
evidence. Lorna Hutson elaborately shows that some practices of penitential 
theology in the justice system, such as confession and swearing, belong to the 
pre-Reformation judicial system. In post-Reformation judicial practice, the use of 
evidence replaced these practices (2007, 45). What is interesting here is that 
Posthumus first works on forensic evidence but then, quite unpredictably, 
lapses into an acceptance of oaths as judicial evidence. Moreover, by excluding 
the possibility that the bracelet might have been stolen with the help of the 
servants, Posthumus shows more trust in the fidelity of Imogen’s servants than 
in Imogen herself. And so it seems that Shakespeare might have wanted to 
indicate how hopelessly premature his protagonist is, at this stage of the play at 
least (Glazov-Corrigan 1994, 392).
The second manifestation of the virtual domain in the play is the practice 
of improvisation. Improvisation is practiced by many characters who quite 
adroitly employ the divergence between the actual and virtual domains of the 
other characters. Two examples will suffice in this regard. One has to do with 
the Queen’s plan to have Imogen poisoned. The Queen asks Doctor Cornelius 
to prepare some poisonous drugs. She explains that she needs them to: “try the 
forces / Of these thy compounds on such creatures as / We count not worth the 
hanging, but none human” (1.5.18-20). This is the plot she presents as actual, 
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but for Cornelius it is only a virtual one: “[aside] I do suspect you, madam. / But 
you shall do no harm” (31-2). Suspecting thus, he engages in an act of 
improvisation, since the drugs he has given her would cause a swoon but are 
not strong enough to kill a human being. As a result of his improvisation is that 
“She is fooled / With a most false effect, and I the truer / So to be false with her” 
(42-4). The box has a long journey throughout the play, moving from the Queen 
to Pisanio (60-74), whom she directs to give it to his mistress, Imogen. Then it 
moves from Pisanio to Imogen (3.4.188-192), who drinks the drug when she 
feels sick in the cave (4.2.38). Drinking the drug makes her swoon and be 
thought dead, until the true story of the drug is revealed at the end of the play 
by Cornelius himself (5.6.249-58). What is interesting about this example is that 
both improvisations are at work: on the one hand, the Queen has partly 
succeeded in importing the drug to Imogen whom she wanted to have killed. On 
the other hand, however, Cornelius’s counter-improvisation also worked well, 
for although Imogen had the drug, she never died. Cornelius was thus 
successful in projecting the virtual plan of the Queen and in (re)acting 
accordingly. In narratological terms, the Queen as an agent did not account for 
the fact that the subagent to her plan, Cornelius, is not an automated one, but 
might have a plan of his own. According to Marie-Laure Ryan, “At every step 
involving a subagent, the planner must project the alternatives facing the 
subagent and foresee the subagent’s reactions” (1991, 136). Cornelius’s move, 
moreover, has far-reaching implications for the plot of the play. “It enables the 
tragicomic transformation of grave and serious events into restorative and 
gratifying ends” (Nevo 2003, 108). This line of the story also shows the 
exhilarating potential of the possible and virtual event: at every juncture of this 
complex course, the action could have turned out differently, which would have 
led to other results than the ones actualized in the play’s world. An awareness 
of these unactualized possibilities is necessary if we are to appreciate the 
aesthetic import of these episodes. 
The other example is related to Pisanio’s improvisation when he was 
ordered by his master Posthumus to kill Imogen.  Pisanio, be it noted, “enjoys a 
certain cunning – the Queen calls him sly” (Lewis 1991, 346). Realizing the 
illusion of Posthumus, he attributes it, quite correctly, to the work of rhetoric 
which we detailed above. He tells Imogen that “Some villain, / Ay, and singular 
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in his art, hath done you both / This cursed injury” (3.4.119-21). To reconcile his 
conscience with obedience to his master, he decides, on the one hand, to 
convince Posthumus that he has really killed Imogen, and, on the other hand, to 
help her escape and never be recognized. To do the first thing, he tells her that 
“I’ll give but notice that you are dead, and send him / Some bloody sign of it, for 
‘tis commanded / I should do so. You shall be missed at court / And that will well 
confirm it” (124-7). This way he will construct in Posthumus’s mind a virtual 
course of events in which Imogen is dead. To foster the likelihood of this event, 
he will give some signs that qualitatively enhance this supposition: one is a 
bloody sign, suggesting Imogen’s blood, and the second is Imogen’s absence 
from the court, which will also suggest her death. Pisanio’s improvisation will 
succeed until the end of the play. To protect Imogen from Cloten, he advises 
and help her to disguise as a page:“and but disguise / That which t’appear itself 
must not yet be” (144-5). To conduct the disguise is also to create a virtual 
course of events, which the other characters think to be actual. According to 
Stephen Greenblatt, disguise can be a form of improvisation (1980, 252). The 
disguise works according to Imogen’s and Pisanio’s plans, by keeping her 
identity covered from her brothers, her father, the Roman ambassador Lucius, 
and even Posthumus, until it is revealed by Pisanio at the end (5.6.229-32). 
These acts of improvisation are integral to the progression and continuation of 
both the play and the royal family: “Pisanio, like Belarius, must now betray his 
master in order to save an heir to the throne" (Simonds 1982, 143).
It is to be noted that the acts of improvisation have taken a geographical 
dimension, being linked as they are to the division the play establishes between 
the court and the wilderness. Milford Haven here stands for “the ‘green world’ or 
other place which in Shakespearean comedy is liberating and restorative” (Nevo 
2003, 106). The court, on the other hand, is associated with intrigues and 
villainy. Even Imogen, frustrated by her father’s court, voices the same 
distinction: “When rich ones scarce tell true. To lapse in fullness / Is sorer than 
to lie for need, and falsehood / Is worse in kings than beggars” (3.6.12-4). 
Accordingly, improvisation is always associated with the court and its figures; 
but in the natural landscape, where we find that “Wordsworthian connection 
between the exiled royal family and a nature that is divine” (Carr 1978, 323), 
people scarcely get involved in such behaviour.
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The third area of the cultivation of virtuality in the play is found in the 
proliferating gaps between the actual and virtual courses of events. As the play 
moves on, we are shown the divergence between what actually happened and 
what the characters think to have happened. In this play, everyone “is at every 
point unaware of or deceived about the major facts affecting [their] situation” 
(Nevo 2003, 92). In narratological terms, this marks the gap between the facts 
of the textual actual world and the private worlds of the characters’ beliefs and 
conceptions. The above examples of the wager scene, deception and disguise 
testify to the exhilarating potential of the virtual domain of the play. The story of 
the two princes is very interesting in this regard. While the actual course of 
action is hidden from the other characters, it is revealed to the audiences 
around the middle the play in (3.3). Before this time, both audiences and 
characters are denied access to the actual course of events, and only then are 
the audiences given that advantage, when it is revealed by Belarius: “How hard 
it is to hide the sparks of nature! / These boys know little they are sons to th’ 
King, / Nor Cymbeline dreams that they are alive. / They think they are mine” 
(3.3.79-82). Among characters it is only Belarius that knows this secret, which 
he now shares with the audiences. This secret is kept up to the end of the play, 
when Belarius, worried about the fate of the two princes, discloses it to 
Cymbeline (5.6.328-32). 
The bitterest irony is when Imogen meets Belarius and the two princes, 
not knowing that they are her brothers. However, the two brothers do not have 
the same access to the actual world as Imogen does. Although both sides are 
ignorant about their siblinghood, the brothers are two times removed from 
reality: knowing neither that Fidele is a woman nor that this woman is their 
natural sister. For Imogen the irony is more piquant because she wishes that 
the two youths were her missing brothers: “[Aside] Would it had been so that 
they / Had been my father’s sons. Then had my price/Been less, and so more 
equal ballasting / To thee, Posthumus” (3.6.73-6). Ironically, the virtual course 
she imagines, expressed by her counterfactual statement, is the same as the 
actual course of state of affairs, an irony that the audience can fully appreciate. 
Here also we can see how the actual shadows the virtual resulting in these 
bitter ironies, for the three siblings are naturally driven to love each other in 
some mysterious way. The brothers’ natural passion induces them to love 
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Fidele: Arviragus says that he loves Fidele “as my brother” (3.6.69). So, 
although their natural familial passion is “unavailable to conscious knowledge, it 
is evidently unconsciously registered” (Nevo 2003, 106). 
The story of Posthumus, Cloten and Imogen is also full of these
divergences between the actual and virtual courses of events. Thanks to 
Pisanio’s plot, Posthumus thinks that Imogen is now dead, while actually she is 
alive. After she takes the drugs, Imogen is thought by Belarius and her brothers
to be dead, which she is not. When she wakes up to see Cloten’s corpse by her 
side, she mistakes him for Posthumus. So, both Imogen and Posthumus think 
the other to be dead, which is not the case in the actual world of the text. It is 
interesting how Shakespeare sometimes leads characters unknowingly to 
amass signs to augment the probability of the virtual and consider it as an 
actual event. When Imogen wakes up to see Cloten’s corpse by her side, she 
mistakes him for Posthumus, proving that by the similarity of the corpse to 
Posthumus: “The garments of Posthumus? / I know the shape of‘s leg; this is 
his hand, / His foot Mercurial, his Martial thigh, / The brawns of Hercules” 
(4.2.311-3). And although Cloten speaks of being similar to Posthumus – “the 
lines of my body are as well drawn as his” (4.1.8) – this is hardly enough to 
establish their identification, which reduces her to a state of unsympathetic 
foolishness (see Lewis 1991, 354). When Guiderius hears the solemn music of 
the bird, he thinks it probable that someone has died: “What does he mean? 
Since death of my dear’st mother / It did not speak before. All solemn things / 
Should answer solemn accidents” (4.2.191-3). When they see the swooning 
Imogen, they immediately conclude that she is dead. It is as if even 
metaphysical forces are tricking characters to live in that virtual, rather than 
actual world. The interesting thing in the play is that not only do characters 
mistake the virtual for the actual, but also the actual for the virtual. This specially 
happens with Imogen who, waking up near Cloten’s corpse, cannot tell whether 
she is living in reality or dreaming:
                                 I hope I dream,
For so I thought I was a cave keeper,
And cook to honest creatures. But ‘tis not so.
‘Twas but a bolt of nothing, shot of nothing, 
Which the brain makes of fumes. Our very eyes
Are sometimes like our judgements, blind.  (299-304)
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The proliferation of the virtual domains in the play and its divergence from 
the actual domain has resulted in the play being considered one of the most 
complex among Shakespeare’s plays.11 This feature, together with the three-
plot structure of the play, makes it look “like a jigsaw puzzle whose broken-apart 
and mixed-up pieces must be matched and put together” (Nevo 2003, 95). This 
all is due to the unprecedented proliferation of the virtual courses of events. In 
Marie-Laure Ryan’s words quoted above, the plot of this play can be seen as a 
‘layered structure, a bundle of possible stories’. The other consequence is the 
cultivation of doubt in the play. As we have seen, doubt is cast on all inputs of 
the material senses, mainly on hearing and seeing. As far as hearing is 
concerned, we have referred to Giacomo’s deception of Posthumus being 
carried out via the ears (Simonds 1982). Giacomo also uses ‘seeing’ to carry 
out that deception. Imogen is also deceived by seeing the corpse of Cloten, 
which she mistakes for Posthumus. All these instances and many others would 
elevate ‘misconception’ to a general theme in the play. The spread of 
misconceptions is related to the proliferation of the virtual events in the play. For 
among Shakespeare’s plays, “perhaps none is so preoccupied with characters' 
misperceptions than is Cymbeline. The characters and the audience constantly 
share the difficulty of distinguishing appearance from reality” (Lewis 1991, 344). 
The third consequence is the cultivation of ironies in the play. In narratological 
terms, dramatic irony can be seen when a character considers as virtual what 
the audience know to be actual or actualisable event. Consequently, we have 
seen how the play is fraught with ironies to which almost all characters fall prey. 
For example, when Pisanio tells Imogen of Posthumus’s wish that she meet him 
in Milford Haven, and that the time for it can be a whole day walk, she exclaims: 
“Why, one that rode to’s execution, man, / Could never go so slow” (3.2.70-1). 
Imogen would be really going to her execution blissfully unaware, if Posthumus’ 
instructions to Pisanio were to be implemented.12
A central issue that captures our attention in the whole discussion above 
about the virtual in the play is the sense of potentiality that it implies. When 
Posthumus in the wager scene starts to entertain the possibility of Imogen’s 
infidelity to him, this just shows the range and limits of his love of and trust in 
her. No matter how vehemently he praises her at the start, his agreement for 
the wager betrays his view of what Imogen can potentially do and be; it is 
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interesting how sexual his language is, when he asks Giacomo if he had ‘tasted 
her in bed’, even before Giacomo starts to give his evidence. Imogen’s 
subjectivity is defined by Posthumus less by what she actually is than by what 
she can potentially be. 
Yet this sense of potentiality of the virtual events can also be a liberating 
strategy and a means for survival. Cornelius saves Imogen’s life by recognizing 
the Queen’s potential for evil and Pisaniosimilarly recognizes Posthumus’s 
liability and potential for deception. In fact, Imogen is saved two times from 
death through these acts of improvisation: first time by Cornelius and the 
second by Pisanio. Characters have been looking for less costly alternatives, 
different from the choices given them in the plot. The characters’ potential, 
moreover, also helps deepen these characters’ self-awareness as well as our
understanding of them. We could not discover these potentialities of Imogen’s 
adaptability nor Pisanio’s wit if it were not for these improvisations, nor, I think, 
have they been fully aware of their own potential, either. Again, it does not only 
show the inherent plurality of the text, but also the plurality of the subject and 
the possibility to be otherwise. The play also shows how, for much of their lives,
the characters live in and promote virtual identities. Moreover, although these 
virtual identities are not actual, they are real, for they have effects in the plot, 
helping to achieve goals, save lives, and push the action towards resolution.  
In conclusion, we have investigated three areas in the play where the 
virtual is paramount: the rhetorical aspects of the wager scene, the acts of 
deception and improvisation in the play, and the interaction between and 
confusion of the virtual and the actual events and states of affairs. All these 
areas show how cognitively functional and indispensable the virtual events are 
to our understanding of the play. It shows that the actual events form a limited 
portion of the complex modal structure of the play: almost all the complexities of 
the plot and the divergent itineraries the action takes are the result of characters’ 
(mis)conception of what happens and their generation of these virtual scenarios. 
It partly explains the notorious complexity of the play’s structure repeatedly 
noticed by critics. Especially in the wager scene, it also shows how satisfaction 
with virtual courses of events can have tragical consequences. In all these 
examples, we have also seen how the probable is indispensable to any account 
of possibility, and this shows the limitation of some narratological possible 
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worlds accounts of possibility, which have largely failed to notice the inherent 
links between the possible and the probable, especially relevant to the ways in 
which characters construct these virtual courses of events. Recognizing the 
proliferation of the virtual domains in Cymbeline will serve as an entree into 
another play, Richard II, where we meet an opposite situation, namely the 
scarcity of the domain of the virtual and its enclosure. This will require more 
cognitive effort on the part of the reader or spectator in that they need to 
reconstruct that virtual domain, albeit retrospectively. 
Richard II
Perhaps falling short of the appropriate critical terminology, A. P. Rossiter 
describes the frustrating ‘inconsistencies and discontinuities’ of Richard II by 
making recourse to the geological term ‘unconformities’, by which he means 
“The whole may be consistent, but only if we have a theory of derangements or 
interruptions” (1963, 24; emphasis in original). Richard II has been notorious for 
its ambiguities, the lack of motivation of its characters, its challengingly non-
linear temporality and the indeterminacy of the historical questions it raises. 
Critics have always pointed out to this bewildering feature of the play. According 
to Henry Berger, “In the opening scenes of Richard II, the inflation of speech is 
no more conspicuous than the silences it constitutes as hidden behind it” (2004, 
107). And, as Robyn Bolam puts it, “In Richard II what is unsaid is often as 
significant as the poetic language which plays off visually on-stage” (2002, 141). 
In this section I shall address this peculiar quality of the play in terms of 
the actual/virtual dichotomies developed above and their general role in the 
intelligibility of the play. I shall argue that, to an extent unparalleled in 
Shakespeare’s work, Richard II allows very limited, if any, access to the mental 
domains of the major characters, especially Bolingbroke, and that this leads to a 
disorienting ambiguity between the actual and the virtual plans of these 
characters, and consequently to determining their motivation. This 
inaccessibility also highlights the notion of inwardness in the play. The play is
also indeterminate regarding many controversial issues about what really 
happened. These issues remain unresolved up to the end of the play. Finally, 
this feature of the play dictates a further effort by the reader to make sense of 
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the whole plot, although answers to many of these questions will remain 
inconclusive.  Below I shall deal with the effect this characteristic of the play has 
had on sifting the characters’ motivations, and then address the indeterminate 
historical facts presented in the play. Later I shall show how the adherence to 
the actual or virtual domains marks the differences between the characters of 
Richard and Bolingbroke, and finally will discuss how all of this supports (or 
thwarts) the intelligibility of the whole play. 
The first aspect of the play is the inaccessibility of the inwardness of 
characters and the difficulty of determining their intentions and motivations. In
drama, motivation is among the crucial facts audiences need to know about 
characters. In fiction the motivation of characters can be accessed via the 
declarations they make in their speech or through narratorial comments. As the 
latter is absent in drama, audiences depend solely on these characters’ 
declarations and on deductions made possible by their actions. Identifying the 
agent’s motivations is very crucial in rhetorical enquiry: “judicial narratio. . . as 
designed to produce a particular telling of events that made sense as evidence 
of motivation, and hence of ‘character’” (Hutson 2007, 137;emphasis in original). 
The rhetorical enquiry and the logic of probabilities on which it is based are 
indeed motivated by the urge of uncovering the inwardness of characters or the 
invisible human intentions and motivations. “It is a desire driven by the sense of 
the inscrutable at the core of the psyche, a mystery that can entice or horrify, 
tempt as well as resist ‘plucking [out]’” (Mukherji 2006, 6). In possible worlds 
terms, motivation requires access to the characters’ private worlds or domains, 
and it is complicated when we try to sift the actual from the virtual plans of these 
characters. Since we are unsure about too many things throughout Richard II, 
then it is the ‘apparent’ rather than the ‘known’ that will dominate as the main 
category of our knowledge in the play. 13 On the virtual level, the play is 
exceptionally interesting since in it the audience, let alone the other characters, 
are denied access to the virtual worlds of some characters, most notably 
Bolingbroke. Even when spectators make inferences about the mental private 
domains of characters, these inferences are always proven inadequate, and are 
frustrated by the characters’ real actions. The characters’ real motives are often 
other than those explicitly expressed (Berger, 2004, 109; Nuttall 2009, 184). In 
this play both ways are filled with complications. On the one hand, characters 
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seldom declare their intended actions and plans. On the other hand, very little 
can be extracted from the narrative structure of the play to identify these 
motives. This is true especially of the two main characters in the play: King 
Richard II and, even more significantly, Bolingbroke. 
The behaviour of King Richard II is not wholly comprehensible when he 
reacts to the first challenge to his kingship in the play, namely the Bolingbroke-
Mowbray conflict in (1.1). The King appoints a day to settle the accusations 
Bolingbroke makes against Mowbray. However, on the appointed day of the 
combat the king, to everyone’s surprise, aborts the combat and instead orders 
the two combatants banished: Mowbray for life and Bolingbroke for ten years, to 
be later reduced to six to lesson his father’s, John of Gaunt’s, grief. The 
significance of and the motivation behind the king’s action have invoked endless 
speculation. While some critics have considered that action to undermine the 
feudal tradition to which Richard owes his kingship (Rackin 1990), others have 
read in it a consolidation of his authority and the force his words (breath) has 
over his subjects (Parvini 2012). Yet the motivation is far from settled as well: is 
it because he is afraid that, should Mowbray appear guilty, the King will also be 
suspected of the murder, or that the winner will grow politically stronger and 
thus poses a further challenge to Richard’s authority? The King’s declaration of 
his motives is not taken seriously by critics: “For that our kingdom’s earth should 
not be soiled / With that dear blood which it hath fostered” (1.3.124-5). Later 
actions of the king show that the life of Bolingbroke, let alone Mowbray, means 
little to him. So, why the king aborts their combat ceremony and orders them 
exiled remains a mystery in this play.
Even more than King Richard II, the character of Bolingbroke presents 
daunting challenge to the play’s readers and audiences to make sense of his 
actions and to identify the way he plans and intends to act. This special 
disposition of Bolingbroke is attributable to his closed mental territory out of 
which very little can be glimpsed, and when glimpsed, will be ruthlessly 
contradicted by his actual action. He is very silent about his intentions and his 
steps are cautiously calculated. He keeps his motives as secure as 
possible.14This is most clear when the audiences try to construct the reason 
behind his armed return to England. The first declaration he makes to York is: 
“As I was banished, I was banished Hereford; / But as I come, I come for 
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Lancaster . . .  And therefore personally I lay my claim / To my inheritance of 
free descent” (2.3.112-3, 134-5). Bolingbroke’s supporters have also 
understood his purpose to be ‘for his own’:
NORTHUMBERLAND. The noble duke hath sworn his coming is
But for his own, and for the right of that
We all have strongly sworn to give him aid;
And let him never see joy that breaks that oath!              (2.3.147-50)
This speech of Northumberland is also dubious: on the one hand, it seems to 
imply that even the support of the nobles was conditional, and is only limited to 
help Bolingbroke take his personal rights, no more. On the other hand, the word 
‘his own’, of which Bolingbroke will make frequent use, is equivocal as to what 
anybody might consider as Bolingbroke’s ‘own’? Even the stance of the other 
lords supporting Bolingbroke is not clear: are they supporting him only to get his 
own, or have they a premeditated position against King Richard? The 
conversation among Northumberland, Rose and Willoughby at the end of act 2, 
scene 1, indicates that they have had enough of King Richard II and might imply 
that their intent in supporting Bolingbroke is to depose Richard, regardless of 
Bolingbroke’s rights and intentions.
So, Bolingbroke does not state from the beginning that he intends to 
depose Richard and replace him. But the contradiction between his declared 
aims and his real action is so frustrating that we soon will watch him behaving 
as a king when he declares his intent to have Bushy and Greene executed: 
“The caterpillars of the commonwealth, / Which I have sworn to weed and pluck 
away”(2.3.165-6). In (3.1), Bolingbroke judges Bushy and Greene and orders 
them executed, laying claim to a right which is otherwise an exclusive right of
the King. In this very scene, Bolingbroke’s declarations are very interesting 
though in no way any more revealing. His speech about the king is full of 
encomium: “You have misled a prince, a royal king, / A happy gentleman in 
blood and lineaments” (3.1.8-9). So he unequivocally admits the royal rights of 
Richard, and he introduces his legitimacy in terms of his blood relationship with 
Richard, “Near to the King in blood, and near in love” (17). However, judging by
the play’s action so far, it is of grave doubt whether Bolingbroke was really ‘near 
in love’ to King Richard II. Interestingly, he accuses them, among other things, 
of making the king ‘misinterpret’ him (18). However, it is not clear whether it is 
only the king who misinterpreted Bolingbroke or also the other characters, and 
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even the audiences as well. His inherently ambiguous and dubious positions 
emit from his enclosed private domain and cannot but be misinterpreted. As 
Brents Stirling puts it with regard to Bolingbroke, “Never, in an age of drama 
marked by discursive self-revelation, has a character disclosed his traits with 
such economy and understatement” (1951, 34).15
As the play progresses, the question of Bolingbroke’s real intentions 
becomes even more complicated. While his initial claim is that he has come
only to claim his confiscated fortune, in a later occasion, he adds another 
condition while showing allegiance to the king:
Henry Bolingbroke
On both his knees doth kiss King Richard’s hand,
And sends allegiance and true faith of heart
To his most royal person, hither come
Even at his feet to lay my arms and power,
Provided that my banishment repealed
And lands restored again be freely granted:                         (3.3.34-40)
The new additional condition is the repealing of his banishment.  Also newly 
added this time is a negative condition which he never voiced earlier: “If not, I’ll 
use the advantage of my power/ And lay the summer’s dust with showers of 
blood” (41-2)16.  Part of the interest of the play lies in this gradual unfolding of 
Bolingbroke’s virtual domain as a result of his action. With Bolingbroke’s 
revelations about his action being very sparse, the audience is left only with the 
real actions to make sense of the events. Accordingly, no differentiation can be 
made between his real and virtual plans. Virtual plans are scarcely expressed in 
his speech, and when expressed, they are soon contradicted by his real actions. 
Characters’ real plans are given voice in soliloquies and asides. Unlike Hamlet, 
Macbeth, Iago or many a Shakespearean protagonist, Bolingbroke never 
soliloquises in this play. The duality between intention and action, or between 
virtual and actual plans, is missing in Bolingbroke, since what we get is only the 
actual action, and we have to (and, it seems, so does Bolingbroke) re-modify 
the intention to match any step being newly taken. According to Joel B. Altman, 
"Bolingbroke has the potential, though it is unexpressed, to be what he 
becomes since he becomes it, however inconsistent are his claims on given 
occasions. He acts, in the theatrical sense, according to the decorum of the 
scene in which he finds himself"(2010, 277). 
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This inaccessibility of Bolingbroke’s intentions infects not only the 
audience but also the other characters. We have just shown the uncertainty 
regarding Northumberland’s interpretation of Bolingbroke’s aims. Nor are we 
sure whether Richard himself has interpreted Bolingbroke correctly. When 
Bolingbroke lays out his conditions mentioned above Richard responds 
favourably.  
Northumberland, say thus the king returns:
His noble cousin is right welcome hither,
And all the number of his fair demands
Shall be accomplished without contradiction.                             (120-3)
His demands having been granted, Bolingbroke must now be satisfied and so 
must be the king, who is not asked to abdicate.  But, to our surprise, the action 
never takes that logical course, and what happens is quite stunning for how 
each character (mis)understands the other:
BOLINGBROKE. My gracious lord, I come but for mine own.
KING RICHARD II.  Your own is yours, and I am yours, and all.       (194-5)
Stunning, since the audiences are left without any answer as to what 
Bolingbroke’s real demand was: if it were overthrowing Richard, then why did 
he not ask that? If it were for his own, then how did Richard understand it 
otherwise? Again this stems from the inherent ambiguity of the phrase ‘my own’, 
which confuses the political with the legal aspects of possession. This may 
follow from a long-standing tradition in Britain of defining the rules of succession 
of monarchy in terms of the rules of the inheritance of lands (Scott 2002, 275).
In fact, Richard, Bolingbroke, Gaunt and York all use these affinities between 
royal succession and land inheritance. For example, Gaunt reproaches Richard 
by saying: “Landlord of England art thou now, not king” (2.1.113). So, it may be 
that Richard has understood Bolingbroke’s ‘my own’ as referring to the royal 
position. So, Bolingbroke’s ‘own’, used by Bolingbroke, Northumberland, and 
even Richard, is far from settled. When Bolingbroke shows his gratitude to 
Northumberland and Percy, he tells them: “And as my fortune ripens with thy 
love” (2.3.48), which means ‘his own’ is not a fixed category and has grown in 
size due to the new political condition and the support he has received. 
The vagueness of Bolingbroke’s intentions brings about the gravest 
mistake in the play, namely Exton’s murder of King Richard II. While Exton 
thinks that he has access to Bolingbroke’s real intention regarding Richard, 
namely to get him killed, it ironically appears otherwise (or at least so claims
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Bolingbroke). Interestingly, Exton’s belief is based on his (mis)understanding of 
Bolingbroke’s declaration, “Have I no friend will rid me of this living fear?” (5.4.2), 
said while Bolingbroke is looking at Exton, who thought that Bolingbroke wishes 
him to kill Richard. Having committed the murder, he is surprised, as we were 
many times so far, that Bolingbroke’s wish was otherwise:
BOLINGBROKE.  Exton, I thank thee not; for thou hast wrought
A deed of slander with thy fatal hand
Upon my head and all this famous land.
EXTON.  From your own mouth, my lord, did I this deed.
BOLINGBROKE. They love not poison that do poison need;
Nor do I thee. Though I did wish him dead,
I hate the murderer, love him murdered.                   (5.6.34-40)
Thus, Bolingbroke’s vagueness, which enabled him to overcome the others, has 
also been a cause which laid slander ‘upon his head and all this famous land’. 
So, even the utterance taken directly from Bolingbroke’s ‘mouth’ is far from 
reliable. In fact, it is not Exton who misinterprets Bolingbroke, but almost 
everyone among the characters, let alone the audience. However, it is not for 
sure whether Bolingbroke did really intend that ambiguity, although in all cases 
the murder of Richard will always be considered as his own crime. 
This inaccessibility of the virtual (or otherwise lack of inwardness) in 
Bolingbroke has been considered by many critics as characteristically 
Machiavellian. In Chapter XVIII of The Prince, Niccolo Machiavelli advises that 
the prince should hide his real intents and conceal his mind under the façade of 
virtuous behaviour. He must “be a great pretender and dissembler” and “be very 
careful never to let anything fall from his lips” that is contrary to these virtues 
([1513] 2005, 61, 62). Hugh Grady remarks that “This is a mistake which 
Bolingbroke emphatically does not make” (2002, 75). Even more, in contrast to 
other Machiavellian figures like Richard III and Marlowe’s Barabas, Bolingbroke 
does not even give any soliloquy. In his Essays, Francis Bacon refers to this 
quality as dissimulation. Bacon defines dissimulation as “in the negative, when 
a man lets fall signs and arguments, that he is not that he is” ([1625] 2002, 19). 
He regards it as akin to and consequent on secrecy which he praises as “politic 
and moral” (ibid., 20). Bacon’s attitude towards dissimulation is rather vague; 
although he considers it politically practical, yet he points out that it subverts 
trust and truthfulness. Secrecy and even dissimulation can best describe 
Bolingbroke’s behaviour. These aspects of his character are perplexing to other 
characters and the audience alike. Maus (1995) and Bacon (2002) both refer to 
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the discomfort expressed regarding inwardness and secrecy, and the urge 
people feel to uncover these secrets. In the light of the above, this aspect of 
Bolingbroke’s political behaviour is a distinct feature of the whole play and might 
account for the cries of unintelligibility of the play that many critics have voiced.  
The second interesting feature of the play is the paucity of facts regarding many 
crucial questions raised throughout the plot. In possible worlds terms, many 
spots are left uncovered in the play’s textual actual world, and many questions 
left unanswered. The result is that the borderline between the actual and the 
possible grows even thinner. This aspect of the play becomes even more 
unsettling given the essentially historical nature of these events as it will taint 
with scepticism all the claims of certainty of historical truth. The play seems to 
generate suspicion about all the issues it tackles. These issues range from 
Bolingbroke’s ‘miraculous’ return to England, the legitimacy of the new king and 
the reality of deposition, the identity of Woodstock’s murderer, and York’s 
attitude to his ‘son’ Aumerle. For example, Bolingbroke’s extraordinarily speedy 
return to England has been a baffling puzzle to the play’s readers and 
audiences. We first hear of his armed return to England from Northumberland at 
the end of act 2, scene 1, only some moments after Gaunt’s death and the 
king’s decision to expropriate his fortune. In that very scene, and immediately 
after the king and Queen exit, we hear Northumberland, Ross and Willoughby 
voicing their complaint about the irresponsible policies of the king and 
exchanging news about the coming of Bolingbroke to England. This means that 
obviously there is not enough time for Bolingbroke to hear about the king’s 
decree, much less to react by collecting an army “With eight tall ships, three 
thousand men of war, / Are making hither with all due expedience, / And shortly 
mean to touch our northern shore” (2.1.288-90). In the light of the discussion 
above about his real intentions, this throws grave doubts as whether this 
landing was really pre-mediated and makes it appear “to have been planned 
before Richard’s seizure of his inheritance, an act that was then appropriated 
retroactively as the justification for invasion”(Altman 2010, 208). However, no 
sufficient explanation is available here since, as it is jokingly put, “Even in the 
days of telephony, the internet, the Channel Tunnel, and the hovercraft this is 
very good going on Bolingbroke's part” (Sutherland and Watts 2000, 87). 
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Whether this is a structural drawback or a strategically planned arrangement on 
the part of the playwright, it betrays the ambiguity immanent in the play and 
contributes to the dramatic interest of the blurred virtual domain of the 
characters.
Another crucial issue shrouded with scepticism in the play is that of royal 
succession. The play leaves undetermined who is the real, legitimate king to 
emerge at the end of the play. Although Bolingbroke asks Richard to be 
summoned to surrender his crown in front of the commons so that “we proceed 
/ Without suspicion” (4.1.147-8), Richard in fact creates just the opposite effect.  
To shake the ground under Bolingbroke’s legitimacy as a king, Richard very 
dramatically succeeds in casting doubt about his real position regarding his 
abdication and to divert the attention from Bolingbroke to himself. This suspicion 
is best expressed via the instability of naming in the latter part of the play, 
especially the use of the title of ‘king’ which is at one and the same time is used 
for both Richard and Bolingbroke, and sometimes neither. “For the rest of the 
play Richard is … a king and no king. And so, by logical inference, is 
Bolingbroke” (Leggatt 1988, 70). One interesting moment of this chaos of 
naming is made by Richard: “God save the king, although I be not he. / And yet 
Amen, if heaven do think him me” (4.1.165-6). Now, it seems, even Richard’s 
confidence in his name, movingly shown at the beginning of act 3, has 
deteriorated and the name of the king ceased to generate that symbolic force 
which Richard used to attribute to it.17Another visual implication that Richard 
succeeds in creating is holding the crown from one side and getting Bolingbroke 
to hold it from the other side, resulting in the effect that we have both men 
bareheaded with the crown empty between them. 
Another question that is wrapped with suspicion is the murder of 
Woodstock, Earl of Gloucester, the king’s uncle. Right from the beginning, the 
murder of Woodstock functioned as a subtext for the play (Bolam 2002, 146). It 
has occasioned one of the most dangerous accusations of Bolingbroke against 
Thomas Mowbray, whose answer is more elusive than the accusation itself. 
Mowbray denies that he killed Gloucester but admits his neglect: “Neglected my
sworn duty in that case” (1.1.134). In act 1, scene 2, the Duchess of Gloucester 
accuses the king of killing her husband, and urges John of Gaunt to revenge his 
brother, which he refuses, given that Richard is God’s anointed deputy on earth. 
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In that scene, Gaunt openly accuses the king of Woodstock’s death (1.2.38-9). 
The Duchess, on the other hand, accuses the ‘butcher Mowbray’ of her 
husband’s death (48). In 2.1, Gaunt frankly reiterates his accusation to Richard 
of Gloucester’s murder (2.1.125-32). Later on the murder of Woodstock crops 
up frequently in the play, especially when Bolingbroke, in 4.1, tries to determine 
who the killer of Woodstock is.  Interestingly, in this scene we get a new suspect,
Aumerle. The mutual accusations among Bagot, Aumerle, Fitzwater and Surrey 
lead Bolingbroke to summon the most decisive eye-witness to the case, 
Thomas Mowbray. The latter has passed away in Venice and the question is 
put off to be decided by combat. The combat never takes place and the 
murderer is never exposed. The confusion is apparent in this small part of Act 4 
in which the word ‘lie’ is used 14 times among these peers. So, the play ends 
without ending the mystery of who carried out the murder of Woodstock, and 
who gave the order for that, although King Richard II himself features as the 
main suspect. 18
The third area of interest is how the actual/virtual dichotomy can be a clue to 
characterization. The dichotomy between the actual and the virtual, and the 
adherence of characters to one or the other, has shaped the characterization of 
the two main figures in the play: Bolingbroke and Richard. Bolingbroke is rooted 
in the actual world of real action and offers very little entree to his mental and 
private domain. The enclosure of Bolingbroke’s private domain and the 
inaccessibility of his real intentions and plans result from his adamant refusal to 
live in imagination and his insistence to adhere exclusively to the real situation 
he is in. This is clear from the passionate exchange that takes place between 
him and his father John of Gaunt before Bolingbroke leaves the English soil. To 
alleviate his son’s grief, Gaunt advises him to mentally manage his distress: to 
think that the king did not banish him, to suppose that he is flying from a 
pestilence that plagued his native land, to imagine that he is heading to what is 
dear to him, to suppose the birds musicians, the flowers fair ladies. These 
instructions, which the audiences of the Henry V Chorus would have happily 
followed, Bolingbroke resoundingly rejects. He is a man who cannot live in a 
virtual domain he creates, but only in the real world as it is here and now: “O, 
who can hold a fire in his hand / By thinking on the frosty Caucasus? / Or cloy 
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the hungry edge of appetite / By bare imagination of a feast?” (1.3.257-60). 
Bolingbroke’s enclosure may be due to the fact that he shows less mastery of
the arts of language. This is why, perhaps, he tends to depend on his hand to 
settle his difference with Mowbray, and not on language as Richard would 
always do. So in Bolingbroke’s world we have only actions that are not 
supported by any background of intention, motivations, or plans. The audience, 
consequently, has to re-construct the private domain of Bolingbroke from his 
actions. 
Richard’s character stands at the other extreme. Especially from act 3
onward, Richard seems to live exclusively in his mental world and shows very 
little contact with reality. This detachment from reality has many manifestations 
in Richard’s behaviour. On the one hand, he indulges in mental reconstruction 
of his reality, and gets immersed in the fictionalizing ‘seeing as’ strategy which 
Gaunt recommended but Bolingbroke decisively rejected. When he arrives at
Barkloughly near the Welsh coast (3.2), Richard starts talking to the earth, 
which he considers as his mother. He then works out an extended conceit in 
which he imagines the earth as listening to him while he urges it to employ her 
spiders, adders, and venoms against her sovereign’s foes. He never shies away 
from these ‘senseless conjugations’ as he calls them (3.2.23). The difference 
between Bolingbroke’s literal language and Richard’s metaphorical language 
stems from the tendency of the former to ‘see’ and of the latter to ‘see as’.  In 
Chapter One we saw that the ‘seeing as’ principle is the basis of fictionality and 
theatricality. This fictionalizing tendency culminates in Richard’s prison soliloquy 
(5.5), when he indulges in comparing his prison cell to the world, comparing his 
brain to a mother and soul to a father, who both beget and populate his cell with 
thoughts. Later he compares himself with the clock: his thoughts are minutes, 
his sighs the jarring sound, his fingers the handles and his eyes the watch.  All 
this shows how introverted and contemplative Richard is, a character that is the 
least suited to practical politics. 
On the other hand, Richard seems to be completely detached from his 
present and is dwelling either in the past or future. Once he realizes his 
inevitable downfall after the news of the scattering of his Welsh soldiers, the 
murder of his courtiers, the joining of York with Bolingbroke and the surrender of
his northern castles, he turns to history, to speak about relevant things long past, 
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refraining from taking any action for the time being: “For God’s sake, let us sit 
upon the ground, / And tell sad stories of the death of kings” (3.2.151-2). This 
invites the rebuke of the Bishop of Carlisle: “My lord, wise men ne’er wail their 
present woes, / But presently prevent the ways to wail” (174-5). The second 
aspect of his indulgence in the virtual is his reflection about himself as part of 
history or of his story as a historical narrative, which is voiced in his last meeting 
with the Queen in his way to the Tower: “And ere thou bid goodnight, to quit 
their griefs / Tell thou the lamentable fall of me, / And send the hearers weeping 
to their beds” (5.1.43-5). Thus, it seems as if Richard is either living in the past 
or future, but never in the present. This suspension of the present, and hence 
the detachment from the actual action, are what set Richard apart from 
Bolingbroke and shaped his tragic fate. In both instances, however, 
Shakespeare seems to have been experimenting with how to delineate some 
complex accounts of the human personality in his tragedies. In fact, Richard II
stands out as an emblem in this stage of Shakespeare’s career in the sense 
that he created a tragic personality not available in his earlier tragedies. As 
critics always like to assert, “Richard himself is one of Shakespeare’s sharpest 
studies of a personality” (Leggatt 1988, 61). I would rather say that, in the light 
of the above discussion, Shakespeare’s experimentation with the personality of 
Bolingbroke is no less impressive, for if the kind of Richard is to culminate in 
future creations like Hamlet and Macbeth, Bolingbroke has no counterpart in 
Shakespeare’s later masterful creations of character. 
Up to now we have surveyed the scarcity and inaccessibility of the private 
domains and virtual intentions and plans and its effect on the mystification of 
characters’ motivations, the uncertainty of the historical facts in the play and its 
role as a characterization technique. Now we are heading towards an 
assessment of the overall effect of these characteristics on the general 
intelligibility of the play. Needless to say, the play challenges its audiences and 
demands more intellectual effort on them than many other plays in the 
Shakespeare canon. The audience has to collect the incoherent information and 
arrange it in any possible way to elicit a possible meaning. As we showed in the 
Introduction, this process is similar to what Joel B. Altman calls ‘the language of 
theatrical potentiality.’ This shows the centrality of the virtual and private domain 
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of characters to the understanding of the action. We have already conceived of 
the virtual as a potential which can be manifested in a variety of ways or 
‘meaning possibilities’. These possibilities render the work a fertile soil for 
different, even conflicting explanations and interpretations. When denied direct 
access to the virtual domain, auditors will craft their way into it depending on 
inferences they make from the scarce information scattered in the text. The 
rhetorical or communicative function of the virtual, which we developed in the 
last Chapter, should be most apparent in the instance of Richard II: due to the 
radical shortage of facts presented to them, the audiences need to make as 
many inferences as need be, in order to make sense of the otherwise 
incoherent and contradictory data given to them. This, in turn, will bring to the 
fore the question of the role of the reader or auditor in constructing the meaning 
of the action. Richard II is a play notoriously demanding on the part of the 
reader or spectator due to its characteristics mentioned so far. 
Yet, given these sense-making strategies, readers can still elicit a 
meaning behind the chaos of the play. Even A. P. Rossiter, with whose 
pessimistic words we have opened this section, admits that readers, for all its 
uncertainty, can at least get a sense of possibility, even probability of the action 
of the play: “We must be satisfied with a fair degree of probability and the 
absence of final certainty” (1961, 35). Sutherland and Watt observe that, rather 
than out of artistic immaturity, the playwright worked out these inconsistencies 
quite deliberately and that theatrical convention will allow its readers to make 
sense of it, just as readers of science fiction can make sense of impossible time 
contractions and other features: “As with SF [science fiction], all that is required 
is that the audience understands the rules of the game, and plays along” (2000, 
91). However, an amount of uncertainty is inevitable in Richard II. One of the 
most distinctive features is that it is an ‘implicit drama’ as Travis Bogard (1955) 
would put it. While a play like Richard III would be called explicit, in the sense 
that at its end we get a certain moral and political lesson, in Richard II “Instead 
we hear different voices trying to understand the world in different ways, and the 
overall effect is speculative”(Leggatt 1988, 59).
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Conclusion
Virtual or possible events are absolutely central in Shakespearean drama. 
Shakespeare has assiduously cultivated an interest in the virtual and probable 
thanks to his rhetorical education. Access to the virtual domains of characters 
provides insights into their motivations and intentions, and would unlock their 
inwardness. Further, virtual events might give rise to numerous misconceptions 
among characters. They also serve to initiate conflict in the fictional world, 
because characters always strive to satisfy their private domains at the expense 
of other characters. Our theoretical framework is jointly rooted in modern 
possible worlds narratology and Classical and Renaissance rhetoric. The 
intensive rhetorical learning in the early modern period has helped Shakespeare 
and his contemporaries to invest heavily in the notions of the virtual and the 
probable in their plays. The two plays discussed in this Chapter are very 
different in terms of date, genre, and mood, but they both attest to the centrality 
of the virtual events to the understanding of drama. While in Cymbeline we have 
an upsurge of the amount of virtual events and courses of action, in Richard II
this domain of the virtual remains enclosed and permits very little access. The 
two plays also differ in their treatment of rhetoric. In Cymbeline, we saw that 
Posthumus seeks only an ‘apparent’ proof. In Richard II, when Richard asks 
John of Gaunt whether Bolingbroke is accusing Mowbray for some ‘known’ 
danger, Gaunt answers that it is an ‘apparent’ danger instead. While the 
‘apparent’ evidence Posthumus asks for is supplied mainly by rhetorical 
deliberation on the part of Giacomo, the ‘apparent’ danger which Gaunt 
identifies in Mowbray is to be proven only by force of hand on the part of 
Bolingbroke. In Richard II actual politics takes over, and the upsurge of poetical 
language Richard cherishes is of no use in a world where no virtual thinking is 
allowed to play a role.
In this Chapter, we have also aimed to prove the utility of certain concepts 
of narratology to give insights into aspects of Shakespeare’s plays. The current 
state of Shakespeare studies has generally discouraged scholars from looking 
into modern narratology due to its formalist and structuralist origins. The above 
analyses should demonstrate that such approaches, as possible worlds 
narratology, can indeed throw considerable light on relevant issues in 
Shakespearean drama. Moreover, it must be clear that these approaches could 
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illuminate many aspects of the discipline of rhetoric. The blend between 
rhetorical and possible worlds concepts carried out in this Chapter has afforded 
considerable insights into both. The observations in this Chapter can also 
contribute to the enquiry of the relation between rhetoric and Shakespearean 
drama, which is an increasingly growing field. Further detailed studies can be 
carried out on other plays of different genres, to discover nuances of 
Shakespeare’s delineations of the virtual and actual in his plays. For example, 
Othello proves a fertile play to do such an analysis. There are already copious 
insightful remarks made by Stephen Greenblatt (1980) and Joel B. Altman 
(2010). Another intricate example about tragical effects of the divergence 
between the actual and virtual is Romeo and Juliet. One counterpart to it can 
pop to mind, which is Much Ado about Nothing which, like Cymbeline, also 
invests in the proliferation of the virtual and also employs forensic rhetoric of the 
sort we have dealt with in the wager scene above. 
Yet however dominated Richard II is by the actual actions of the 
characters, parts of that actual map of events dealt with in the play are blurred 
and the audience is left uncertain about many historical ‘facts’ raised in the 
course of the action. With this shortage of fact as well, the borderline between 
the actual and the possible becomes very thin. While possibility might be 
tolerated, even acclaimed in fiction, Shakespeare is experimenting with this 
form of modal epistemology in his re-writing of history. If Richard II seems 
immune from the impact of deliberative rhetoric, Shakespeare, it seems, has 
gone that far in other history plays as to elaborate on the cognitive role of 
rhetoric and the probable on the reworking of history. In the next Chapter, we 
will examine the three parts of Henry VI and address the role played by rhetoric 
and the notion of probability on the factual status of historical worlds. 
140
141
Chapter Three
The Possible Worlds of Shakespeare’s Histories
RICHARD PLANTAGENET. The truth appears so naked on my side
That any purblind eye may find it out.
SOMERSET. And on my side it is so well apparelled,
So clear, so shining, and so evident,
That it will glimmer through a blind man’s eye. 
(1 Henry VI:  2.4.20-4)
In this famous scene set in the Temple garden, York and Somerset are 
bickering about some historically controversial events that took place prior to 
the beginning of the play. In order to sort the supporters of each side, and since 
their attendants are reluctant to speak, York suggests that those who support 
his argument pluck a white rose and Somerset advises his supporters to pluck a 
red one. In this way they set the grounds for the Wars of the Roses that will last 
for decades. In this scene, York, Somerset as well as their supporters are 
obsessed with establishing the truth about the events that happened prior to 
that time. The word ‘truth’ is mentioned 8 times in this small scene (out of 12 in 
the whole play), let alone the pronominal references to that word. In other words, 
both York and Somerset are striving to retrospectively reconstruct the actual 
past events whose validity is far from agreed-upon. However, each presents a 
special mode of truth: York’s ‘naked’ truth and Somerset’s ‘apparelled’ truth. 
Technically phrased, the difference is between truth about the actual past as a 
purely ontological category that has to do with what really happened, or rather 
as a cognitive category having to do with how that past is represented in ways 
that render it more credible and probable. 
In the last Chapter, in our survey of the functions of the virtual events in 
Shakespeare, we unproblematically distinguished between the actual and the 
virtual in Shakespearean drama. However, in Shakespeare’s representation of 
the historical past, the distinction between the actual and possible is made on 
cognitive rather than ontological levels. In this Chapter I shall argue that, in his 
representation of history, Shakespeare tends to problematize the very notion of 
the actual past. Shakespeare stresses that the actual past, as we now conceive 
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it, is a representation. As such, he highlights two aspects of the representation 
of past reality that we have considered essential to the nature of the possible or 
the virtual: its rhetorical (or cognitive) function and its potentiality. In their 
contest about the past, characters are more concerned about providing a 
credible representation of the past (apparelled truth) than about establishing the 
absolute factuality of that past (naked truth). That representation of the past is 
essentially carried out through rhetorical and narrative strategies which 
emphasize the cognitive aspect of the representation. Although the very facts of 
the past might pass uncontested, the past reality still carries the potential of 
different representations and interpretations. Thus, the potentiality of the virtual 
as well as its rhetorical function also infects the representation of the actual past 
itself. 
The questions about the nature of the actual past and its affinities with the 
virtual have theoretical and practical overtones. Theoretically, they are pertinent 
to the preoccupations of possible world theorists in two main points. First, 
possible worlds theory has generally rejected claims about the fictionality of the 
actual past, claims mainly associated with the postmodern challenge. Possible 
worlds theorists have opposed the claim made by Hayden White and others that, 
since historical writing uses literary devices, then history has a fictional aspect. 
But as we shall show later, this rejection results from confusion about the 
meaning attached to the concept of ‘fiction’; this concept has acquired two main 
meanings: an ontological meaning in the sense opposite to ‘historical truth’ and 
a cognitive meaning in the sense of literary and narrative organization. The 
second point has to do with the nature of the actual world: whether or not our 
knowledge of and access to the actual world is “independent of any mediating 
concepts, categories or structures of representation" (Norris 1992, 41). Two 
main positions can be discerned within possible world theory regarding this 
question: an essentialist position which holds that possible worlds, the actual 
world included, are independent of their linguistic representation; and a 
constructivist position which holds that they are only accessible through and 
thus influenced by their linguistic and cultural representations. These two views 
would adhere to the ‘naked’ versus ‘apparelled’ truths, respectively. 
Practically, the question of the cognitive and potentialist aspects of the 
actual past becomes more provocative as we approach the domain of history 
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and historical truth. It is not a question of whether the real past existed or not; 
rather it is the question of whether our understanding and appreciation of the 
past is independent from or contingent on the representations of that past. In 
Shakespeare’s history plays, characters are desperate to prove their 
unmediated version of the real past. In this Chapter, I am less concerned about 
the actual/virtual dichotomy (which we pursued in the last Chapter) than with the 
exact nature of the actual world itself. I shall address these questions in the 
History plays, here represented by the three parts of Henry VI, and will 
demonstrate throughout that characters in these plays always treat historical 
truth in cognitive rather than merely ontological terms. Although they claim 
otherwise, these characters are less concerned with what really happened than 
with how to present their version of events more credibly and persuasively, 
using rhetorical, narrative and literary techniques. Given that these plays are 
intensely grappling with issues of historical writing and historical truth, it can be 
argued that this observation might also cover the practice of historiography in 
the early modern era when these plays were first performed. 
Below I shall firstly examine the theoretical aspects of the debate between 
possible worlds theorists and adherents of the postmodern challenge (mainly 
Hayden White) about the effect of the rhetorical and narrative strategies on the 
factual status of historical representation. Then I shall turn to the early modern 
intellectual milieu and show that these questions about the representation of the 
past were hotly debated in the fields of history and, even more, in literary and 
rhetorical theories. Lastly I shall show how these controversies are reflected in 
these three plays; and I shall explore how characters view their role in 
transmitting historical material and what that can tell us about a view of 
Renaissance historiography which the plays might have been keen to present. 
Possible Worlds of History: The Ontological and the Cognitive
In this section, we shall trace the debate regarding the influence of 
representation on the fictional or factual status of the actual past. This will set 
the context for the contested issues between the possible worlds theory and 
postmodern views of reality. I shall argue that, in this debate, possible worlds 
theorists mainly address the ontological dimension of fictionality and confuse it 
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with the cognitive sense intended by White and others. The discussion will also
unveil two views in possible worlds theory regarding the nature of the actual 
world: the essentialist and constructivist views. Lastly, I shall make a case for a 
‘potentialist’ realism view of the actual world, mainly advanced by J. Fisher 
Solomon (1988). This view, I shall argue, invests the represented past reality of 
the actual world with features which we have strongly associated with the virtual, 
namely its potentiality and cognitive function.  
The question of whether historical representation results in ontological 
truth or just acceptable and credible interpretations of the past is an old one, but 
has taken a systematic theoretical shape in the latter part of the twentieth 
century. The sceptical questioning of the nature of historical representation 
came to be called the postmodern challenge. I do not intend to go through all 
the ramifications of that debate1, but will only concentrate on the work of two 
pioneering theorists in this domain, Roland Barthes and Hayden White, for they 
have been the subject of the debates triggered by ‘possible worlds’ theorists 
about the matter.
Both Barthes and White stressed the discursive, cognitive nature of 
historical representation. In his essay, “Historical Discourse”, Barthes holds that 
historians on the level of discourse make use of the very narrative techniques 
used by writers of narrative fiction, such as shifters, indexes, and functions. 
History, he argues, cannot be reduced to a mere collection of facts, but has to 
do with how these facts are presented: “the historian assembles not so much 
facts as signifiants” (1970, 153; emphasis in original).  He also avers that 
although historical writing purports to refer to the real past, it really, as any other 
language-use, does not refer to anything outside itself. Thus, in claiming to refer 
to the ‘outside reality,’ history mistakes the signified for the referent.  According 
to Barthes, the main discursive category used in history since the nineteenth
century is narration. Narrativity was the main historical style in nineteenth 
century historical writing, when history was trying hard to separate itself from 
fiction and myth and establish itself as a discipline. However, narration itself 
was borrowed from fictional genres, namely the realistic novel. At the end of his 
essay, Barthes phrases the paradox this way: “Narrative structure was evolved 
in the crucible of fiction (via myth and first epics), yet it has become at once the 
sign and proof of reality” (ibid., 155). 
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Hayden White takes up the narrativist claim and moulds it in a more 
elaborate theory about historical representation. In his Metahistory (1973), 
White employs the theory of narrative genres, mainly adopted from the theory of 
tropes by Northrop Fry, to study and analyse the realistic modes of historical 
writing. In this book, White sets out to “consider the historical work as what it
most manifestly is, that is to say, a verbal structure in the form of narrative 
prose discourse that purports to be a model, or icon, of past structures and 
processes in the interest of explaining what they were by representing them” 
(1973, 2). He then presents many levels of conceptualization of the historical 
work, mainly: chronicle, story and emplotment (ibid., 5). 2 Chronicle is a 
collection of the unprocessed historical events listed in their chronological order. 
Story is the endowment of this set of events with a marked beginning, middle 
and end. Then comes the role of emplotment to explain that story and endow it 
with meaning by associating it with one of the plot structures familiar in literary 
genres such as a tragedy, comedy, romance or satire. White refers to and 
explains in detail other modes of explanation, such as explanation by argument 
and by ideological implication. But we concentrate on emplotment since White 
signals it out as his focal point, and it is the most relevant to narrativity. And it is 
mainly through emplotment that historical works share a common strategy with 
literary works. 
One corollary of laying bare the narrative structure of historical discourse 
is to acknowledge that there is no essential difference between the discourses 
of history and literary fiction. For Hayden White, in fact, this concern with 
fictionality was already there in Metahistory3: the term ‘fiction’ appears as early 
as that book, and White uses the term ‘fiction’ and its derivative ‘fictive’ in that 
earlier book (see White 1973, 6). In Tropics of Discourse (1978), White 
complains that “in general there has been a reluctance to consider historical 
narratives as what they most manifestly are: verbal fictions the contents of 
which are as much invented as found and the forms of which have much in 
common with their counterparts in literature than they have with those in the 
sciences” (1978, 82; emphasis in original). Speaking of the process whereby a 
story is endowed with meaning by being emplotted one way or another, White 
declares: “That is essentially a literary, fiction-making operation” (ibid., 85). So 
White’s argument, fairly or not, was taken to say that there is no fundamental 
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difference between fiction and history and that by being narrative, historical 
representation is also fictional. 
Although historians were sceptical about these views of historical 
representation,4 literary scholars generally met postmodern views about history, 
especially White’s ideas, hospitably. 5 However, literary theory was not 
homogenous regarding that claim. Possible worlds theorists were especially 
uneasy about these claims. Below I shall sketch two attempts to accommodate 
these views to a possible worlds framework by Lubomir Dolezel and Marie-
Laure Ryan. Both Dolezel’s and Ryan’s discussions of the postmodern 
challenge are based on mistaken understanding and confusion of the 
ontological and cognitive senses of fictionality sketched so far. While White and 
Barthes use fictionality in a cognitive sense, Dolezel and Ryan focus on its 
ontological sense. In its cognitive sense, ‘fiction’ is taken to mean the quality of 
the work that makes it intelligible, usually in being moulded within frames that a 
certain culture regards as acceptable. In its ontological sense, ‘fiction’ has to do 
with that dimension of a work which precludes its claim to literal truth. Paul 
Ricoeur identifies these two senses and complains about the “equivocation 
created by the use of this term [fiction] in two different senses: first as a 
synonym for narrative configurations, second as an antonym to historical 
narrative's claim to constitute a ‘true’ narrative” (1984, 64)6. White’s insistence 
on the cognitive aspect of fictionality was misdirected towards that of the 
ontological status of historical writing. 
Lubomir Dolezel has opposed the postmodern challenge on the basis of 
‘possible worlds’ theory. Dolezel relocates the problem from the level of 
discourse to the level of worlds and asks whether “the possible worlds of fiction 
and history are identical in their function and global structure or show some 
marked differences in these respects” (2010, 33). Dolezel responds to White’s 
claims by arguing that although fiction and history might have discursive 
similarities, yet they are irreducibly different on the level of possible worlds: the 
possible worlds of fiction and of history are markedly different. On the level of 
worlds, Dolezel marks four differences between the possible worlds of fiction 
and history. The first is a functional difference. While fictional worlds are 
alternatives to reality, historical worlds are images of the actual past. The 
second difference is a structural difference, according to which fictional worlds 
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can be structured of any kind of existents, natural and supernatural, while 
historical worlds are restricted to natural existents. The third is agential 
constellation: the agents appearing in a world of historical representation are 
restricted by the original cast that happened to exist in the represented past, 
while in fiction additional agents are allowed. The fourth difference between the 
possible worlds of fiction and history lies in their treatment of incompleteness, 
which is an unavoidable feature of both kinds of worlds. But while gaps in 
fictional worlds are ontological, in historical worlds they are epistemological (see 
ibid., 33-38). Dolezel goes on to identify a difference between fiction and history 
on the level of discourse as well. Fictional texts are categorized under the 
concept of poeisis, since they are performative and call the fictional worlds they 
project into existence. So, they do not refer to worlds that pre-exist them and, 
consequently, are not to be judged as true or false. Historical discourse, in 
contrast, is an example of noesis whose function is to acquire knowledge of and 
serve as a model for the actual past. Thus, historical statements are constative 
and consequently are subject to truth valuation (see ibid., 42-4). 
It is clear that Dolezel is mainly concerned with the ontological aspect of 
fictionality, rather than its cognitive aspect. His view of the actual is essentialist,
in the sense that he is treating the actual world as a given, unmediated by 
cognitive factors. Even his distinction between poeisis and noesis is ontological 
in nature. This inability to set the two aspects apart leads him to summarize 
White’s argument fallaciously:  “Emplotment is a literary operation; literature is 
fiction; therefore, history is equivalent to fiction making” (Dolezel 2010, 21). The 
two sides of the syllogism are not the same: ‘emplotment is fiction’ refers to the 
cognitive process of making intelligible, while ‘literature is fiction’ refers to the 
ontological status of literature as lacking literal truth. This misleading syllogism 
does not do justice to White’s claims. Hayden White was careful to dissociate 
himself from the ontological side of the argument and to lean instead on the 
cognitive side. White insists that the existence of the fictive component of 
emplotment in no sense “detracts the status of historical narratives as providing 
a kind of knowledge” (1978, 85).7 On the other hand, White’s emphasis on 
‘emplotment,’ ‘interpretation,’ and ‘discourse’ only betrays that concern with that 
cognitive property of the historical discourse whereby it renders the events 
narrated more intelligible to its readers. ‘Emplotment’ is derived from the 
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concept of ‘plot’ in narratology8 in the wider sense of “the global dynamic (goal-
oriented and forward-moving) organization of narrative constituents which is 
responsible for the thematic interest (indeed, the very intelligibility) of a narrative 
and for its emotional effects” (Prince 1987, 72; also Ricoeur 1984, 65).  
Marie-Laure Ryan also disagrees with Hayden White for endorsing the 
fictionality of all narrative and that any representation of reality consists in acts 
of selection, emplotment, interpretation, and even the “making-up” of events to 
fill in the gaps. According to her, “the thesis presupposes a referential definition 
of fictionality incompatible with the intensional account defended in this book” 
(1991, 259). Her other objection is that if all external data are mentally
processed, then “every mental representation is a fiction. By embracing too 
much, the term ‘fiction’ becomes a useless category” (ibid.). She also insists on 
the existence of external referents: “As a type of semantic structure, story or 
plot is a signified, not a referent. Reality, on the other hand, is a referent and not 
a signified” (ibid., 264)9. It is clear that all these objections have to do with the 
ontological aspect of fictionality. However, her worry about stretching the 
meaning of ‘fiction’ too far is reasonably justified, although that sense of 
organization is only restricted to the deliberate, conscious effort done in literary 
and representational media.  
The discrepancy between emphasis on the ontological or the cognitive 
category results from the fact that possible worlds theory and some aspects of 
the postmodern challenge belong to different critical paradigms, each with its 
distinctive view of ‘fictionality.’ The work of Hayden White can be partly classed 
with formalist oriented criticism, such as the theories of the Russian Formalists 
and the New Critics for his typology is quite indebted to Northrop Frye’s theory 
of literary genres. Moreover, White’s formulation bears resemblance to their 
insistence that the distinctiveness of the literary work is based on its specially
ordered and coherent configuration and that fiction results from transforming 
‘story’ into ‘plot’ (Foley 1986, 51). In this paradigm, ‘fictionality,’ in its ontological 
sense used by ‘possible worlds’ theorists, was not the central question for 
formalist literary criticism. Rather, the central question for literary theory before 
the 1906s was ‘literariness,’ and even when ‘fiction’ was used it mainly denoted 
the property of being of a literary quality. In its ontological sense used 
nowadays, ‘fictionality’ emerged as a central question in literary theory from the 
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1970s onward. We have Ruth Ronen to thank for paying attention to the 
“conflation of fictionality and literariness apparent in literary studies” (1994, 80)10. 
And for Ryan, to be sure, this sense of literariness should be kept apart from 
fictionality: “the three features literary, narrative and fictional remain distinct, and 
do not presuppose each other” (1991, 1). 
What all these discussions also imply is that there is no consensus among 
possible worlds theorists about the very status of the actual world. We 
mentioned two positions at the start of the Chapter: the essentialist and 
constructivist positions. The essentialist view is obviously defended by Lubomir 
Dolezel, as shown in the discussion above, and it stresses the status of the 
actual world as a given, fixed entity that is unmediatedly accessible to us. 
Against this view is the constructivist one, mainly adopted by Umberto Eco 
(1979; 1990), according to which the actual world is the sum total of the 
conceptions and beliefs we carry about reality which are defined according to 
our different encyclopaedias: “Within the framework of a constructivist approach 
to possible worlds, even a so-called ‘actual’ or ‘real’ world of reference must be 
taken as a possible world, that is, as a cultural construct” (1979, 222).  Marie-
Laure Ryan (1991), as we have seen, has leant more towards an essentialist 
view of the actual world. However, in her later work, Narrative as Virtual Reality
(2001), she tries hard to reconcile a possible world approach with a postmodern 
view of the actual world: “With an indexical definition, the concept of actual 
world can easily tolerate historical, cultural, and even personal variations. 
Without sacrificing the idea of an absolutely existing, mind-independent reality, 
we can relativize the ontological system by placing at its center individual 
images of reality, rather than reality itself” (2001, 101). The constructivist view, 
in fact, opens the door to the interference of language which, to a great extent, 
defines and shapes our conceptions of reality. Hence, I think, we should 
seriously look into how the past stages of the actual world(i.e., history) can be 
influenced and shaped by the representational strategies we use to access it.
The constructivist view of the actual world attempts to reconcile the extreme 
realist stance with the fictionalist stance of postmodernism. 
Another fruitful attempt to stand in between these two extremes is J. 
Fisher Solomon’s notion of ‘potentialist’ realism. According to Solomon, as we 
cannot accept the sweeping fictionalism of the postmodern treatment of history, 
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we cannot likewise accept the extreme realist position of the existence of a 
given, fixed and unmediated reality. Solomon thinks that, although some facts 
can be unequivocally verified about any historical event, this does not mean that 
we can have absolute and detailed knowledge about that event. Yet, these facts 
can serve as the backdrop for understanding the event and interpreting it in 
given ways. In other words, these facts establish the potentiality of the past 
reality to be interpreted in these ways. "These potentialities do not absolutely 
determine our interpretations of the specific actualities that bear them, but they 
can help guide them. They can . . . help us both evaluate and hierarchize our 
possible interpretations" (Solomon 1988, 46). The interpretations of the past 
events are carried out by tracing how similar events unfolded in relatively similar 
circumstances. The events under question would thus have the potentiality to 
behave in a relatively similar fashion: "The basis for these guesses lies in the 
regular behaviour, the real propensities of material history itself" (ibid., 48). Thus, 
the potentialist realist stance would preserve the factuality of the past and at the 
same time leave it flexible enough to accept different interpretations based on 
probabilistic reasoning.
Although Solomon places potentialities in reality more than in discourse 
(ibid., 45), the strategy for tracing potentialist interpretations and connections is 
basically rhetorical. This strategy is based on measuring the probability and 
likelihood of events and interpretations according to certain general propensities 
and regularities. With this sense of potentiality, we are in a position to 
"extrapolate from present evidence to future events on the basis of observed 
regularities, rational conjectures, the weighing of probable outcomes, 
etc."(Norris 1992, 43).Both areas of probability and regularities are intimately 
rhetorical. As for probability, we have observed how probability has been a 
central theme and strategy in Classical and Renaissance rhetoric. As far as 
regularities are concerned, rhetoric has dealt with these regularities in terms of 
topics. In other words, the rhetorician can explain certain events by fitting them 
in some general categories that have relatively similar themes. Topics are an 
integral part of rhetoric since Aristotle. The use of topics also relies on a sense 
of potentiality: by having similar features with a certain category, a historical 
event or action has the potentiality to behave and unfold in similar terms as the 
other members of that category. Although the particulars of each category are 
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different, yet their general propensities and behaviour are supposed to be 
similar: “similar historical circumstances bear similar historical propensities, that 
while ontological actualities differ from moment to moment, their potentialities 
need not" (Solomon 1988, 48). In light of potentialist realism, our knowledge of 
the actual world is based on understanding the potentialities that exist in its 
objects and events; this understanding is informed by probabilistic thinking, 
which is an integral part of rhetoric. Individual events, or groups of events, can 
be comprehended when they are made to fit in one of the master-plots that we 
associate with major happenings in history. Thus, the two components of the 
virtual event – potentiality and probability – are also present in approaching the 
actual world (historical past included), although this is not to compromise an 
amount of verifiably factual knowledge of the past. 
In this section we have surveyed the debates regarding the factuality of 
our knowledge of the actual world, especially relevant to the historical past. We 
have observed that the above debate has been mainly misplaced on the 
ontological dimension, while it should be dealt with on the cognitive dimension. 
We have also remarked that certain possible worlds theorists have endorsed a 
more flexible view of the actual world as a cultural construct. Lastly we have 
introduced the idea of ‘potentialist realism’ and shown that it better preserves 
the factuality of the actual world and at the same time holds it susceptible to 
interpretations and explanations based on the potentiality of events and objects. 
Although it is not wholly rhetorical, this potentialist stance leaves the door open 
for rhetorical and probabilistic strategies (which are mainly associated with the 
virtual) to intrude in our understanding of the actual world and its historical past. 
In the next section, we shall trace these controversies down to the early modern 
period, especially in regard to how they reflected in the debate regarding the 
difference between literature and history. 
Probability, Rhetoric and History in Early Modern England
The questions raised in the last section regarding the factuality of the actual 
world and historical representations also sparked robust debates in early 
modern England among historians on the one hand and literary and rhetorical 
theorists on the other. A good many of these controversies have their starting 
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point with Aristotle’s distinction between poetry and history, where he considers 
that history deals with what has been while poetry deals with what might be. In 
this section I shall argue that Aristotle’s distinction between poetry and history 
spells out that potentiality and probability are essential features of poetry, and 
might imply that they are not features of historical discourse. After Aristotle, 
however, the interest in these features was taken over by the field of rhetoric 
rather than poetry, and rhetorical discourse has moved these features to actual 
world events, as reflected by the use of ‘narratio’ which re-shapes the order of 
events as they really happened. Although literary and rhetorical scholars in the 
early modern period preserved Aristotle’s distinction, yet they extended the 
features of potentiality and probability to historical discourse itself. These 
debates are also thematized in many other forms of historical representation, 
and I shall show that they featured heavily in the history play genre, mainly at 
the hand of William Shakespeare. Below I shall delineate the discussion of the 
issue in Aristotle’s Poetics, and then trace the interest in the creation of 
credibility of representation in rhetoric. Lastly, I shall trace the influence of these 
debates on Shakespeare’s history plays. 
In his differentiation between poetry and history, Aristotle emphasizes the 
cognitive and potentialist dimensions in poetry, as distinct from history. The 
potentialist dimension consists in the requirement of poetry to depict what ‘might 
be’ instead of what has been. In the Poetics, Aristotle puts forward the idea that 
while literature and rhetoric are proper realms of the potential, history is the 
exclusive realm of the actual. Aristotle distinguishes between history and poetry 
on the ground that the former deals with what actually happened (or the has 
been) while the latter deals with what would potentially happen (or the might be). 
He writes: “(I)t is not the poet’s function to relate actual events, but the kinds of 
things that might occur and are possible in terms of probability or necessity. The 
difference between the historian and the poet is . . .  that the one relates actual 
events, the other the kinds of things that might occur” (IX.1451a35-1451b5; 
emphasis in original). Consequently, poetry is more philosophical than history. 
Put differently, poetry deals with general and universal truths while history deals 
with particular truths. Even when poetry deals with particular historical individual, 
the final lesson is a universal one. 
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As far as the cognitive dimension is concerned, it is highlighted by 
Aristotle’s insistence on probability as a criterion of poetry. Aristotle’s interest in 
probability is so intimate that, relative to the small size of the Poetics, the word 
for ‘probable’ registers its highest number of occurrences in Aristotle (Sansone
2012, 168). Aristotle stresses the cognitive dimension and his main concern 
seems to be the intelligibility of the presentation of the action, rather than its 
ontological status. According to some translations, so to speak, the distinction 
Aristotle draws is one between the ‘actual’ and the ‘probable’, not one between 
the ‘actual’ and the ‘possible’. This way Aristotle, quite astutely, pulls the mat 
from under ontologically-oriented attacks on poetry, like that of Plato. In a 
famous passage from the Poetics, Aristotle writes: “Things probable though 
impossible should be preferred to the possible but implausible” (XXIV.1460a25). 
Or, in another translation, “Probable impossibilities are to be preferred to 
improbable possibilities” (Dorsch 1965, 68).‘Possibility’ here is to be understood 
as the ontological category, while ‘probability’ is the cognitive one. By making 
the ‘probable’11, ‘credible’ or ‘convincing’ (according to various translations) the 
criterion of poetry, Aristotle is placing the emphasis on the work-reader axis 
rather than on the world-work axis. By prioritizing ‘probability’ over ‘possibility’, 
he is making the point that the basis of representation (or mimesis) is more a 
cognitive relation between the work and reader or beholder and less a 
relationship between the work and world. 12
The cognitive dimension is also manifest in Aristotle’s treatment of 
‘mimesis,’ which refers to the organizational capacity of the literary work that 
produces its cognitive effect. This organizational aspect of mimesis is mainly 
highlighted in Paul Ricœur’s reading of the Poetics. According to Ricœur, the 
essence of the mimetic activity lies in the power of organizing into an intelligible 
whole what are otherwise coincidental and incoherent incidents. Thus he 
considers the ‘imitation or representation of action’ and ‘the organization of the 
events’ as quasi-identical processes (1984, 34). As Aristotle considers the poet 
as both imitator of action and maker of plot, the two concepts are hardly 
separable. And thus the probable emerges from this organizational activity the 
final end of which is to make the human action more intelligible: "To make up a 
plot is already to make the intelligible spring from the accidental, the universal 
from the singular, the necessary or the probable from the episodic"(ibid., 41). In 
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this sense, the probable cannot be separated from the universal or potential. 
The potential, the things that might happen, can only be defined in terms of 
what men of a given type would do in certain circumstances. “[T]he possible 
and the general are not to be sought elsewhere than in the organization of the 
events, since it is this linkage that has to be necessary or probable"(ibid., 40-1). 
This organization is mainly carried out through narrative techniques. So, it is this 
organizational power of the mimetic activity that renders events probable and 
intelligible. ‘Probability’ in Aristotle, so argues Ricœur, is roughly the 
combination of credibility and persuasiveness. Although the latter was the 
pivotal point in his Rhetoric, Aristotle, as we have seen above, also touches on 
the cognitive relation of the work to its recipients in his very notion of the 
‘probable’ in the Poetics.  The quality of literary works which we call ‘mimesis’ 
consists in two things: the internal organization, and the credibility as judged by 
the listener. The latter is consequent on the former. Thus, Aristotle’s criteria for 
poetry encompass the two concepts of potentiality and probability. The former 
has to do with the aspect of poetry of dealing with the universal rather than the 
particular. The latter consists in the cognitive function of poetry and is mainly 
carried out through the organizational power of mimesis. Aristotle is silent in the 
Poetics whether or not actual discourse (i.e., history) is entitled to have these 
two features.
As Aristotle assigned the two features of potentiality and probability to 
poetry, rhetoric has moved them to the realm of actual events. Although 
Aristotle has dealt with these dimensions in both the Poetics and Rhetoric, 
poetic theory after Aristotle only marginally elaborated on them. And it was 
rhetoricians who took over the job of elucidating the full significance of these
concepts, mainly due to their central role in arbitration and deliberations, legal 
and otherwise. We surveyed their emphasis on virtuality and probability in the 
last Chapter, but now we are only directing the attention to the role played by 
narrativization and organization in achieving probability. Classical rhetoricians 
studied all these features under what they called the Statement of Facts or 
narratio. We have already seen how rhetoricians like Cicero and Quintilian 
stress the importance of the narratio in presenting a certain course of events as 
the actual ones. As it depends on the selection and ordering of events, the 
narratio helps make intelligible a string of events that is otherwise incoherent 
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and disconnected. Lorna Hutson goes even further to suggest that “a 
sophisticated attitude to the capacity of narrative to contribute to judicial 
probability, by making ‘the intelligible spring from the accidental’” was already of 
use to dramatists in the end of the Elizabethan period (2007, 123).However, the 
anxiety about the use of narration to reshape actual world events surfaces as 
we cannot fail to notice the association between the forensic force of the 
narratio and the ability to deceive (ibid., 127). For the events constructed 
through the artificial processes of the narratio are not necessarily the actual 
string of events that really took place. 
Rhetoricians since then were pretty aware of the power of organization 
and narrativization in shaping the cognitive reception of actual events. So they 
cultivated the principle that their deliberations should not only be ontologically 
possible (true) but also cognitively probable (truth-like). On the one hand, books 
of rhetoric stressed the distinction between truthful and truth-like and 
accentuated the fact that the narrative should not only be truthful but also truth-
like. When author of Rhetorica ad Herennium speaks about the Statement of 
Facts in legal deliberations, he mentions that it need be not only true, but also 
truth-like: “If the matter is true, all these precautions [regarding organization] 
must none the less be observed in the Statement of Facts, for often the truth 
cannot gain credence otherwise”(1.9.16). In De Inventione, Cicero also makes 
the point that probability is a feature of narrative that can be manipulated using 
different proofs (1.37.67). Quintilian mentions many strategies whereby 
credibility can be achieved, such as assigning causes and motives to the acts 
being described, using preparatory remarks, scattering evidence here and there,
and so on (4.2.52-7). He goes even further to suggest that manipulating the 
different parts of the narrative may alter the meaning and significance of the 
facts being narrated and thus presents the past reality in a cognitively 
differentiated fashion: “I do not of course deny that just as there may be some 
points which you should deny in your statement of facts, others which you 
should add, and yet again others that you should alter, so there may be some 
which you should pass over in silence” (4.2.67). Elsewhere he puts it more 
explicitly: “Neither do I agree with those who assert that the order of our 
statement of facts should always follow the actual order of events, but have a 
preference for adopting the order which I consider most suitable” (4.2.83). By 
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emphasizing that the orator should behave more like a lawyer than a witness, 
Quintilian implies that the real facts are not sorelevant as the use they are put to. 
It is also interesting how he suggests that these strategies are already literary 
and artistic ones: “It is also possible to treat the subject in such a way as to give 
it an air of credibility, as is done in comedy and farce” (4.2.53) 
This issue also persisted in the Renaissance accounts of rhetoric. In his 
The Arte of Rhetorique (1553), Thomas Wilson also stresses the importance of 
the style of the representation in constructing the facts on behalf of the orator’s 
client. He advises that emplotting events differently may change their whole 
meaning to the listeners, a principle that the orator can use for his interest: "Yea, 
we shall make our doynges seme reasonable, if we frame our worke to natures 
wil” (1553, 60v). Although here he does not recommends the change of the 
actual order of events, he uses the word 'make' a lot with the linking verbs 
'seem' and 'appear', which indicates that the main concern is the ‘appearance of 
truth’ rather than the truth itself. Things are given new meanings by being 
emplotted differently as “Thynges gathered by conjecture to seeme otherwise 
than they are, delite muche the eares being wel applied together" (ibid., 82v).  
Here again the tension arises between an adherence to the ‘naked’ or 
‘apparelled’ truths. In the whole process the role of narrative is blindingly 
obvious, and Wilson warns the orator from the ‘naked’ repetition of facts, which 
is why he advises the use of variety in conclusions: “For, if the repeticion should 
bee naked, and onely set furthe in plain woordes, without any chaunge of 
speache, or shift or Rhetorique: neither should the hearers take pleasure, nor 
yet the matter take effect”, which is why he recommends that “it is necessary to 
use arte to the outermoste” (ibid., 63r). In all rhetoricians quoted above ‘art’ is 
used to mean the literary craft of composition or the poet’s or dramatist’s 
mimetic power. And this refers to the role played by the ‘probable’ in literary 
works, which are made the example to be followed by rhetoricians, and it 
testifies to the centrality of the organizational power of mimesis in works of art in 
general. 
Thus far we have observed that Aristotle assigns features of potentiality 
and probability to poetry and remains silent as to whether they could apply for 
discourse about the actual world, and specifically about history. We have also 
remarked that rhetoric has used these features – especially the force of 
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organization and narrative ordering – in deliberating about actual world events. 
In early modern England these issues have sparked heated debates. Although 
Aristotle’s ideas held weak sway on sixteenth century theorizing, yet his 
distinction between poetry and history has formed the basis for these debates. 
However, these discussions are plagued with a certain amount of ambiguity in 
the Poetics regarding the extent of this distinction. Generally, Aristotle’s 
distinction between poetry and history has been read as disparaging history, 
and this reading has persisted in Western thought for quite a long time.13
However, it is doubtful that Aristotle meant that history should lack probability. 
He only said that poetry should have it. For history, it is not a necessary 
component and it could be there or not. But there is no reason whatsoever why 
it should not.14 This is supported by the fact that Aristotle must very likely have 
been silent about many aspects of the nature of history. In fact, we should not 
expect him to say any more about history since his main subject was poetry; 
and he only mentioned history in order to define poetry in terms of what it is not.
The inherent theoretical ambiguity as well as the affinities between the 
practice of history, rhetoric and literature, have ignited heated controversies 
regarding the nature of historical truth among historians, on the one hand, and 
literary and rhetorical scholars, on the other hand. Historians in that period are 
keen to stress their exclusive pursuit of the truth. This is mainly guided by the 
laws of history set by Cicero in De Oratore, which were highly respected and 
idealized: “For who does not know history's first law to be that an author must 
not dare to tell anything but the truth ? And its second that he must make bold 
to tell the whole truth” (2.14.62). In the same treatise he praises history as that 
“which bears witness to the passing of the ages, sheds light upon reality, gives 
life to recollection and guidance to human existence, and brings tidings of 
ancient days”(2.9.36). Barbara J. Shapiro (2000) persuasively observes that the 
insistence on registering ‘fact’ or ‘truth’ was a common tradition among the 
historians of the period. Richard Brathwaite, for example, insists that history 
requires 'Truth, in sincerely relating, without having anything . . . foisted in by 
our owne invention, to smooth the passage of our story” (quoted in Shapiro 
2000, 40). Historians promoted the image of the ‘naked’ truth, as opposed to the 
‘apparelled’ truth which stood for rhetorical ornament. “Rhetoric was often 
contrasted with "truth," and especially with the "naked" truth of matter of fact.':" 
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"Nakedness" was contrasted to artifice that disguised truth. History should not 
be ‘dressed up with gloss and artifice’” (ibid., 59). This pursuit of truth and the 
endeavour to separate between factae and fictae, can best be conducted by 
dismissing the rhetorical ornaments through which history can be presented. 
This tendency was further fostered by the Protestant Reformation call for the 
‘plain truth’ as distinct from the catholic embellished ‘truths’. Scholars like John 
Jewel, John Cheke, Roger Ascham and others called for plain style and 
condemned the Catholic culture of images which also claims to present the truth 
(See King 1982, 138-160). However, this does not mean that there was a 
consensus on what ‘truth’ counted for because, as we have seen, history in this 
period admitted some events which are more suitably categorized as myths and 
romances in modern historical standards. 
On the other side of the debate, some literary and rhetorical scholars have
claimed more affinity with history than historians would admit. In De Oratore, 
Cicero has flatly put it, “Videtisne, quanum munus sit oratoris historia?” (Do you 
not see how far history is the work of the rhetorician?) (2.14.62). History was 
seen in the period as a branch of rhetoric, if only as a kind of non-creative 
writing aimed at persuasion (Boyd 1980, 195). Mostly the writing of history in 
any form, prose or poetry, was aimed to instruct and edify. The final end, then, 
for any presentation of history was persuasion, which is a rhetorical end. To 
achieve this end, even the criterion of verification is compromised. As George 
Puttenham points out, “These historical men nevertheless used not the matter 
so precisely to wish that all they wrote should be accounted true, for that was 
not needful nor expedient to the purpose, namely to be used either for example 
or for pleasure”([1589] 2004, 90). As ‘literature’ was a generic term, it 
encompassed all kinds of written discourse, including ‘history.’ Moreover, many 
literary genres dealt directly with historical material, such as the history plays 
and historical poetry, both of which flourished specially in the latter half of the 
sixteenth century.15 However, the interesting thing is that history and literature 
were sometimes written by the same individuals, such as Samuel Daniel and 
Michael Drayton. Moreover, many events which we now align with fiction and 
myth (such as the stories of Brutus and Arthur) were considered facts and 
admitted in books of history as such. In short, the sharp distinction between 
history and literature might not be at high stakes at that period. 
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The affinity between literature and history were reflected in historical 
writing. Early modern historians was keen to make use of literary and rhetorical 
strategies which compromise their quest for truth and would rather highlight the 
end of potentiality and credibility instead. As far as potentiality is concerned, 
historians sometimes might seem satisfied with the potential if the actual was 
out of reach. When the historian’s quest for the past facts may not be satisfied, 
he would feel compelled to search not only for what has been but also for what 
might have been. In fact, the latter might be a clue for achieving a sense of the 
former. This process might go even deeper when historians have a sense of the 
irretrievability of the past, so much so that they no longer opt for the has-beens 
and are merely satisfied with the might-have-beens. This is specially the case 
when the historian is trying to reconstruct a possible picture of the past events, 
past figures and their actions. Although this is based on certain verifiable facts, 
yet it works on a sense of potentiality of what could have happened. Another 
example of the use of potentiality is the invented speeches.16Unable to capture 
the real speeches which historical figures had uttered, historians were content 
to register what these figures might have said in a similar occasion. Besides, 
the might-have–been is not only inevitable, but also desirable. Given the 
didactic end of historical writing, it is only this way that the generalizations of 
history can be comprehended and its lessons learned. Relevant to what we 
have shown in our discussion of ‘potentialist realism’, history was taught in 
Renaissance schools in terms of the general topics, or topia of rhetoric, where 
students were asked to classify historical events in terms of these general 
categories. In the Renaissance grammar schools, “the student was taught to 
analyse the materials of history (as well as those of narrative poetry) in terms of 
set topics and styles"(Riggs 1971, 39). So, the potentialist and universalist 
aspects have played a role in the didactic power of history as significant as, if 
not more significant than its actualist aspect. For the lessons of history to be set 
out, it is enough to determine what could happen or could have happened so 
that people can act accordingly.17
As these scholars stressed the potentialist aspect of historical writing, they 
also emphasized its cognitive aspect, which consists in using literary and 
rhetorical strategies to make its material more credible. So, it was claimed that 
historians need make their stories not only true but also truth-like or verisimilar. 
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Sir Philip Sidney claims that historians borrow poetic techniques to convey their 
meanings: “And even historiographers, although their lips sound of things done, 
and verity be written in their foreheads, have been glad to borrow both fashion 
and, perchance, weight of the poets” ([1595] 2004, 5).18In the Renaissance, 
Aristotle’s mimesis with its focus on the probable was very prevalent under the 
term ‘verisimilitude,’ which meant making narrative more believable and true-to-
life. A dawning awareness of the power of verisimilitude in the period was not 
restricted to poets and rhetoricians but also extended, quite noticeably, to 
historians as well. So, in addition to their endeavour to show the truth, they also 
strove to present their material as truth-like, or true to reality, probable, or 
verisimilar. And it is here that literary elements intervene in the historical 
discourse. As Paola Pugliatti has shown, “verisimilitude is considered a link 
between poetry and history and . . . at least some Renaissance writers seem to 
be aware of the communicative function of fictional elements or at least fictional 
procedures in histories.” Historians’ need to use these elements and procedures 
was motivated by their awareness that the naked statement of truth is hardly 
viable and that “written accounts of history should constantly strive to render 
truth verisimilar” (1996, 71). The need to be verisimilar might compromise the 
historian’s goals of accuracy and wholeness. As J.H. Hexter succinctly put it, 
“"the microscopic means of historiography have to be adapted to its 
macroscopic ends" (1968, 8). To be sure, verisimilitude is originally a literary 
category and not a historical one. 
Thus it appears that early modern scholars held that even history (or the 
past of the actual world) is amiable to the features of probability and potentiality, 
which we identified with the virtual event. This way we start to appreciate the 
relevance of debates raised in the first section – among possible worlds 
theorists and proponents of the postmodern challenge – about the factuality of 
the actual world, and the extent to which factual representation can borrow tools 
and strategies from literature and rhetoric. Consequently, the postmodern ideas 
about the rhetorical nature of historical discourse, including Hayden White’s, 
must have seemed less strange to early modern scholars than they do to us 
now. According to Ivo Kamp, “when we consider White's arguments in the 
context of Renaissance ideas about history already discussed, they instantly 
become less controversial . . . [Historians] saw a much closer affinity between 
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literary and historical sensibilities than we do today” (1996, 16; see also Rackin 
1991, 22 and Riggs 1971, 12). We need not go full way through that domain as 
provocative studies have been conducted which show the extent to which 
Renaissance historical writing employed methods and strategies mainly used by 
imaginative writers.19
In addition to history, rhetoric and literary theory, another genre that also 
engaged in such controversies about the nature of historical reality is the 
Renaissance history play. The history plays, which flourished in the last two 
decades of Elizabeth’s reign, touched on questions of the past, history and 
historical writing in a variety of ways. These questions also crop up fairly 
frequently in the history cycles of Shakespeare, to whom the genre owes its 
highest achievements. Critics have stressed Shakespeare’s engagement in the 
history plays with questions of the past and its reproduction.  According to 
Graham Holderness, "The plays can be read as serious attempts to reconstruct 
and theorize the past" (1985, 31). Others have accentuated the uniqueness of 
the stage as a means of reproducing history and the questions its raises in that 
reproduction. Brian Walsh observes that the history plays are part of the 
period’s historical culture and that they provide another mode of historical 
representation which, though it departs at times from the historical sources, yet 
it has a new and exceptional representational power of its own. He relates the 
work of the theatre to the antiquarians of the period who tried to unearth the 
materiality of the past. The theatre is likewise trying to resurrect that material 
existence through the actor’s body. Walsh claims that Shakespeare must have 
been influenced by the work of antiquaries, such as William Camden: “Theater 
depends upon a creative faculty for fantasy of and conjecture about the past 
that, as Camden admitted, is present in the historian’s work as well"(2009, 20). 
The peculiarity of the theatrical medium is also accentuated by Phyllis Rackin 
who opines that the problems of historiography were further complicated when 
history entered the Elizabethan stage: "Played out in the theatre, the problems 
of historiographic representation were redefined and intensified" (1990, 22; see 
also Goy-Blanquet 2003, 13). 
Among the questions of historical writing that were ‘redefined and 
intensified’ in the history plays is the effect of rhetorical and literary strategies on 
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the validity of the historical truth being represented. So in these plays we can 
hear echoes of the controversies between possible worlds theorists and 
proponents of the postmodern challenge, which we traced back to similar 
debates in the early modern period among historians, rhetoricians and literary 
theorists. Ivo Kamp refers to the relevance of the above controversies, 
especially the ideas of Hayden White and the tension between the historical 
content and the literary form in which it is moulded, to the issues tackled by the 
Renaissance history plays: “This appreciation prodded the late-Elizabethan 
Shakespeare and the early Stuart dramatists to a keener comprehension of 
issues of historical representation in ways resembling White's” (1996, 16). 
Below I shall look at how these questions featured in Shakespeare’s history 
plays, taking as examples the three parts of King Henry VI. 
‘Naked’ vs. ‘Apparelled’ truth in Shakespeare
So far, we have addressed the debates about the factuality of the actual world
and its past, and observed that the actual world is also susceptible to some 
characteristic features of the virtual, namely potentiality and probability. The 
potentialist stance supports not only the verifiable facts but also the events, 
causes and interpretations which can be justified on the ground of these facts. 
Probability emerges in historical discourse on the basis of its need to be 
intelligible, credible or verisimilar. We have also remarked that, although 
scholars in the early modern era accepted Aristotle’s distinction between poetry 
and history, yet they stressed the potentiality and intelligibility of historical 
representation. These questions have also been reflected and thematized in the 
history plays of Shakespeare and his contemporaries. 
In this section I shall argue that in Shakespeare the representation of 
history is seen to deploy rhetorical and literary elements which serve to 
foreground the potentialist nature of historical facts and the cognitive function of 
historical representation. I shallexplore these controversies as they have been 
thematized in Shakespeare’s 1, 2 & 3Henry VI as examples from these plays 
are enough to elucidate the matters in question.20 I have chosen these plays 
since they have received less critical attention than the later histories 21 . 
Moreover, these questions are pertinent to these three plays because they deal 
163
directly with questions of historical truth and historical representation. 
Characters in these plays are obsessed with finding out ways to prove their 
historical point of view to other contesters. As these plays chronicle the 
beginning and roots of the Wars of the Roses, they have been characterised by 
severe factionalism, where every faction is keen to establish what it considers 
as historical ‘truth’. We have seen how the word ‘truth’ features extremely 
frequently in the temple garden scene, the scene that sets the ground for the 
further controversy, which shows how they are ceaselessly trying to anchor the 
actual world of their past. By exploring how characters in these plays manage to 
write their history, I shall argue that the plays examine the extent to which 
historical discourse uses rhetorical and literary representational devices, and 
how these contribute to the refining of the cognitive and potentialist aspects of 
that discourse. In these plays there are three areas where historical truth looked 
apparelled in rhetorical and literary devices: the use of emplotment, the use of 
tropes, and the use of theatricality in the staging of history.22
The first area, emplotment, occupies a pivotal position in any discussion of 
historical narrative representation. Emplotment, generally understood as 
organization or configuration of events, is so necessary to any definition of 
narrative and it is that feature that renders any raw historical material into an 
intelligible whole. “Emplotment transforms or configures a multiplicity of events, 
characters, and conditions into a narrative, and narrativity constitutes its form of 
understanding chiefly through emplotment broadly conceived” (Berkhofer 1997, 
118).As emplotment is guided by the requirement of intelligibility, it also unveils 
the open potentiality of historical events. Although the emplotment works on 
verified facts, yet it points to their openness to multiple interpretations and 
susceptibility to arrangement and re-arrangement. It thus shows how 
representation might have an adverse effect on how history, emplotted 
differently, is read and re-read as differently. There are many telling examples 
where the different arrangement and selection of historical events can yield new 
historical narratives and causes history to be re-read differently and characters 
to act according to these new readings. 
One such example is in 1 Henry VI, when Joan is managing to persuade 
Burgundy to dissociate himself from the English league and join the French 
forces. She pleads to him, among other things such as the suffering of his 
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countrymen, by invoking one event that he seems to have failed to consider so 
far: the unconditional release of his enemy, Duke of Orleans, by the English:
Call we to mind, and mark but this for proof:
Was not the Duke of Orleans thy foe?
And was he not in England prisoner?
But when they heard he was thine enemy
They set him free, without his ransom paid,
In spite of Burgundy and all his friends.
See, then, thou fight’st against thy countrymen,
And joint’st with them will be thy slaughtermen.   (3.7.68-75) 
Joan here is not feigning any false event, but she re-orders these events in a 
new way, bringing into focus one event (that of the English release of the Duke 
of Orleans.) Ordered this way, these signifiers yield new signifieds, with their 
referents remaining the same. This proves that although reality is still the same 
‘out there’, our understanding and evaluation of it will vary according to what 
elements of that reality are highlighted, the way they are ordered, and which 
among them is brought into prominence. Put in technical terms, plot or 
discourse is “an interpretive model built up by the mind as it tries to understand 
events – whether real or imaginary” (Ryan 1991, 264). Emplotment does not 
consist in the creation of some new events, but is the re-managing of already 
established ones. Joan also seems well-versed in the arts of rhetoric, for she is 
following the rhetoricians’ recipe that different arrangement of events yield 
different meanings of these events. Joan's convincing of Burgundy 
"demonstrates her clever manipulation of the political art of rhetoric" (Watson 
1990, 48). Burgundy knows of that event so far, but, having read it in a different 
paradigm, he did not attach to it the significance he does this time. Joan seems 
very aware of the fact that “The events are made into a story by the oppression 
or subordination of certain of them and the highlighting of others” (White 1978, 
84; emphasis in original).  Re-emphasized and put into a different array of 
events, this event now carries a new meaning to Burgundy, signifying the 
English carelessness about his interests and ruling out any sense of their 
league. History being re-interpreted, his attitude now is radically different and so 
he is going to act differently. 
The effect of Joan’s words has been alternatively attributed to her feminine 
charm. According to Nancy A. Gutierrez, the effect of Joan’s words stems from 
her feminine and witch-like power (1990, 192). Maurice Hunt, on the other hand, 
holds that Joan has bewitched Burgundy by using terms of seeing, such as 
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'look', 'behold', 'see', etc. which unconsciously undid his resistance to her 
demand: Joan achieves that effect by using visual imagery and appealing to her 
countrymen’s pathos (2002, 90). However, these strategies would not have 
been effective in this instance were it not for the rhetorical artistry to play its role. 
Had her feminine bewitching been enough Joan would not have needed to 
narrate her reasoning the way she did. As far as terms of vision are concerned, 
they definitely have had a conceptual effect on Burgundy, but can only work 
within the rhetorical frame she moulded them in. 
Historically speaking, it is interesting to know that the real event of the 
dissociation of Burgundy from the English and taking sides with the French took 
place over many years of negotiations (see Goy-Blanquet 2003, 31-3). More 
interesting still, Joan and Burgundy are never reported to have met at all. So it 
can be argued that, by creating this unhistorical event, and by collapsing the 
long story of many years into one short moment, Shakespeare just wanted to 
demonstrate, especially to those familiar with the historical details, the power of 
narrative to achieve in one argument what was achieved over many years. 
No less illuminating an example is that of Warwick in 3 Henry VI(The True 
Tragedy of Richard Duke of York and the Good King Henry the Sixth), after 
Edward has betrayed his embassy to King Lewis VI and chosen to marry 
Elizabeth instead of Lady Bona, Lewis’s sister for whose hand Warwick is sent 
to ask. Irked by Edward’s position, Warwick denounces his allegiance to him 
and, shocked by this event, he undertakes a new reading of the events that 
have marked his relation to the Yorkists. Interestingly, he brings into 
prominence events the real significance of which he was so far reluctant to 
realize:
That I am clear from this misdeed of Edward’s,
No more my king, for he dishonours me,
But most himself, if he could see his shame.
Did I forget that by the house of York
My father came untimely to his death?
Did I let pass th’abuse done to my niece?
Did I impale him with the regal crown?
Did I put Henry from his native right?      (3.3.183-90; emphasis added)
In order to make intelligible his last story, Warwick had to ‘forget’ and ‘let pass’ 
some events (such as the untimely murder of his father and the abuse of his 
niece) the significance of which was inconsistent with the old story, and so were 
rejected as anomalous. But with the new events popping up, these old ones can 
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now be harmoniously added to make a comprehensive whole. Unlike Burgundy, 
it is Warwick who reminds himself of events which he ‘forgot’; like Burgundy, 
however, Warwick re-arranges the events, with the forgotten ones now brought 
into prominence, thus forging new readings of the past. “The same event can 
serve as a different kind of element of many different historical stories, 
depending on the role it is assigned in a specific motific characterization of the 
set to which it belongs” (White 1973, 7). This new reading of his history turns 
old enemies into friends and old friends into enemies. Now he composes a new 
history, radically divergent from the old one; and now Warwick has to forge new 
convictions, the most salient of which is the admission that the rule of England 
is Henry’s ‘native right’, although, ironically, Warwick has been very zealous to 
argue on York’s side, considering the house of Lancaster as usurpers (3 Henry 
VI: 1.1.23). Thus, these two examples show the role emplotment or 
configuration plays in the reshaping of historical events, creating ever new 
narratives that would in turn explain these events differently. This shows how far 
emplotment is crucial in constructing intelligible historical interpretations of 
events, and how, this way, history is subject to rhetoric and literary discursive 
manipulations. It also reveals the openness and vast potentiality of historical 
past or events of the actual world to acquire new meanings according to the 
way they are re-arranged. 
The second area where the rhetorical and literary devices intervene in any 
historical narration is the use of tropes and figures, which include metaphors, 
parables or even proverbs, in conveying a point of view about one specific 
character or event. These would convey information but only combined with 
value judgement, and would thus compromise the truthfulness of that 
information. They become much more interesting when they are used in 
narrating historical events, since it will call into question the claims of validity 
and impartiality implicitly made when narrating historical events. They serve a 
cognitive end in enhancing the intelligibility and probability of the historical 
narrative. Mark Turner observes that stories in general, and parables in 
particular, are a basic means whereby humans make sense of their world, in 
explaining, predicting and judging their experience. Literary parables and even 
proverbs work by presenting one story and projecting it on another story. By 
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taking the wisdom of the first story for granted, the listener is implicitly invited to 
judge the second story accordingly. “This projection of one story onto another 
may seem exotic and literary, and it is—but it is also, like story, a fundamental 
instrument of the mind. Rational capacities depend upon it. It is a literary 
capacity indispensable to human cognition generally” (1996, 5). They also 
reveal the potentiality of the historical events. Like emplotment, they invest in 
the potentiality of historical narrative to entertain as many different 
interpretations as the tropes projected into them, and the potentiality of the 
original story to be projected on different tropes and parables. 
Historical writing is fraught with figurative language, and Shakespeare’s 
histories abound with extended metaphors and analogies that are used to 
represent a historical reality by means of analogy. When characters are 
presenting their own narrative, they sometimes make recourse to metaphorical 
analogies to back it up and make it more intelligible. One significant example is 
to be found in 2 Henry VI(The First Part of the Contention of the Two Famous 
Houses of York and Lancaster), when York is contemplating how the King 
agreed to give away two French cities in return for his marriage to Margaret. 
York’s plight is deepened since he thinks that what they have given is his own, 
for he considers himself the rightful heir to the English throne:
I cannot blame them all – what is’t to them?
’Tis thine they give away and not their own!
Pirates may make cheap pennyworths of their pillage,
And purchase friends, and give to courtesans,
Still revelling like lords till all be gone,
Whileas the seely owner of the goods
Weeps over them, and wrings his hapless hands,
And shakes his head, and, trembling, stands aloof,
While all is shared and all is borne away,
Ready to starve and dare not touch his own.
So York must sit and fret and bite his tongue,
While his own lands are bargained for and sold.    (1.1.219-30)
In this extended metaphor York is re-narrating his story and so is re-writing his 
version of history using these analogies. Characters like York are motivated to 
use these analogies since they appeal to bits of human life and experience that 
are generally accepted or even considered as truisms, such as the behaviour of 
pirates in York’s analogy. Moreover, they increase the probability of the claim 
being made, for they are piling up as many examples as possible which support 
that claim, the more so when the examples are considered as natural or social 
axioms. Consequently, they evoke an immediate, clear and decisive judgement 
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on the part of the hearer, for none would agree that what pirates do is legal. 
Thus, the claims expressed by these parables and analogies will be readily 
accepted as true; it is as if the speaker is making the implicit claim that what 
he/she is saying is as true as the analogies he/she is using. Moreover, to be 
more believable and more happily applicable to the original stories, some of 
these analogies are minutely detailed and extended, as the above example 
clearly shows: the pirates are to be understood as the Lancastrians, the ship 
owner as York, and the courtesan as Margaret, and so on. So, these analogies 
are more narratively coherent models, and can represent reality more intelligibly 
to the listeners. And it shows the inherent potentiality of the actual events (such 
as the marriage of Henry and Margaret) that they can acquire new meanings by 
being projected on different metaphors. 
The analogies foster the sense of the apparelled truth since metaphorical 
representations are closely intermixed with narrative presentation and 
consequently will compromise the claim for a naked truth or a pure ontological 
reality. One area in which they compromise that truth is in the addition of 
perspective and intrusion of point of view. Metaphorical statements, employed 
in a narrative representation, also serve to describe that reality, just as literal
statements do. But they have to them an additional dimension: they express the 
speaker’s point of view and the image he/she makes and intends to convey to 
the listeners. As F. R. Ankersmit puts it, “the difference between literal and 
metaphorical statements lies in the latter’s capacity to define or individuate a 
‘point of view’” (1983, 193). Metaphorical narration is more acutely focalized 
than literal narration and so in addition to the events being narrated and the 
narrative structure imposed upon them, we have a third element which is the 
way these events are to be evaluated and emotionally responded to. “This 
implies that metaphorical statements can never be completely reduced to literal 
statements that only have descriptive or cognitive content” (ibid.). In York’s 
narration, for example, not only are we presented with past or historical events 
narratively structured, but we are asked to sympathize with his cause and 
denounce the deeds of his enemies: clearly enough, we are meant to adopt his 
attitude and respond accordingly. As a result, these metaphors convey more 
than the description of what really happened.
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Furthermore, the heavy use of these metaphors helps further affiliate 
historical and literary discourse. And as point of view is a characteristically 
literary device, this shows how far literary devices are employed in historical 
writing. Moreover, they work as an organizational category, just as narrative 
emplotment does. Without these metaphors, “our view of the world will 
immediately disintegrate into disconnected and distractible bits of information. 
Metaphor synthesizes our knowledge of the world” (Ibid., 194). Metaphors are 
inevitable, just as narratives are. However, they can be seen as fallacious, since 
the similarities claimed in them are more often stated than proved. More often 
than not, they are supposed to be taken for granted. In this sense, they are 
more performative than constative. We denounce what pirates do, but why 
should we consider Henry VI a pirate? It is the metaphor that invites us to do so. 
The significance of the attitudinal or perspectival dimension of these 
metaphors can best be appreciated in cases where there are conflicting 
metaphorical representations about one character or one event. A case in point 
is the different, even divergent ways in which the image of Gloucester is 
constructed during 2 Henry VI. Gloucester, until his murder half way through 
this play, serves not only as a conflicting side against the others but a site 
where all the conflicts intersect. Save for the young king, all the others 
characters, themselves in conflict, share the one wish of getting rid of 
Gloucester. These characters use ‘flock’ and ‘gardening’ imagery to portray him 
in different ways. Richard Duke of York, speaking about Somerset, Suffolk, the 
Bishop and Buckingham, refers to their conspiring against Gloucester: “Till they 
have snared the shepherd of the flock, / That virtuous prince, the good Duke of 
Humphrey” (2.2.73-4). Although he might be a hypocrite here, York’s statement 
portrays the relation of Gloucester to the king as that of a shepherd to a flock, 
ascribing thus to him all the features of a shepherd: kindness, concern, and 
protection. On the other hand, they all position Henry and endow him with 
features of innocence, weakness, and helplessness. This implies the view that 
Gloucester is really faithful to and a good carer for the king. Later, Margaret, 
urging the king against Gloucester, uses gardening imagery to describe him: 
“Now ‘tis the spring, and weeds are shallow-rooted; / Suffer them now, and 
they’ll o’ergrow the garden, / And choke the herbs for want of husbandry” 
(3.1.31-3). The relation between the king and Gloucester is that of the gardener 
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to the weeds, which he should pluck if the garden is to flourish. Interestingly, the 
subject-object relationship between the two is shifted in the two metaphors. 
Margaret’s perspective is readily backed up by Suffolk: “The fox barks not when 
he would steal the lamb” (55). Shortly later, York changes position and joins 
Gloucester’s enemies. Interestingly, he uses the same animalistic imagery to 
warn against the Duke’s danger on King Henry VI:
YORK. Were't not all one an empty eagle were set
To guard the chicken from a hungry kite,
As place Duke Humphrey for the King's protector?
QUEEN MARGARET. So the poor chicken should be sure of death. 
(3.1.248-51)
These tropes give ever new images about the relation between the King and 
Gloucester, though they serve the same purpose of demonizing Gloucester.
They are similar to that of York in positioning the king as the lamb in both 
analogies while Gloucester is changed from a shepherd to a fox or an eagle. 
The King also becomes involved in constructing the image of Gloucester. 
King Henry VI seems to provisionally adopt his queen’s analogy: “My lords, at 
once, the care you have of us / To mow down thorns that would annoy our foot / 
Is worthy praise” (3.1.66-8). Here he uses the same gardening image and now 
Gloucester is a thorn that the others are trying to pluck lest it hurts Henry’s feet. 
Gloucester himself takes part in his image-making. Defending himself against 
the lords’ arraignments, Gloucester represents himself to the king repeating 
York’s initial analogy: “Thus is the shepherd beaten from thy side, / And wolves 
are gnarling who shall gnaw thee first” (191-2). In the midst of this debate the 
king is to interfere with a significant extended analogy after Gloucester having 
been arrested: 
And as the butcher takes away the calf,
And binds the wretch, and beats it when it strays,
Bearing it to the bloody slaughterhouse,
Even so remorseless have they borne him hence;
And as the dam runs lowing up and down,
Looking the way her harmless young one went,
And can do naught but wail her darling’s loss;
Even so myself bewails good Gloucester’s case     (3.1.210-17)
In this emotionally charged description of Gloucester’s case, the king is re-
shaping the relationship between the two: this time it is the king who is caring 
for Gloucester who is presented here as a victim; and it is the other lords who 
are described as butchers. After the exit of the king, the queen and the lords are 
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negotiating how to rid themselves of Gloucester, reiterating the same animalistic 
analogies mentioned above, with one new addition by Margaret who asserted 
that Gloucester is deceiving Henry as “the mournful crocodile / With sorrow 
snares relenting passengers, / Or as the snake rolled in a flow’ring bank / With 
shining chequered slough, doth sting a child / That for the beauty thinks it 
excellent” (226-30).23 In this speech, Margaret is also advancing a point of view 
about the king himself as a child who, thanks to his innocence (credulity, 
perhaps!) is easily deceived by the crocodile-like tears of Gloucester. In these 
illuminating examples from Henry’s speech to the others, analogies are 
extensively used to give an image of reality which serves to amplify the 
character’s perspective and consequently justify his/her stance:
Henry constructs an elaborate allegorical picture of himself as a cow unable 
to save its calf from the slaughter-house . . .  the speech is not just a way of 
analysing what is happening but a way of fixing himself in the role of 
helpless onlooker, as though he had no choice in the matter. It is in a 
curious way a speech of self-justification, and, in the lines that follow, 
Gloucester’s enemies pick up the method, constructing a series of miniature 
allegories to justify the killing. (Leggatt 1988, 25)
The above examples show that historical representation is not a purely 
descriptive activity. Rather, evaluation is indelibly inscribed in any 
representation. As these characters are striving to convey what they consider 
as facts, they cannot help pouring it into evaluative and perspectival moulds. 
The abundance of these analogies in the histories is a testimony that narration 
is impossible without a ‘point of view’ in which the narrator is positioned and 
from which he/she perceives the events being narrated and, using these 
analogies, invites us to view these events that way. 24
These tropes and analogies also work like a narrative to serve a forensic 
claim of a crime that has taken place. This use is partly similar to the use of 
emplotment and also to forensic rhetoric mentioned in the last chapter. An 
example of that is Warwick’s forensic reasoning in 2 Henry VI regarding the 
murder of Gloucester in which he accuses Suffolk and Winchester of killing the 
dead Duke: 
WARWICK. But both of you were vowed Duke Humphrey's foes,
[To CARDINAL BEAUFORT] And you, forsooth, had the good Duke to keep:
'Tis like you would not feast him like a friend;
And 'tis well seen he found an enemy.
QUEEN MARGARET. Then you, belike, suspect these noblemen
As guilty of Duke Humphrey's timeless death?
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WARWICK. Who finds the heifer dead and bleeding fresh,
And sees fast by a butcher with an axe,
But will suspect 'twas he that made the slaughter?
Who finds the partridge in the puttock's nest
But may imagine how the bird was dead,
Although the kite soar with unbloodied beak?
Even so suspicious is this tragedy.                        (3.2.182-94)
The forensic nature of Warwick’s speech is quite clear. He is trying to convict 
Suffolk and Winchester of Gloucester’s murder using some general themes or 
topics. These topics, however, are not derived from human behaviour but rather 
from metaphorical tropes whose truth is taken as a given. The potentialist and 
cognitive aspects of Warwick’s image of reality are glaringly obvious. In his 
account any segment of reality (like the incident of Gloucester’s murder) has the 
potential to be interpreted differently and to acquire meanings as different as the 
stories projected on it. It is the susceptibility of reality to these different plottings
and re-plottings that constitutes its inherent potentiality. Besides, this also points 
to the urgency upon historical contesters to make their claims into intelligible 
and convincing stories. The rhetorical nature of this speech is foregrounded 
since its final end is to convince those present (including the King and his 
entourage) of the responsibility of Suffolk and Winchester for Gloucester’s death. 
All these examples point to the fact that the reality being constructed in these 
contentions about historical events is not objective. At its best it is a potentialist 
reality that employs all kinds of tools, literary and rhetorical, to present itself as a 
possible interpretation of the historical events. 
The third area in which Shakespeare injects literary and rhetorical elements into 
the representation of history is theatricality. It has to do with creating the self-
consciousness, shared by actors and spectators, that what is being presented is 
not history but a performance. This consciousness, in turn, will leave the door 
wide open to viewing history in terms of fictional and literary genres. The 
interrelation between theatre and history is clearly recognized. Although the 
performance of self-conscious theatricality (including the play-within-a-play) was 
regarded as “a constituent and intrinsic component of the comedic genre” in 
general (Fischer and Greiner 2007, xiii) and of Shakespeare’s comedy in 
particular (K. Ryan 1989, 91), some scholars have also pointed out the 
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importance, even the centrality, of this technique in historical drama in general 
and Shakespeare’s histories in particular. More generally, theatricality has been 
identified as crucial to thinking and writing about history itself. According to 
Herbert Lindenberger, “If the idea of theatre and theatricality has been 
particularly relevant to historical drama, it has also enjoyed a peculiar affinity 
with the writing of history itself. When history becomes conscious of itself, it 
often expresses itself in theatrical terms” (1975, 29). Thus, we tend to think of 
political figures as actors on the stage of history (as Queen Elizabeth I once told 
her Parliament after the execution of Mary Stuart) and of a certain sad event as
a tragedy of that given figure and so on. Shakespeare’s histories show 
heightened awareness of this aspect of history.  “Shakespeare was alert to a 
variety of historical processes and his political characters often behave 
theatrically – at worse being guilty of dissimulation, at best as though they are 
conscious of taking part in a play” so much so “that we might even surmise that 
a classic definition of postmodernist novels as ‘historiographical metafictions’ 
well describes Shakespearean history plays” (Hattaway 2002, 19).  
In the Henry VI dramas, historical figures often show their acute 
awareness that they are just playing roles on that huge stage of history. 
Sometimes they self-consciously ask for certain roles to play. In 3 Henry VI, 
while York’s sons are negotiating how to convince their father to breach his 
promise to Henry VI, Edward insists that he “can better play the orator” (1.2.2). 
But it later seems that Richard is better in ‘playing’ that role. The theatricality of 
oration is a theme that runs throughout the play. In Chapter One, we 
demonstrated the close affinity between early modern rhetoric and theatre, so 
much so that one discipline was borrowing techniques from the other. Later in 
that play, King Henry approves Clifford’s advice: “Full well hath Clifford played 
the orator” (2.2.43). Richard also is very aware of his need for role playing: “I’ll 
play the orator as well as Nestor” (3.2.188). Still again, he acknowledges the 
unavoidability of playing roles that were assigned to and imposed upon him by 
Nature. Here he refers to the ‘fact’ that he was born with teeth, which 
dumbfounded the midwife and other women: “And so I was, which plainly 
signified / That I should snarl and bite and play the dog” (5.6.76-7). Moreover, 
role-playing is rooted in even so serious an activity as fighting in warfare; 
receiving post from Margaret threatening him with war, Edward exclaims: 
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“Belike she minds to play the Amazon” (4.1.104). Joyous with their provisional 
victory over Talbot in 1 Henry VI, Alencon boasts that his countrymen will “hear 
how we have played the men” (1.8.16). Later he approves Joan’s role in 
persuading Burgundy to join the French: “Pucelle hath bravely played her part in 
this, / And doth deserve a coronet of gold” (3.7.88-9). Early in the same play, 
the messenger narrating how Talbot was taken prisoner casts the brunt of 
blame on John Fastolf: “Here had the conquest fully sealed up, / If Sir John 
Fastolf had not played the coward” (1.1.130-1). 
On a still deeper level, characters seem no less conscious that their 
current actions will be played over and over, and will be told and retold in the 
future course of history, serving as the subject matter for future stories and 
plays. Their concern about their future stories stems from the deep aesthetic 
and historical awareness that elements in these stories might be changed to 
serve the requirement of intelligibility and also of the inherent potentiality of their 
stories to be given new meanings by being framed differently. This is nowhere 
clearer than in York’s recognition that his plight will turn into a popular tragedy: 
“Keep thou the napkin and go boast of this, / And if thou tell’st the heavy story 
right, / Upon my soul the hearers will shed tears” (3 Henry VI, 1.4.160-2). York 
here is not only aware than he will be a history, but is equally conscious of the 
devastating effect of historical representation. So he is obsessed that his story 
might not be told right, and his tragedy might not make the effect it should. 
Ironically, his story is now being told (or better, shown) while he is uttering these 
words. (The title of early editions was ‘The True Tragedie of Richard Duke of 
York). Later in that play, King Henry, speaking to Richard of Gloucester who 
came to kill him, is likewise aware that his story, with the murder of his own son 
included, will turn into a historical material: “My breast can better brook thy 
dagger’s point / Than can my ears that tragic history” (5.6.27-8). On another 
level, these characters speak of historical events, political designs and military 
actions as if they were part of a theatrical plot. In 2 Henry VI, Gloucester is 
using a theatrical metaphor as he tries to show the king the real motives behind 
the lords’ accusation against him: “I know their complot is to have my life” 
(3.1.147). Thus, he views his death as one event in their plot. However, it is not 
the closing event: “But mine is made the prologue to their play” (151). So, he 
makes all historical figures in 2Henry VI appear like actors on the stage of 
175
history. The interesting point here is that, in a sense, they are being revealed as
actors on the stage of the Rose theatre when these lines are uttered. “Such 
lines trigger a recognition that all these great events are ‘play’d in jest by 
counterfeiting actors’ . . . both the professionals who are acting Henry VI and 
the dedicated amateurs in history’s pageant they are portraying” (Leggatt 1988, 
10).25 In 3 Henry VI, back from the battle for a moment after his army seemed to 
be vanquished, Warwick is told by Edward that his brother has been killed. 
Exasperated by Edward’s and his own inertia, Warwick says: 
Why stand we like soft-hearted women here,
Wailing our losses, whiles the foe doth rage;
And look upon, as if the tragedy
Were played in jest by counterfeiting actors?    (2.3.25-8)
Warwick’s situation can be read as occupying the role of audience and so is still 
partly outside the theatrical illusion: “His momentary isolation from the battle 
that rages before him seems now to reflect an attitude more suited to the 
audience at a play” (Righter 1962, 92). Kathryn Schwarz, on the other hand, 
reads these lines in terms of blood-relations connecting male characters in the 
play, and concludes that Warwick, in uttering these lines, has stepped 
completely outside of the theatrical illusion: "A brother’s death removes battle 
from abstraction – the stage, the genre play, the counterfeit – to lived 
experience, from a set of conventions acted out by rote to an urgent condition of 
necessity” (2003, 351). The word ‘tragedy’ was used interchangeably with and 
even preferred to the words ‘play’, ‘act’ and ‘scene’, and it always invoked a 
theatrical sense. Warwick’s self-conscious reflexivity leads him to speculate 
about what is going on before him now as a theatrical performance and so is 
liable to be acted over as a play again and again. Ironically, his speech is itself 
part of a real performance and he himself is one of its ‘counterfeiting’ actors. 
What these examples clearly show is that historical truth is itself 
performative, not constative. ‘Role-playing’ indicates that a character is 
assuming a personality other than his or her own. So, if in reality, past or 
present, things are hardly what they seem, then the reconstruction of that reality 
gets more and more complicated and the retrieval of its ‘truths’ becomes harder 
to attain. Performance, then, turns out to be an integral part of reality and is not 
imposed by any external authority. This equation between reality and 
performance fosters the sense of the virtual component that is always needed 
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to help us make sense of the theatrical performance. Consequently, it enhances 
the potential nature and the cognitive function in the actual world itself. 
Moreover, it also disarms the contrast Dolezel draws between a fictional 
discourse that is performative and a historical discourse that is constative as 
being no longer valid from the point of view presented in these plays. 
There are many other more ‘literal’ instances of role-playing, such as 
Joan’s disguise as peasant in 1 Henry VI (3.2), the townsman’s feigned ‘miracle’ 
in 2 Henry VI (2.1) and Eleanor’s behaviour and Hume’s deception of her, and 
so on. However, Shakespeare pushes that perception of history to a 
considerable extreme in the example of Jack Cade in 2 Henry VI. Motivated by 
York, Jack Cade launches a rebellion against Henry VI, claiming himself to be 
John Mortimer and, thus, makes claim to the English throne. Though crammed 
with public murders, Cade’s scenes are among the comic episodes in the play. 
Part of the comic effect of these scenes stems from Cade’s claims and self-
conscious performance, whereby he infelicitously and circularly endows himself 
with titles and establishes his own history. Cade claims his father to have 
descended from Edmund Mortimer who married the daughter of the Duke of 
Clarence, third son to Edward III. According to that version, the second son of 
Edmund Mortimer, Jack’s father, was stolen by a beggar-woman and grew up
ignorant of his birth and worked a bricklayer. 
As part of the performative nature of Cade’s discourse, he does not have
recourse to any verifiable truths or historical facts. When Stafford’s brother 
objects that his claim about the Mortimers is false, Cade says: “Ay, there’s the 
question – but I say ‘tis true” (4.2.127). Cade’s discourse completely dispenses 
with what Barthes (1970) has called “shifters of listening” or, following Roman 
Jacobson, “testimonial statements” which are present in any historical discourse, 
whereby the historian refers to his source as a testimony to what he/she is 
saying. Cade’s claims are all performatives: they do not tell facts that pre-exist 
them, but establish these facts as he utters them, by the very act of uttering 
them. Unlike any other performatives, however, they lack any felicity conditions 
and the only warrant of their truth is their very utterance: “Away! Burn all the 
records of the realm. My mouth shall be the Parliament of England” (4.7.11-3). 
Further, we can say that, as performative statements, they are not subject to 
any truth judgement. They needn’t, even cannot be true or false. Ironically, one 
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of his followers, Smith the weaver, is too unwitting to understand the status of 
Cade’s statements. After Cade has claimed the descent of his father who 
worked a bricklayer, Smith the weaver is trying hard to give a testimony to 
Cade’s claims: “Sir, he made a chimney in my father’s house, and the bricks are 
alive at this day to testify. Therefore deny it not” (4.2.134-5; emphasis added). 
Interestingly, Smith’s use of ostensive history (the live chimney) is quite strong, 
yet it does not give warrant to Cade’s claims, since the only thing it can prove is 
that Cade’s father was a bricklayer, which is not a matter of dispute.
No less interesting is his bestowal of knighthood on himself, when he is 
told of the arrival of Sir Humphrey Stafford and William Stafford:
MESSENGER. Fly, fly, fly! Sir Humphrey Stafford and his brother are hard by with 
the king’s forces.
CADE. Stand, villain, stand – or I’ll fell thee down. He shall be encountered with a 
man as good as himself.  He is but a knight, is a?
MESSENGER. No.
CADE. To equal him I will make myself a knight presently.
[He kneels and knights himself]
Rise up Sir John Mortimer.
[Rises]
Now have at him!                          (4.2.100-8)
The deontic power needed to bestow knighthood is here also warranted by 
Cade himself. The irony is that Cade is not equal to the Staffords until he 
becomes a knight, and the only one who can make him a knight is Cade. Thus, 
the unworthy Cade is made worthy by the unworthy Cade. There is another, 
related sense in which Cade is also presented as a performer, as York likens 
him to a ‘wild Morisco’ or a morris dancer (3.1.365). The two juxtaposed 
meanings of performance explored here with relation to Cade help us capitalize 
on the theatricality of history. For as a performing actor, Cade’s existence is 
testified to by his own phenomenological presence on-stage, not by his 
functioning as a sign referring to and authenticated by something other than his 
own presence. And as history shares with theatre the quality of referring to 
another reality outside of itself, here Cade is dispensing with his semiotic 
function on behalf of his phenomenological existence. In terms we used in 
Chapter One, he foregrounds his performant function at the expense of his 
referential function. So his history is no longer in need of testimonial statements, 
and is established solely by his very presence. Thus, it implies that most of what 
we consider as verified is no more than a claim and that a good deal of history 
is a performative activity. These two points are given prominence by the use of 
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this exaggerated example of Jack Cade. His claim of descent and bestowal of 
knighthood, however, are more closely related to each other than they may first 
appear and Shakespeare’s skill is such that, by juxtaposing them together, he 
shows how the claims to truth made by historical representations may be no
better grounded than these baseless social conventions.
Thus, one theatrical feature that is laid bare in the Cade scenes is 
conventionality. Significantly, it reflects on the social dimension of 
conventionality. These episodes expose the social reality as a sum of 
conventions at its best. Not only in theatre, then, but also in reality what we see 
is not based on real attributes but merely on conventions, which compromises 
the status of the actual world and consequently of history itself. This enhances 
the view that what we take to be the actual world is a cultural construct. To be 
sure, titles and names have no factual material existence. They are just 
potentialities arising from the actual state; in other words, they are more of 
interpretations than facts. The ironies exposed in the Cade episode betray, 
among other things, scepticism about these social conventions, such as the 
bestowal of knighthood. With Cade naming himself Sir John Mortimer, “the 
stage presents us with a visual parody of the power of naming” (Watson 1990, 
74). According to Ellen C. Caldwell, the Jack Cade episode questions the 
validity of all ceremony at the heart of the aristocratic society, for performing it 
that way “inverts the ceremony and questions its sanctity" (1995, 54). So, the 
behaviour of Cade is attributable not only to York but to the whole aristocratic 
society (Cartelli 2003, 327). 
Up to now we have surveyed how the historical representation is inescapably 
enshrined within rhetorical and narrative strategies – emplotment, tropes and 
theatricality – that put its claim to naked truth into compromise, and set it in line 
with the virtual features of potentiality and probability. In some instances, 
however, characters are desperate to catch the ‘naked’ truth which is the ideal 
goal of any historical representation. Nevertheless, these characters are equally 
aware that a naked representation of truth is an oxymoron, which is why they 
tend to dispense with linguistic and narrative representation in favour of a direct 
material presence of the historical fact itself. They tend to use ‘ostension’ as a 
method of telling history. Ostension is a way of defining something by bringing
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the thing itself or its examples into view. By bringing the physical thing onstage 
characters manage to dispense with the potentiality and probability associated 
with any representation. On the one hand, bringing the very thing onstage 
would narrow the potentiality of any added interpretation or connection. On the 
other hand, since the thing itself is present, ostension eliminates the need for 
representational tools to make the thing or event intelligible.  However, in the 
last resort Shakespeare is careful to point to the overall cognitive aspect of the 
representation, and the irony that even their ostensions are made intelligible as 
being part of a performance which is representational in essence.   
One blatant example is Richard of Gloucester’s presentation of the 
evidence for his deeds in the battle of St. Albans. At the beginning of 3 Henry VI, 
Richard Duke of York is busy reviewing his triumph over the king’s forces and 
gives opportunity for his sons and supporters to report and prove their deeds:
EDWARD. Lord Stafford’s father, Duke of Buckingham,
Is either slain or wounded dangerous.
I cleft his beaver with a downright blow.
That this is true, father, behold his blood.
[He shows a bloody sword]
MONTAGUE. [to YORK] And, brother, here’s the Earl of Wiltshire’s blood,
[He shows a bloody sword]
Whom I encountered as the battles joined.
RICHARD. [to Somerset’s head, which he shows]
Speak thou for me and tell them what I did.
YORK. Richard hath best deserved of all my sons.
[To the head] But is your grace dead, my lord of Somerset?    (1.1.10-18)
What these characters are doing is writing the battle, writing their past and 
chronicling their history. As evidence of this construction of the past, each 
collects some data, the strongest among which was the head of Somerset, 
being based on that material datum. The strength of this evidence stems from 
the fact that, in contrast to the other data presented, it is the least liable to 
interpretation. 26 There is only the actual fact, and no room is left for any 
potentiality or a potentially alternative interpretation. Even blood is not sufficient 
as evidence for it may be of somebody else other than the ones these warriors 
claim to have wounded or killed. Moreover, with it York cannot be sure whether 
this wound was deadly or not. Hence Edward’s honest claim: ‘Is either slain or 
wounded dangerously.’ With the head, on the other hand, there is only one fact: 
that Somerset is killed, which is why it is only Richard’s claim which invoked 
York’s exclaim: “Richard hath best deserved of all my sons.” And it is so 
unmediated that Richard even does not speak what he has done, as others did; 
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rather, he asks the head, his evidence, to ‘speak’ for him and ‘tell’ them what he 
did. So, Richard’s history, unlike the others’, is not written with words, but with 
ostensive data. He is seeking to present a ‘naked’ rather than an ‘apparelled’ 
truth. Although Richard dispenses with verbal narrative reconstructions, yet he 
still aims at intelligibility, this time in theatrically ostensive means. 
In a previous context, York is also claiming this method as historical 
verification. Beleaguered by Somerset’s inefficiency in France, when the latter 
has lost all the remaining English conquered territories, York is asking for an 
evidence of Somerset’s prowess: “Show me one scar charactered on thy skin. / 
Men’s flesh preserved so whole do seldom win” (2 Henry VI: 3.1.300-1). 
Somerset’s claims of having fought in France can only be verified by his ‘scars’. 
It is men’s flesh, not their words, that speak true. And thus it is not speaking 
(nor writing) that is the best method of historical proof, but rather it is ‘showing’. 
Yet the piquant irony Shakespeare is making in these examples is that, 
despite these characters’ ceaseless endeavours to get out of the grip of 
narrative and rhetorical representation, they are still enmeshed within it, and 
their presentation can only make sense within that representational frame. After 
all, the head which Richard throws on the stage is not the historical Somerset’s 
head, but a dummy head used to represent the head of the historical Somerset 
or, more accurately, to represent the head of the actor who plays Somerset.
(Interestingly enough, this account is historically anachronistic: Richard Duke of 
Gloucester could not have killed Somerset since he was only three years old at 
the first battle of St. Albans in which the Duke of Somerset was murdered.) 
Moreover, the head, as part of a theatrical performance, is not capable of 
speaking for Richard, but rather it can only make sense as part of the larger, 
more complex frames of representation in that performance. The head, in other 
words, is being spoken for rather than speaking itself. Nor are the scars which 
the actor playing Somerset is asked to show his own (if he had scars to show at 
all). Even if such scars are shown, they would only be intelligible as part of the 
performance of this play. Thus even in their hardest efforts to escape the 
confines of rhetorical representation, historical potentiality and the openness to 
interpretation, these characters find themselves again entrapped in the literary 
device of metatheatricality which we above considered as contributing to the 
image of apparelled truth. 
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A more complex and illuminating instance of the inevitability of historical 
representation is in the story of the invitation of Talbot by the Countess of 
Auvergne in 1 Henry VI. This example shows that even direct encounter, which 
is not mediated by any historical representation, is in need of cognitive efforts to 
be intelligible. The Countess feigns that she is impressed by the military 
characteristics of Talbot but in fact she intends to imprison him and save her 
country from his scourge. More significantly, she first wanted to see him, so that 
“Fain would mine eyes be witness with mine ears, / To give their censure of 
these rare reports” (2.3.9-10; emphasis added). The Countess’s speech betrays 
her scepticism about any act of representation. Although she is contemporary 
with Talbot, her knowledge of him is a historical knowledge in the sense that it is 
based on ‘reports’. (Spatial distance is exerting the same epistemic gap as 
temporal distance.) The Countess is quite conscious of the fact that her 
knowledge, based on those reports, is anything but reliable. Hence her attempt 
to back up her ‘ears’ with her ‘eyes’. When she first sees Talbot, she is alarmed 
by the gross disparity between seeing and hearing:
COUNTESS OF AUVERGNE .And he is welcome. What, is this the man?
MESSENGER. Madam, it is.
COUNTESS OF AUVERGNE. Is this the scourge of France?
Is this the Talbot, so much feared abroad
That with his name the mothers still their babes?
I see report is fabulous and false.
I thought I should have seen some Hercules,
A second Hector, for his grim aspect
And large proportion of his strong-knit limbs.
                                                                           (13-20; emphasis added)
Reports, then, are ‘fabulous’ and ‘false’. This raises her historical awareness 
and leaves her shocked by the discrepancy between what she is seeing and 
what she ‘should have seen’. The what she ‘should have seen’ is a virtual 
potentiality of Talbot which is constructed thanks to the former representations 
made about Talbot and on which the Countess has based her image of him. 
She is quite aware that historical representation results in a potential reality and 
not the actual one. As a result, she prefers ‘seeing’ to ‘hearing’. Paradoxically, 
Talbot corrects her ‘wrong belief’ by problematizing even the validity of ‘seeing’ 
and the verifiability of ostensive history.  When she tries to imprison him, he 
derides her since “that you have aught but Talbot’s shadow” (45). Now, even 
‘seeing’ is not sufficient guarantee of knowledge, for although he is standing by 
her, what she can see is just his shadow. Utterly perplexed, she exclaims: “He 
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will be here, and yet he is not here. / How can these contrarieties agree?” (58-9). 
This is not the Talbot proper, but the shadow that must be complemented by its 
substance, i.e., his soldiers. So, even the presented physical thing is not yet the 
whole story, because its potential is something beyond itself. The potential of 
Talbot is in his soldiers, who help make Talbot what he really is. 
The scene has provocative metatheatrical and metahistorical significance. 
Metatheatrically, Talbot may be alluding to the theatrical nature of his existence, 
as the word ‘shadow’ meant ‘actor’ in the early modern period. After all, the past 
is in essence irretrievable, and the scene marks the futility of desiring to recover
it again. Phyllis Rackin observes that the Countess prefers the physical objects 
to written history as more verifiable and trustworthy. So, the desire to see the 
real Talbot is impossible to achieve, be it through historical record or theatrical 
representation. "Like the Countess, Shakespeare's audience wanted to see the 
renowned Talbot, and like her, they were likely to be disappointed” (Rackin 
1985, 334). On the metahistorical dimension, the scene marks the shadowy and 
paradoxical aspects of the historical representation itself. For although these 
various media claim to represent the real past, they really give no more than a 
shadowy image of that past. And as theatre and history share a quality of 
referring or looking from a distance, reference both presents the past and 
distances us from it, constantly reminding us that it is a semiotic mechanism not 
real recovery. “Like Talbot, the past represented here is both present and not 
present” (Walsh 2004, 132). It is both here and not here, with us capturing only 
its shadow while its substance, unlike Talbot’s soldiers, is irrecoverably 
receding. The metatheatrical and metahistorical dimensions are closely linked 
together and they help to capitalize on the essential problematic of historical 
drama in general: "just as the appearance of the actor himself may not live up to 
the legend of the character he is portraying; behind the challenge to Talbot, 
Shakespeare is dealing with one of the fundamental problems of historical 
drama, characteristically calling attention to the difficulty rather than smoothing 
it over."(Leggatt 1988, 3) 
The lesson Talbot is teaching the Countess is twofold: first, that historical 
representation is always selective and reductive: faced with a complex 
phenomenon, it reduces it to its most salient aspect and selects that aspect as 
the sole representative part of that phenomenon. Hence the marginalization of 
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many groups of historical actors; armies, for instance, are reduced to their 
leaders. Representations are always shadowy. Secondly, Talbot demonstrates
that understanding reality is not a mere sensory activity, but is also a cognitive
one. His more advanced lesson is that not only ears, but also eyes, unwedded 
by cognitive operations, are unreliable for the capture of that reality. It is her 
eyes that ‘misconster’ his body and mind (2.3.73). In this deeper example, even 
ostension is in need ofa cognitive framework if a reality is to be perfectly 
captured. And the Countess has learned that lesson: “Victorious Talbot, Pardon 
my abuse./I find thou are no less than fame has bruited, / And more than may 
be gathered by thy shape” (67-9).27
These examples reveal the affinity between historical representation and 
theatrical representation. As representations, both attempt to retrieve a reality 
that is no longer there. Moreover, they demonstrate that even historical persons 
might tend to understand their reality (which is the past being represented) in 
theatrical terms. This affinity between historiography and theatre would highlight 
the performative and theatrical nature of history resulting in a deeper 
understanding of how people in the past ‘performed’ their present to get us to 
read it as a full-fledged story or a play. And in turn this capitalizes on the extent 
to which history is being narratively emplotted and cognitively oriented. 
Conclusion
Shakespeare problematizes the concept of the actual world and its historical 
past by stretching the essential characteristics of the virtual (its cognitive 
function and potentiality) to apply also for history. The possible and actual of 
reality are treated as more cognitive than ontological categories. Historical 
reality is a potentialist reality since it is mediated by representational strategies 
and is open to many interpretations. As a representation, it has also to be made 
intelligible via the use of many strategies that are literary or rhetorical in nature. 
Thus, the truths which historical representation yields are more ‘apparelled’ than 
‘naked’. Shakespeare’s interest in these issues is due to the debates about 
these issues in early modern England among literary and rhetorical scholars as 
well as historians. These debates are fuelled by Aristotle’s distinction between 
poetry and history, which seems to promote potentiality and intelligibility to 
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poetry rather than history. Although many scholars generally accepted 
Aristotle’s distinction, yet they identified these many features in historical writing 
itself. As far as Shakespeare’s practice is concerned, characters in the three 
parts of Henry VI are desperate to prove their historical claims using rhetorical 
devices that would make their claims more credible and convincing. The use of 
these devices highlights the probabilistic and potentialist nature of their 
historical representations which they, however, deliberately attempt to conceal. 
We have investigated in detail three areas of representational intervention of the 
perception of historical reality: emplotment, use of tropes and theatricality. 
Emplotment enables characters to re-arrange past events to make an 
intelligible and comprehensive whole, and it invests in the potential of events to 
acquire ever new interpretations. Tropes work the same way by projecting 
imaginary stories into the real events which helps to give them new meanings 
compatible with the metaphor or trope. With theatricality, the plays might also 
intensify the sense of artificiality and representation by depicting the whole 
historical process as a form of theatrical playing and performance. Interestingly, 
even when characters try to break from the shackles of representation and 
aspire for the ‘naked’ truth by presenting the real thing onstage, their attempts 
are ultimately futile. As we have observed in Chapter One with regard to theatre, 
we are reminded of the irretrievability of the actual in history. In both history and 
theatre, representation is all there is. In Chapter One we have problematized 
the concept of pure iconicity, and in this chapter we have shown that ostensive 
history is, at its best, an oxymoron. 
The other main point I would like to stress here is the contribution the 
above discussion would make to the current paradigm debate in literary theory. 
As we have seen in the Introduction, ‘Possible worlds’ theory can be situated 
within a paradigm that supersedes poststructuralist and postmodernist currents 
and powerfully contributes to their main concerns, especially the influence 
exerted by discourse and representation on the fictionality of reality in general, 
including scientific and historical ‘realities’. Christopher Norris (2007) takes 
great pains to demonstrate that ‘possible worlds’ is one advanced contribution 
to that debate which originated with the positivistic fostering of the two cultures: 
the objective scientific culture and the subjective speculative one. 
Postmodernism and poststructuralism, argues Norris, can be seen as a reaction, 
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though an extremist one, to that doctrine. What these latter approaches did was 
to deny objectivity at all even to the realm of sciences. In the Introduction we 
showed the advantages this approach yields to historiography. In one way, it is 
a move “beyond the typically poststructuralist idea that language, discourse or 
representation go all the way down and hence that there is no distinguishing 
between historical and fictive narratives or scientific and non-scientific texts” 
(2007, 122). If positivism denied existence of any kind to fictional objects and 
ascribed falsehood to fictional, or even scientifically unverified statements, 
postmodernism denied objective unmediated knowledge for even the scientific 
and historical modes of enquiry. The possible worlds framework, on the other 
hand, acknowledges real existence to all those modes of objects, factual and 
fictional, and reckons existence as an attribute that is to be judged only relative 
to a given world, thus giving a realist account of all these modes of 
representation. Theories of ‘possible worlds’ proved efficient in defending fiction 
against positivist views. But, as the above discussion must have shown, it is not 
clear that it could as efficiently defend non-fiction against the sweeping 
fictionalization of the postmodern trend. So, whether the present formulations of 
‘possible worlds theory will live up to these high expectations voiced by Norris 
and others is a matter at stake!
The above discussion should have shown the relevance of the debates of 
the postmodern challenge to the intellectual controversies in early modern 
England. It also broadens our appreciation of the discipline of rhetoric for it was 
a site for such controversies. It should have also demonstrated the affinity 
between historical and theatrical representation. As both are striving to 
represent an absent reality, both are subject to the same limitations and 
challenges. Further research can be carried out on other Shakespearean
histories to trace that tendency in his representation of historical representation. 
The three plays of Henry VI belong to an early stage of Shakespeare’s career 
and might serve to argue that this historical, discursive and rhetorical 
awareness has been present since that early stage. Moreover, Shakespeare’s 
indirect approach to these issues can be compared to more direct 
pronouncements available in other playwrights, such as Ben Jonson’s treatment 
of historiography in his Sejanus his Fall. 
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The concept of ‘potentialist realism’ advanced in this chapter will also 
feature in the next Chapter on counterfactuals in Shakespeare. On the one 
hand, although a counterfactual takes it for granted that there is an actual fact, 
yet it opens up that reality to different understandings and interpretations, as 
well as to ideological manipulations. On the other hand, the use of 
counterfactuals underscores the employment of probabilistic thinking to 
underpin what was possible in a given situation in the first place. Though we 
shall investigate counterfactuals in plays belonging to different genres, the 
history plays will also feature clearly in the below discussions, which again 
shows the relevance of these questions to historical representation. 
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Chapter Four
Counterfactuality and Contingency in Shakespearean 
Drama
The gardener in Shakespeare’s Richard II draws a comparison between the 
gardeners’ work in weeding the royal garden and the work of the king in the 
whole realm by contemplating the fate of the deposed king:
                                                      O, what pity is it
That he had not so trimmed and dressed his land
As we this garden! 
                                   . . . .
Had he done so to great and growing men,
They might have lived to bear and he to taste
Their fruits of duty. Superfluous branches
We lop away, that bearing boughs may live.
Had he done so, himself had borne the crown,
Which waste of idle hours hath quite thrown down.    (3.4.56-8, 62-7)
Many readers are likely to pass over this speech, dismissing it as mere fancy 
contemplation for it cites events that failed to exist in the past. David M.
Bergeron, for example, observes that “This moment in the play does little to 
advance the narrative and derives from no hint in the sources" (2002, 49). This 
opinion exemplifies a common reaction to such passages in Shakespeare. 
However, the significance of this speech stretches far beyond the mere 
advancement of the narrative. By revisiting the recent past, the gardener 
constructs a counterfactual statement, exploring how the present might have 
been different had certain past events been undone. More importantly, he 
implies that the king could have avoided that fate had he acted differently. 
Observing the present status of the King, the gardener attributes it to nothing 
other than the king’s own actions. This rather rational attribution of causality in a 
play partly dominated by medieval values and expressions of Providentialism is 
quite remarkable. 
The significance of counterfactual statements like these in Shakespeare 
has so far attracted little critical attention. Partly due to their inherent limitation in 
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forming the actual story, critics usually pass them over in favour of actual events. 
Even when some scattered examples are tackled, they are not studied as part 
of a larger category of counter-to-fact statements that deserve attention as such. 
Yet, such neglect misses the intricate ontological and cognitive niceties that 
such uses usually imply. Moreover, this practice blinds us to the multiple 
dimensions of analysis that counterfactuals have invited in other disciplines like 
philosophy, psychology, history and the social sciences. 
This Chapter sets to examine such counterfactual statements in the 
Shakespeare canon. It argues that these counterfactual statements in 
Shakespearean drama work basically on virtual events and that they exhibit the 
two features of probability and potentiality which we considered essential 
elements of virtuality. Through the causal links they create, counterfactuals use
possible and virtual events in order to enhance the intelligibility of the actual 
events and probability of the action in the plays. On the other hand, it is only 
through probabilistic methods that we can establish what was and was not 
possible in a given situation. So they feature a reciprocal movement from the 
ontologically possible to the cognitively probable and vice versa.
Counterfactuals also exhibit the rich potential of virtual events, as they show the 
many layers of alternative possible realities latent beneath the actual event.
Counterfactuals in Shakespeare’s plays form a functional category which serves 
a variety of ends; it is also a multifaceted phenomenon which is manifested in 
mainly four dimensions: psychological, historical (or political), philosophical and 
literary. They show how characters respond emotionally to dramatic events, 
how they evaluate these events and attribute success or failures to actions and 
persons, based on the scope of the alternative possibilities they imagine for 
these events. Politically, they explain the basis on which characters cast blame 
in national misfortunes according to their imagined ideal political state of affairs, 
surveying their history for certain turning points before which things could have 
turned out differently. Philosophically, they demonstrate a tendency towards 
more rational causal thinking and away from providential accounts of historical 
events. On the literary dimension, they enhance the ontological and cognitive 
aspects of the fictional world, and demonstrate the viability of possible worlds 
approaches to the study of literary structure, and they serve to enhance the 
ontological and cognitive aspects of the fictional world. 
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In the light of the above, counterfactual statements share some features 
with the virtual events that we discussed in Chapter Two, which mostly consist 
of the characters’ intended plans and projected scenarios, and which either 
converge with or diverge from the actual course of events. There we stressed 
that these virtual events, although they may not be actualized during the course 
of the action, do still form an integral part of the plots of the plays. 
Counterfactual scenarios form one set of virtual events or unactualized 
possibilities in the course of action. But while some virtual events discussed so 
far are future-oriented (forming the characters’ prospective attitude about what 
will happen and what to do next), counterfactuals are past-oriented. Even when 
virtual events are about the past, they are used to re-construct the actual past.
With counterfactuals, however, the actual past is already known and we 
contemplate how it could have been different. So, whereas we have the ‘fact’ as 
a given in counterfactuals and so try to imagine a counterfact, in other types of 
the virtual event the fact itself is in question and not yet determined. Although 
these counterfactual scenarios diverge from what really happened, they are far 
from trivial. Throughout this chapter we will encounter more of the characteristic 
features of counterfactual statements in Shakespeare. 
Counterfactuals, Possibility and Causality
The main two aspects of counterfactual thinking are causality – the ability of 
counterfactual statements to imply causal judgement – and possibility, since 
they are choosing among inherently possible alternatives to any given event or 
action. Generally, a counterfactual is defined as a conditional statement with a 
false antecedent specifying a past event that did not take place (Roese and 
Olson 1995, 2). Counterfactuals have been attracting increasing attention in 
philosophy and other disciplines thanks to their methodological value as a tool 
for explaining causality. Causality and causal relations are among the basic 
conceptual tools that enable people to make sense of their world (Piaget 1974). 
Counterfactuals are not the only method whereby causation can be explained, 
for there are other methods to explain causality, chief among which are 
explanation by direct causes, explanation by covariational factors, and the 
covering law model, which we shall explain below soon.
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Counterfactuals are set apart from these other methods of causation in 
two important respects: their principle of explaining causality and the kind of 
causal explanation they yield. As far as the first point is concerned, 
counterfactuals are based on a special use of the possibility principle. Direct 
causal explanation is based on actuality, for it explains an event by only looking 
at what really happened (A, therefore B), while counterfactual reasoning 
explains an event by looking at what might possibly have happened if it were 
not for the existence of the cause in question (not B, therefore not A). "Whereas 
counterfactual reasoning is about possibility, causal reasoning is about reality" 
(Spellman, Kincannon and Stose 2005, 28). Causal explanation is reality-based. 
But both counterfactual and covariational explanations are possibility-based. 
Both counterfactual reasoning and covariational reasoning work on evoking 
possibilities. However, they differ in that the goal of the counterfactual is “finding 
ways to undo the outcome or something like it" while that of the covariational is 
that of "finding ways that would increase the probability of the outcome or 
something like it"(Mandel 2005, 23; emphasis in original). This entails another 
difference between the counterfactual and the covariational modes of reasoning: 
the former can only undo one factor at a time and so it attributes causality to 
one cause only, while the latter, also called contributing factor explanation, 
looks at the relative importance of different factors or causes. Consequently, 
while covariational reasoning works well with equifinality (the idea that the 
outcome can be brought about separately by many different causes), 
counterfactual reasoning does not (see Spellman, Kincannon and Stose 2005, 
28; Mandel 2005, 26; Goertz and Levy 2007, 13).
The second difference is related to whether the causes attributed through 
counterfactual reasoning are sufficient, necessary or both. Goertz and Levy 
(2007, 24) arrange these variables from the strongest to the weakest as (1) 
necessary and sufficient conditions, (2) sufficient conditions and (3) necessary 
conditions. It has been argued (Mandel 2005, 15) that one problem with 
counterfactual scenarios is that they invoke necessary causes while in everyday 
use causation tends to imply sufficient causes. However, in common sense 
uses as well as the way causality is attributed in literature, the differences 
between these modes are mostly blurred. As we will see later, Shakespeare’s 
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characters always imply both necessity and sufficiency in attributing causality, 
but necessity can be seen as more basic in these counterfactuals. 
Thinking about possibilities is the main characteristic of counterfactual 
reasoning. Although causal relations generally imply necessity, yet 
paradoxically the essence of counterfactual thinking is rooted in possibility and 
contingency (Hawthorn 1991, 13). So, although causality implies that when the 
cause exists the result should follow, counterfactuals argue about the cause 
itself that its existence was one possibility among many alternatives; one that 
could have been avoided and, when avoided, the result would not have 
happened either. This is why counterfactuals cannot be imagined without 
imagining possibilities. Our ability to think counterfactually is facilitated by our 
ability to imagine alternative possible scenarios that diverge from the actual. 
This is made clear by the psychological, historical and philosophical treatments
of counterfactuals. Psychologically speaking, "People imagine counterfactual 
alternatives by keeping possibilities in mind" (Walsh and Byrne 2005, 72). Byrne 
(2005, 115) distinguishes between direct causal reasoning and counterfactual 
reasoning on the basis of imagining possibilities: when people think causally 
they imagine only one possibility but when they think counterfactually they think 
in terms of two or more possibilities. That is why people tend to practice causal 
reasoning more frequently than they do counterfactual reasoning: "Inferences 
based on one possibility are easier than those based on multiple ones"(ibid., 23). 
Historically speaking, a counterfactual approach to the past legitimizes the 
existence of countless possibilities of the actual past. It is based on the inherent 
potentiality in human action to open up for countless alternatives. Human 
history has been no more than the collective of millions of human decisions, all 
of them contingent, all of them mutable. Consequently, “the past becomes 
present (or is renewed) as a function of the possibilities objectively implied in 
this past" (Scalmer 2006, 3; see also Cowley 2005, xvii). Philosophically 
speaking, traditional treatments of counterfactual conditionals in philosophy 
(Stalnaker 1968; Lewis 1973) have been based on the ‘possible worlds’ theories, 
and have endeavoured to account for counterfactuals in terms of possibility. 
However, ontological possibility is not an end in itself in counterfactual 
reasoning. Rather the ultimate aim behind constructing counterfactuals is 
cognitive: counterfactuals enhance causal reasoning and causality is one of the 
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basic principles whereby humans make sense of their world and how things 
tend to happen in it. Thus, it turns out that one way to understand and make 
sense of the actual events and their causes is through the possible. The 
possible is conceptually indispensable in our cognitive development and it is a 
skill that humans start to develop through imaginative work in the early stages 
of their childhood (Harris 2000). The utility of the possible in explaining the 
actual has been recognized in different disciplines. According to Robert Cowley, 
"There is no better way of understanding what did happen in history than to 
contemplate what very well might have happened" (2005, xvii). Since the 
possible, with its inherent potentiality, is an integral part of reality, then its 
recognition is a prerequisite for the understanding of that reality. Although the 
direct experimental methods are still profitably in use, investment in the possible 
can widen the range of our understanding of historical and social phenomena: 
“From the imaginary, unexploited traces of the actual might be discerned” 
(Scalmer 2006, 4). In the field of the social sciences, Max Weber made the 
resounding claim that "In order to penetrate the real causal interrelationships, 
we construct unreal ones"(1949, 185-6; emphasis added).
Counterfactual thinking, moreover, is a form of rational thinking. It is far 
from being mere fancy, based on playful flights of the imagination. Although it 
has been dismissed by many as such, its proponents have managed to set 
certain criteria for its rational orientation. Firstly, as Robert Cowley has put it, 
“Probability is the key” (2005, xvii). Counterfactual scenarios must be kept 
within the range of what is considered probable according to the standards of 
the field in question. This buttresses the dialectic between possibility and 
probability which we have emphasized throughout this thesis. That is why the 
counterfactuals constructed by historians are viewed as more probable since 
historians know more of the details and have enough experience of what could 
happen in any given situation (Scalmer 2006, 3). Another criterion is 
consistency with the agreed historical facts, for understanding and interpreting
these facts is the ultimate aim behind the construction of counterfactuals 
(Tetlock and Belkin 1996, 23). Consequently, some writers have suggested that 
counterfactual scenarios should differ as little as possible from the historical 
facts, calling this the ‘minimal re-write’ rule (for a list of these criteria see 
193
Scalmer 2006, 7). All these criteria are set in order to elevate counterfactual 
thought experiments into more valuable, reliable and sense-making experiences. 
Thus far we have remarked the main two sources for interest in 
counterfactuals as causality and possibility. This interest has ranged over many 
disciplines like philosophy, sociology, psychology, history and others. However, 
some of the philosophical nuances about causality surveyed above might not be 
readily applicable in Shakespeare, where a more flexible and common-sense 
meanings of that aspect might be applicable. The possibilistic aspect of 
counterfactuals has proved to be a liberating strategy for opening ever new 
horizons for human existence. Below we shall see how these aspects of 
counterfactuals are reflected in Shakespeare’s plays as well as the uses to 
which they are put.
Counterfactuality in Shakespeare’s Drama
Literary works before postmodernism occasionally have recourse to 
counterfactual statements in their attempts to illuminate some aspects of the 
actual course of events. Postmodern fiction, however, has gone farthest in that 
direction, creating whole counterfactual worlds. The investigation of 
counterfactuals in literature is underdeveloped, but thanks to some recent 
adventures in this domain, we have begun to develop a better idea of the 
significance of this device in literature (Dannenberg 2008; Dolezel 2010; Warbel 
2011; Widmann 2011). Most of these studies, though, take prose fiction as their 
starting point and rarely touch on drama. In this Chapter I shall discuss the 
counterfactual statements used in Shakespeare’s plays by looking at the 
various ways characters in Shakespeare’s plays think counterfactually. I
investigate the reasons why characters use counterfactuals and the overall 
significance of this use. Through the analysis of these counterfactual 
statements we will see how characters are using these essentially virtual 
scenarios to make sense of their lives and also how they use probabilistic 
methods to establish what they consider to have been possible in the first place. 
In this regard, we can primarily discern two kinds of counterfactual use in 
Shakespeare’s plays: figurative and literal. Then I shall single out the literal 
counterfactuals as the main subject of this Chapter and study them in the main 
194
four dimensions mentioned above: psychological, historical, philosophical and 
literary. 
Figurative counterfactuals are used non-seriously in order to approach 
reality figuratively – more specifically, they are always deployed to form 
hyperbolical statements about reality. They are not serious since their 
antecedents consist in physically impossible events. There are a few examples 
of this kind of counterfactuals scattered throughout the plays. For example, In 
King Lear, when Lear asks the blinded Gloucester whether he can mark the 
penning of the challenge, the latter painfully answers: “Were all thy letters suns, 
I could not see” (4.5.133). In Richard II, the Duchess of York is chiding her 
husband for betraying her son Aumerle’s treason to the king. York indignantly 
replies: “Were he twenty times my son, / I would appeach him” (5.2.101-2). At 
the climax of Othello’s suspicions about Desdemona’s relation to Cassio, she 
tells him of her worries about Cassio’s death, which invites Othello’s 
exasperated answer: “Had all his hairs been lives, my great revenge / Had 
stomach for ‘em all” (5.2.81-2). It is blindingly obvious that the letters turning 
into suns, York being twenty times Aumerle’s father and Casio’s hairs being 
lives are all impossible from the vantage point of the physical world. Some of 
them, like the last two examples, cannot even be imagined. 
This restriction of the possibility to even imagine the precedent serves to 
distinguish figurative from literal counterfactuals. Seelau et al would dismiss the 
above examples as a kind of fantasy, and they argue “that counterfactual 
thinking, unlike free-form fantasy, is strongly constrained by people’s knowledge 
of the laws that govern the world around them” (1995, 60). In other words, while 
counterfactuals are used by people to speculate about things that could have 
happened, this special kind is used to assume the existence of things that could 
not happen. In other words, they do not pose any alternatives to reality. From 
the literary point of view, however, they are far from being pointless, since they 
are all examples of figurative language mainly used here to make hyperboles. 
Byrne (2005) would otherwise include these examples under what she calls 
‘semifactuals’. Since literal or proper counterfactuals presuppose a result that is
mainly expressed in the consequent, that result is different from the actual one 
(hence the prefix ‘counter-‘).Semifactuals, on the other hand, assume the same 
consequent no matter what the antecedent is. Thus, semifactually used, these 
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figurative counterfactuals are partly deployed to point to an invariant outcome, 
and to deny causal relations between the antecedent and consequent. 
Causality, which is very crucial to any counterfactual thinking, is not implied in 
semifactuals.     
Literal counterfactuals, which will occupy our focus for the rest of this 
chapter, are used by characters to seriously speculate about the way things 
could have turned out differently. They are literal in the sense that their 
antecedents, though assumed to be counter to what has really happened, did 
have an opportunity to have happened. They express the limitless potentiality of 
things to develop into different paths. In other words, they were within the realm 
of the possible, and so they are seriously employed by characters to speculate 
about alternative paths the course of action could have taken but failed to do. 
They are put to uses that are directly relevant to these characters’ private and 
public lives. To account for its multi-faceted nature, we will address four 
dimensions of counterfactuality in Shakespeare: psychological, historical, 
philosophical and literary. 
The Psychological Dimension
The psychology and social psychology of counterfactual thinking has attracted 
increasing attention in the last decades (Roese and Olson 1995; Byrne 2005, 
Mandel, Hilton and Cattelani 2005). This research has resulted in many findings 
regarding the motivation to conduct counterfactual thinking, the different modes 
of that thinking, the laws that determine our counterfactuals and our emotional 
responses to these constructions. I shall show the relevance of some of these 
distinctions to Shakespeare’s use of counterfactuals. The characters’ use of 
counterfactuals always unveils their emotional states, especially their responses 
– positive or negative – to events and actions. It also betrays their urge to 
assess their achievement relative to their potentiality. It also reveals their 
ideological and emotional biases, as these responses are based on value 
judgements. 
One psychological distinction is between self-focused counterfactuals 
(undoing some actions or attributes of one’s self) and externally-focused 
counterfactuals (mutating aspects external to the self). “This pattern should be a 
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functional strategy because attributions to the self should promote feelings of 
control, whereas external attributions should not” (McMullen, Markman and 
Gavanski 1995, 150). Another crucial distinction is between upward and
downward counterfactuals. This depends on the kind of comparison made 
between the factual and counterfactual events: whether the counterfactual state
is imagined as either better (upward) or worse than the actual (downward), 
respectively. Each of these comparisons would generate a special type of 
emotion: regret or satisfaction, respectively:
Counterfactuals can take different forms, and these forms appear to have 
different emotional consequences. One type of counterfactual is called an 
upward comparison, and it involves a person considering how the outcome 
could have been better, for example, “If only I hadn’t taken a new route to 
the airport I wouldn’t have missed my plane.” This type of counterfactual 
consistently has been found to lead to increased feelings of regret after a 
negative event. Another type of counterfactual thinking entails a person 
replaying the event with a worse outcome or making a downward 
comparison. This type of counterfactual usually takes the form “At least,” or 
“It could have been worse,” and it may have more positive emotional 
consequences, such as feelings of relief. 
(Kasimatis and Wells 1995, 82-3; emphasis in original) 
These distinctions are of a great value in Shakespeare’s plays. In these 
plays, characters almost always employ upward counterfactuals, contemplating 
the ways things could have turned out better than they actually did. By 
generating this type of counterfactual comparison they always express deep 
regretful emotions in reaction to bad events that could have been avoided, but 
were not. As we have observed, characters measure their actual achievement 
against their potential, and respond accordingly. For example, a self-focused 
upward counterfactual is voiced by Cardinal Wolsey in King Henry VIII (All is 
True)after the wheel of Fortune has turned against him: “Had I but served my 
God with half the zeal/ I served my king, He would not in mine age / Have left 
me naked to mine enemies”(3.2.456-8). As a counterfactual, this statement 
consists in undoing a factual action (the long service Wolsey made to the king, 
to the exclusion of his religious duties) and contemplating what the result would 
have been (a better reward for the cardinal at the end of his life). His 
seriousness is anchored in the possibility of the mutated antecedent (that 
Wolsey had instead served his God zealously). An externally-focused upward 
counterfactual is mounted by John of Gaunt in Richard II. Irked with Richard’s 
public and private policies against his uncles, which consisted in the murder of 
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Gloucester and the destruction of Gaunt himself, John of Gaunt speculates in 
the presence of Richard about how this situation could have been avoided:
O, had thy grandsire with a prophet’s eye
Seen how his son’s son should destroy his sons,
From forth thy reach he would have laid thy shame,
Deposing thee before thou wert possessed,    (2.1.104-7)
The external focus of this counterfactual statement is indicated by the absence 
of any first-person pronouns from its antecedent and consequent. Here Gaunt is 
contemplating what some other person, namely his father Edward III, prophet-
like, could have done to eschew these devastating effects that resulted from 
Richard becoming king. The causal relation in this counterfactual is both explicit 
and implicit: explicit in attributing the destruction of Edward’s sons to Richard 
(how his son’s son should destroy his sons) and implicit (attributing the 
accession of Richard II to the short-sightedness of Edward III and his failure to 
recognize Richard’s destructive potential). However, the context privileges only 
the first explicit causality and no blame is directly mounted against Edward III. 
“Gaunt is here clear that the country he loves, the England that is like a moated 
manor house, has been destroyed by Richard” (Nuttall 2009, 187).1
Downward counterfactuals, which set a state of affairs worse than the 
actual one, are very rare in Shakespeare. In 1 Henry VI, immediately after the 
French discovered the dead Talbot, they contemplate his courage. Charles 
makes a very significant remark: “Had York and Somerset brought rescue in, / 
We should have found a bloody day of this” (4.7.33-4). On the one hand, this 
expresses a French modesty in front of Talbot’s colossal power, based on their 
recognition of Talbot’s full potential as winner of battles. On the other hand, 
there is a causal relation implied by the counterfactual statement: the reason 
behind Talbot’s defeat is not the French prowess, but the irresponsible acts and 
negligence of the English lords, York and Somerset, who refrained from sending 
support to Talbot. Even if by ‘bloody day’ Charles does not imply a wholesale 
defeat, it still suggests that, if rescue came in, the French victory would not have 
been so easily won. Whatever the reason, however, this statement marks a 
feeling of relief and satisfaction that events could have turned out worse than 
they did. 
The paucity of downward counterfactuals in Shakespeare goes in line with 
the findings of psychological research. Psychologists state that people tend to 
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imagine outcomes that are better than the real ones, and negative outcomes 
are found to constitute the main impulse to constructing counterfactuals (Olson, 
Roese and Deibert 1996, 297). Psychologists have attempted to give some 
explanation to this tendency. Mandel (2005, 20), for example, holds that 
counterfactuals usually concentrate on prevention strategies and so focus on 
human error, the result being the generation of more upward counterfactuals 
than downward ones. Imagining a better state is more favourable than 
imagining a worse one. "We are happy to imagine a better world, but less 
enthused by its deterioration" (Scalmer 2006, 6). It seems that people are more 
concerned about the failure to fulfil one’s potential and their lost opportunities 
than about priding one’s self with thee achievements. Moreover, it has been 
shown that upward counterfactuals enhance learning opportunities for those 
who construct them, while downward counterfactuals always function as a 
‘wake-up’ alarm (Segura and Morris 2005). Psychologists differ as to whether 
the regret which results from an upward counterfactual is more commonly 
associated with past actions (Byrne 2005, 44) or with past inaction (Mandel, 
Hilton and Catellani 2005, 6). As shown from the above examples and the ones 
below, Shakespeare’s characters tend to feel regret more for inactions than for 
actions. This is especially clear from the Richard II examples and those from
Henry VI to be detailed below. As far as the pedagogical value of 
counterfactuals is concerned, it is mainly at work with self-focused
counterfactuals, when characters are contemplating their own actions and 
inactions. However, most examples so far and below show that they are 
externally-focused in the sense that characters tend to contemplate the actions 
and inactions of other characters. One pedagogically functional counterfactual 
is that of cardinal Wolsey in Henry VIII mentioned above. 
It is to be noted, however, that the registers of ‘better’ and ‘worse’ 
employed in counterfactual comparisons are perspectival, in the sense that 
what some characters may consider good, another may regard as bad. Thus, 
characters structure their counterfactuals according to their subjective and 
prejudiced value systems. In As You Like It, when Orlando defeats Charles in 
boxing, Duke Fredrick is first pleased by the achievement of this young man, 
whom he does not know. But once Orlando tells him of his descent, that he is 
the son of Sir Rowland de Boys, Fredrick gets exasperated:
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I would thou hadst been son to some man else.
The world esteemed thy father honourable,
But I did find him still mine enemy.
Thou shouldst have better pleased me with this deed
Hadst thou descended from another house.
But fare thee well, thou art a gallant youth.
I would thou hadst told me of another father.    (1.2.190-6; emphasis added)
The counterfactual antecedent, “Hadst thou descended from another house,” is 
definitely biased since Fredrick himself admits that this is one of the best 
houses in his dukedom: “The world esteemed thy father honourable,” and so his 
judgement is singled as abnormal since it is contrary to what the whole ‘world’ 
would consider otherwise. Orlando already possesses the honourable potential, 
regardless of whether Ferdinand is pleased or not. Fredrick’s forming of this 
counterfactual as an upward one shows his personal prejudice against Orlando.
Sometimes, the value-judgement that is integral to downward and upward 
counterfactuals is blurred or overshadowed on behalf of other functions for 
these statements. For example, in Hamlet, when Gertrude tells Claudius of 
Hamlet’s killing of Polonius, Claudius exclaims: “O heavy deed!/It had been so 
with us had we been there” (4.1.12-3). Claudius is contemplating a 
counterfactual state of affairs in which he himself, instead of Polonius, was 
hiding behind the curtain. The consequent is that he would have been killed, 
just as Polonius was. However, the kind of value-laden comparison in this 
counterfactual (if Claudius is making such a comparison at all!) is ambiguous. 
From the rest of his speech it is made clear that Claudius is not making a point 
of his luck at not being there, nor is he comparing himself to or considering his 
fortune better than the unlucky Polonius. Rather he is making a point about 
Hamlet; Claudius claims that he recognizes a murderous potential in Hamlet 
that can infect almost everybody: “His liberty is full of threats to all– / To you 
yourself, to us, to everyone” (4.1.13-14). This is more like a semifactual and his 
point is something like: “Whoever was there, Hamlet would have killed him or 
her.” 
At other times, this value-judgement is completely silenced and left to the 
spectator to make. One example of the vagueness of the value judgement of 
counterfactuals is the surveyor’s narration of the disloyalty of the Duke of 
Buckingham to the king in Henry VIII. The surveyor narrates a counterfactual 
statement that Buckingham is said to have uttered: “That had the king in his last 
sickness failed, / The Cardinal’s and Sir Thomas Lovell’s heads / Should have 
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gone off” (1.2.185-7). The ambiguity of whether the comparison is upward or 
downward stems from the fact that it is (reported as) Buckingham’s speech 
narrated by the surveyor in the presence of the king and the cardinal. From 
Buckingham’s point of view, it is an upward counterfactual, improving on the 
factual state; but from the point of view of the king and the cardinal (and the 
surveyor), it is a downward counterfactual, worsening the actual state of affairs. 
And the question of which comparison is being made is left to the spectator to 
determine. This prejudiced and even ambiguous use of counterfactuals refers 
us to a main point: as fact and factual statement are liable to ideological 
manipulations, so are counterfactuals. And as a fact is only a perspective, so is 
the counterfact. This also points to the potentialist aspects of reality and its 
susceptibility to contrasting interpretations and manipulations. This use of 
counterfactuals is also enabled by the fact that the effect of a counterfactual is 
listener-specific because “the very same counterfactual can engender 
dramatically different affective reactions” (Markman and McMullen 2005, 77).
Another distinction has been drawn between behavioural and 
characterological counterfactuals. In the former, the changes in the antecedent 
are related to the actions and doings of a character, but in the latter they 
concern his/her personality traits (Dannenberg, 2008, 120). However, as the 
discussion so far about Shakespeare’s counterfactuals has shown, the 
borderline between these two areas – actions and personality – are always 
blurred. In the counterfactuals mentioned above, it is not clear whether the
blame is cast on the personality of the target character or on some specific 
actions he/she did, and it is not clear in the first place whether personality traits 
and actions can be profitably separated in Shakespeare.
These examples have shown how counterfactuals, although they are 
imaginary scenarios, can shed light on how characters are thinking, on how 
they assess the results of their and others’ actions and how they respond to 
these outcomes. Characters use these purely possible events in order better to 
appreciate the significance of the actual actions they went through. They also 
determine their response – positive or negative – as well as their stance 
towards and evaluation of the actions of other characters. In the next sections 
more examples will be given which also attest to the crucial psychological 
revelations that counterfactuals can afford. 
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The Historical Dimension
The second dimension of counterfactual thinking in Shakespeare’s plays is the 
historical dimension, and it has to do mainly with the use of counterfactuals in 
contexts of political factionalism and dissent. Counterfactuals used to 
contemplate turning points and historical events always serve political ends. 
Counterfactuals are heavily used in discussions about history and historical 
events. For example, it is an observed fact that military history is one of the 
most fertile areas of investigation of counterfactuals in general and 
counterfactual history in particular (Cowley 2005, xvi; Scalmer 2006, 7).Like 
individuals, nations are also concerned of measuring their actual achievements 
against their potential capabilities. Here we are mainly dealing with 
Shakespeare’s history plays, where characters make use of counterfactuals to 
assign causes of political events to certain figures. This is mostly used to lay 
blame on certain leading figures, attributing to them the causes of national and 
military failures. This use also betrays the ideological biases and prejudice 
based on political positioning of different users of counterfactuals. Below I shall
trace the development of the use of counterfactual in historical analysis and 
then turn to look into this phenomenon in Shakespeare’s plays. 
Generally, there are two main genres which explore counterfactual 
scenarios in history: counterfactual history and counterfactual historical fiction. 
Counterfactual history is a mode of historical writing which explores not the 
actual past but the potential courses which history could have taken had certain 
turning points been mutated. It is a revisionist effort to examine alternative 
possibilities in historical situations. Historians have tried to speculate about what 
the history of the West would be if certain crucial moments in its history were 
undone. Attempts have been made, for example, to speculate how the West 
would have been had the Persians won the battle at Salamis, had Jesus never 
been crucified, had England remained a Catholic country, and had the history of 
technology been different (Telock, Lebow and Parker 2006). In an earlier 
collection of essays of the same genre, contributors have speculated about 
what might have happened had Hitler won World War II, had Charles I avoided 
the English civil war, and so on. (Ferguson 1997). 2 The second genre is 
counterfactual fiction which has thrived especially in the postmodern era. 
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Fictions depicting counterfactual histories began to appear in the nineteenth 
century, such as Nathaniel Hawthorne’s “P.’s Correspondence” (1845) or
Edward Everett Hale’s “Hands Off” (1881). However, it was never established 
as a separate genre until the mid-twentieth century (Dannenberg 2008, 205; 
Dolezel 2010, 105). Famous texts include Ward Moore’s Bring the Jubilee
(1953), Philip K. Dick’s Man in the High Castle (1962), Kingsley Amis’s The 
Alteration (1976), Robert Harris’s Fatherland (1992), John Whitbourn’s A 
Dangerous Energy (1993). It is interesting that the turning points that are made 
the focus in both genres are relatively similar: the English Reformation, World 
War II, the American civil war, and so on. 
Counterfactual history and the fiction of counterfactual or alternate history 
belong to two different disciplines: history and fiction, respectively. However, 
they are so affiliated that many would consider them one and the same thing. 
This is due to the fact that counterfactual history has not yet established itself as 
a respectable branch of historical scholarship; many professional and academic 
historians have shown scepticism and hostility toward counterfactual history, 
which to them is no more than an imaginative game. Int heir view, 
counterfactual questions are simply not worth asking. Counterfactual history is 
more welcome among literary critics and fiction writers than it is among 
historians (Ferguson 1997, 8). Lubomir Dolezel investigates the ontological and 
linguistic status of counterfactual history, as falling midway between history and 
fiction. As far as the ontological status of counterfactual history is concerned, 
Dolezel states that “All worlds of counterfactual history, whether conducted by 
historians or by fiction makers, whether their function is cognitive or aesthetic, 
are semantically fictional” (2010, 122; emphasis in original). Accordingly, the 
linguistic status of counterfactual statements is similar to that of fictional 
statements in general. More specifically, instances of counterfactual arguments 
in these two genres have been found analogous to experiments in science 
fiction and Hollywood film, which “are not academically respectable” (Ferguson 
1997, 3). However, at least two differences can be discerned between science 
fiction and counterfactual fiction. The first has to do with the relative distance 
from the actual world: counterfactual fiction takes the actual world as its starting 
point and so refers to many actual events, but science fiction departs largely 
from it. The second is that science fiction usually reconfigures the future while 
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fiction of counterfactual history revisits the past in order to modify it and ends up 
with a different present (see Dolezel 2010, 106-7).
It must have been clear, from the examples of counterfactual statements 
in Shakespeare cited so far, that most of these statements are taken from the 
History plays in comparison to the comedies and even tragedies. And as 
Shakespeare’s histories are mainly dealing with hectic periods with the Wars of 
the Roses lasting very long, then they are unsurprisingly a fertile ground for the 
use of counterfactuals.  If we combine this with the fact that in the Renaissance, 
history was almost inseparable from politics (Hattaway 2002, 15), we achieve 
insight into the political significance of counterfactuals. So, our exploration of 
the political dimension of counterfactuals in Shakespeare will be devoted to the 
history plays. However, in no sense can Shakespeare’s plays be considered as 
counterfactual historical fictions, since they do not construct a counterfactual 
historical reality that ‘differs substantially from the actual state of affairs’. Rather, 
they employ some scattered instances of counterfactual thinking conducted by 
characters to serve certain functions to be specified later in more detail. 
Examples of counterfactual thinking, however, are not distributed equally 
over Shakespeare’s histories: they abound in some plays and are relatively rare 
in others. Generally, this can be attributed to the idea (or fact), often cited as an 
accusation against the use of counterfactual historical thinking: that 
counterfactual thinking is more common in certain nations at certain times than 
others. More specifically, counterfactual history is more prevalent with 
unfortunate groups who happen to lose in the incessant conflict of history. (In 
King Lear, for example, counterfactuals are made by Lear, Kent, Fool, and 
rarely by any of the other camp.) According to Edward Hallet Carr, one of the 
fiercest opponents to counterfactual history, it is a game for the losers: in 
unfortunate groups, “theories that stress the role of chance or accident in history 
will be found to prevail” (quoted in Ferguson 1997, 5). Accordingly, history is for 
the winners, but counterfactual history (if history it can be called) is for the 
losers. These unfortunate groups will thus insist that their identity is constituted 
by their potential capability as by their actual achievements. Interestingly, 
counterfactual thinking is more frequently conducted in Shakespeare’s three
Henry VI plays and Richard II than in any other history play. In the light of the 
above argument, this may be explained by the fact that these plays, more than 
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other histories, depict the plight of a nation torn with civil-war in all its misery 
and wretchedness. And it is in these plays that monarchs get deposed and then 
killed. Nor is it surprising that most of the counterfactuals used in these plays 
are upward ones, betraying the characters’ aspiration to get away from or to do 
better in their conflict-ridden situation. Downward counterfactuals are 
exceptionally rare, and are only used by the winners, as in the example of 
Charles in 1 Henry VI cited above. 
The utility of using counterfactuals in discussions about history lies in their 
capacity to explain causation. Specifically, proponents of counterfactual history 
have adhered to its inevitability in ascribing causal relations in any historical 
survey, and accordingly, of doing counterfactual historical thinking. According to 
Tetlock and Parker, “(L)ike it or not, we are all counterfactual historians. There 
is absolutely no logical way to make causal inferences without simultaneously 
making assumptions about how events would have unfolded if the causal 
factors we consider crucial had taken on different forms” (2006,15). In what 
follows we will see how characters make use of counterfactual thought 
experiments in order to explore the potential of different players and to attribute 
causes to certain events, which enables them to cast blame on certain 
characters rather than others. 
In Shakespeare’s history plays, characters often have recourse to 
counterfactuals to determine causal relations. For example, in his narration of 
how Talbot was captured by the French, the messenger in 1 Henry VI tells the 
English lords: “Here had the conquest fully been sealed up,/ If Sir John Fastolf 
had not played the coward” (1.1.130-1). The messenger is here implying that, 
all other factors apart, the main cause behind the English loss of this battle is 
the treason committed by Sir John Fastolf due to his cowardice. 3 The 
counterfactual is also making a point about Talbot and the English army: 
despite its loss, the messenger points to the potential heroism of the English 
army, in the sense that their defeat is, at its worst, a mere contingency.  The 
counterfactual, then, sheds light on how certain characters explain given events 
and actions. On the French side, while later in that play the French are 
discussing their defeat and loss of Orleans to Talbot, Charles accuses Joan of 
causing this defeat, which invites her rational reasoning: “Or will you blame and 
lay the fault on me?– / Improvident soldiers, had your watch been good, / This 
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sudden mischief never could have fall’n” (2.1.58-60). Charles then accuses 
Alencon, and so the latter makes a similar answer: “Had all your quarters been 
as safely kept/As that whereof I had the government, / We had not been thus 
shamefully surprised” (64-6). Both Joan and Alencon are using counterfactuals 
to identify the real cause behind the French defeat. Joan attributes it to the 
soldiers not being good, and Alencon to the other quarters not being safely 
guarded as his quarter was. It should be noticed, moreover, that all these are 
upward counterfactuals voiced by the losers on the field of history. The only 
downward, modest counterfactual is the one cited above of Charles referring to 
the dead Talbot: “Had York and Somerset brought rescue in,/We should have 
found a bloody day of this” (4.7.33-4). 
Military action outside the histories is also a fertile ground for the 
generation of counterfactual statements. In Antony and Cleopatra, after the 
battle of Actium Camidius appears to lay the blame of the defeat on his general 
Mark Antony: “Had our general / Been what he knew himself, it had gone well" 
(3.10.25-6). The significance of this counterfactual is its scope since it casts all 
the blame on the one factor of Antony’s fluctuating character – that under 
Cleopatra’s spell, he had not been what he knew himself. (Ironically, Camidius 
is giving voice to the ‘Cleopatra’s nose’ theory later formulated by Blaise Pascal.) 
At the same time, however, the counterfactual refers to the military potential of 
Antony which is shrouded by his affection for Cleopatra. Later when Antony’s 
army makes a temporary victory, Scarus revisits the first battle, but this time 
distributing the blame, making all the army, not Antony alone, have their share 
of it: “Had we done so at first, we had droven them home / With clouts about 
their heads”(4.8.1-3)4.  
However, not all counterfactuals are as direct as the messenger’s 
statement. In the example cited above of John of Gaunt’s chiding of Richard II, 
the causal relation is explicitly stated: (how his son’s son should destroy his 
sons). But the brunt of the blame in the counterfactual statement (Had thy 
grandsire) cannot be ascribed to Edward III, given the shiny image constructed 
to him throughout the play, and so all the blame returns to be dropped on 
Richard himself. A clearer instance of how characters conceive of the events 
going on around them and how they ascribe responsibility to different agents is 
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given also in Richard II, in the speech of the gardener (cited at the beginning of 
this Chapter):
                                                      O, what pity is it
That he had not so trimmed and dressed his land
As we this garden! We at time of year
Do wound the bark, the skin of our fruit trees,
Lest, being over-proud in sap and blood,
With too much riches it confound itself.
Had he done so to great and growing men,
They might have lived to bear, and he to taste,
Their fruits of duty. Superfluous branches
We lop away, that bearing boughs may live.
Had he done so, himself had borne the crown,
Which waste of idle hours hath quite thrown down.    (3.4.56-67; emphasis added)
The gardener ascribes the decline of Richard to his own action; the 
counterfactuals in these lines imply that Richard’s policies are both a sufficient 
and necessary cause for his downfall. He fell down because he did not oppress 
the power of growing men.5  Although he is speaking retrospectively, the scene 
shows that “The gardener is a better judge of men than Richard is” (Bach 2003, 
239). And in the contexts of the counterfactuals of both Gaunt and the gardener, 
the misfortunes of England are equally ascribed to the king himself, which is 
voiced by the many epithets given to England in both speeches; Gaunt is just 
speaking of it as: “This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England, / This 
nurse, this teeming womb of royal kings,”(2.1.50-1) and the gardener and his 
men are also discussing the wretched conditions of “our sea-walled garden, the 
whole land” (3.4.44).6
From the political point of view, the last two examples from Richard II are 
significant since they cast the blame of political degeneration on the head of the 
state, the king himself. However, they differ regarding the point at which they 
think the course of action could still have been changed. This difference is due 
to the different perspectives of the two characters in placing the turning points, 
which can be defined as “those decision nodes where it would have been 
relatively easy to move onto a different path" and after which that movement 
becomes increasingly difficult (Goertz and Levy 2007, 29). While Gaunt speaks 
about the turning point as that of the very crowning of Richard, the gardener 
considers it to be the moment where Richard began to let other lords get 
stronger than himself. These political overtones might have had certain 
implications for the original audience of Richard II with regard to the figure of
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Elizabeth I. These implications, and the partial censorship they ensued, partly 
explain the force of the political import of counterfactuals. 
By the same token, it is interesting that counterfactuals about the king 
himself in the Henry VI plays are delayed to the third part, when civil dissention 
begins to seem inevitable. At the beginning of 3 Henry VI, the king is shocked 
by seeing York assuming his place, but he is still asking Westmoreland to be 
patient. Henry’s behaviour sparks the harsh reproach from Clifford: “Patience is 
for poltroons, such as he [indicating YORK]. / He durst not sit there had your 
father lived” (1.1.62-3). This speech is both an encomium for Henry V (which is 
a general motif in the three parts of Henry VI) and a reproach for Henry VI. 
According to Clifford, the deterioration of the state, which culminates in York 
assuming the position of the king, is attributable to Henry’s character alone: only 
Henry is to be blamed for this situation. York did not dare to do that if Henry V 
ruled, but he dares do it since it is now Henry VI who is ruling. At the same time, 
it points to the rebellious potential in York, which only needed an opportunity to 
be realized. It is interesting that it is again Clifford, now lethally wounded in the 
battle of Towton, who makes a similar counterfactual in his last soliloquy:
And, Henry, hadst thou swayed as kings should do,
Or as thy father and his father did,
Giving no ground unto the house of York,
They never then had sprung like summer flies;
I and ten thousand in this luckless realm
Had left no mourning widows for our death;
And thou this day hadst kept thy chair in peace.   (2.6.14-20)
As this extended counterfactual statement would imply, the ascendance of the 
house of York, the killing of men and the widowing of women as well as the 
king’s dethronement could all have been avoided if Henry behaved as a king. 
Consequently, he is the cause behind all these plights that befall his nation. 
One of Henry’s most loyal supporters, Clifford here is bitterly ascribing his own 
plight and that of the whole nation to Henry VI. Although that plight has been 
caused by the House of York, yet the causational agency attributed to Henry is 
preventive: it means that no matter how vicious the Yorkists are, they could 
have been prevented as was done by Henry IV and Henry V. What Clifford’s 
counterfactuals then imply is that "Shakespeare himself was keenly aware of 
the fact that the War of the Roses could have been averted had it not been for 
the King's incompetence" (Parvini 2012, 110). 
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Clifford’s point is later made by Queen Margaret as she listens to her son’s 
scolding Richard of Gloucester, ordering him to speak as a subject does to his 
master. Sparked by Prince Edward’s speech, Margaret and Gloucester make 
this shared counterfactual:
QUEEN MARGARET.  Ah, that thy father had been so resolved.
GLOUCESTER.  That you might still have worn the petticoat
And ne’er have stolen the breech from Lancaster.    (5.5.22-4)
Margaret is also here ascribing the wretchedness of her situation to Henry’s 
lack of resolve. Ironically, while Clifford wished that Henry had acted like his 
father and grandfather, Margaret wishes that he had acted like his own son. 
Both Clifford and Margaret cast the blame on Henry himself. The last example 
can also be read as two counterfactuals which share the antecedent but diverge
in the consequent. The antecedent is expressed in Margaret’s statement, but 
she did not complete the counterfactual since Richard of Gloucester interrupts 
her and suggests another consequent. According to Margaret’s counterfactual, 
if Henry was so resolved, the Yorkist rebellion would now have been crushed. 
But according to Richard’s counterfactual, if Henry was so resolved, Margaret
would have had little influence on Henry who would have accepted to hand 
kingship over to the Yorkists after his death. In both scenarios, the civil dissent 
would have been avoided although with different gains for the Houses of York 
and Lancaster. 
In these counterfactual statements the nuances of causal attribution are 
very informative in terms of both who is being blamed for what. As far as the 
former is concerned, the blame is mainly cast on the monarch himself, as with 
Richard II and Henry VI. However, in the Henry VI plays, sometimes the blame 
is also shared by Margaret. This seems to be the attitude of York’s sons when 
they meet the King, the Queen and others before York in 3 Henry VI. As in his 
previous counterfactual, Richard of Gloucester says that the house of York 
would not have revolted were it not for Margaret dominating the King and ruling
instead of him: “Hadst thou been meek, our title still have slept, / And we, in pity 
of the gentle King, / Had slipped our claim until another age”(2.2.160-2). It is not, 
of course, completely clear that Richard is honest about ‘slipping their claim’ 
and letting Henry rule peacefully if it were not for Margaret to interfere. On 
another occasion, Edward makes the same point, though more equivocally. 
Reproaching Margaret, he pins the blame on Henry’s marriage of her: “And had 
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he matched according to his state, / He might have kept that glory to this day” 
(2.2.152-3). In this speech it is not clear whether he is blaming Margaret or 
Henry’s decision or that the blame is joint between them. Together with Richard 
of Gloucester’s counterfactual above, we can discern a general tendency by the 
Yorkists to direct the blame to Margaret than to King Henry VI himself.  As for 
what is being blamed, it is difficult to determine in these examples whether 
these are behavioural or characterological counterfactuals, whether the 
personality of the king or some of his actions (or inactions) are the real reason 
behind these miseries. Needless to say, these counterfactuals about Henry are 
more about inaction than about action: Henry here is being blamed for not 
having acted the way he should or not having acted at all to prevent these 
miseries.
The advantages of the use of counterfactual historical reasoning 
notwithstanding, it can also be subject to serious abuse. Counterfactual 
arguments run the risk of being ideologically biased and self-serving. For, 
among these limitless possibilities, the counterfactualizing agent may choose to 
stress only those that promote his or her claims, no matter how solid they are:
“counterfactual arguments . . . often march in lockstep with the ideological 
agenda of the investigator” (Tetlock and Parker 2006, 31). In sum, 
counterfactuals may carry not only the rational reasoning of the investigator, but 
also his or her biases, prejudices and self-interests. 
As examples of ideologically-biased counterfactuals we can look into the 
beginning of 1Henry VI where, lamenting the death of Henry V, Gloucester 
implicitly mounts a hostile remark against the Bishop of Winchester: “Had not 
churchmen prayed, / His thread of life had not so soon decayed”(1.1.33-4). 
Gloucester’s remark is paradoxical since he ascribes to the Churchmen devilish 
and godly features: devilish, since their prayers caused the death of this great 
king; and godly since their prayers are so immediately heard in Heaven as to 
cause the death of Henry V (Heims 2010, 97). Anyway, what the statement 
means is that the main cause behind the death of the king was the Churchmen. 
The absurdity of this counterfactual is that there is no way to test its validity. The 
only function it serves is to express Gloucester’s prejudice against Winchester, 
due to their cut-throat competition over the control on the young king, and so 
the phrase is not intended by Shakespeare to be taken at all seriously. It might 
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have a direct meaning if we (following the editors of the Norton Shakespeare) 
understand it as a pun on ‘prey’, which implies that Winchester really conspired 
against the dead King. Another self-serving counterfactual in 2 Henry VI is 
made by Somerset and Queen Margaret against York. Hearing the news of the 
Irish rebellion, York suggests that a lord other than Somerset be sent there to 
put it down. This invites a counterfactually oriented reply from Somerset and 
Queen Margaret:
YORK.  That Somerset be sent as regent thither.
’Tis meet that lucky ruler be employed–
Witness the fortune he hath had in France.
SOMERSET. If York, with all his far-fet policy,
Had been the regent there instead of me,
He never would have stayed in France so long. 
                           .  .  .  .  .  .  .
QUEEN MARGARET. Thy fortune, York, hadst thou been regent there,
Might happily have proved far worse than his.  (3.1.290-5, 305-6)
In order to refute York’s disparaging statement about Somerset, Somerset and 
the Queen, politically camped together against York, form downward 
counterfactuals to imply that things could have turned out worse than they did. 
Downward counterfactuals, as we have shown above, are used by the lucky 
and victorious camp. The implication made here by Somerset and Margaret is 
significant: although Somerset’s fortunes in France may be bad, still they are 
not the worst there is. The worst could still have happened had York been there. 
So York’s disapproval of Somerset has been turned against York himself, and 
accordingly what Somerset did is now considered good – and even victorious -
in comparison to what York might have done had he been in France instead. 
Consequently, thanks to these counterfactuals, Somerset’s defeat can be 
viewed as victory. The political prejudice latent in this counterfactual is very 
evident: how could York have done worse than losing the French cities? York, 
on the other hand, is very aware of this self-serving quality of these 
counterfactuals, which is why he immediately and forcibly answers:
York.  What, worse than nought? Nay, then, a shame take all!     (307)
It seems that Margaret is well-versed in using baseless, self-serving 
counterfactuals. When the king is told that the rebels, led by Jack Cade, are 
now in Southwark and that Cade intends to crown himself in Westminster, 
Buckingham advises the king to fly away. Margaret’s response to this situation 
is remarkable:
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QUEEN MARGARET.  Ah, were the Duke of Suffolk now alive
These Kentish rebels would be soon appeased!                         (4.4.40-1)
This partly decontextualized statement betrays a psychological, rather than a 
logical and practical need for Margaret. Desperately injured by Suffolk’s death, 
Margaret cannot help contemplate, albeit in vain, what the dead Suffolk, whose 
affection she frivolously gained, could have done had he been still alive. The 
way she forms it, as an upward counterfactual, is also ideologically informed, 
since this way she wants to prove, at least to herself, that with the presence of 
Suffolk things would be better than they are now without him. Better, that is, 
even to the king himself and to the state. The counterfactual, moreover, implies 
a potential which Suffolk possesses to prevent and crush any rebellion. The 
egocentric quality of Margaret’s counterfactual statement is further stressed by 
the fact that it does not evoke any response whatsoever and passes completely 
unnoticed by the king and the attending lords. After all, the Duke of Suffolk is 
known less for his valour than for his financial corruption. 7 All this proves how 
personal interests, political ideology and other factors will orient which
counterfactuals we consider plausible and which are not.
Brian Walsh has rightly observed regarding 1 Henry VI  that "The play’s 
idea of causation is in fact rooted largely in factionalism” (2004, 135). This is 
especially true with the attribution of causality through counterfactuals in the 
Henry VI plays. As factionalism is one of the central themes in the whole history 
cycles, we come to better appreciate the role of causation in these plays. And 
as counterfactuals were the main causational method, it should be now become 
clear how vital counterfactuals are in these plays. The psychological and 
political dimensions of counterfactuals are hardly separable. The political uses 
of counterfactuals also afford profound insights into the psychology of 
characters through scrutinizing the choices they have made. The sense of 
regret that characters voice in these instances betrays their intolerance of the 
faulty choices that have been made and show how gloomy the world seems to 
them, triggering these counterfactualizing faculties. In the last part of this 
Chapter, we will discuss the literary significance of these uses. Here suffice it to 
say that these counterfactuals enhance the coherence of the literary worlds of 
these texts. Even the self-serving, ideologically-informed counterfactuals, to 
which reference has already been made, do serve to illuminate the personality 
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of the characters who construct them, betraying their crises, pitfalls, and 
concerns. 
The Philosophical Dimension
The third dimension in the study of counterfactuals has to do with their 
philosophical value. The counterfactuals in Shakespeare’s plays enhance the 
sense of the rational attribution of causality and insistence on human agency 
and free will. The sheer sense of inherent possibility in counterfactuals 
highlights the multiple choices and the alternatives available in every juncture of 
events. This, in turn, shatters the sense of determinism and its implication of the 
only one route that events should have taken. Providential claims as well as 
prophecies are often discredited in Shakespeare and contradicted by the real 
actions of the plays. In discrediting the providential logic, Shakespeare has 
contributed to the new spirit emerging in his time towards more rational 
explanations of causality in historical and human happenings in general. 
Philosophically speaking, to conduct counterfactual thinking is, in one way, 
to grant the contingency of history and to refuse the deterministic views of 
history according to which there is only one way the course of history should 
move, and in no way can that course by changed. According to David Lewis, in 
a world where deterministic laws prevail, it needs a miracle to think in a 
counterfactual way (1973, 75). It is interesting that many historians who attack
counterfactual history have a deterministic view of historical necessity. One 
such harsh attack on historical counterfactuals is mounted by Benedetto Croce: 
“Historical necessity has to be affirmed and continually reaffirmed in order to 
exclude from history the ‘conditional’ which has no rightful place there . . . What 
is forbidden is. . . the anti-historical and illogical ‘if’” (quoted in Ferguson 1997, 
6). Ferguson discerns three different modes of deterministic thinking, religious, 
materialist and idealist, which differ in their explanation of the origin of 
determinism. However, “All three schools of thought regard ‘what if’ questions 
as fundamentally inadmissible” (ibid.,5).
Thus, according to this survey, counterfactuality and determinism are 
irreconcilable. Proponents of this view of the contingency of human history 
would hold that “counterfactual thinking provides strong arguments against 
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historical determinism.” (Dolezel 2010,118).  However, some scholars think that 
the counterfactual and the deterministic modes of thinking are to some extent 
reconcilable in theory and practice. Tetlock and Parker think that even 
deterministically oriented historians “often invoke ‘revisionary’ counterfactuals 
that attenuate rather than amplify deviations from reality.” To these historians 
even in counterfactual situations “history would have been but briefly detailed 
and quickly put back on track by the intercession by equilibrium-restoring causal 
forces” (2006, 19).
In early modern England, deterministic thinking was mainly spelled out 
through Providential arguments that tended to ascribe important historical 
events to divine intervention. It is still a matter of much debate regarding the 
extent to which Providential views of history were dominant at that period. It has 
been pointed out that the Providential bent of the Middle Ages was losing its 
grip on the thinking of the period on behalf of modern ideas of history 
popularized through the works of Niccolò Machiavelli amongst others. Phyllis 
Rackin (1991) shows that the medieval Providential historical view was giving 
way to the Machiavellian historical methods which advanced a more realistic, 
cause-and-effect based interpretation of historical events in a world where the 
hand of God is either absent or invisible. This paved the way to the emergence 
of the modern view of the historical event in which contingency is an integral 
component. According to Paul Ricoeur’s definition, "An event is what could have 
been done differently" (1984, 97). I shall not go full length into these debates 
here, but will contend that the frequent use of counterfactuals at that period by 
historians shows a growing conviction of a causal rather than a Providential 
interpretation of events. They might tend at times to adopt a providential 
explanation of some events, but for the most part historians sought realistic 
explanations for the majority of other events. 
Machiavelli himself makes frequent use of counterfactuals to express his 
conviction of the contingency of the historical events he is investigating. In 
Chapter XXV of The Prince, Machiavelli says of Fortune that it “shows her 
power where there is no well-ordered virtue” ([1513] 2005, 84). He applies that 
to Italy which, if defended like its neighbours, would not have been invaded and 
so destroyed by Fortune. Later in the same Chapter he talks about Pope Julius 
the Second’s expedition against Spain and the Venetians: “For if he had waited 
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until he could leave Rome with agreements settled and everything in order, as 
any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded”(ibid., 86). 
So although the person in question here is a Pope, his success is never 
attributed to a divine intervention on his side, but rather to consequences for 
certain decisions he chose to make under the right conditions. In England, 
historians occasionally made recourse to counterfactuals to explain historical 
events. Writing about the miseries that befell Queen Margaret, Edward Hall 
casts the blame on her because, among other things, she helped in the murder 
of Humphrey Duke of Gloucester, the king’s wisest and most faithful advisor: 
“For surely he [Gloucester] being alive and having the moderation and 
governance of the commonwealth, King Henry had never wavered in so many 
hazards and jeopardies of his life as he did” (1809, 298). Hall here argues that 
the fate of King Henry VI (and with him Margaret) would have been quite 
different had Gloucester lived longer. 
In Shakespeare, characters sometimes voice deterministic views. 
However, these views are often made on the basis of preconceived ideology 
rather than on sheer conviction of determinism. Even if these Providentialist 
pronouncements express a conviction, they will soon be contradicted by the 
events in the plays. As has already been shown, the causal view of events is 
always dominant in the plays. Outcomes are realistically attributed to real 
causes, mostly to deeds of characters. One major method of ascribing 
causation in the plays has been the use of counterfactuals. With counterfactuals 
emphasis is laid more on the individual agents and less on general conditions, 
let alone on divine intervention. So, our investigation of counterfactuals so far 
should have illuminated the humanistic bent usually attributed to 
Shakespearean drama (see Holderness, Potter and Turner 1988, 2; Hattaway
2002, 16; Parvini 2012, 99). 
Below I shall trace the deterministic voices in the plays and show they are 
counterbalanced by the causational insight mainly based on counterfactuals. In 
Shakespeare’s plays determinism may be said to take two forms: first, the role 
ascribed by characters to divine interventions in the action and, second, the 
prophecies voiced by characters regarding the course the action will take in the 
future. Both of these phenomena are not uncommon in the history plays. 
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As far as Divine Providence is concerned, in 2 Henry VI, King Henry 
always relies heavily on God in determining his fate and that of his nation. Told 
by Somerset that he is now bereft of all his territories in France, he replies: 
“Cold news, Lord Somerset; but God’s will be done” (3.1.86). In Richard III, 
Margaret contemplate the performative power of curses and how they might be 
happily granted by Heaven: 
Did York’s dread curse prevail so much with heaven
That Henry’s death, my lovely Edward’s death,
Their kingdom’s loss, my woeful banishment,
Should all but answer for that peevish brat?   (1.3.188-91)
Later in the play, when he is to fight Richard III in the final battle, Richmond also 
has recourse to God to achieve victory: “God and our good cause fight upon our 
side” (5.5.194). In Richard II, the Bishop of Carlisle assures the king of God’s 
support to him, no matter what happens: “Fear not, my lord. That power that 
made you king / Hath power to keep you king in spite of all” (3.2.27-8). Henry V 
also tends to ascribe all success he achieves to God alone: “But this lies all 
within the will of God, / To whom I do appeal” (1.2.289-90). Later when he 
listens to the casualties report after his celebrated victory in France, he 
vehemently says: “O God, thy arm was here, / And not to us, but to thy arm 
alone / Ascribe we all” (4.8.100-2). So, in these examples, characters give 
expression to the idea that the course of history moves in the one way dictated 
by God, and could not have moved otherwise. Consequently, in the world 
determined by divine providence any mode of counterfactual thinking is not 
permissible. 
Prophecies and foretelling also advance a deterministic stance when they 
are claimed to be of a divine origin because they imply that the fate of persons 
and nations is determined in advanced and will not change no matter what they 
do. Prophecies also abound in these plays. For example, while on his deathbed, 
John of Gaunt makes a prophecy of the future of King Richard II: “Methinks I am 
a prophet new-inspired / And thus, expiring, do foretell of him. / His rash, fierce 
blaze of riot cannot last” (2.1.31-3). Later in the play, the Bishop of Carlisle, 
irked with the dethronement of the king, also prophesizes devastation and 
vengeance to befall the kingdom:“And if you crown him, let me prophesy / The 
blood of English shall manure the ground, / And future ages groan for this foul 
act” (4.1.127-9). In 2 Henry VI, the Duke of Gloucester shows his anger about 
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the bargain whereby Henry sacrificed some French cities to get married to 
Margaret, and anticipates the result: “Lordings, farewell, and say when I am 
gone, / I prophesied France will be lost ere long” (1.1.142-3). In 1 Henry VI, 
sadly contemplating the growing enmity between York and Somerset and other 
lords, the Duke of Exeter recalls to mind a certain prophecy about the fate of the 
young king, that he sees applicable now: 
And now I fear that fatal prophecy
Which, in the time of Henry named the Fifth,
Was in the mouth of every sucking babe:
That ‘Henry born at Monmouth should win all
And Henry born at Windsor should lose all’–                  (3.1.199-203)
King Henry VI, now in despair to live out his own reign, seems to put his hope in 
the young Henry, earl of Richmond, about whom he voices a famous prophecy:
Come hither, England’s hope.
        [King Henry] lays his hand on [Richmond’s] head 
  If secret powers
Suggest but truth to my divining thoughts,
This pretty lad will prove our country’s bliss.
(3 Henry VI: 4.7.68-70)
So famous was this prophecy that, before the battle at Bosworth, Richard III is 
depicted contemplating its credibility and significance:
I remember me, Henry the Sixth
Did prophesy that Richmond should be king,
When Richmond was a little peevish boy.
A king . . .  perhaps . . .  perhaps.                    (Richard III: 4.2.98-101)
When verified, as is always the case in these examples8, prophecies would also 
block the possibility of counterfactual thinking, just as Divine Providence would 
do. For if there is one way that the action should take (that preordained by 
Providence and expressed in the prophecy), then it would be pointless to 
contemplate what could have happened had they moved otherwise. So, how 
does the contingency of history indicated by the counterfactuals cited above fit 
into this deterministic view?
To answer this question, we have to differentiate between divine 
providence and prophecies, for each begs a different treatment. As far as 
Providence is concerned, we can say that all these attributions to the divine 
providence in the plays are voiced by characters, and in no way can be 
assuredly said to express the opinion of Shakespeare himself. Moreover, they 
are mounted for some dramatic purposes and are far from anchoring a 
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philosophical view to be endorsed in these plays. For example, Richard II’s 
reliance on the role of angels to fight by his side is soon falsified (even ridiculed) 
by the consequent events of the play. Immediately after he utters these words, 
Salisbury comes to tell him that his Welsh soldiers have fled away. According to 
Ivo Kamps, Richard fails to recognize that the Divine Right theory is an ideology 
and not knowledge (1997, 20-1). As for most of the other providential claims, 
they are better ascribed to the characters uttering them than to Shakespeare. 
As Henry A. Kelly points out, “It seems best, therefore, to regard opinions 
concerning the providential outcome of solitary events as characterizing only 
the sentiments of the speakers at the time in which they speak them, and not 
Shakespeare’s own view”(1970, 272). The only exception he admits is 
Shakespeare’s clear ascription of Divine support for Henry of Richmond in his 
war with Richard III (ibid., 292-5). Moreover, even King Henry VI does equally 
“attribute to chance, fortune and the will of God” (Lull 2002, 95). And the aspect 
of setter-up and putter-down of kings is attributed more to Warwick than God in 
3Henry VI by Margaret (3.3.157) and by Warwick himself (3.3.263-4; 5.1.34). 
Further, Shakespeare’s approach in the description of wars is very realistic in 
setting causes for defeat and victory. Shakespeare is very careful to establish 
the logical relations of cause and effect in the movement of the action in his 
histories, leaving little room for miracles (Quinn 1959, 47).9
Thus, in no way can the providential will be considered as the moving 
force of the action. When mentioned, the providential theme is manipulated only 
to achieve some dramatic and rhetorical effects. Even more; having surveyed 
many examples where reference to Providence is made in Shakespeare, Robin 
Headlam Wells concludes that “From the variety of ways in which providence is 
referred to in the histories and tragedies, it is clear that Shakespeare is often 
using it as a dramatic device to satirize credulity”(2009, 147). As a result, the 
expression of divine intervention does not discredit the validity of counterfactual 
thinking as voiced in the above examples. 
With regard to prophecies, they betray a deterministic view if, on the one 
hand, they are made as voicing a divine revelation and, on the other hand, if 
they express a necessary movement of history on the basis of which the 
prophecy is made. In Shakespeare’s histories, however, the origin of the 
prophecies is far from settled; while Henry VI’s prophecy about Richmond may 
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be attributed to Heaven ‘my divine thoughts’, others may not be directly 
attributable to that divine source. More often than not, these prophecies are 
based on an inductive survey of human history itself, to anticipate how events 
will unfold depending on how they have been seen to move in the past. In this 
sense, while religious determinism is based on divine providence, the 
determinism implied in the prophecies is based on what Ferguson calls ‘material 
history’. It is based on the assumption that by uncovering the historical ‘laws’, 
one can anticipate the future detours of history. For example, the prophecies 
that abound in Richard II can be attributed to predictions based on knowledge of 
human nature rather than informed by divine omniscient powers. When the 
Bishop prophesies about the outbreak of civil war if Henry Bolingbroke is 
crowned king (4.1), he “is not speaking in terms of divine punishment here, but 
in terms of a human situation – if they raise one house against the other, a 
terrible division will result”(Kelly 1970, 210).   
So, while Shakespeare’s sources tend to place these prophecies in divine 
revelation, he chooses rather to place them on an empirical basis of human 
action (Wells 2009, 157-9). The clearest expression Shakespeare gives to this 
kind of historical inductive reasoning is in 2 Henry IV when Henry IV, in a 
conversation with Warwick, remembers Richard II’s prophecy to 
Northumberland of how he and Bolingbroke will turn out enemies. Warwick 
explains to him that Richard’s foreknowledge was historical, rather than divine:
WARWICK.There is a history in all men’s lives
Figuring the nature of the times deceased;
The which observed, a man may prophesy,
With a near aim, of the main chance of things
As yet not come to life, who in their seeds
And weak beginnings lie intreasured.
Such things become the hatch and brood of time;
And by the necessary form of this
King Richard might create a perfect guess
That great Northumberland, then false to him,
Would of that seed grow to a greater falseness,
Which should not find a ground to root upon
Unless on you.
KING HENRY IV. Are these things then necessities?
Then let us meet them like necessities;
And that same word even now cries out on us:        (3.1.75-89; emphasis added)
While Warwick here is denying the divine origin of Richard II’s prophecy, yet he 
is referring to a kind of historical necessity, the view that from the way things 
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took place in the past we can infer how they are going to unfold in the future. 
This does presuppose the existence of certain ‘necessary’ laws according to 
which the movement of events is programmed. This practice is rooted in the 
potentialist aspect of reality which allows the movement among similar events to 
deduce relatively similar conclusions: "similar historical circumstances bear 
similar historical propensities, that while ontological actualities differ from 
moment to moment, their potentialities need not" (Solomon 1988, 48). These 
laws and propensities fully conceived, people can prophesy the future ‘perfectly’, 
as Richard foresaw the break between Northumberland and Bolingbroke.10 So, 
the sense of ‘necessity’ voiced in Warwick’s account does not rule out the 
contingency of historical events. Rather it is still attributing it to a very strong 
cause-and-effect relationship. Although the borderline between determinism 
and potentiality might be thin, still they are markedly distinct: “potentialities are 
not determinate in the dialectical sense, but at the same time they are not 
wholly indeterminate either" (ibid.). 
Observations like Warwick’s are subject to what psychologists call 
‘hindsight bias’, which “refers to a person’s judging a prior outcome as having 
been more predictable and even inevitable subsequent to learning the outcome” 
(Sherman and McConnell 1995, 221). Hindsight bias is very significant in the 
study of history since it denotes a tendency according to which “observers of 
the past are prone to rely too much on factual frames and to slight, even ignore, 
counterfactual frames” (Telock and Parker 2006, 25). Observers working within 
factual frames ask questions about why a certain event happened, but those 
working within the counterfactual frame would otherwise ask of other events 
that had a chance to happen and that could have happened instead, or how 
what really happened could have been avoided. Hindsight bias implies a 
factualist position, and its result is “that the outcome appears more 
retrospectively foreseeable than it was prospectively” (Telock and Parker 2006, 
25). Hindsight bias is then one theoretical difficulty facing the project of thinking 
about history counterfactually. One problem with the account of the prophecy 
about the fall of Henry VI and, more significantly, Warwick’s and Henry IV’s 
account of Richard II’s prophecy, is that they are mainly made retrospectively. 
Consequently, they may have fallen victim to this bias.  Since they look at it as 
their past, it appears to them as factual. Since they consider the past as the 
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domain of what really happened, then all events that took place during the past 
appear now to be necessary and inevitable. These events would look otherwise, 
however, had these speakers situated themselves in that past, for then things 
will appear just as possible. According to Michael Scriven, “Inevitability is only in 
retrospect. . .  and the inevitability of determinism is explanatory rather than 
predictive”(quoted in Ferguson 1997, 71). 
This practice based on hindsight bias, which historian Raymond Aaron 
calls “retrospective illusion of fatality” (quoted in Ricœur 1984, 188), will 
undoubtedly distort the historical observation since it will make the observer 
take as necessary what originally is merely possible. The epistemological 
danger of hindsight has been spotted by many theorists: Tetlock and Belkin call 
it ‘outcome knowledge,’ the tendency to perceive the past events more as ex 
poste than ex ante and they warn that it "contaminates our understanding of the 
past"(1996, 15). In the Warwick quote, the distortion of history is more than 
clear; Warwick speaks about this outcome as ‘necessarily’ following its 
premises; and it is because Richard was able to capture this ‘necessary’ law 
that his guess was ‘perfect’. According to Warwick, things between Bolingbroke 
and Northumberland could not have turned out differently, and so the former is 
not accountable for any of its devastating results. (This is the paradox of 
causation to which we referred earlier, namely that it is based on contingencies 
but once it is established the cause and effect relationship will seem necessary.) 
Not surprisingly, this analysis appeals to Henry IV and seems to ease him out of 
the sense of guilt he has just shown in his narration of the prophecy, which is 
why he exclaims with relief: “Are these things then necessities? / Then let us 
meet them like necessities:” repeating the word ‘necessities’ twice. To be sure, 
it was Henry IV who first alluded to ‘necessity’ in his narration of what happened 
between Richard and himself: “Though then, God knows, I had no such intent, / 
But that necessity so bowed the state / That I and greatness were compelled to 
kiss” (3.1.67-9). An appeal to ‘necessity’ is a reasonable way to disclaim any 
responsibility for what has happened, especially if we accept that Bolingbroke 
was ‘compelled’ to be king even out of his control. 
The last example also shows that, just like counterfactuals, prophecies 
and deterministic claims can be ideologically informed and politically 
manipulated. Prophetic and deterministic claims may turn out to be political 
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tools whereby countlessly infamous atrocities are committed. Henry IV is here 
using Warwick’s biased account of the ‘falseness’ of Northumberland to justify 
his war against the rebels. So not only are these theories not neutral, but they 
are really destructive. As Ferguson tersely points out,
[W]e begin to see where determinist theories really do play a role in history: when 
people believe in them and believe themselves to be in their grip. . . The trouble 
is that the theories on which he [Man] has generally based his prediction have so 
often been defective . . . In a different way, belief in determinist theories made all 
the great conflicts studied here . . . more rather than less likely. Ultimately . . . 
those who died in these conflicts were the victims of genuinely chaotic and 
unpredictable events which could have turned out differently. Probably as many 
people have been killed by the unintended consequences of deterministic 
prophecies as by their self-fulfilling tendencies. It is nevertheless a striking fact 
that their killers have so often acted in the name of determinist theories, whether 
religious, social or racist. (1997, 88) 
This account implies that providential and deterministic claims are always 
spelled out by political authorities to delimit the human inherent potentiality for 
change and block out the horizon even of the mere possibility of that change. 
Accordingly, the generation of counterfactuals in the domain of politics can be 
explained as a defence mechanism employed by people in order to reclaim their 
potential to change, counter this excessive determinism, and open up the 
imagination to new alternatives which authorities are reluctant to grant. Sean 
Scalmer makes this point with reference to the last few decades, when the 
range of possibilities has been contracted and international politics seemed to 
move in one unalienable direction. In reaction to that hegemonic ideology, the 
majority of people “remained committed to the possibility of a different world. 
The latter grouping has no paradise to proclaim or new order to announce. 
Their alternative worlds lie within the imagination” (2006, 5). And this imaginary 
world is given voice, among other things, through counterfactuals. In 
Shakespeare this is validated by the fact that these deterministic views are 
virtually uttered by those beneficial from the political status qua, and more often 
than not by monarchs. Monarchs in Shakespeare are rarely reported to have 
constructed counterfactuals.11
Even more, some of these consequences are not simply ‘unintended’, but 
are shrewdly manoeuvred. A striking example of this is at the beginning of 
Richard III, where Richard of Gloucester, later King Richard III, discloses some 
of his plans to seize the throne. One of these plans, the famous G-prophecy, 
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consists in deliberately spreading prophecies about the potential murderer of his 
brother King Edward IV, duping him into thinking that it is their brother Clarence:
Plots have I laid, inductions dangerous,
By drunken prophecies, libels and dreams
To set my brother Clarence and the King
In deadly hate the one against the other.
And if King Edward be as true and just
As I am subtle false and treacherous,
This day should Clarence closely be mewed up,
About a prophecy, which says that ‘G’
Of Edward’s heirs the murderer shall be.                (1.1.32-40)   
Richard shows acute historical awareness, manifested in his understanding of 
how determinist views inform the actions of those who believe in them. This is 
coupled with his knowledge of the nature of his brother king Edward IV, namely 
his susceptibility to prophecies, libels and dreams. It is Edward IV’s belief in the 
necessity of these prophecies that led him to imprison his brother Clarence and 
then get his murder by Richard facilitated. It is on the basis of that belief that he 
destroyed his brother and, consequently, himself and even his own children. 
The bitter irony here is that, even if the prophecy is really true, its reference is 
far from settled: the letter ‘G’ is the initial for many names; even if it is the initial 
of ‘George’, that name has many referents. And “ironically the false prophecy 
proves to be true when “G”—not George (Clarence) but himself, Gloucester—
comes to murder the young princes” (Farrell 2009, 45-6). So, Edward’s 
conclusion is based on many probabilities that could easily turn out to be invalid.  
This example thus suggests “that Shakespeare understood prophecy as 
imaginative behavior: in this instance as the vehicle of violent thoughts and the 
compulsion to confess” (ibid., 46).
Akin to Richard of Gloucester’s political use of prophecies is Eleanor’s 
dream in 2 Henry VI. Dreams are used as channels whereby prophecies are 
said to be conveyed, and they are always thought to have a divine source. In an 
attempt to motivate him to claim the throne for himself, Eleanor claims to her 
husband, Duke of Gloucester, that she dreamt that she was seated in the 
Church of Westminster, “Where Henry and Dame Margaret kneeled to me, / 
And on my head did set the diadem”(1.2.39-40). More astute than Eleanor’s 
rather naive dream is that of the Cardinal of Winchester who claims to have 
dreamt of the death of the Duke of Gloucester when the latter was found dead: 
“God’s secret judgement. I did dream tonight / The Duke was dumb and could 
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not speak a word” (3.2.31-2). He is implying here that, as the source of his 
knowledge is divine, then heaven should have a hand in the death of the Duke 
of Gloucester. The Cardinal’s dream is truer to the nature of dreams since it is 
more symbolic than Eleanor’s. Both dreams, however, are disorientingly 
ambiguous. 
But the fact that Winchester narrates his prophecy after Gloucester was 
found dead casts more doubts on his claim.12 This last feature of prophecies is 
addressed by Francis Bacon in his essay “Of Prophecies.” Bacon’s opinion of 
the subject is generally negative: “My judgment is, that they ought all to be 
despised; and ought to serve but for winter talk by the fireside” ([1625] 2002, 
132). For that he gives three reasons. One is that they are mentioned only when 
they prove true, and the other is that many are based on conjecture which then 
is elevated to the level of prediction. The last reason is especially relevant here: 
“The third and last (which is the great one) is, that almost all of them, being 
infinite in number, have been impostures, and by idle and crafty brains merely 
contrived and feigned after the event past”(ibid., 133).
Thus, by the use of counterfactuals Shakespeare is stressing the 
contingent nature of human history. The counter-use of prophecies and the 
references to Divine intervention is only voiced by some characters and cannot 
be taken to represent the philosophical view of the author. Moreover, some of 
these pronouncements are called into question (even ridiculed) and the 
ideological nature of the others is laid bare throughout the plays. Shakespeare 
insists, via the use of counterfactuals, on the contingency of history, and he 
relates results to volatile actions of the characters. Thus, while Exeter may 
attribute the fall of Henry VI to the prophecy saying that ‘Henry born at Windsor 
should lose all’, Clifford attributes it to Henry’s unkingly behaviour and Margaret,
to his lack of resolve. And while the Welsh captain may relate the fall of Richard 
II to certain astronomical signs, the gardener ascribes it to Richard’s failure to 
delimit and oppress the power of ‘growing men’. In the context of these plays, 
Shakespeare gives more credibility to these counterfactual contemplations and 
less, if any, credibility to these prophecies. As far as Warwick’s speech is 
concerned, his “homely naturalism invites us to understand prophecy as a 
function of character, while making any providential significance seem 
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incalculable if not purely fantastic” (Farrell 2009, 60). As Neema Parvini has 
succinctly put it, the employment of causational methods 
lends Shakespeare's treatment of history a sense of contingency and immediacy 
that cannot be found in studies of prescribed history. We are reminded constantly 
of how things might have been were it not for certain people . . . Hotspur might
have killed prince Hal . . .Shakespeare's history plays are not simply an account 
of what happened, but dynamic and probing analyses of historical causality which 
places the responsibility for the outcomes of events squarely on the shoulders of 
men and women.                                  (110-1; emphasis in original)
In his tracing of the influence of Machiavelli’s historical thought on 
Shakespeare’s drama, Hugh Grady states that it started roughly around 1595 
with the writing of Henry V and Richard II: “Shakespeare seems to adopt this 
Machiavellian concept of a limited historical voluntarism and a world of fortune 
and contingency as a general principle (at least starting in 1595) but he applies 
it differently to different plays” (2011, 135). However, the analysis so far of the 
Henry VI plays encourages us to re-assess this claim and look some time 
earlier than 1595 for tracking such tendencies of recognizing contingency and 
chance in history. Our survey in this section reveals that, from an early moment
in his career, Shakespeare departs from the medieval Providential views and 
seems more in touch with the humanistic tendencies, mainly popularized in Italy 
and the continent by Patrizi and Machiavelli, which stressed the role of the 
human agency in the making of historical events. Accordingly, deterministic 
views voiced through Providential explanation as well as prophecies and 
dreams, cannot be taken as a last say by the dramatist about these issues. 
Rather, they can only express ideological convictions by certain characters and 
are often exposed as unrealistic in light of the actual events taking place. 
The Literary Dimension
In this section, I shall try to shed light on the significance of counterfactuals as 
they are used in these plays to the ongoing discussion of the contribution of 
‘possible worlds’ theory to literary studies in general. I have delayed this section 
deliberately since the full appreciation of the literary significance of 
counterfactuals is manifested by the roles they play on the other dimensions, 
which must have been clear at this point. The discussion in this section is 
inclined towards literature in general, and should by implication be pertinent to 
Shakespearean drama. Counterfactuals can be especially relevant to the study 
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of literature in mainly four aspects: explaining the truth of fiction, negotiating the 
usefulness of possible worlds approaches to narrative, deepening the 
ontological status of literary fiction and accounting for its cognitive value. 
The first aspect of counterfactuals in literature is the issue of truth of fiction. 
The truth value of fictional works is a long-standing problem which has inspired 
many approaches. One fruitful way to deal with this question by philosophers 
and literary theorists is counterfactuals. These scholars have shown that the 
epistemological status of fictionality can best be interpreted in terms of 
counterfactual conditionals. In his work on counterfactuals, David Lewis (1973) 
addresses the question of truth of counterfactual statements in terms of ‘relative 
similarity’ among possible worlds. In his later work on truth in fiction, Lewis 
proposes that “Reasoning about truth in fiction can be very like counterfactual 
reasoning” (1978, 42). According to this formulation, “[t]he facts yielded by the 
fictional text are implicitly cast in the role of the antecedent, and the interpretive 
statement functions as consequent” (Ryan 1991, 49). For instance, the 
statement “Hamlet is hesitant” can be translated as: “If Hamlet exists, and the 
plot of his story is enacted in the actual world, then Hamlet is hesitant.” This 
statement is counterfactual since the antecedent (“Hamlet exists”) is not true in 
the actual world. Lewis specifies this relationship in terms of the following 
syllogism:
A sentence of the form “In the fiction f, p” is non-vacuously true iff some 
world where f is told as known fact and p is true differs less from our actual 
world, on balance, than does any world where f is told as known fact and p 
is not true. It is vacuously true iff there are no possible worlds where f is told 
as known fact. (1978, 42; emphasis in original)
This formulation, however, is not satisfactory for literary theorists of fictionality. 
Marie-Laure Ryan identifies many problems in this definition: mainly, it does not 
differentiate between the textual reference world (where the p is true or false) 
and the textual actual world (where p is told as true or false) as well as ignoring 
the possibility of unreliable narration. Instead, she proposes the following 
formulation:
There is a set of modal universes A, which are constructed on the basis of a 
fictional text f, and in whose actual world the nontextual statement p is true.
There is a set of modal universes A, which are constructed on the basis of a 
fictional text f, and in whose actual world the nontextual statement p is false.
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Of these universes, take the one which differs the least, on balance, from our 
own system of reality. If it belongs to set A, then p is true in TRW, and the 
statement “In TRW, p” is true in AW. Otherwise, p is false in TRW and “in TRW, p” 
is false in AW. (ibid., 50)
And it is on the basis of this formula that she arrives at the ‘principle of minimal 
departure’ according to which we, as readers, tend to speculate about the
fictional world as if it differs the least from our actual world. Unless otherwise 
indicated, the textual actual world should feature the same laws as those of the 
actual world. We will use the principle of minimal departure in our comparison 
between fictionality and counterfactuality later in this section. Here suffice it to 
say that although Ryan’s formulation is more elaborate than Lewis’s, I think that 
all the details added are already latent in Lewis’s analysis. For, after all, she 
considers that ‘Textual Actual World’ and the ‘Textual Reference world’ are 
analogous. Besides, I think that Lewis was quite aware of the problem of the 
unreliable narrator, and that his formula ‘told as known fact’ is phrased to 
eschew that pitfall. 
The second aspect is the utility of possible worlds approaches to the study of 
counterfactuals. The use of counterfactuals in literature gives credit to possible 
worlds approaches to the analysis of narrative. In contrast to the traditional 
formalist and structuralist approaches, the possible worlds approaches are not 
deterministic or teleological. This aspect of literary determinism features on both 
levels of text and theatrical performance. Literary determinism also serves to 
compare literature to history and the concept of historical determinism 
discussed above. In light of the above examples, we can contend that modal 
approaches to literature, some of which are surveyed in Chapter Two, prove 
more viable to treat acomplex structural phenomenon like counterfactuals, and 
they can counter what might be called ‘literary determinism.’ 
The first thing to be noted in this regard is the inadequacy of the traditional 
formalist and structuralist plot models to account for the significance of 
counterfactuals. Traditional formalist and structuralist models restrict their focus 
on only actual events that took place in the narrative. These models yield a 
teleological view of plot by treating it as a static construct which is to be studied 
in terms of its ending. Looking at the events retrospectively, from the end 
backwards, this “perspective upon the plot was anchored in the locus of its 
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completion, thus reducing everything to the timelessness of the moment” 
(Godzich 1985, xix).The problems with this retrospective view of events are 
multiple. This view would allow us to see only these events that really took 
place, and to lose sight of those that could have taken place but did not. This 
pitfall is analogous to the hindsight bias which we have identified with historical 
writing. According to Paul Ricoeur (1985, 39), "The regressive necessity of a 
law of temporal finality blinds us, so to speak, to the alternatives that a 
progressive reading, on the contrary, encounters” (see also Ronen 1994, 168; 
Herman and Vervaeck 2001, 154-5). Besides, this view blocks any potentiality 
latent in reality for change and transformation. The problem with this 
deterministic view is that with it the literary work ceases to make any sense for 
its readers, for if we assume that everything is preordained and people can do 
nothing about it, then there is no point in claiming that literature can teach or 
edify. "There is nothing to be learnt from the action and happenings that take 
place in a fictional world that has been reduced to the state of a deterministic 
parallel reality governed universally by immediate necessity"(Meister 2003, 12). 
Consequently, the pedagogical significance of counterfactuals which we 
observed above will be certainly missed with these traditional, actualist 
approaches. 
Possible worlds oriented plot models, in contrast, have the advantage of 
accommodating these nonactualized possibilities and attaching to them the 
significance they assume in the texts. Moreover, these nonfactual events are no 
less necessary to the understanding of the plot as the actual ones. According to 
Possible Worlds approaches, “a virtual event inscribed in the private domain is 
of course as much part of the plot as one asserted as fact” (Ryan 1991, 262). 
Narratives and plays do not always present one story chronologically ordered, 
but rather switch back and forth and do often present a plurality of possible 
worlds as alternate versions of the actual world until one version is chosen and 
privileged as the actual one. 
This limitation of the traditional approaches gets clearer when 
counterfactuals are taken into account. For these analyses will obliterate the 
rich pluralistic texture of the possible worlds that deviate from the actual version 
of events which are created by the counterfactual activity. As Hillary 
Dannenberg puts it, the significance of counterfactuals is that they are not 
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merely returning to the past, rather “they alter the past and in doing so construct 
a new world, one whose ramifications can also create a new present” (2008, 53). 
This temporal movement is usually overlooked by the ‘timelessness’ of the 
linear approaches to plot. Complex plots provide the reader with a plurality of 
versions for both the past and future. Although, in the course of reading or 
watching a literary work, only one of these competing versions will be 
ontologically privileged and established as the actual one (except, of course, in 
some postmodern fictions where there is no privileged version), the other 
versions do also contribute to a full understanding of the literary work. As one 
string of events is chosen as the factual, the counterfactual one(s) would help to 
add to our appreciation of that factual one, which is then defined less by what it 
is than by what it is not. As the above examples must have made clear, 
counterfactual versions of events are used by characters to ascribe causality to 
given events, cast responsibility on certain figures and attach significance to 
some situations and actions. If, in summarizing a play, these counterfactual 
statements are overlooked as simply ‘not taking place’, then we will lose sight of 
these vantage points in the plays. 
These discussions of literary determinism have emerged with regard to 
prose fiction. Theatre, however, adds one more complications which is the 
status of theatrical performance. Any discussion of determinism should deal 
with the two levels of text and performance. As far as the latter is concerned, 
watching the theatrical performance undermines the feeling of determinism 
evoked by external, especially divine intervention. It can be asserted that the 
very act of staging history is an implicit acknowledgement of that contingency, 
since it foregrounds the human dimension of the actions of the historical figures; 
consequently, it will push to the background all other agencies, Divine or 
otherwise. In this sense, the spectators can only see these characters acting 
and reacting onstage, and so any other reference to other factors will be 
overlooked under the spell of the dramatic performance. By being shown how 
these characters were acting, what mistakes they committed and what choices 
(right or wrong) they made, the spectator can immediately recognize how easily 
these mistakes could have been avoided, and how possible it was not to go the 
wrong way. The spectators are aware of the potential of the human beings to 
act unpredictably, and so with performance nothing yet is fixed and 
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unchangeable. Moreover, the immediate presentness of the performance is a 
guarantee against the quagmire of hindsight bias to which so many historians 
fell prey. The immediacy and contingency of the stage performance also 
undermines Providential thinking (Hattaway 2002, 11). However, Stephen 
Greenblatt considers the contingency of the performance to be only artificial, 
and that eventually everything is determined by the dramatic script (1988, 17). 
True, but as we have shown in Chapter One, playing is inherently unpredictable;
moreover, the interesting thing is that in Shakespeare even the script is giving 
voice to these possibilities by constructing counterfactual scenarios. We have 
surveyed how the texts give expression to counterfactuals and unactualized 
possibilities. So, the binary opposition Greenblatt refers to between a 
determined script and an improvisational performance is undermined, since the 
script itself gives voice to the contingency of the whole framework. 
The affinity between literary determinism and historical and religious 
Providentialism gets clearer when we call to mind the fact that the early modern 
theorists, like Sir Philip Sidney and George Puttenham, were likening the work 
of the poet to the work of God (Puttenham [1589] 2004, 57; Sidney [1595] 2004, 
9).The place of the historian in this scheme is further complicated for he tries to 
track the work of God’s Providence through the historical events. According to 
Northrop Frye, poets begin with the form, historians move toward it (1963, 163). 
In their attempt to construct past events, historians work according to 
probabilities based on cause and effect. As we have shown in the last Chapter 
in discussing the work of Hayden White, historians might endeavour to endow 
their resultant structure with coherence or form by linking events causally to 
each other. Historians are affected by literary works and try hard to emulate 
them. Driven by a sense-making impulse which we have identified in the last 
Chapter, historians aspire to create a narrative as coherent as that in the works 
of literature. Elizabethan historians, for example, were viewing the medieval 
ages in terms of plots, from Richard II to Henry VII, sensing a kind of pattern 
that runs through all these periods. Although this method would only yield what 
J. Fisher Solomon calls ‘potentialist realism’, yet it endows the historians’ 
patterns with a sense of determinism. This is partly due to the retrospective 
nature of their endeavour: "History is always constructed in retrospect" (Rackin 
1990, 59).This way historical narrative will also be teleologically oriented and so 
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it will leave little room to the possible and contingent, and will be dominated by 
hindsight bias. Thus, this implies that as literary works are predetermined by a 
script, history is also predetermined by a script, the script of God’s Providence. 
Then, one reason why Providentialism is held in history is because historians 
are using the tools and practice of poets. 
The third aspect of the literary dimension of counterfactuals is their ontological 
status. Although counterfactuals are inherently fictional, yet they enhance the 
ontological status of the main work in which they appear, and also work 
according to the principle of minimal departure which we encountered above. 
Moreover, counterfactuals might be globally understood to form new fictional 
worlds out of well-established worlds, as in the notion of adaptation and 
‘counterfictionality’. Lastly, contemplating counterfactual situations might lead to 
ironies due to the ignorance of some characters of the real state of the actual 
world. 
As far as their ontological status is concerned, there is no gainsaying that 
counterfactual worlds, of whatever kind, are “semantically fictional” (Dolezel 
2010, 122). However, the fictionality of counterfactual statements in a literary 
work is different from the fictional mode of the work itself. According to Marie-
Laure Ryan (1991; 2001), the difference lies in the idea of ‘recentering’. While 
fictional worlds of literary texts require the reader to ‘relocate’ him/herself in the 
new world rather than his native actual world and to believe in their autonomous 
existence, counterfactual statements are not intended “to create alternate 
possible worlds for their own sake, but to make a point about AW [Actual World]” 
(1991, 48). Elsewhere she uses the metaphor of telescope and space travel 
vehicle to stand for counterfactuals and proper fiction, respectively. 
In the telescope mode, consciousness remains anchored in its native reality, 
and possible worlds are contemplated from the outside. In the space-travel 
mode, consciousness relocates itself to another world and, taking 
advantage of the indexical definition of actuality, reorganizes the entire 
universe of being around this virtual reality. I call this move recentering, and 
I regard it as constitutive of the fictional mode of reading. (2001, 103)
Although this distinction is generally valid, two points need be made here: first, 
this restriction on counterfactuals as lacking ‘recentering’ does not apply to 
counterfactual fictions of alternate worlds nor to works of counterfactual history. 
These works are also properly fictional and do invite the reader for a similar 
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‘recentering’ in the new worlds they create, not because they are 
counterfactuals, but because they are fictions. This yardstick seems to apply 
only for short counterfactual statements scattered in a larger fictional work, such 
as the above examples of counterfactuals in Shakespeare. Second, the criterion 
of counterfactuals as ‘making a point about the actual world’ is also elusive. In a 
general sense most literary works make a point about the actual world. 
Examples range from allegorical works that represent reality in a symbolic 
manner to political literary works which always have a message about the 
contemporary states of affairs and so on. Accordingly, the point made by 
counterfactuals denotes the causality inferences made about a given event.
Another ontological affinity between fiction and counterfactuals is the 
principle of minimal departure. According to Marie-Laure Ryan (1991, 50), this 
principle should be applied to them both. Our implied assumption regarding the 
details of the fictional worlds is that, unless otherwise indicated, they are similar 
to the actual world. In order to be reliable, rational and intelligibly functional, 
counterfactuals have also to differ as little as possible from the known details of 
the actual world. This is why the account of the truth of fiction given above has 
taken counterfactuals as its starting point.
Between the two ends of a pure fiction and a counterfactual statement in a 
fictional work there is a middle ground which Richard Saint-Gelais, borrowing a 
term from Matt Hills, refers to as ‘counterfictionality.’ He defines it “as the 
alteration of a previous fiction, i.e. the replacement of at least one of its 
episodes, facts, etc., by other states of affairs” (2011, 244). Unlike 
counterfactuals but like fiction, counterfictions are complete fictional works. 
However, they share with counterfactuals the tendency to undo certain events 
and thus change the course of plot accordingly. But while counterfactuals are 
internal devices, keeping the change within the confines of the literary work 
itself, counterfictions constitute external, intertextual relationships with previous, 
usually canonical literary fictions. Saint-Gelais’s notion of counterfiction is closer 
to the practice of literary adaptation, which can be viewed as a counterfactual 
applied on a broader global level. These counterfictions work on the enormous, 
limitless potential of any story to generate ever new stories or new versions. 
Saint-Gelais rightly suggests that, just like fiction proper, counterfiction differs 
from counterfactuals in that it does not use the “if . . . then . . . ” construction
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(ibid., 247). The reason, quite justifiably, is that as make-believe, fiction and 
counterfiction tend to conceal their fictional status, unlike counterfactuals whose 
fictional, non-actual status is purposefully foregrounded. 
Furthermore, on the ontological level, counterfactuals enhance the status 
of the fictional world as real by contrasting it with other, ‘less real’ scenarios. 
Since the alternative scenarios are presented as ‘counterfacts’, the reader is 
invited to believe as ‘factual’ the background events counter to which they are 
contemplated. This point is significant especially if coupled with the indexical 
account of actuality advanced by David Lewis and adopted by later ‘possible 
worlds’ theorists in the literary field. According to this theory, “’Actual’ is 
indexical, like “I” or “here”, or “now”: it depends for its reference on the 
circumstances of utterance, to wit the world where the utterance is located” 
(1973, 86). So, both ‘fact’ and ‘counterfact’ are to be indexically viewed and 
relatively considered. Some events or states are regarded as ‘facts’ only 
because the text presents them as such. The same states may be denied the 
status of factuality in another text or context. On this basis we can regard as 
untenable the conclusion Dolezel derives from the falseness or nonfactuality of 
counterfactual statements, in relation to the factual status of historical discourse:
The theoretical import of this thesis is far-reaching: the falseness of the 
counterfactual statements about the past presupposes the existence of the 
factual, that is, true statements about the past, such as ‘Germany lost World 
War II.’ If there were no historical facts, there would be no historical 
counterfacts. (2010, 122)
The problem with this argument is that it treats the factuality of historical events 
as an absolute value measured in contradistinction to the historical 
counterfactuals. But the fact that a given event can be counterfactually 
conceived does not invest it with absolute factuality, because even fictional 
‘facts’ do have counterfacts, and still they are ‘facts’ only relative to a certain 
ontological realm. i.e., they are treated and presented as such in the textual 
actual world. Thus, the existence of historical ‘counterfacts’ does not by itself 
demonstrate that there are absolute historical ‘facts’.
Counterfactuals are also used to create a sense of irony. This is specially 
the case with what we can call ‘reverse counterfactuals’ where characters’ 
limited knowledge makes them mistake counterfacts for facts. The result would 
be that, in their attempt to construct a counterfactual statement, they end up 
constructing a factual one. For example, we saw relevant to our analysis of 
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Cymbeline in Chapter Two, how Imogen feels as if the two boys had been her 
lost brothers. “[Aside] Would it had been so that they / Had been my father’s 
sons. Then had my price / Been less, and so more equal ballasting / To thee, 
Posthumus” (3.6.73-6). As, unbeknownst to her, they turn out to be in fact her 
brothers, she misses the fact and consequently mistakes the counterfact. So it 
turns out that the counterfactual scenario she has wished is itself the actual 
state of affairs. Sometimes characters tend to use ‘double counterfactuals’ 
where they fabricate a fact in order to form a counterfact to deceive other 
characters. In The Two Gentlemen of Verona, Julia, disguised as Sebastian, 
pleads to Silvia’s conscience of how the real Julia, whom Proteus has forsaken, 
would look like and how she would now feel. She says that when they were 
playing together, and when he/she was given a woman’s part to play in “Madam
Julia’s gown, / Which served me as fit, in all men’s judgements, / As if the 
garment had been made for me” (4.4.153-5). Julia fabricates a fact, that she 
was Julia’s childhood playmate, in order to construct a counterfact, that she 
looked as if she were Julia herself. As the fact is fabricated, then itself a 
counterfact, then the counterfact turns out to be a fact (that the garment is really 
made for her). In both examples, however, the effect is relatively similar: to 
deepen the sense of the coherence of the literary work and the sense of the 
factuality of the whole framework relative to which these single events can be 
assessed as factual or counterfactual. 
The fourth aspect of the study of counterfactuals in literature is the role they 
play in the cognitive function of the literary work. Counterfactuals contribute to 
the reader’s immersion in the fictional world. They also enhance the coherence 
and intelligibility of the literary work, just as narrative emplotment and 
organization do. Lastly, they are also a useful tool in critical interpretation which 
critics might occasionally use to evaluate certain events in the fictional world. As 
far as readerly immersion is concerned, it is suggested by Marie-Laure Ryan 
(2001) which she introduces as an alternative to the notion of realism. In her 
discussion of such writers as Richardson, Fielding, and Smollett, she views their 
achievements as “neither the art of revealing ‘how things are’ nor the art of 
imitating real-world speech acts but the art of getting the reader involved in the 
narrated events” (2001, 161).  This immersive effect is achieved by many 
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cognitive strategies that are aimed to obscure to the reader the ontological 
status of the work. “The reader sinks down into the narrative world and 
becomes oblivious to her own ontological level” (Dannenberg 2008, 23). As a 
result of this oblivion, the reader tends to forget (or perhaps, overlook) the 
fictional status of the literary work and consequently treats it as an ontologically 
autonomous and self-contained realm. One of the strategies whereby readerly 
immersion is achieved is counterfactuality. Counterfactuals enhance causal 
relations and, both in real life and in traditional literature, causation is one of the 
most important sense-making strategies whereby we tend to connect and then 
to understand different, otherwise unrelated events. So, by employing the same 
principles in their works as those operative in real life, authors are inviting their 
readers through the use of counterfactuals to believe in the sameness of the 
text’s world to their actual world. Moreover, this new world will seem coherent 
enough to entrench its own autonomy and consequently its realistic effect (ibid., 
30). 
Moreover, counterfactuality has special affinities with emplotment, which 
we identified in Chapter Three as a source of intelligibility. Both emplotment, in 
its Aristotelian sense, and counterfactuality are rooted in causation and 
probability. If we retrospectively weigh the real choices against the unreal 
events, then we are dealing with probabilities: calculating what actions will most 
probably or likely lead to which events. The knowledge that underlies such a 
judgement is rooted in our reservoir of plot schemata, which enables us to make 
these judgements. In this regard Paul Ricoeur wonders, "But does it not in the 
first place refer to that extraordinary laboratory of the probable constituted by 
the paradigms of emplotment?"(1984, 184). Based on that knowledge, we can 
assert that a certain event is more quantitatively qualified to take place in this 
given situation. This is how emplotment and counterfactuality reciprocally feed 
upon each other. And this is why some historians explain the increasing use of 
counterfactuals as contributing to the return of narrative techniques to the 
historical profession: “In the search for readers, many historians have sought to 
borrow novelistic and dramatic techniques. Counterfactuals have appealed as 
one mysterious method in this capacious box of tricks" (Scalmer 2006, 5). In the 
last Chapter we investigated how even historians make recourse to 
narrativization to render their discourse more intelligible to the readers, and 
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counterfactuals are just one aspect that can add up to the narrative structuring 
of the historical text. 
Interestingly, the cognitive value of counterfactuals is not restricted to 
those voiced in the plays, but rather sometimes Shakespeare critics tend to 
construct counterfactuals in order to make some point about the plays or the 
playwright. As early as 1709, Nicholas Rowe argues that it was better for 
Shakespeare to let his imagination free to give us, as he really did, new and 
uncommon thoughts “than if he had given us the most beautiful passages out of 
the Greek and Latin poets” which every scholar could have given (quoted in
Smith 2004, 7). Later in the century Alexander Pope makes a point about the 
uniqueness and individuality of Shakespeare’s characters, so much so “that had 
all the Speeches been printed without the very names of the Persons, I believe 
one might have apply’d them with certainty to every speaker.”(quoted in ibid., 
10). Modern critics are no exception: Neil Heims, for example, assesses the 
significance of the role of Falstaff in the Henry IV plays by asking “What would
be the effect on 1 Henry IV if Falstaff had been the anti-Falstaff?"(2010, 130),
and by asserting that “Had Hal not banished Falstaff, the nature of history would 
have been redefined and, fundamentally, its spirit altered, subverted, not merely 
challenged but turned inside out and deflated"(ibid., 113). There are too many 
examples of this mode of critical appreciation to be covered here. 13Richard 
Saint-Gelais refers to some experiments in writing whole critical monographs 
about a literary work in a counterfactual fashion, a practice which he includes 
under his concept of counterfictionality mentioned above (2011, 247-8). 
Although the examples from Shakespeare criticism just cited do not in any 
sense qualify as counterfictions, yet they point to an important fact: that 
constructing counterfactual scenarios is an indispensable tool for cognitively 
comprehending any phenomenon. 
These four aspects of the literary dimension of counterfactuals show how 
multi-faceted their aesthetic value is. It has been shown how crucial they really 
are to the understanding of the very nature of fiction and its ontological status. It 
also highlights the sense of potentiality that is essential to counterfactuals. It is 
this potential lurking under the guise of the actual and the inevitable that 
enables characters to endlessly contemplate the alternative ways that could 
have been taken. With their analysis we also come to better appreciate the 
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utility of the possible worlds approaches to the study of literature. Still far more 
important is the contribution they make to the intelligibility of the action of the 
literary work. 
Conclusion
This survey of the use of counterfactuals in Shakespeare has shown how 
effective these possible scenarios are in articulating the coherence and 
intelligibility of the actual events of the plays. The fascination with 
counterfactuality stems from the fact that it is a multi-dimensional phenomenon 
that has psychological, political, philosophical and literary ramifications. 
Through their use of counterfactuals, we get clues to the characters’ psyches, 
revealing how they react to their past actions or failures to act, the emotional 
responses that these contemplations will elicit, as well as their prejudices and 
biases. Through the use of counterfactuals in the political domain we have 
observed how characters assess the choices made in public affairs and the way 
they attribute failure and (quite rarely) success to players on the stage of history. 
These counterfactuals chronicle the history of a nation through the actions or 
failure thereof of its major players. Philosophically, these scattered statements 
shed new light on how characters conceived their world and the freedom, or 
lack thereof, they enjoy in shaping the events the way they did. In the literary 
dimension, counterfactuals are shown to contribute to many philosophical 
debates about the nature of fictionality and the truth of fictional discourse. They 
do also have an integral role in weaving a coherent structure that enhances the 
intelligibility of the actual course of events. Significantly, the treatment of 
counterfactuals has given credit to the possible worlds approaches for they lay
emphasis on theses unactualized possibilities which traditional approaches, 
with their actualist bias, will certainly miss.
The analysis in this chapter is supposed to open new arenas in a wider 
survey of the use of counterfactuals in drama, analogous to the survey carried 
out by Hillary Dannenberg (2008) about prose fiction. That will give us a clearer 
view of the idiosyncratic use of these devices by different writers in different 
periods. It can be also carried out chronologically to register how the use of 
counterfactuals in drama has evolved over time. For had such studies been 
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conducted a long time ago, we would have been now in a better place to 
appreciate counterfactuality!
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Conclusion
In this study I have argued that the possible or virtual events in Shakespearean 
drama are as important as the actual events. Their importance stems from two 
main aspects that have been foregrounded throughout the study. The first is the 
sense of potentiality inherent in the possible. Instead of viewing the possible as 
the passive negation of the real or the actual, this study has emphasized its 
nature as vitality or as a power latent in the Shakespearean fictional world.
Actualized differently, the virtual would yield many varied realizations of that 
world, be it in the spectators’ imaginations, in different theatrical performances, 
or even in the characters’ conceptions of the fictional world they inhabit. The 
second is its cognitive function and the sense-making role it plays in 
Shakespeare’s drama and theatre. On the level of theatrical performance, the 
virtual reality or possible world created in the spectators’ imagination will help 
them to mould the otherwise disparate material happenings of the stage nto a 
coherent whole. On the level of plot, virtual events are no less necessary a 
component of plots than actual events are. They help us understand the 
background of the actual event, the knowledge and intentions that underlay it,
and the obligations and wishes that triggered it; they give us access to 
characters’ inwardness, and so on. Furthermore, the possible itself is 
established by using probabilistic thinking, for characters arrive at what have 
possibly happened based on its relative probability of occurrence. 
The duality of text and performance in Shakespeare has been present 
throughout the study, and it has informed its original chapters division: while 
Chapter One is devoted to the analysis of the role of the virtual or possible in c
theatrical performance, the other chapters are devoted to the analysis of the 
plots and narrative content of the plays, something which they share with 
narrative fiction in general. However, different aspects of that duality are 
foregrounded in different parts of the study. While in Chapter One we have 
shown how the purely performant function of theatre makes little use of the 
virtual, in Chapter Four we have emphasized that theatrical performance is a 
space more contingent and less predictable than the dramatic text. In 
performance, nothing is determined and an alternative course of events might 
be improvised, but in the text everything is set once and for all. Nevertheless, 
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the Shakespeare text itself opens a space for alternativity through its use of 
counterfactual scenarios. 
I have tried to cover the main genres of Shakespeare’s drama in this study, 
namely tragedy (as in Antony and Cleopatra), comedy (A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream), History (Richard II, Henry VI) and Romance (Cymbeline). However, the 
histories have occupied a larger space of our speculation about possible worlds 
in Shakespeare, and history plays feature in almost all chapters of the thesis. 
The reason for this is the special relevance of and the tensions caused by 
possible worlds to the questions of history and historical truth. This stems from 
the debate between essentialist, constructivist, and potentialist conceptions of 
the actual world. We have argued above for a form of ‘potentialist realism’. 
Potentialist realism preserves the factuality of discourses about the actual world 
and about history, but holds that this reality still has the potential to be 
interpreted differently and to be applicable to many different situations if the 
same circumstances are retained. Besides, it is potentialist in the sense that it is 
mostly accessible through cognitive process and probabilistic thinking. Thus, 
the main two aspects of the virtual – potentiality and cognitive functionality –
seem also to shape our image of the actual world and its history. In other words, 
we have relocated the concepts of the possible and the actual from the 
ontological to the cognitive dimension. As far as history is concerned, although 
possible worlds theorists have argued that the possible worlds of history and 
fiction are essentially different, we have shown that the nature of historical truth 
is compromised by the discursive strategies used to represent it. Moreover, for 
the psychological, political and philosophical reasons discussed above, 
Shakespeare’s history plays served as a fertile space for conducting 
counterfactual thinking and generating alternative virtual scenarios of what 
might have happened. This sense of counterfactuality in history also increases 
our awareness of the rich potentiality latent in any historical situation. 
Possible worlds theory has established its place among the literary and 
philosophical paradigms of the last decades, such as structuralism, formalism, 
poststructuralism and postmodernism. We have shown the advantage of 
possible worlds plot models over the formalist and structuralist ones. By holding 
a forward-looking view on the movement of the plot, possible worlds 
narratologists see each stage of the plot as opening a series of alternative 
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possible courses of events, from which only one will be chosen and realized as 
the actual one, while the others are delegated to the status of virtual events. 
This yields a dynamic view of the plot, rather than the static view offered by 
formalist models which emphasize the end of the story. It also strives to 
dissociate itself from postmodernism and postructuralism by insisting on the 
modal differentiation between the actual world and merely possible worlds and 
by resisting the sweeping textualism of postmodernism. 
The interdisciplinary nature of this study has been a challenge and a 
source of fascination at the same time. The challenge has been to bring
different disciplines – possible world narratology and Shakespeare studies,
each with its own methods and assumptions– into dialogue with each other. 
Possible worlds theory is mainly a formal theory, while the field of Shakespeare 
studies is chiefly dominated by historicist approaches. The study has been tries
to bring each discipline to bear on the other and be informed by certain 
assumptions of the other discipline. It is fascinating due to the intellectual effort 
needed to work out this synthesis of two different disciplines and due to the 
revealing insights which they offer into each. 
This investigation of the possible worlds theory in Shakespeare has the 
potential to open up new avenues for further research. We can here make three 
suggestions regarding topics for further study. The first is a possible world 
framework for genre theory, especially the distinction between tragedy and 
comedy. Insofar as the notions of possibility, necessity, and probability are 
concerned, two differences between the two genres can be discerned. The first 
is that tragedy moves according to the laws of actuality while comedy and 
romance move according to the laws of possibility. As Kiernan Ryan puts it, 
“The tragedies are preoccupied by the brutal destruction of the potential by the 
actual. . . But in his Elizabethan romantic comedies and in the haunting last 
plays of his Jacobean period, Shakespeare’s imaginative gaze is levelled at the 
remote horizon of what could be, rather than absorbed in the immediate tyranny 
of what is” (1989, 74). This can be explained by having recourse to some formal 
features of possible worlds theory. The modalities dominant in comedy are 
those of possibility while tragedy is dominated by the modalities of necessity. 
That is to say, a character in comedy preserves the right to change an option 
s/he has taken so far, which is hardly possible in tragedy. Moreover, in comedy 
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the characters’ domains consist mainly ofWish Worlds, while in tragedy they 
consist of Obligation Worlds. Wishes are more flexible than obligations, which 
means that characters in comedy can adjust their goals if they appear 
unattainable, but characters in tragedy stick to these goals, no matter how 
disastrous the effects are. The second difference is that the comedies, even the 
Romances, do not fully adhere to the laws of probability that determine the 
tragedies. As Kiernan Ryan writes of the comedies and Romances, “The works’ 
undisguised surrender of the laws of likelihood to the rule of the miraculous . . . 
frees Shakespeare’s imagination to forsake at will the plausible logic which past 
or probable events might be expected to exhibit“ (ibid., 81; also Altman 2010, 
346). However, I think that it is less an absence of probability in these plays 
than a need to employ different criteria of coherence and plausibility for different 
genres (see Maître 1983, 37). Much more subtle differences between the two 
genres can be discerned according to this framework. Moreover, possible 
worlds theory can even contribute to a clearer view about the relationship
between fiction and reality, especially in the case of history plays and the layers 
of reality they are supposed to reflect. 
The second area where possible worlds theory can contribute to the study 
of Shakespeare and literature in general is adaptation. We mentioned such an 
attempt made by Cindy Chopoidalo (2009) in the Introduction. However, 
possible worlds theory has still much more to say about adaptation. Following 
Dolezel’s (1998) notion of narrative modalities, I think that traditional 
adaptations seek to redistribute these modalities between the original and the 
adaptation. Thus, in alethic terms, what was possible in the original might turn 
out to be impossible in the adaptation. In epistemic modality, what was 
unknown in the original might be known and believed in the adaptation. In 
axiological modalities, what was deemed bad might turn out to be good and 
desirable in the adaptation, and so on. This way the changes brought about to 
the original work might be formally explained. Moreover, the fidelity generally 
expected from the adaptation can be explained according to Marie-Laure 
Ryan’s principle of minimal departure which we surveyed in Chapter Four. 
According to Ryan (1991, 54), this principle does not only apply to the relation 
between the actual and fictional worlds, but can also apply to the relationship
between a text and any other text. Furthermore, adaptation can be seen as a 
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form of ‘counterfictionality’ which we have examined in Chapter Four. Thus, a 
possible worlds account of adaptation can move beyond the prevalent 
approaches to this complex phenomenon. 
The third area to which possible worlds can contribute is the teaching of 
literature. As we have shown, possible worlds analysis has aesthetic 
dimensions which might be especially appealing to young readers of literature. 
In this regard, the consideration by the learner of the alternative possible worlds 
latent within the fictional world is of immense cognitive value for the learner,
because it helps them to better appreciate the significance of the actual one. In 
other words, we can know things by what they are not as well as by what they 
are, and we might come to better understand a character by considering what 
he/she could have done (but did not) as well as by what they actually did. 
Moreover, learners might be asked to evoke alternative stories by choosing 
other events that might have taken place in the original story. This can also help 
students in creative writing construct new plots using traditional stories as their 
point of departure. 
With all these applications and many others I think that the possible in 
Shakespeare is a fertile place to refresh our perspective on Shakespeare’s 
dramatic art. In addition, more work can be done on poetry, the Sonnets and the 
narrative poems, to find out how the treatment of possibility in Shakespeare’s 
poetry differs from, or is continuous with, his experimentation with possible 
worlds in drama. For example, the speaker in the Sonnets habitually calls forth
a different world and imagines himself assuming different roles. The Sonnets
also touch frequently on the question of truth and the effect of representation 
(the poet’s ‘pen’) on it. The narrative poems provide a fertile ground for 
exploring the possible worlds created by narrative. The ekphrastic passage in 
The Rape of Lucrece is but one familiar example of this power of narrative to 
create imaginary worlds. Moreover, further work still needs be done on other 
early modern dramatists and poets to discover the distinctive treatment of the 
concept of the possible by different writers. 
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Notes
Introduction
1 The assumption of the existence of other, infinite possible worlds might seem 
ontologically costly since it does not pass Ockham’s razor, a concept coined 
after the ideas of William of Ockham (1287 - 1347). It refers to a principle of 
parsimony on the level of ontological thinking. According to the principle of 
Ockham’s razor, hypotheses with the fewer number of assumptions are to be 
preferred over those with the larger number of assumptions (see Spade 1999). 
In this regard, possible worlds theory assumes the existence of an infinity of 
possible worlds. Lewis’s version of modal realism assumes that all these 
possible worlds are ontologically real. Whilst Lewis holds that the benefits of his 
view justify its ontological cost, his opponents do not. 
2 Indexical terms, such as ‘now’, ‘here’, ‘I’, ‘this’, etc., are expressions which do 
not have fixed referents. The referent of an indexical term, rather, can only be 
determined depending on the immediate context in which it is uttered. Its 
referent can be fixed after determining the speaker, time and place and other 
aspects of the linguistic context (see Lyons 1995, 302-12). According to this 
explanation, the words ‘actual’ and ‘possible’ are indexical terms in the sense 
that their meanings are relative to the context in which they occur. If uttered in 
any world, the word ‘actual’ refers to that particular world, be it our world or any 
other world. 
3 Modality is that quality of human language which enables us to talk not only 
about the actual state of affairs, but also about possible states of affairs. It is 
mainly expressed in English using the modal auxiliaries ‘may’, ‘might’, can’, 
‘ought to’, etc., as well other nominal, adjectival and adverbial expressions (see 
Lyons 1977, Chap. 17). Not surprisingly, possible worlds theorists build on the 
concept of modality in their treatment of plot. Accordingly, plots do delineate not 
only actual events, but also possible events; or they depict not only what has 
happened, but also what might have happened and ought to happen. Later we 
shall see how Dolezel rightly observes that narrative modalities are the real 
denominators of action and conflict in the fictional world. 
4 In Chapter Three I shall provide a reading of Aristotle’s Poetics which 
emphasizes the main two aspects of possibility or virtuality: the potential and 
the probable. 
5 The notion of the ‘Model reader’ is an essential part of Eco’s semiotic theory of 
texts. This notion has to do with the shared codes between the author and the 
readers which make the work communicative. According to Eco, “The author 
has thus to foresee a model of the possible reader (hereafter Model Reader) 
supposedly able to deal interpretively with the expressions in the same way the 
author deals generatively with them” (1979, 7). 
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6 Alethic modality determines what is possible or impossible for the existents 
and actions of the fictional world. Deontic modalities determine what is 
obligatory, allowed or prohibited in the fictional world. Axiological modalities 
dictate what is considered as good, bad or neutral in the value system of the 
fictional world. Lastly, epistemic modalities determine what is known, believed 
or unknown by characters regarding the facts of the fictional world. 
7 My use of the ‘virtual’ in relation to the possible worlds of theatre is not to be 
confused with what came to be called ‘virtual theatre’ developed with the help of 
modern technology. For a survey of the idea of ‘virtuality’ in literature and 
electronic media see Ryan (2001); for an introduction to virtual theatre see 
Giannachi (2004). Brenda Laurel’s Computers as Theatre (1993) brings the 
different meanings of the term in computers and theatre together and also 
touches on the metaphorical nature of computer interface representation and 
theatrical representations. 
8 For example, Brian McHale, in his Postmodernist Fiction (1987), uses the 
Possible Worlds framework to shed light on ontological aspects of postmodern 
fiction. The main characteristic of that fiction, what he calls the ‘dominant’, is 
that it foregrounds ontological issues. According to McHale, it is this quality of 
postmodern fiction that justifies the use of this framework. The ontological 
aspect of the theory is also foregrounded in Alice Bell’s The Possible Worlds of 
Hypertext Fiction (2010). Bell applies possible worlds theory to hypertext fiction, 
which she regards as displaying a special ontological self-consciousness. 
Chapter One
1Prince ([1988] 2004) discerns three classes of events that form a lacuna either 
in the narrative story or discourse: the unnarratable, the unnarrated and the 
disnarrated. The third refers to some hypothetical scenarios hinted at in the text. 
The first two refer to events that either cannot be narrated or are deliberately 
elided from the text. The unperformed or unperformable are actions and events 
that either cannot be brought onstage or which it was decided not to put 
onstage. 
2 I mentioned in the Introduction that possible worlds theorists put forward views 
about fictionality. Here I am mainly discussing Ryan’s (1991; 2001) theory. I 
shall not address Dolezel’s (1998) theory of fictionality in detail since he rarely 
touches on the question of the fictionality of theatre.
3 This survey of the theories of fictionality is by no means comprehensive. I 
have addressed only those theories which address the question of the 
fictionality of theatre. For general accounts and surveys see Searle (1975), 
Currie (1990), Cohn (1999), Sainsbury (2010), and Swirski (2010).
4 Enargeia is often confused with another figure from which it differs only slightly: 
energeia. Heinrich F. Plett states the difference as: “‘Energeia’ refers to a style 
that is made dynamic through a pathetic-visual vividness of representation, 
while Enargeia refers to the perceptual evidence of detailed descriptions” 
(quoted in Bernhart 2007, 134). See also Plett (2010, 46-7). 
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5 It is to be noted that this does not reflect the terminology used by the 
Elizabethans to talk about theatre. According to John Astington (2010, 30), they 
used the term ‘presenting’ to talk about ‘representation.’ 
6 Italian Renaissance literary theory displayed more variety and depth than 
English Renaissance theory. It also engaged more widely with classical literary 
theory, especially Aristotle, which makes it a fertile source of theories of theatre 
participation. I choose to discuss these two critics, among the many other Italian 
critics in the Renaissance, since they represent two contrasting views and the 
two poles of the actual and virtual components of theatre. This is not to imply 
that they have a direct influence on Shakespeare’s practice, but only to show 
the range of views that were prevalent at that time. For more information about 
Italian literary criticism, see Weinberg (1961) and Hathaway (1968; 1973). 
7 In her study of the representational and presentational modes of acting, Lesley 
Wade Soule calls acting the mimetic-illusionistic and playing the celebrative 
mode (2000, 3-4).
8 The terminology employed in talking about theatre in the period also implied 
both presentational and representational tendencies. For example, the word for 
play was ‘show’ and for action was ‘gesture,’ while the words ‘actor’ and ‘player’ 
were used interchangeably. However, Soule holds that the word ‘actor’, not 
‘player’, was used in the sense of ‘personation’ (2000, 126). Andrew Gurr 
laments that English has no one word for both the senses of seeing and 
hearing. Rather it uses the hearing-oriented Latin word ‘audience’ and the 
seeing-oriented word ‘spectator.’ And he distinguishes even between these 
senses: while seeing is considered stronger and conveyed a stronger touch of 
reality, ‘hearing’ was weaker and rather conveyed a sense of virtual, referential 
reality. (1987, 86-9)
9 Numerous invaluable studies of Shakespeare’s views of dramatic art have 
been conducted. One classic example is Righter (1962). In the last two decades 
there was upsurge of interest in the idea. See, for example, Fass (1986), 
Kiernan (1998), Weimann (2000) and Astington (2010).  
10 See, for example, Berry (1966), Brennan (1989), Wilson (1995), Hardy 
(1997), Meek (2009), and Gruber (2010). 
11 For a historical survey of the figure of ‘phantasia’ see Watson (1988). 
12 According to Alan Stewart, it is a play whose “characters spend much of the 
play recounting, hearing of, and commenting on what has happened elsewhere" 
(2009, 95). And as Janet Adelman puts it, "The play consists of a few actions 
and almost endless discussions of them" (1973, 30). Barbara Hardy also 
considers it primarily a play about narration (1997, 23).
13 The metatheatrical aspects of the play have been frequently pointed out by 
critics. Janet Adelman observes that “Antony and Cleopatra constantly insists 
on its status as a play” (1973, 39). For a survey of views of this aspect of the 
play see Deats (2004, 4-5). 
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14 Laura Quinney (2008, 244) suggests that the whereabouts of Antony are of 
crucial concern for all the characters, especially Octavius Caesar and 
Cleopatra, while Pauline Kiernan suggests that Antony seems to be in 
Alexandria and Rome and almost everywhere (1998, 170).
15 See Pauline Kiernan (1998) for a succinct account of these and similar 
discrepancies in the play between the different modes of representation. 
16 Phyllis Rackin (1972, 204) makes this point with regard to Enobarbus’s 
description of Cleopatra, but it can be extended to many other descriptions of 
the two protagonists. Indeed, this also refers to a general feature of the play 
which led it to be less frequently performed than other tragedies by 
Shakespeare. The non-performativity of the play is ascribed, besides these 
hyperbolic descriptions, to the large number of scenes and its dispersed 
locations (Deats 2004, 35). 
Chapter Two 
1 Whether her fainting was real or feigned is another matter that has evoked 
different interpretations and speculations. For an account of her faint, see 
Sutherland and Watts (2000, 65-8). 
2 This approach to goals and plans, jointly inspired by modal logic and artificial 
intelligence, might seem too mechanistic to apply to complex literary works like 
Shakespeare’s plays. In fact, Marie-Laure Ryan (1991) applies it mainly to short 
stories and fairy tales. However, as I will show, at least some aspects of this 
formulation might be profitably applied to parts of Shakespeare’s plays. For a 
critique of these approaches see Cook (1995).
3 However, Marie-Laure Ryan (1991, 167-9) discerns many differences between 
her notion of ‘virtual embedded narratives’ and Prince’s category of the 
‘disnarrated.’ She accepts only some of Prince’s cases as falling under the 
category of ‘virtual’ and by these she stresses two main differences: first, the 
virtual should not necessarily have linguistic realization. Second is that 
ontologically the virtual forms part of the plot, whereas some cases of the 
disnarrated do not. Yet she still sees these cases of the disnarrated as fulfilling 
an aesthetic purpose: “they track forking paths on the textual map, thereby 
increasing the size and diversity of the territory travelled in imagination” (ibid., 
169).
4 The other two branches of rhetoric are deliberative and epideictic rhetoric. 
This tripartite distinction is first formulated in Aristotle’s rhetoric. I use the term 
‘rhetoric’ to refer not to the style manuals and lists of figures of speech, but 
rather to the art of argument and persuasion. In the Renaissance, both 
meanings were common, although the former were more so. As Wendy 
Olmsted writes, “English writers on rhetoric (with notable exceptions such as 
Thomas Wilson) emphasize style and figure at the expense of argument” (2006, 
68). Studies of the relation between rhetoric and Shakespearean drama also 
polarize around these two fields. For example, Marion Trousdale (1982) deals 
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mainly with matters of style, especially in the Renaissance tradition of de Copia 
and the way it is manifested in Shakespeare. Raphael Lyne (2011) also deals 
with rhetorical tropes in Shakespeare, but from a cognitive point of view. He 
widens his scope to include figures other than metaphor. Lorna Hutson (2007) 
deals mainly with the forensic branch of rhetoric, and will be frequently 
consulted in this study. Lynn Enterline (2012) is concerned with the emotional 
aspect of the rhetorical effect, and how Shakespeare acquired that from his 
grammar-school learning. Richard Halpern (1991) focuses on the ideological 
implications of the Renaissance educational system, mainly informed by Marx’s 
notion of ‘primitive accumulation.’
5 Strauver (2009) gives a compelling account of the intricate relation between 
modality and rhetoric. 
6 I am not implying here that Aristotle was the main influence on Renaissance 
rhetoric. On the contrary, Aristotle has very little influence at this stage in the 
development of rhetoric. (Mack 2003, 83) I am just tracing the development of 
the ‘probability’ element in rhetorical theory. 
7 For examples of the enthymeme, see Richards (2008, 35).
8 The use of the term ‘probable’ here breeds ambiguity, for it can refer to the 
event itself or to the method used to infer the occurrence of that event. I have 
tried to avoid this ambiguity by using the term ‘contingent’ for the former 
meaning and the term ‘probable’ for the latter. As I have shown above, these 
two meanings are closely related; rhetoric has to deal with them together, and 
the next paragraph shows that both were defining features of rhetorical 
analysis. 
9The example Wilson gives is informative: it is of a soldier suspected of killing a 
farmer. The orator is trying to prove this suspicion by accumulating data that 
augment the probability of the soldier having slain the farmer. The soldier, so 
the oration goes, is one who has been leading an aimless life, and has just 
returned from war, where his hands have been already smeared with blood, 
having killed many enemies. Such a person is more likely to slay more people. 
Besides, he has long been known as a thief who was brought up in a den of 
thieves. Moreover, he is known to be jobless, a rioter, a whoremonger, etc. 
Another sign is that he was there at the time the crime was committed, and he 
was sturdy and strong whereas the deceased farmer was weak (Wilson 1553, 
50-1; for similar examples see also Rhetorica ad Herennium 2.3.5-2.5.8). 
10An interesting example Greenblatt gives is one narrated by a Bristol merchant, 
John Gay, about the attempt of British colonizers to trade with the natives of the 
New World. In November 1612, a group of Englishmen arrived at Beothuck 
Indian houses and, finding none there, decided to leave some signs of their 
presence and good will: “Order was taken that nothing should be diminished, & 
because the savages should know that some had bin theare, everything was 
removed out of his place, & brought into one of the cabins, and laid orderlie one 
upon the other, & the kettle hanged over them, wheearin thear was put some 
bisket, & three or fower amber beades. This was done to beginne to winne them 
by fayre meanes” (quoted in Greenblatt 1991, 101.) The intruders’ improvisation 
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here consists in their attempt, later proved successful, to project the probable 
ways in which the natives’ imagination could lead. The intruders are trying, 
moreover, to lead their imagination in a certain direction, excluding all the other 
possibilities; for example, that things have been removed may be attributed to 
animals, a possibility which the intruders managed to exclude by piling things up 
in an orderly manner. Even now, that might have been taken as a sign of 
offence, which possibility was excluded by putting the kettle and beads over the 
other things. So the intruders’ “act entails an imagining of the Beothuck 
response when they return to the village, a calculation of their probable
interpretation of the signs – and the manifest fact that the intruders have so 
carefully imagined the villagers’ response is implicitly one of the signs that they 
have left” (ibid.; emphasis added).
11 See Maley (1999, 148). 
12 For more about irony in the play, see Hoeniger (1962).
13 When Richard at the opening of the play asks John of Gaunt whether 
Bolingbroke is accusing Mowbray for some ‘known’ treason, Gaunt shrewdly 
answers that he is accusing him for an ‘apparent danger seen in him’ against 
the person of the king. This dichotomy between the ‘known’ and the ‘apparent’ 
will linger throughout the play. 
14 Some critics hold that even Bolingbroke himself was not aware of his real 
motives and that his action was spontaneous and not premeditated, that he was 
guided by events, not the other way around. For example, Harold F. Folland 
writes that “Like Richard, Bolingbroke fails at first to realize the drastic 
implications of his act, and Shakespeare has not indicated just when he realizes 
how little distinction there is between his forcible demand for right and rebellion” 
(1973, 391). For our purposes, even if this is true, it does not invalidate my 
argument, but rather supports it. 
15 Bryon Bolam even holds that the original spelling of the name, ‘Bullingbroke,’ 
implies the sense of ‘deception,’ being composed of the word ‘bulling.’  Or it 
may be an imitation of water, from ‘boil’ or ‘bubble,’ which explains the wide use 
of the ‘water’ imagery in the play (see Bolam 2002, 142). 
16 In his historical poem, Civil Wars, in which he outlines the War of the Roses 
between the Houses of York and Lancaster, Samuel Daniel also stresses the 
ambiguity of Bolingbroke’s intentions, alluding to the possibility that even 
Bolingbroke himself is tricked by the advantage of power he is going to hold. 
The poet depicts Bolingbroke the first night he lands on the English shore after 
his banishment, when he is visited by the spirit Genius. Genius warns him that 
his coming will leave the door wide open for civil wars in which “The babes, 
unborne, shall be borne to bleed”(1.89).Bolingbroke assures his Country’s spirit: 
“I am thy Champion, and I seeke my right: / Provok’t I am to this, by others 
spight” (I.90). Genius thus prophesies that “Thou shall not know what then will 
be thy minde, / When thou shalt see thyself advanced and strong”(I, 91). 
17 See Weingarten (1966) and Leggatt (1988) about this instability of naming in 
the play. 
250
18 On the role Mowbray is supposed to play in Shakespeare’s plot, see 
Champion (1975). On the murder of Woodstock, see French (1971) and 
Sutherland and Watt (2000, 92-99). 
Chapter Three 
1 The debate about this issue is very wide. In addition to the sources that I 
mention in the text, it is useful to look into more sustained discussions of the 
matter like Zogarin (1999) as an opponent of the postmodern challenge and 
Jenkins (2000) as proponent of that challenge. For general treatments of 
relevant issues, see Curthoys and Docker (2006), Munslow (1997; 2007) and 
Windschuttle (2000). 
2 One problem with Hayden White’s work is that White has never used a 
consistent terminology. Paul Ricoeur, for example, complains of the confusion 
caused by this constant change of terminology causes, and the different 
typologies it yields (1984, 167).
3 This is contrary to Dolezel’s exposition of White’s theory, where he claims that 
the term ‘fiction’ is not used in Metahistory: “indeed, as far as I can tell, the term 
fiction does not appear anywhere in the book” (Dolezel 2010: 21; original 
emphasis).
4 White was pessimistic about the reception of his ideas in both history and 
literary theory (1978, 122). Critiques levelled at this view came, just as 
expected, from historians (Zagorin 1999; Windschuttle 2000). Robert F. 
Beckhofer points out that White’s ideas were ignored and rarely practically 
applied, except in the field of intellectual history (1997, 16-8, 24).
5 Most scholars writing about Shakespeare’s histories welcome White’s thesis, 
such as Ivo Kamps (1996) and Phyllis Rackin (1990).
6 Ricoeur is interested in the structural and configurational aspect of mimesis 
insofar as it is a prelude to its cognitive effect.
7 Elsewhere White asserts that “to say that we make sense of the real world by 
imposing upon it the formal coherency that we customarily associate with the 
products of writers of fiction in no way detracts from the status as knowledge 
which we ascribe to historiography” (1978, 99). Acknowledging the reality of the 
past, White avers: “Historical discourse does not, then, produce new information 
about the past” (ibid., 2). In a later study, he asserts that he does not deny 
history the status of facts and the possibility of their knowledge, but without 
discourse they would be more of an archive than proper history. To be sure, 
discourse does not add facts, but only interpretations (1999, 2-3). Thus, White’s 
acknowledgement of the existence of historical ‘facts’ renders Dolezel’s 
differentiation pointless, since White, after all, does not deny the differences 
between the components of historical and fictional worlds. 
8 Gerald Prince identifies a narrow and a wide meaning for the ‘plot’ in 
narratology. In its narrow meaning, it refers to “the main incidents of a narrative, 
the outline of situations and events (thought of as being distinct from the 
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characters involved in them or the themes illustrated by them)” (1987, 71). In 
this text I am using it in the wider sense defined above. 
9 Dorrit Cohn is of the same opinion when she observes that historical 
representation is set apart from fictional representation in that the former has 
the additional element of an external referent, and so the di-terminology of 
‘story’ and ‘plot’ is inadequate for historical representation: “A novel can be said 
to be plotted, but not emplotted . . . in this respect the process that transforms 
archival sources into narrative history is qualitatively different from (and hardly 
comparable to) the process that transforms a novelist’s sources . . . into his 
fictional creation”(1999, 114). 
10 In fact, Hayden White’s work is associated more with the Formalist, New 
Critical and even structuralist tradition than with the Poststructuralist and 
Postmodernist ones. As Anne Curthoys and John Docker put it, “White’s work is 
itself open to poststructuralist critique. In adopting from Frye the notion that 
there are agreed meanings, forms, genres, in literary language, his conception 
of genre and text derives more from structuralism than poststructuralism”(2006, 
193).  
11 Aristotle defines the ‘probable’ as the thing that people of a certain type would 
say and do in given situations. Writing about portraying characters according to 
the rules of probability and necessity, he says that it means: “that for such a 
person to say and do such things is necessary or probable” (XV.1454a33-4). 
And as I will show in the next note, he is not contrasting the two terms, as he is 
defining one, ‘probable’, in terms of another, ‘possible.’ In other words, to decide 
whether some action or speech is   probable or not depends on whether it is the 
sort of thing that happens in real life, i.e., possible. Thus the criterion of 
probability is the frequency of occurrence: “the possible seems plausible: about 
the possibility of things which have not occurred we are not yet sure; but it is 
evident that actual events are possible – they could not otherwise have 
occurred” (IX.1451b15-20). 
In the Renaissance and eighteenth-century England, the criterion of probability 
continued to be defined on the basis of general human nature, knowledge of 
which is more public than scientific. And ‘public opinion’ in this sense is different 
from what some poststructuralist critics have taken it to be, namely as ideology 
in the negative sense of false consciousness. Rather, this term has positive 
meanings in the period (See Nuttall 1983, 57).   
12 Aristotle here is not setting the two categories in opposition to each other; 
rather he is asserting that the impossible can be made probable (credible): he is 
not saying that every impossible is probable. The 'possible' exists but the 
'probable' is cognitively constructed. So, the ontological category is mediated by 
the cognitive one. It is only cognitively that we consider things to be possible or 
not. But, quite reasonably, every possible should be probable. Aristotle's dictum 
is a demonstration of the power of discourse and he is anticipating a 
postmodern position.
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13 See Beverley Southgate (1996, 14-8) for a survey of the effect of Aristotle’s 
formulation on the difference between history and poetry and how it influenced 
later accounts of the question, especially in the Renaissance. 
14 In another important passage from the Poetics Aristotle seems to imply that 
historical discourse relates non-unified, disconnected events. About the epic 
Aristotle writes: “Its structure should not be like histories which require an 
exposition not of a single action but of a single period, with all the events (in 
their chronological relationships) that happened to one person or more during it” 
(XXIII.1459a20-5). Nevertheless, the above discussion applies to this passage 
as well: briefly, he only says that some histories lack narrative coherence; in no 
sense does this mean that they should lack it. 
15 Whether these forms of writing were considered by contemporaries to be 
history per se is a matter of dispute (see Kewes 2005, 5; Woolf 2005, 62).
16 The figure of speech used in such cases was called ‘Prosopopoeia‘. See 
Gavin Alexander’s (2007) account of this figure of speech. 
17For similar views of the role of the possible and probable in the historical 
writing of the period, see Lull (2002, 89-90) and Holderness, Potter and Turner 
(1988, 3).
18Sidney speaks about poetry, because poetry was the default case for 
imaginative literature (Nelson 1973, 39). And its ‘truth’ was even preferred to the 
fabrication of Romance (ibid, 51). This was also before the novel, in its realistic 
form, occupied the position of the default case of fiction in later centuries. See 
Chapter One for a discussion of the generic divisions of fictionality.
19 Two works may suffice for an example: John Foxe’s Acts and Monuments
(1563) and Thomas More’s Richard III (1513) (Anderson 1984, Chap.6; 
Collinson 1997; Levine 1997). 
20 As I am using these plays as examples, I am of course aware of the 
authorship controversies which they have triggered. 2 Henry VI and 3 Henry VI 
have occasioned less debate. 1 Henry VI, however, is notoriously difficult 
regarding its complete attribution to Shakespeare and its date relative to the 
other two plays. The play is generally thought to have been written after the 
other two plays. Critics have also identified other ‘hands’ in its authorship in 
addition to Shakespeare; one of the main candidate is Thomas Nashe. The 
main line of the argument in this chapter is mostly irrelevant to, and does not 
depend on, settling these controversies. Moreover, the common themes and 
ideas in the three plays that we examine in this Chapter might unveil a kind of 
unity among them. For discussions of the authorship problem of 1 Henry VI, see 
Kirschbaum (1952), Law (1954), Harlow (1965), and Vickers (2007). 
21 This is not to say, however, that their chances of performance were less than 
the other histories. On the contrary, the performance history of these plays is 
very rich in the twentieth century, and this dimension of the plays has received 
considerable critical attention. See Watson (1990) and Reeves and Rutter 
(2006). 
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22 Two disclaimers need be made before we proceed. First, I am choosing these 
plays although I am fully aware that they lack the narrative structure that other 
plays have. The plays at their best are considered episodic and shapeless. (see 
Dean 1982, 36;  Lull 2002, 92; Dessen 2004, 273; Leggatt 2009, 133). I am not 
claiming that these plays have a typical, uninterrupted narrative structure; 
nevertheless they are full of subtle examples of the effective use of narrative 
and invite speculation into the nature of historical representation. It can be 
argued that Shakespeare shows the importance of narrative in the least 
narrative of his history plays. Second, given the main interest in this chapter, 
namely how the plays reflect on the questions of historical representation, it 
makes less relevant question of the extent to which Shakespeare has followed 
his sources. To be sure, Shakespeare’s departure from his sources varies from 
one play to another. Occasionally, Shakespeare drastically modifies the 
historical events, especially in 1 Henry VI (See Saccio 1977, 105). 
23 It is interesting that Margaret elsewhere complains that her husband is a 
'pupil still' (1.3.50). Moreover, Eleanor, Gloucester’s wife, also calls him 
Margaret’s baby: “She’ll pamper thee, and dandle thee like a baby” (1.3.149).
24 It is interesting to note that the use of these analogies can also to be traced to 
the Chronicles themselves. For example, Edward Hall frequently describes 
Henry V as a shepherd to his flock (soldiers) (1809, 112). He also uses 
serpentine imagery so frequently to describe conspiring figures. Holinshed, on 
the other hand, used these tropes very rarely in his historical narration (see also 
Goy-Blanquet 2003, 80). 
25 Larry S. Champion (1977, 296) considers Gloucester the main character in 
the play and that he occupies around 69% of the second part. So, it is as if all 
the historical events are no more than a play.
26 That ostensive evidence is not open to interpretation is also called into 
question elsewhere in Shakespeare. I am thinking here mainly of Falstaff 
carrying the body of Hotspur in 1 Henry IV after the battle of Shrewsbury in act 
5, scene 4, claiming that it was he who killed him. 
27 Given the significance that can be attached to this scene, we cannot but 
disagree with Nicholas Grene that the scene of the Countess "is remarkable in 
Shakespeare for its anomalousness"(2002, 192). 
Chapter Four
1 This example may be better categorized as a figurative counterfactual, since 
the antecedent (Edward III having prophet’s eyes) is impossible, which would 
turn the whole counterfactual into non-serious fantasy. Nevertheless, the special 
context of this play, which abounds in prophecies and predictions, may 
guarantee the possibility of such contemplation. Earlier in the same 
conversation with Richard, Gaunt declares: “Methinks I am a prophet new 
inspired / And thus, expiring, do foretell of him” (2.1.31-2). If Gaunt grants 
himself this privilege, it is quite possibly that he grants it, just as seriously, to his 
father. Moreover, prophethood seems to be ascribed in the play to old wise men, 
as is indicated by the Welsh Captain’s predictions about the fall of Richard: “The 
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pale-faced moon looks bloody on the earth, / And lean-looked prophets whisper 
fearful change;” (2.4.10-1) So, it is more than likely that Edward III, the great 
king that he was, could have possessed this gift. In the upward counterfactuals 
of Wolsey and Gaunt, we can identify a sense of regret over what has happened. 
2 Collections of counterfactual historical case studies have mushroomed in the 
last decade. For example see Cowley (2005) and Roberts (2004). There are 
some case studies that centre on one topic, such as Macintyre and Scalmer 
(2006) about Australian history and Beckett (2011) about British Prime 
ministers. There is a book-length study of one case such as Harvey (2012) 
about the war on Iraq. 
3Historically speaking, Falstolf is not responsible for the capture of Talbot and 
he is not as cowardly as Shakespeare depicts him (Saccio 1977, 112-3; Goy-
Blanquet 2003, 38).
4 In a detailed historical counterfactual scenario Josiah Ober (2005) traces the 
effects of the battle of Actium on the future of the Roman Empire and the world 
as a whole, and evaluates specifically the effect of Cleopatra on the defeat of 
Antony. According to his analysis, that effect should not be exaggerated, 
because many other factors contributed to bring about that result. 
5 Although the fall may sometimes be attributed to the flatterers (see Levin 
2009, 112), it was the king who let them behave the way they did. The 
recurrence of the pronoun ‘he’ referring to Richard in the gardener’s speech 
places this blame mainly on the King. 
6 Critics and directors did not fail to realize the affinity between the roles of the 
gardener and John of Gaunt, so much so that in a production of the play in San 
Diego, California, the role was doubled and the two characters were played by
the same actor. See Potter (2003,  302) and Hopkins (2003, 407)
7 For the financial corruption of Suffolk, see Cartelli (2003, 330-2) and Saccio 
(1977, 120-1). For the intimate relation between Margaret and Suffolk, see 
Williams (1974).
8 Alexander Leggatt, acknowledging that in the Henry VI plays prophecies 
always prove true, describes Lucy’s prophecy about the Talbots as invalid. After 
their death, Lucy says of Talbot and his son: “from their ashes shall be reared / 
A phoenix that shall make all France afeard” (4.7.92-3). According to Leggatt, 
“The Talbots’ deaths, like the deaths of heroes in later tragedies, truly constitute 
an ending” (2009, 130).
8 The miracle in 2 Henry VI act 2, scene 1, is significant, since almost every 
attendant, save for Gloucester, is deceived by it. Even the King exclaims to 
Simpcox: “Poor soul. God’s goodness hath been great to thee. / Let never day 
nor night unhallowed pass, / But still remember what the Lord hath done” 
(2.1.86-8). It shows how inaccurate the ascription of divine intervention in some 
events may be. Ironically, the Cardinal, Suffolk and Gloucester play with the 
word ‘miracle’ after this deception is laid bare (160-3).  
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10 Interestingly, in his A Dialogue Concerning Witches and Witchcraft, George 
Gifford asserts that even those visited by the devil might tell of future events 
with some validity. The reason is that Satan, having been around throughout 
human history, has learned how things normally turn out. So he can use that 
knowledge to predict future events and convey it to some men or women (1603, 
62).
11In some histories, however, we have moments when monarchs engage in a 
wishful or regrettable practice which includes undoing the actual past and 
imagining a different course of events. Henry VI, for example, wishes that his 
father had never bequeathed him a kingdom: “I'll leave my son my virtuous 
deeds behind, / And would my father had left me no more!"(3 Henry VI, 2.2.49-
50). Henry IV also expresses a wish that his son Hal had been exchanged for 
Hotspur: 
                    O, that it could be proved
That some night-tripping fairy had exchanged
In cradle-clothes our children where they lay,
And called mine Percy, his Plantagenet!
(1 Henry IV: 1.1.85-88)
Richard II voices his regret while in prison: “I wasted time and now doth time 
waste me” (5.5.49). He expresses it in terms close to the gardener’s 
counterfactual remark: “Which waste of idle hours hath quite thrown down” 
(3.4.67).
12On dreams and prophecies in the Henry VI plays, see Watson (1990, 47); 
Goy-Blanquet (2003, 84-5) and Grene (2002, 132-7, 149-50).
12 For more examples see Rackin (1990, 190) and Sutherland and Watts (2000, 
34, 77, 109. 160, 171). This might constitute what Saint-Gelais calls, regarding 
critical counterfictions, a “sophisticated literary joke” (2011, 250). 
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